Abouammo v. United States

    Issues

    Can a criminal defendant be tried in a district where no criminal acts occurred but where the defendant intended the crime to have an effect?

    Oral argument:
    March 30, 2026
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

    This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Constitution permits prosecution in districts where only effects of criminal conduct occurred or whether criminal prosecutions must occur in locations where the defendant’s actual conduct took place. In this case, the government prosecuted Abouammo, who allegedly falsified documents in order to obstruct a federal investigation, in the Northern District of California even though the conduct he was charged for occurred in the Western District of Washington. Abouammo argues that venue is only proper where an “essential conduct element” occurred, not where the effects of that conduct occurred. The United States argues that venue is proper where the intended effects of a defendant’s conduct took place, especially in inchoate offenses where an express intent element is essential to the crime. The outcome of this case could impact traditional venue protections, forum selection, and prosecutorial discretion.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether venue is proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute’s intent element “contemplates” effects that could occur there.

    Facts

    Ahmad Abouammo began his role as a Media Partnerships Manager for the Middle East and North Africa (“MENA”) region at Twitter in 2013.Abouammo acted as an intermediary between Twitter and influential people in the MENA region, and in particular, from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (“KSA”) which made up half of Twitter’s users in the region at the time. Through this role, Abouammo became close to an associate of the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (“MbS”) named Bader Binasaker. Binasaker requested favors from Abouammo such as verifying MbS’s twitter account and removing accounts that impersonated MbS. Abouammo allegedly sent Binasaker confidential information about Twitter users critical of the KSA and the Saudi royal family in exchange for expensive watches and large sums of money.

    In 2015, Abouammo quit his job at Twitter and started a new freelance social media consultancy in Seattle, Washington. He continued to work with his Saudi contacts, including Binasaker, connecting them with his old colleagues at Twitter. Binasaker also continued to send Abouammo wire transfers of large sums of money, including multiple payments of $100,000 to Abouammo and his father.

    In 2018, FBI agents from San Francisco, California traveled to Abouammo’s residence in Seattle, Washington to speak with him as part of an investigation out of the San Francisco office. Abouammo revealed that he knew Binasaker was connected to the Saudi government but did not admit to passing any private information on to anyone connected with the KSA. Abouammo instead told the FBI agents that he had received payment from Binasaker for social media consulting. To substantiate his claim, Abouammo went upstairs for approximately thirty minutes and emailed agents an invoice for $100,000 worth of social media consulting. Metadata from his laptop revealed that Abouammo falsified this invoice during the thirty minutes he was upstairs.

    In November 2019, a grand jury in the Northern District of California indicted Abouammo for acting as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the Attorney General and falsifying records in a federal investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519. After delays due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Abouammo moved to dismiss the document falsification charge on grounds of improper venue. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the motion. After a two-week jury trial, Abouammo was convicted of, among other counts, the falsification of records in a federal investigation under section 1519. The district court denied Abouammo’s motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for a new trial. The court then sentenced Abouammo to forty-two months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a fine of $242,000.

    Abouammo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging his conviction for falsification of documents on the grounds of improper venue, among other challenges. On December 4, 2024, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction under section 1519, finding that venue was proper under section 1519 because the contemplated effect of the falsification of documents was to impede an investigation happening in California, despite the act of falsification occurring in Washington.

    On July 16, 2025, Abouammo petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 5, 2025, to answer the question of whether venue is proper where no offense conduct took place.

    Analysis

    STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1519’S VENUE REQUIREMENT

    Abouammo contends that the Northern District of California was not the proper venue to bring a charge of falsification of documents because the falsification occurred in Seattle, not San Francisco. Abouammo maintains that because the alleged act of falsification is the only “essential conduct element” of a section 1519 violation, it is the only element that can determine proper venue. Abouammo posits that a violation of section 1519 requires three elements, in which the accused must “(1) knowingly (2) falsify a document (3) with the intent to influence an actual or contemplated federal investigation.” Abouammo contends that only the element “falsifying a document” actually involved any conduct. Abouammo argues that the other elements, which implicate mens rea, are not conduct and therefore are not elements of a crime that can support proper venue. Abouammo argues that because venue is distinctly related to the fact that conduct essential to the crime occurred in a specific location, an element about a defendant’s intent, as opposed the defendant’s acts, would not count as an “essential conduct element.” Abouammo also argues that a mental state, regardless of whether it is an “essential conduct element,” cannot have been committed somewhere except for where the defendant was physically present.

    Regarding whether venue is proper in a location connected to any obstructive effects from the crime, Abouammo argues that obstructive effects are not elements of a section 1519 violation, so obstructive effects cannot change whether venue is proper. Abouammo argues that the purpose of section 1519 is to prohibit document tampering, not obstructing investigations, as evidenced by the statute’s relaxed nexus requirement between the alleged conduct and an investigation. Abouammo maintains that this supports his argument that the act of falsification is the “essential conduct element” here, not the obstructive effects. Furthermore, Abouammo notes that the Court has never allowed venue based on the effects of an offense that were not related to a defendant’s conduct or required for conviction. Additionally, Abouammo argues that falsification of documents under section 1519 is not a crime that continues until the falsified documents are received by agents. Instead, Abouammo argues, it is a discrete act that ends once the false documents are created. Abouammo rejects the idea that the nature of the crime in section 1519 is to criminalize the making of a communication, instead arguing that it only criminalizes the pure act of falsifying a document. Abouammo argues that while document-falsification offense is not necessarily always discrete, it is normally, particularly in this case.

    In response, the United States argues that proper venue is not limited to where a defendant acted unlawfully. Instead, the United States maintains that proper venue may consider where a defendant’s actions “are directed and experienced.” The United States argues that when Congress has not specified the venue for an offense, courts should determine where the crime occurred based on both the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the acts constituting the crime. The United States additionally argues that the Constitution does not forbid holding a defendant accountable in one district for an act occurring in another district where the crime “takes shape” in the first district. The United States notes that in conspiracy crimes, proper venue can be in any district where the defendant’s action in one district “launch[ed], or anticipate[d]” events in other districts. The United States argues that this is true even if the events in other districts were not a required element of the crime. The United States highlights that Supreme Court precedent allows prosecutions for crimes in a district other than where the defendant acted where the defendant “intended his conduct to have effect and his actions ultimately took effect.” The United States further explains that the Supreme Court has ruled multiple times that a defendant could be tried in a location in which the effects of their crime took place, particularly noting instances where a crime was committed through communication and tried in the location where the communication was received.

    Furthermore, the United States argues that a section 1519 violation is an inchoate obstruction of justice offense, meaning that a section 1519 violation involves the intent to obstruct justice. Therefore, the United States posits, the express intent element of section 1519 is essential to the crime. The United States maintains that the intent element is what makes a section 1519 violation unlawful. For example, the United States argues that falsifying a document for a lawful purpose, such as for parody or a prank, would not be a crime under section 1519. However, the United States points out, falsifying a document becomes unlawful when it is done with the intent to obstruct a federal investigation. The United States argues that when the intent of a person who is falsifying a document is aimed at obstructing justice, the direction and effect of that aim in another district makes that district a place in which the crime was committed. The United States posits that this interpretation of the statute allows for proper venue in a district beyond just where the defendant physically falsified the document.

    HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF PROPER VENUE

    Abouammo argues that a historical analysis of the Sixth Amendment and Article III’s Venue Clause indicates that basing proper venue on the location of an offense’s intended effects is unconstitutional. First, Abouammo argues that the common-law right to trial by jury, the underpinning of the Sixth Amendment, was established to ensure a trial in which the jury would be local to the district where the essential conduct occurred. Second, Abouammo argues that the Founding generation was particularly upset about the English Parliament attempting to try offenses in places other than where their essential facts occurred because Parliament frequently called for colonists charged with treason to be held for trial in England based on the alleged effects of their conduct. Abouammo contends that the Constitution was written with these concerns in mind, evidenced by the debates at the Constitutional Convention. Abouammo asserts that these concerns underpinned the outcomes of early American cases that clearly treated offenses as committed only where an act necessary for guilt took place. Abouammo argues that these precedents established that venue is only proper in a location in which the essential acts of a crime took place.

    The United States responds that a proper reading of the Constitution finds that venue may be  proper in a district besides the district in which the accused was personally located at the time in which the crime was committed. The United States references a sixteenth-century report of Bulwer’s Case, written by Lord Edward Coke, that recognized the possibility that a nuisance in one county could be tried in another county where “the injury was done.” The United States also contends that while a historical analysis of colonial jurisprudence indicates that colonists were upset where Parliament decided England was the proper venue for crimes committed in the colonies, it does not show that crimes are only committed where the defendant acts. Additionally, the United States adds that even if it is historically accurate that the colonist’s views on venue did not favor finding venue proper where the effects of the crime took place, it would not change the subsequent precedent of the Supreme Court that is being litigated in the case in the present day.

    Discussion

    FAIRNESS TO DEFENDANTS AND PROSECUTORIAL FLEXIBILITY

    The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the National Association of Federal Defenders (“NACDL and NAFD”), in support of Abouammo, argue that allowing venue in districts where no actual conduct occurred imposes undue burdens on criminal defendants.NACDL and NAFD contend that requiring defendants to stand trial far away from their homes increases litigation costs because defendants, attorneys, and witnesses must travel to and remain in distant jurisdictions for extended periods of time. NACDL and NAFD further claim that such expenses disproportionately harm defendants with limited incomes because of the prolonged separation from their families and support systems during lengthy trials. The Cato Institute (“Cato”), in support of Abouammo, asserts that effects-based venue would allow prosecutors to bring charges in distant venues because they are more favorable to the prosecution. Cato states that this governmental discretion could pressure more defendants into plea agreements to avoid the costs and hardships of distant trials.

    The United States argues that broad venue rules are necessary to ensure effective enforcement of federal criminal law. The United States contends that modern crimes, particularly those involving digital documents and defendants located in metropolitan regions, often span multiple jurisdictions and cannot be confined to a single geographic location. According to the United States, limiting venue to the precise location of a defendant’s conduct would allow offenders to evade prosecution when it is difficult to determine the location of a digital operation. In addition, the United States argues that courts retain authority to transfer cases or dismiss those brought in improper venues. The United States contends that this provides adequate protection against prosecutorial abuse while still allowing prosecutors the flexibility required to handle complex and multi-jurisdictional crimes.

    JURY TRIAL LEGITIMACY AND INTEGRITY

    Cato argues that the Constitution’s venue provisions are designed to preserve the legitimacy of the jury trial by ensuring that defendants are judged by members of the community where the alleged offense occurred. Cato asserts that these protections prevent the government from forcing defendants to stand trial in hostile jurisdictions with unfamiliar juries. Cato contends that allowing venue based on the “contemplated effects” of conduct undermines this constitutional design by severing the connection between the alleged crime and the community that evaluates it. Similarly, the NACDL and NAFD argue that allowing prosecutors to select distant forums risks eroding already fragile safeguards against forum shopping.

    The United States counters that venue based on the effects of a crime is consistent with the purposes of federal criminal statutes designed to protect the integrity of government investigations. The United States argues that when a defendant’s conduct is intended to obstruct or influence a federal investigation, the harm occurs where that investigation is located. According to the United States, allowing for jury trials in those districts ensures that the courts most closely connected to the affected parties can adjudicate the case. The United States also points out that there may be crimes where the only obvious location of the crime is where the conduct is “intentionally directed and felt.” As a result, the United States argues that allowing venue based on effect in these cases may be the only feasible way to determine where a jury trial should take place.

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    Emma Babashak and Audrey Hager

    Edited by:      Andrew Hallowell

     

    Additional Resources