Trump v. Slaughter

    Issues

    Does the separation of powers permit statutory removal protections for heads of multimember administrative agencies? If so, do federal courts have the authority to reinstate wrongfully discharged members of such agencies?

    Oral argument:
    December 08, 2025
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether “for-cause” removal protections over members of multimember administrative agencies, like the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), violate the separation of powers and, even if they do, whether federal courts have the power to reinstate wrongfully removed officers. President Donald J. Trump claims that the Constitution vests the entire executive power in the president and, therefore, the president must be able to control officers who exercise power on his behalf through the threat of removal. Rebecca Kelly Slaughter argues that removal protections benefit the separation of powers and enable administrative agencies to function as Congress and the founders intended. This case implicates the amount of power that a president may constitutionally exert on agencies and the stability of such agencies, including, potentially, the Federal Reserve, going forward.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    (1) Whether the statutory removal protections for members of the Federal Trade Commission violate the separation of powers and, if so, whether Humphrey’s Executor v. United States should be overruled. 

    (2) Whether a federal court may prevent a person’s removal from public office, either through relief at equity or at law.

    Facts

    Congress established the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) through the FTC Act of 1914. Congress’ central purpose in passing the act was to prevent unfair competition in commerce. To this end, Congress gave the FTC power to conduct hearings and investigations, and to issue cease-and-desist orders. It also gave the FTC power to make administrative rules and regulations (so-called “quasi-legislative” powers) and the power to issue decrees in certain suits (a so-called “quasi-judicial” power). The Clayton Act, passed simultaneously with the FTC Act, “empowered the FTC to enforce prohibitions on price discrimination and anticompetitive mergers.” The FTC Act specified that the FTC would be led by five commissioners, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, who would serve seven-year staggered terms. Under the Act, no more than three commissioners could be members of the same political party, and the President could only remove a commissioner for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”

    Respondents Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya were FTC commissioners; both were members of the Democratic Party. Bedoya’s term was to expire in September 2026, and Slaughter’s in September 2029. In March 2025, President Donald Trump, Petitioner, purported to “remove” Bedoya and Slaughter from their position as commissioners; he did not cite any “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.” Since then, Bedoya and Slaughter have been locked out of their computer accounts and offices and otherwise blocked from continuing to serve as commissioners. The FTC now consists of three commissioners, all Republicans.

    In March 2025, Bedoya and Slaughter sued Trump and several FTC officials in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.  Contending that their removals violate the FTC Act, Bedoya and Slaughter sought relief in the forms of a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and a writ of mandamus.  In sum and substance, they ask the court to bar Trump and the other defendants from interfering with Bedoya and Slaughter’s continued service as commissioners.

    In its opinion of July 17, 2025, the District Court dismissed Bedoya’s claims on standing and mootness grounds, since Bedoya resigned from the FTC after filing suit. But the District Court granted Slaughter’s motion for summary judgment. The court reviewed longstanding precedent, including a 1935 case involving almost identical facts, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, to hold Slaughter’s removal illegal. It also held that Slaughter is entitled to the declaratory and injunctive relief she sought. On July 24, the District Court refused to stay its order.  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia granted Trump’s request for an administrative stay of the District Court’s order on July 21, but on September 2 dissolved that stay and refused to grant a stay of the District Court’s order pending appeal of that order to the Court of Appeals. Trump then applied to the Supreme Court for a stay of the District Court’s order; on September 8, the Court granted an administrative stay. )

    On September 22, 2025, the Court granted Trump’s application for a stay, and treating the application as a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment, granted certiorari.  

    Analysis

    EXECUTIVE POWER OVER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

    Trump contends that the Vesting Clause and Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which state that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President,” who “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” vests the entire executive power in only the President and no one else. Trump argues that to exercise this power, the president must be able to remove executive officers, such as Slaughter, who exercise the power on his behalf, at will. Trump posits that removal authority is the only way to guarantee that executive officers continue to obey the president’s commands once appointed. Trump claims that this power logically must extend to multimember administrative agencies because they wield immense amounts of executive power that the president must be able to control.

    Trump further claims that at-will presidential removal powers are consistent with the historical understanding of executive powers. Trump contends that when Congress created the first executive departments in 1789 the prevailing view was that Congress had “no right to diminish or modify” the president’s removal powers over their officers. Trump argues that this contemporaneous history confirms that the Constitution vests the president with unfettered removal powers. Trump posits that the Supreme Court has routinely struck down statutes that encroach on the president’s removal powers throughout history.

    On the other hand, Slaughter argues that no constitutional provision explicitly grants the president unlimited removal powers over executive officers. Slaughter asserts that inferring such broad powers from either of the clauses Trump relies upon would be “more than the text [can] bear.” To the contrary, Slaughter argues that the Take Care Clause actually supports limits on removal powers because a congressionally enacted limit on removal would be one such law that the president must take care to execute. Slaughter posits that although presidents certainly have complete removal authority when their power “stems from the Constitution itself,” such as when acting as commander-in-chief, that power is not present when “Congress has concurrent authority” over the “government function” like with the FTC through the Commerce Clause.

    Slaughter suggests that founding-era history supports limits on the president’s removal authority. Slaughter claims that the “Independent Sinking Fund Commission,” a multimember agency created in 1790 to handle the public debt, as well as other commissions, contained several officers whom Congress did not authorize the President to remove. Slaughter argues that the Supreme Court has endorsed this practice by repeatedly approving of multimember bodies with members insulated by “for-cause” removal protections.

    IMPACT OF HUMPHREY’S EXECUTOR 

    Trump argues that Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, a 1935 Supreme Court decision which upheld the for-cause removal restriction on the FTC, a multimember agency that was said to perform “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” functions instead of exercising any executive power, does not compel a different conclusion and that even if it does, it should be overruled.

    First, Trump claims the Supreme Court has already conceded that the 1935 FTC actually was exercising executive power and has limited the applicability of Humphrey’s to its facts. Trump argues that the FTC, then and now, can bring enforcement actions against citizens, promulgate binding rules, and initiate adjudications as well as investigations—all executive powers. Trump asserts that therefore, even assuming Humphrey’s is still good law, the president retains the power to remove heads of the FTC, like Slaughter, because they exercise executive power.

    Second, Trump contends that the Supreme Court should overrule Humphrey’s to the extent that the decision still carries precedential affect. Trump claims that all of the factors that the Supreme Court looks to in deciding whether overruling a prior case is appropriate support this path. First, Trump asserts that Humphrey’s contravened text, history, and precedent, which created a poorly reasoned opinion that the Court has continually repudiated. Second, Trump posits that Humphrey’s allowed the creation of a “fourth branch” that is not subject to any political accountability which creates dire real-world consequences. Third, Trump notes that Humphrey’s has been unworkable for federal courts to apply and led to contradictory holdings across the country. Fourth, Trump claims that overruling Humphrey’s would not disrupt any reliance interests because the agencies in question would continue to exist and function, just subject to at-will removal powers.

    Slaughter counters that Humphrey’s should control the outcome of this case and that it should not be overruled.

    Slaughter notes that Humphrey’s also dealt with the removal of a member of the FTC, the same agency Slaughter works for, and that it upheld removal protections for multimember bodies composed of bipartisan experts. Slaughter contends that this principal has been explicitly upheld by the Supreme Court twice since Humphrey’s was decided, as recently as 2010. Slaughter asserts that Humphrey’s did not turn on whether the agency exercised any executive power, rather the question is whether the agency exercised executive power granted to the president explicitly in the Constitution. Slaughter argues that therefore, the FTC does not exercise powers that the president must have direct control over.

    Slaughter also asserts that Humphrey’s should not be overruled. First, Slaughter argues that Humphrey’s is certainly not “egregiously” wrong, which is what the Supreme Court’s precedents regarding overruling a case require. Second, Slaughter posits that overturning Humphrey’s would short-circuit the democratic process and exacerbate issues with political accountability because Congress, not the courts, are best equipped to handle these decisions. Third, Slaughter claims that Humphrey’s is perfectly workable and has been understood and applied by presidents, courts, and agencies since it was decided. Fourth, Slaughter contends that overturning Humphrey’s would upend countless administrative agencies structures that people and businesses have organized their lives around.

    FEDERAL COURTS EQUITABLE POWERS

    Trump further claims that even if the removal protections in this case are constitutional, federal courts do not have the authority to reinstate a previously removed officer. Trump argues that forcing the president to entrust executive power in an individual whom the president previously determined was unfit to handle it would contravene the vesting clause. This is why, Trump asserts, the traditional remedy for an allegedly erroneously removed officer was backpay, not reinstatement.  

    Trump additionally contends that federal courts cannot reinstate officers because it falls outside of their statutorily conferred powers. Trump claims that a court cannot issue an injunction or declaratory judgment to reinstate an executive officer because the Supreme Court has already held that the Judiciary Act of 1789, the only source of federal courts equitable powers, did not permit it.  Trump argues that courts can likewise not issue writs of mandamus to reinstate an executive officer because these writs cannot contravene the separation of powers principles undergirding this case. In all, Trump notes that none of the existing remedies courts are authorized to give encompass reinstating executive officers and Congress has chosen not to authorized additional remedies.

    Slaughter counters that federal courts do have the power to reinstate executive officers. Slaughter asserts that founding-era courts of law and equity gave relief to wrongly removed executive officers. Slaughter cites several cases and essays from around the founding that discuss how anyone wrongly discharged from public office could be “restored by Mandamus.” Slaughter contends that because this power existed at the founding, the Judiciary Act of 1789 likewise conferred this power on federal courts through their equitable discretion in issuing declaratory judgments or injunctions.

    Slaughter argues that Trump’s vesting clause arguments beg the question and tries to double count his constitutional arguments. Slaughter further argues that the Constitution compels an opposite conclusion because “[i]f courts cannot check lawless executive removals, then intolerable consequences follow.” Slaughter additionally emphasizes that no Congressional statute displaced this historic equitable power.

    Discussion

    IMPLICATIONS RELATED TO PRESIDENTAL POWERS

    Supporting Trump, the New Civil Liberties Alliance (“NCLA”) argues that granting the president the power to remove FTC commissioners and other members of bodies heading independent agencies promotes democratic accountability, by ensuring that it is specifically the president who exercises executive power.  According to the NCLA, granting the president unfettered removal power promotes accountability by ensuring that voters know it is the president who is responsible for decisions made by the FTC and other agencies, thereby allowing voters to hold a specific decision-maker (i.e., the president) electorally accountable.  Americans for Prosperity Foundation (“AFP”) makes the related point that democratic accountability in this context fosters liberty, because voters can hold an elected official responsible for decisions of the FTC or other agencies that may restrict liberty. NCLA also argues without the removal power Trump seeks, the president cannot fully carry out his constitutionally prescribed duties, especially given that the FTC engages not only in domestic law-enforcement, but also “investigative activities with foreign law-enforcement agencies.”    

    Supporting Slaughter, Thirteen Retired Federal Judges contend that allowing the president unfettered removal power concentrates a dangerous amount of power in a single person and could lead to tyrannical decision-making. Former Members of Multimember Boards and Commissions emphasize that leaving in place current limits on the removal power would still allow the president to have significant control over the FTC and similar agencies—namely, the president still can still implement his agenda through the power to appoint commissioners and name the commission chairperson. These amici also worry that granting unfettered removal power to the president would allow a president to unilaterally prevent an independent agency—established and funded by Congress—from  functioning at all by removing so many commissioners that those remaining make up less than the number required for a quorum.  

    IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISION-MAKING AT THE FTC AND AT OTHER INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

    Supporting Trump, Pacific Legal Foundation argues that the independent agencies’ decision-making reflects not the neutral expertise that the agencies’ insulation from presidential removal was supposed to bring about, but partisan and arbitrary actions; in other words, that the limits on presidential removal have failed to serve their intended purpose.  AFP notes that giving the president unfettered removal power would not affect any agency’s continued existence and functioning: the FTC and other agencies could continue to do their work, and prior agency actions would not be automatically invalidated. AFP also emphasizes that granting the president the power to remove FTC and other agency commissioners at will would not imply that the president can also remove Federal Reserve governors at will, so a decision favoring Trump would not imperil the independence of the Federal Reserve.  

    Supporting Slaughter, Open Markets Institute contend that the FTC’s independence has allowed it to conduct several landmark studies and promulgate important rules that protect consumers.  Bipartisan Former Chairs of the FTC attribute the high quality of FTC decision-making to its independence, arguing that the FTC’s “bipartisan structure ensures that important agency decisions are the subject of careful deliberation across party lines and serves as a check against drastic swings in agency policy driven by political winds.” Former Members of Multimember Boards and Commissions note decision-making of agencies headed by bipartisan boards tends to be relatively stable, which benefits the entities that the agencies are regulating, by making regulations predictable. Finally, Thirteen Retired Federal Judges worry that granting the president the unfettered power to remove FTC commissioners would also imply greater presidential removal power over administrative law judges who have similar statutory protections as the FTC commissioners (including those on the United States Tax Court, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces)—thereby threatening those judges’ independence.       

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    Garrett Taylor and Daniel Lempert

    Edited by:      Domnick Q. Raimondo

    Additional Resources