VENUE

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Constitution permits prosecution in districts where only effects of criminal conduct occurred or whether criminal prosecutions must occur in locations where the defendant’s actual conduct took place. In this case, the government prosecuted Abouammo, who allegedly falsified documents in order to obstruct a federal investigation, in the Northern District of California even though the conduct he was charged for occurred in the Western District of Washington. Abouammo argues that venue is only proper where an “essential conduct element” occurred, not where the effects of that conduct occurred. The United States argues that venue is proper where the intended effects of a defendant’s conduct took place, especially in inchoate offenses where an express intent element is essential to the crime. The outcome of this case could impact traditional venue protections, forum selection, and prosecutorial discretion.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

Petitioner, Atlantic, and Respondent, J-Crew, entered into a contract that included a forum-selection clause limiting venue to two courts in Virginia, including a federal court. Contrary to that provision, J-Crew filed suit in the Western District of Texas alleging breach of contract for nonpayment for contracted services. Atlantic asks the Supreme Court to reverse the lower courts and transfer the case to the venue specified by the contract. Atlantic argues that a valid forum-selection clause renders improper any venue not specified in the contract. In opposition, J-Crew contends that proper venue is defined by statute and that a forum-selection clause does not render improper a statutorily permissible forum. This case will resolve the circuit split regarding the enforceability of forum-selection clauses. Specifically, the Supreme Court will determine whether a § 1404(a) transfer is appropriate when a lawsuit is filed in violation of a valid forum-selection clause. This implicates the ability of private parties to contract around federal statutes, raising questions about the limits on the freedom of contract, the ability of plaintiffs to forum-shop, and the capacity for parties to secure a favorable choice-of-law by filing their case first.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Issues

This case concerns the proper venue for litigating the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standards. The EPA argues that its actions pursuant to these standards must go to the D.C. Appeals circuit. This is because the EPA contends that its actions were either nationally applicable, since they affect refineries in multiple circuits, or based on a determination of nationwide scope, since they stem from agency determinations about the Renewable Fuel Standard’s scope. Calumet Shreveport Refinery counters that the actions should not exclusively be litigated in the D.C. Circuit but rather in the applicable appeals circuits across the country, since the EPA’s determinations are not nationally applicable, but rather individualized adjudications on the petitions of hundreds of small, local refineries based on particular local circumstances. This case has important implications for the direction of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation, as well as shaping the direction of administrative law and the power allotted to executive agencies.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a manufacturer is allowed to file a petition for judicial review in a place besides the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, where it also does not reside or have its principal place of business, because the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer’s products that is located there. In this case, the Food and Drug Administration denied R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co.’s premarket tobacco product application, and R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. sought judicial review of this administrative order along with certain retail sellers. The Food and Drug Administration argues that filing a petition for review based on a retail seller’s residence or principal place of business is improper because retail sellers are not covered within the Tobacco Control Act’s zone of interests, the Tobacco Control Act would prohibit retailers from obtaining judicial review, and venue must be proper for all petitioners. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. counters that their petition is proper because retail sellers are covered within the Tobacco Control Act’s zone of interests, the Tobacco Control Act would allow retail sellers to obtain judicial review, and venue only needs to be proper for a single petitioner. This case has important implications for the regulation of e-cigarettes, retail sellers of tobacco products, and forum shopping.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case arises out of a custody dispute between an Italian father, Domenico Taglieri, and an American mother, Michelle Monasky, whose marriage had deteriorated, and where the mother had removed the child to the United States before a court could determine the parents’ custody rights. To determine whether the child must be returned to Italy, the Supreme Court must decide whether to uphold the Sixth Circuit’s order to return the child based on its affirmation of the district court’s determination that the child habitually resided in Italy. Monasky argues that the Hague Convention’s text supports an actual-agreement standard for habitual residence, and that the Hague Convention does not contemplate courts imposing habitual residence on a child when the child’s situation in the state would be precarious and the child lacks meaningful connections with the state. She further argues that the statute, appellate history, and the mixed legal and factual nature of habitual residence support de novo review. Taglieri responds that the lower courts properly applied a fact-sensitive analysis of the child’s situation in Italy and, furthermore, that if “actual agreement” were required, the Hague Convention would under-protect children in hotly disputed custody cases who most need protection. He also contends that clear-error review should apply because habitual residence issues are more factual than legal, and because such review is more expedient, consistent with the Hague Convention’s aims. The outcome of this case will have implications for international child abduction and custody cases involving claims of domestic violence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether states are permitted to challenge final actions of the EPA in regional circuit courts; or, if publishing a state-specific final action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states forces challenges to be filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Oklahoma contends that the final action as it pertains to it is local in nature and should, therefore, be presented in the regional circuit court. The EPA argues that the disapproval action applies nationally, making it reviewable only by the D.C. Circuit. The outcome of this case raises concerns about federalism and forum shopping as well as impacting the effectiveness of the EPA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide the appropriate remedy for prosecuting a criminal defendant in an improper venue—specifically, whether the defendant must be acquitted. Smith argues that a determination of improper venue must be treated as an acquittal that bars the re-prosecution of the same defendant for the same offense. The United States responds that venue determinations are not questions of factual innocence or guilt and are therefore properly remedied by retrial. This case has significant implications for upholding the constitutional right of criminal defendants to be tried in a proper venue and preventing prosecutorial misconduct.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

In 1957, the Supreme Court held in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp. that the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), was the “sole and exclusive” venue provision in patent infringement actions. After Congress amended the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, in 1988, the Federal Circuit in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. held that the statutory amendments supplanted Fourco and § 1391(c)’s definition of a defendant’s “residence” applied to § 1400(b). In 2011, Congress amended the general venue statute again.

TC Heartland and its many amici argue that the 2011 amendments supersede VE Holding and reinstate Fourco, thereby restricting a corporate defendant’s “residence” to its state of incorporation. In contrast, Kraft maintains that the 2011 amendments bolster VE Holding’s conclusion that a corporate defendant “resides” wherever it is subject to personal jurisdiction. The Court’s decision about which venue definition is proper in patent infringement actions could significantly limit where defendants are eligible to be sued, thereby reducing forum shopping in patent infringement actions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

In August 2006, Respondents Gina Fiore and Keith Gipson returned from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to their home in Las Vegas after passing through Atlanta, Georgia. Fiore and Gipson are professional gamblers and had traveled to San Juan to legally gamble. Upon arriving in Atlanta, Fiore and Gipson were detained by Petitioner, DEA agent Anthony Walden, who confiscated Fiore’s and Gipson’s winnings on suspicion that the money was tied to illegal drug activity. Fiore and Gipson sued Walden in Nevada for the return of the money. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction over Walden. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the requirements of personal jurisdiction and proper venue had been satisfied. Walden argues that Nevada lacks personal jurisdiction over him because he has no contacts with the state—besides his knowledge that Fiore and Gipson reside there—and because it would be unfair to subject a defendant to a forum based on a plaintiff’s residence that is different from the forum where the actions giving rise to the claim occurred. Fiore and Gipson respond that Walden intentionally directed his actions toward residents of Nevada, thereby harming Nevada residents, making Nevada a proper state to exercise personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court will decide whether a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose only contact with the forum state is his knowledge that the plaintiffs reside there. The outcome will address a basic question about how far courts can extend their jurisdiction, and thereby impact a threshold issue in any lawsuit: where plaintiffs can sue.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by