Salazar v. Paramount Global

    Issues

    Does the Video Privacy Protection Act protect consumers who subscribe to any service from a company that provides video‑related services, or only consumers who subscribe to the company’s video‑related services? 

    Oral argument:
    October 14, 2026
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide who qualifies as a consumer under the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”). Michael Salazar, a subscriber to Paramount Global’s (“Paramount”) sports newsletter, asserts that Paramount disclosed his video‑viewing history to Facebook without his consent. Salazar argues that the VPPA’s reference to “goods or services” covers subscribers to any product a video provider offers, even if their subscription is unrelated to videos. Paramount counters that the statute limits consumer status to people who rent, purchase, or subscribe to audiovisual goods or services. The Court’s decision will clarify which website users may invoke the VPPA when providers disclose their video‑viewing information through online tracking tools. The outcome also has implications for the privacy of online viewing histories, businesses’ use of advertising technology, and their exposure to class‑action liability.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the phrase “goods or services from a video tape service provider,” as used in the Video Privacy Protection Act’s definition of “consumer,” refers to all of a video tape service provider’s goods or services or only to its audiovisual goods or services.

    Facts

    The Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”) is a federal privacy law that prohibits video tape service providers from knowingly sharing personally identifiable information about an individual’s video‑viewing history without that individual’s consent. Congress enacted the VPPA in 1988 to protect the privacy of video customers after a Supreme Court nominee’s video‑rental records were publicly disclosed. The statute defines a “consumer” as “any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider.”  It defines a “video tape service provider” as an entity engaged in the business of rental, sale, or delivery of “prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials.” 

    In September 2022, Michael Salazar filed a class action against Paramount Global (“Paramount”) in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, claiming that Paramount violated the VPPA.  Salazar subscribed to an online newsletter from 247Sports.com, a Paramount website. According to Salazar, while logged into Facebook, he watched videos on 247Sports.com.Salazar claims that Paramount installed Facebook’s web‑tracking tool on 247Sports.com, which enabled Paramount to transmit information about Salazar’s video‑viewing activity to Facebook. The information transmitted to Facebook included the video content name, the video’s URL, and Salazar’s Facebook ID.

    Paramount moved to dismiss Salazar’s complaint for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim. The district court concluded that Salazar had established standing because the disclosure of personally identifiable information to a third party is a concrete harm, and that this harm was traceable to Paramount. The district court nevertheless dismissed the suit. The court reasoned that, to qualify as a consumer, Salazar had to be a subscriber of “goods or services” specifically related to audiovisual content. Salazar appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

    On April 3, 2025, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that the VPPA’s definition of “consumer” only applies to a person who rents, purchases, or subscribes to audiovisual goods or services from a video tape service provider. In concluding that Salazar had not plausibly alleged that he was a “consumer” protected by the VPPA, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged a circuit split over the meaning of “consumer” under the VPPA.

    The Sixth Circuit held that Salazar’s free 247Sports.com newsletter subscription did not make him a consumer under the VPPA. The court reasoned that the phrase “goods or services” must be interpreted in light of the statute’s reference to “video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials.” The Sixth Circuit therefore held that a person does not become a VPPA consumer merely by subscribing to any service offered by an entity that provides audiovisual materials.

    Salazar petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. On January 26, 2026, the Supreme Court granted Salazar’s petition.

    Analysis

    THE TEXT AND CONTEXT OF THE VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT

    Salazar argues that subscribing to Paramount’s newsletter makes him a “consumer” under the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”) because the newsletter is “a good[] or service[] from a video tape service provider.”Salazar claims that the plain text of the statute does not impose an additional limitation requiring the good or service to be audiovisual.Salazar contends that the VPPA defines “consumer” broadly to include renters, purchasers, and subscribers of “goods or services” without limiting the category of goods or services. Accordingly, Salazar asserts that the unmodified terms “goods” and “services” should be given their ordinary meaning at the time of enactment, and in everyday use, these terms refer to all the materials a provider offers. Salazar also points to the word “any” before “renter, purchaser, or subscriber” as evidence that Congress intended an expansive definition encompassing all renters, purchasers, and subscribers of a provider’s goods and services, rather than a narrow subset. Salazar asserts that the phrase “from a video tape service provider” identifies the entity supplying the goods or services and does not require each product that company supplies to be audiovisual.

    Salazar further argues that Congress knew how to impose protections limited to audiovisual services but chose not to do so in the definition of “consumer.” Salazar notes that the VPPA’s definition of “personally identifiable information” refers to information identifying a person as having requested or obtained “video materials or services from a video tape service provider,” while the definition of “consumer” refers more broadly to “goods or services from a video tape service provider.”Salazar asserts that this difference illustrates that Congress knew how to impose that limitation but deliberately omitted a “video” modifier from “goods or services.” Salazar contends that the definition of “consumer” establishes whose information the VPPA protects from disclosure, while the definition of “personally identifiable information” establishes what information the statute protects. Thus, Salazar argues that renting, purchasing, or obtaining a non‑video product or service from a video tape service provider can establish consumer status, even if record of that non‑video transaction is not protected video‑viewing information. 

    Paramount counters that Salazar’s newsletter subscription does not establish consumer status under the VPPA because the statute applies only to consumers who rent, purchase, or subscribe to audiovisual material.Paramount contends the VPPA’s definition of “consumer” has two requirements in the plain text of the statute. Paramount asserts that first, the goods or services must come from a video tape service provider, and second, the relationship to the provider must take the form of a rental, purchase, or subscription of audiovisual materials. Paramount interprets the phrase “from a videotape service provider” as limiting the relevant goods or services to those the provider supplies in its capacity as a video provider. Paramount explains that even though “goods or services,” considered alone, could describe non‑video products, the VPPA’s surrounding language limits the phrase to goods or services relating to audiovisual materials.Paramount maintains that the definition of “consumer” must therefore be read together and in the context of a statute about video records. Paramount illustrates its interpretation by comparing a video tape service provider to a medical provider; it argues that a privacy law protecting information held by a medical provider would not necessarily extend to a customer who buys coffee at the medical provider’s cafeteria. Paramount asserts that Salazar’s interpretation creates a disconnect between the consumer relationship and the video content at issue. Specifically, Paramount argues that a person could qualify as a “consumer” by subscribing to a non‑video service, while separately receiving statutory protection for watching free online videos despite never renting, purchasing, or subscribing to a video service.

    Paramount also emphasizes the verbs Congress chose to define the consumer relationship. Specifically, Paramount asserts that “renter, purchaser, or subscriber” describes the ways consumers obtained video products when Congress enacted the VPPA in 1988. Paramount reads the definitions of “consumer” and “video tape service provider” as corresponding sides of video transactions: consumers rent, purchase, or subscribe to audiovisual materials that providers rent, sell, or deliver. Accordingly, Paramount contends that a person who “subscribed” to a service from such a provider would have enrolled to receive video content, rather than something unrelated. Paramount maintains that the word “any” includes all renters, purchasers, and subscribers of qualifying goods or services but does not expand which goods or services qualify. Paramount therefore argues that tying consumer status to audiovisual goods or services better fits the VPPA’s consent framework and its focus on records generated by video transactions.

    THE VPPA’S PURPOSE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

    Salazar highlights that Congress enacted the VPPA to protect consumers’ identifiable video‑viewing records from disclosure. Salazar contends that the statute’s text should control over any alternative inference drawn from its title or historical context. Salazar argues that Congress’s definition of “consumer” does not restrict consumer status to those who receive only a particular kind of goods or services. Salazar asserts that an “atextual” limitation on consumer status would add a restriction that Congress did not include in the text. Salazar also turns to the VPPA’s legislative history to argue that Congress intended for the VPPA to protect a consumer who purchases both video and non‑video products. Specifically, Salazar points to the Senate Report’s example of a department store that sells both videotapes and other products to show that, while an individual may become a “consumer” by purchasing either video or non‑video products, the VPPA protects only records of video‑related “personally identifiable information.”  

    Paramount responds that the VPPA’s title, headings, and legislative history support a narrower interpretation limited to video transactions and viewing records. Paramount asserts that the statute’s headings and full title point to coverage of video‑related transactions and not unrelated non‑video purchases. Paramount highlights theVPPA’s heading above the definition of “consumer”—“Wrongful disclosure of video tape rental or sale records”—and the statute’s full title, which refers to privacy “with respect to the rental, purchase, or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials.” Paramount also interprets the Senate Report’s department‑store example as confirming that a business’s obligations extend only to customers’ video transactions, rather than to purchases of unrelated products. Finally, Paramount argues that the availability of at least $2,500 in statutory damages and possible punitive damages under the VPPA weighs against imposing liability based on unrelated transactions occurring years apart.

    Discussion

    THE VPPA’S REACH: PRIVACY LOOPHOLES VERSUS LITIGATION EXPOSURE

    Professor Victoria L. Schwartz, in support of Salazar, argues that corporations do not adequately protect privacy without government intervention due to the market. Professor Schwartz contends that limiting the VPPA to audiovisual subscriptions could create a loophole by allowing companies to structure subscriptions around broader services, such as memberships or newsletters. Professor Schwartz posits that companies could then sell subscribers’ video‑viewing data without violating the VPPA, even though that data is the type of sensitive information the law was intended to protect. Professor Schwartz notes that although not all newsletter subscriptions generate concerns about evading the VPPA, many businesses—like broadcast news channels and streaming services—combine written words with video and audio. Professor Schwartz therefore asserts that a narrow interpretation could allow businesses to act in bad faith to profit off their consumers.

    The National Retail Federation (“NRF”), in support of Paramount, counters that a broad interpretation would burden providers even further because providers must comply with “privacy and data minimization laws.” The NRF argues that a broad interpretation would significantly increase liability and exposure to litigation. The NRF contends that such an interpretation would transform the VPPA into a general‑purpose privacy statute, exposing providers to substantial statutory damages even when a consumer suffered no specific financial loss. The NRF asserts that even businesses with access to monetary resources and support would not be able to withstand exposure to litigation, so a broad interpretation could force digital providers to choose between promoting their business practices with video content and risking expensive litigation.

    BUSINESS OPERATIONS AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 

    The Electronic Privacy Information Center and eighteen technical experts and legal scholars (“EPIC et al.”), in support of Salazar, argue that a broad interpretation would protect consumers’ privacy, as providers increasingly collect personal information about users. EPIC et al. assert that identifiable video‑viewing information can reveal private details about a person’s interests, beliefs, health, relationships, and politics, so modern tracking can create significant privacy harm. EPIC et al. assert that a broad interpretation would not hinder providers’ ability to advertise. EPIC et al. posit that providers could continue to advertise through targeted advertising tailored to the content of the webpage or through third parties after obtaining the user’s informed consent. EPIC et al. characterizes consent as a manageable burden, which the providers in the industry can afford.

    America’s Newspapers, in support of Paramount, argues that a broad interpretation would impose significant operational and financial burdens on news organizations, as they would have to change how their websites operate.  America’s Newspapers asserts that news providers would need to restructure their business models to either increase the use of paywalls or decrease their use of videos, both of which would negatively affect revenue and decrease public access to the news. America’s Newspapers contends that if news providers increase the use of paywalls, it would decrease the availability of free news online. America’s Newspapers argues that a broad interpretation of the VPPA could force news organizations to choose between video‑based communication and analytic tools, and giving up third‑party analytics tools means losing important information about a news provider’s reader base.

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    Alexa Krochmal and Skyler Johnson

    Edited by:      Brenda Narvaez

    Additional Resources