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ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

Federal Communications Commission v. Prometheus Radio Project

Issues

Did the Third Circuit correctly vacate three Federal Communication Commission orders because the Commission did not adequately justify how those orders would impact minority media ownership?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit erred when it vacated several Federal Communications’ Commission orders that, among other things, relaxed agency cross-ownership restrictions. Prometheus Radio Project, which challenges the FCC’s orders, claims that the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it did not consider how repealing cross-ownership restrictions would affect minority and female ownership of broadcast services. The FCC counters that courts owe the agency substantial deference when it considers multiple policy factors in its rulemaking capacity. The Supreme Court’s decision could affect the scope of judicial review of administrative actions, the integrity of local news coverage, and the diversity of broadcast media.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit erred in vacating as arbitrary and capricious the Federal Communications Commission orders under review, which, among other things, relaxed the agency’s cross-ownership restrictions to accommodate changed market conditions.

The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”) regularly issues orders to regulate broadcasting media. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC at 573.

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Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

Issues

Should the court overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, or at least determine that courts should not defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute when part of the statute is silent regarding powers granted somewhere else in the statute?

This case, along with its companion case Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, brings before the Supreme Court the question whether the court should overrule, or at least strictly limit, its decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Under Chevron, courts defer to reasonable executive agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language. Petitioner Loper Bright Enterprises argues that the Chevron decision contravenes the separation of powers by giving too much power to the executive branch. Respondent Raimondo counters that Chevron is a cornerstone of administrative law and is protected by the principles of stare decisis. The Court's decision on this matter will influence how effective the administrative agencies can regulate corporations and individual behavior and the balance of power between the federal judiciary and the administrative state.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court should overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

Petitioner Loper Bright Enterprises (“Loper”) is a commercial fishing company that sells, among other things, Atlantic herring. Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Raimondo, 45 F. 4th 359, 364 (D.C. Cir.

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McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation

Issues

Is the district court in this case required to accept the Federal Communications Commission’s interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act without reviewing the validity of the interpretation?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a district court is required to defer to the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) without reviewing the validity of the interpretation. Petitioner, McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. (“McLaughlin”), argues that the Hobbs Act does not prevent district courts from interpreting the TCPA in private litigation. Respondents, McKesson Corporation and McKesson Technologies, Inc. (collectively “McKesson”), counter that FCC orders are binding and can only be reviewed by a court of appeals. McLaughlin asserts that FCC orders do not bind courts because they are interpretive rules. The outcome of this case will have major implications for the authority of federal administrative agencies. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Hobbs Act required the district court in this case to accept the Federal Communications Commission’s legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, makes it unlawful for any person to send unsolicited advertisements to a recipient’s telephone facsimile, or fax machine. 

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National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Issues

Should the Supreme Court grant immediate stay of OSHA's emergency order requiring the employees of all businesses with one hundred or more employees to either be vaccinated or submit to weekly testing?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a stay should be issued against the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (“OSHA”) vaccine-or-testing regime for businesses with 100 or more employees. Petitioner the National Federation of Independent Business argues that the Court should stay the emergency temporary standard because it is likely that the emergency temporary standard at issue exceeds OSHA's authority, and the businesses will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. In response, Respondent OSHA argues that Congress explicitly authorizes it to address COVID-19 exposure at the workplace; and therefore, an emergency temporary standard is lawful when OSHA determines, based on substantial evidence, that it is necessary to address the immediate risk of COVID-19. The Court’s decision on this case could have significant impacts on the economy, constitutionally protected liberties, and public health.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court should issue a stay of OSHA's vaccine-or-testing regime for all businesses with 100 or more employees.

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Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools

Issues

May an individual sue in district court for monetary damages after accepting a settlement offer through administrative proceedings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether settlement with a school satisfies the exhaustion requirement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) so that a student might bring a claim for monetary damages in a district court. Miguel Luna Perez asserts that IDEA’s exhaustion is satisfied by a settlement with a school, not only by a decision on the merits. Perez further argues that requiring individuals to exhaust their claims in lieu of settlement would be futile. Further, Perez asserts that allowing non-IDEA claims to proceed without IDEA exhaustion would not cause individuals to bypass the administrative IDEA process. Sturgis Public Schools and Sturgis Board of Education (“Sturgis”) counter that settlement is insufficient for exhaustion requirements especially when the individual seeks monetary damages. Sturgis further contends that allowing non-IDEA claims to proceed without IDEA exhaustion might result in parents seeking monetary damages in the courts to the detriment of their child’s free appropriate public education. The outcome of this case has important implications on the substantive rights of children with disabilities in terms of the dispute resolution proceedings between the schools and parents. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether, and in what circumstances, courts should excuse further exhaustion of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s administrative proceedings under Section 1415(l) when such proceedings would be futile; and (2) whether Section 1415(l) requires exhaustion of a non-IDEA claim seeking money damages that are not available under the IDEA. 

When Miguel Luna Perez (“Perez”) was nine, he emigrated from Mexico and began school in the Sturgis Public School District. Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools at 2. Since Perez was deaf, the school assigned him an aide to assist him with learning sign language. Id. However, the aide did not know sign language. Id.

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Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce

Issues

Whether statutory silence constitutes an ambiguity under Chevron deference, and whether the court should overturn the landmark administrative law case Chevron v. NRDC.

This case, along with its companion case Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, asks the Supreme Court to consider the government’s interpretation of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act and the reach and constitutionality of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Under Chevron, courts defer to reasonable executive agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language. Relentless, Inc. contends that the partial industry funding component of the government’s at-sea monitors program relies on a faulty interpretation of the governing statute, and that Chevron deference itself is an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers and an abdication of interpretive responsibility by the judiciary. The Department of Commerce counters that its interpretation of the statute is both correct and  entitled to deference. The outcome of this case could have seismic consequences for administrative law, statutory interpretation, and the balance of power between the federal judiciary and the administrative state.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court should overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (“MSA”) regulates commercial fishing in the United States. Relentless v. Department of Commerce at 2-3. It establishes eight regional councils to draft fishery management plans and prevent overfishing. Id. All plans are reviewed and published by the Department of Commerce.

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Sackett v. EPA

Issues

What is the proper test to determine which wetlands fall within the scope of regulation under the Clean Water Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the jurisdiction granted to the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) by the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) to regulate wetlands. One test for determining whether a wetland falls under the CWA is the continuous surface connection test, which allows a wetland to be regulated when it shares a continuous surface connection with a body of water. Another test is the significant nexus test, which allows an adjacent wetland to be regulated when it significantly affects waters covered under the CWA, regardless of a surface connection between them. The Sacketts assert that, under the principles of statutory interpretation and congressional intent, a version of the continuous surface connection test is proper and therefore their lot of land does not fall under the jurisdiction of the CWA. The EPA counters that due to judicial deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations of statutes, the significant nexus test is the proper test, and therefore the Sacketts’ land does fall under the jurisdiction of the CWA. The Court’s decision in this case implicates the costs which industries must bear for their infrastructure, the allocation of state and federal power, and the protection of water quality across the United States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit set forth the proper test for determining whether wetlands are "waters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).

In 1972, Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” Sackett v. United States EPA at 1079. The CWA prohibits any person from discharging pollutants into the “waters of the United States” without a permit.

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West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency

Issues

Under a provision of the Clean Air Act, did Congress prohibit the EPA from issuing rules and standards of performance that could potentially reshape the country's electricity grids and unilaterally decarbonize any sector of the economy?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the statutory limitations imposed on the Environmental Protection Agency by the Clean Air Act when it attempts to regulate emissions emanating from stationary sources. Petitioner West Virginia argues that the Court should not allow the EPA to issue significant rules that can reshape the country’s electricity grids and thus expand the agency’s power to an unprecedented level. Respondent the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) responds that the Court should not read into the text an artificial restriction because any qualification will be directed at the states, not the federal agency. The Court’s decision in this case has heavy implications for the scope of federal administrative power, climate change policy, and statutory interpretation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, in 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d), an ancillary provision of the Clean Air Act, Congress constitutionally authorized the Environmental Protection Agency to issue significant rules — including those capable of reshaping the nation’s electricity grids and unilaterally decarbonizing virtually any sector of the economy — without any limits on what the agency can require so long as it considers cost, nonair impacts and energy requirements.

In 1963 Congress passed the Clean Air Act, which aimed to “protect and enhance” the quality of our air. Am. Lung Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency at 930. In 1970, Congress amended the Clean Air Act and granted the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) additional powers to regulate any “new and existing” sources of air pollution originating from stationary sources. Id.

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