Johnson v. United States Congress
Issues
Does the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act strip federal district courts of jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to laws affecting veterans’ benefits?
This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (“VJRA”) bars federal district courts from hearing constitutional challenges to statutes that affect veterans’ benefits. Floyd Johnson seeks to challenge the constitutionality of a federal law that caps veterans benefits for incarcerated veterans. Johnson argues that the VJRA’s text does not expressly nor impliedly preclude district court review of constitutional questions. The Government responds that the VJRA expressly requires constitutional claims to proceed through the administrative review process and argues that the implied preclusion factors support this conclusion. The outcome of this case raises important questions about the adequacy of administrative review and the separation of powers.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Whether the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act stripped district courts of the jurisdiction, recognized by this court in Johnson v. Robison, to hear challenges to the constitutionality of acts of Congress affecting veterans’ benefits.
Facts
In 2013, Petitioner Floyd Johnson was convicted of several felonies in Florida state court and then sentenced to forty years in prison. While he was in prison, Johnson applied for disability benefits from the Veterans Benefits Administration (“VBA”). Johnson initially received a seventy percent disability benefits rate because of his service‑related post‑traumatic stress disorder. This rate was raised to eighty percent after an administrative appeal. However, the VBA then lowered Johnson’s rate to ten percent citing § 5313 of the Veterans’ Benefits Act. Section 5313 directs the VBA to cap disability benefits for veterans who are incarcerated longer than sixty days because of a felony conviction.
Johnson filed a pro se complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida alleging that § 5313 violates the Bill of Attainder Clause and Equal Protection Clause under the Fifth Amendment. In his complaint, Johnson requested an order requiring the VBA to both stop capping incarcerated veterans’ disability benefits under § 5313 and retroactively compensate those who were underpaid because of this cap.Afederal magistrate judge recommended dismissal of Johnson’s case, reasoning that Johnson’s claims were frivolous and lacked any arguable grounding in law. In making a recommendation based on the merits, the magistrate judge assumed that the district court had proper jurisdiction over Johnson’s constitutional challenges. Johnson objected to the magistrate’s recommendation, but the district court determined his objections were conclusory. The district court subsequently adopted the magistrate’s recommendation and dismissed Johnson’s complaint.
Johnson appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The court considered whether Johnson could sue Congress for the unconstitutionality of a veterans’ benefits statute, and if Johnson could amend his complaint to name another party as the defendant if Congress is not the proper party.
The Eleventh Circuit first held that the lower court’s assumption of jurisdiction was improper. The court noted that federal courts may not assume jurisdiction and rule on the merits of a case. The court determined that sovereign immunity deprived the district court of subject‑matter jurisdiction over Johnson’s complaint. Because both parties acknowledged that Congress had not waived its immunity, the district court should have dismissed Johnson’s case for lack of jurisdiction. The court then denied Johnson’s request for leave to amend his complaint because any amendment would be futile. The court concluded that, under the Veterans Judicial Review Act (“VJRA”), only the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“CVAC”) and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had the jurisdiction to hear Johnson’s constitutional claims. The court rejected Johnson’s argument that district courts retain jurisdiction over facial constitutional challenges. Therefore, the court claimed that even if Johnson removed Congress from the lawsuit, the lower court would still have no jurisdiction under the VJRA. The Eleventh Circuit accordingly vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case for dismissal without prejudice.
Johnson petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on December 17, 2025. The Supreme Court granted Johnson’s petition for a writ of certiorari on April 6, 2026.
Analysis
EXPRESS PRECLUSION
Johnson argues that the VJRA does not preclude review of questions about whether benefits statutes themselves are constitutional. Under38 U.S.C. § 511, Johnson observes, district courts cannot hear “questions of law and fact necessary to a decision by the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of benefits.” Johnson notes that § 511 includes the key word “under,” which refers exclusively to the application or interpretation of a veterans’ benefits statute. Johnson contends that the Government and Eleventh Circuit’s arguments require a broader preclusion rule that is not supported by the narrow language of § 511. Therefore, Johnson argues that § 511’s jurisdictional limits do not extend to questions of constitutional validity, citing Johnson v. Robison for support. Johnson observes that Robison determined that § 511’s predecessor statute did not bar district courts from hearing constitutional challenges to veterans’ benefits laws, relying on the phrase “under [a] law.” Johnson argues that when Congress retained the same language interpreted in Robison, Congress intended to preserve the Court’s interpretation. Johnson observes that the legislative history of the VJRA also supports the idea that Congress agreed with the holding in Robinson.
Furthermore, Johnson points out that the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“BVA”) is expressly barred by VA regulations from reviewing the constitutionality of an act of Congress. Johnson adds that, while the VJRA gives the Federal Circuit and the CVAC the ability to decide constitutional questions, it does not suggest that the BVA has the same authority. Accordingly, Johnson contends that questions of constitutionality cannot be among the questions “necessary” to the BVA’s decisions. Johnson points out that the same “necessary” and “under” language describes the kinds of questions the BVA is obligated to decide under § 511, but Congress clearly did not intend to mandate the BVA to decide constitutional questions. Johnson concludes that, because the language must have the same meaning, the jurisdictional bar cannot extend to constitutional challenges. Finally, Johnson argues that, even assuming the statute is ambiguous, the Court should apply the veteran’s canon, under which the Court construes ambiguous veterans’ benefits statutes in favor of the beneficiary.
The Government responds that § 511 precludes district court jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to veterans benefits decisions.The Government first argues that the phrase “under a law” in the VJRA modifies “decision of the Secretary” instead of “questions of law and fact.” Therefore, the Government reasons, the VJRA does not import Robinson’s holding that the predecessor statute did not apply to claims arising under the Constitution. Moreover, the Government notes that, at the time Robison was decided, there was no law that authorized review of decisions about veterans’ benefits. The Government contends that Robison’s holding was fundamentally tied to the total lack of judicial review, which posed a potential constitutional concern of its own. The Government points out that this concern does not apply to the VJRA, which channels judicial review of constitutional challenges to VA benefits decisions to the CVAC and the Federal Circuit. The Government asserts that VJRA’s legislative history indicates that Congress only agreed with Robinson in the context of the predecessor statute and intended for the VJRA’s channeling scheme to address Robinson’s concerns.
The Government also argues that the constitutionality of a benefits statute is “necessary” to the Secretary’s decision because the ultimate decision cannot rest on unconstitutional statutes. Contrary to Johnson, the Government contends that there is no problem with the BVA issuing decisions on the constitutionality of benefits statutes because there is no categorical bar on agencies addressing constitutional issues. Furthermore, the Government argues that the legislative history of the VJRA supports the idea that Congress intended for the BVA to consider constitutional challenges. The Government points out that the BVA has previously decided constitutional challenges on the merits, including challenges to the statute reducing benefits for incarcerated veterans. Accordingly, the Government concludes that the VA regulation that Johnson cites does not prevent the BVA from deciding constitutional issues. Finally, the Government questions the continued legitimacy the veteran’s canon. The Government notes that the VJRA already treats veterans fairly, and the Court need not apply a special rule to favor veterans.
IMPLIED PRECLUSION
Johnson argues that the VJRA does not impliedly remove district court jurisdiction over constitutional challenges. Johnson contends that an implied preclusion analysis under Thunder Basin Coal v. Reich is unnecessary because the Supreme Court has only ever applied the analysis in cases where the statute is silent on preclusion, but § 511 addresses jurisdiction expressly. Even applying Thunder Basin’s three‑factor test, Johnson argues that the VJRA would not prevent district court review. Johnson notes that the first factor is whether stripping district court jurisdiction would eliminate meaningful judicial review. Johnson claims the VJRA scheme fails because the BVA takes years to resolve appeals and does not address constitutional issues, forcing claimants to wait until they can first present their constitutional challenges. Next, Johnson states that the second factor is whether the claim is “wholly collateral” to the agency’s usual processes. Johnson argues that constitutional challenges are collateral because they have no relation to the BVA’s ordinary business, which consists of assessing a veterans’ disability and its connection to military service. Then Johnson turns to the third factor, which is whether the claim is within the agency’s expertise. Johnson contends that the BVA has no special expertise in constitutional law and thus has no unique perspective on pure constitutional issues. Johnson argues that even if the BVA had expertise in surrounding matters like statutory interpretation, deference is unjustified because the BVA is barred from deciding constitutional challenges completely.
The Government responds that the plain text of § 511 precludes district court review of constitutional challenges, so the Thunder Basin implied preclusion analysis is unnecessary. Despite this, the Government notes that the Court has occasionally consulted the Thunder Basin factors when applying an express preclusion provision. The Government argues, for the first factor, that meaningful review does not require district court involvement because review by the CAVC and the Federal Circuit is sufficient. The Government contends that Johnson’s cited data on the speed of BVA decisions does not represent the ordinary pace of review. Next, the Government argues for the second factor that constitutional claims are not “wholly collateral” to the VJRA because the constitutional issues are necessarily prior questions to the administration of benefits. The Government argues for the third factor that the BVA has expertise in the benefits statute, which would be relevant to resolving various threshold questions to constitutional claims. The Government responds to Johnson’s concerns about constitutional expertise by noting that the BVA’s often engages with constitutional issues while resolving benefits-related issues. The Government notes that even where the BVA lacks constitutional expertise, the VJRA allows BVA members to draw on formal opinions from the VA’s General Counsel and the Attorney General. The Government points out that because the BVA must frequently answer all questions that spring from to the statute in this case, the BVA is very experienced in interpreting constitutional questions.
Discussion
ADEQUACY OF VJRA REVIEW PROCESS
The Federal Circuit Bar Association (“FCBA”), in support of Johnson, assert that the VJRA’s multi‑layered review process is inadequate because it can take years to resolve an administrative appeal. The National Veterans Legal Services Program, in support of Johnson, add that veterans must wait years to initially raise a facial challenge because the entire administrative process must be resolved prior to accessing judicial review. Furthermore, Military‑Veterans Advocacy, Inc. (“MVA”), in support of Johnson, argues that the VJRA process is particularly unfit to handle constitutional challenges because of its non‑adversarial nature. MVA notes that veterans usually proceed without counsel, which can lead to constitutional issues being overlooked or improperly preserved.
The Government retorts that the appellate review process instituted by the VJRA is adequate. The Government asserts that this process provides veterans with at least one non‑executive branch court to competently address constitutional questions. Furthermore, the Government argues that the BVA regularly decides constitutional questions, meaning claimants do not have to wait until they reach a judicial forum to raise a constitutional challenge. The Government claims that current wait times for veterans are inflated due to short‑term abnormalities with the BVA’s docket. Finally, the Government contends that, if courts around the country ruled on the constitutionality of veterans benefits statutes, the benefits process would be undermined by inconsistent or duplicative decisions.
SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS
The Institute for Justice (“IJ”), in support of Johnson, writes that courts should not cede authority to hear issues to executive agencies like the VA, for doing so would disrupt the separation of powers. IJ notes that courts have a long history of combatting unlawful executive action and argues that Thunder Basin has allowed lower courts to abdicate their responsibility for independently checking executive overreach. The New Civil Liberties Alliance, in support of Johnson, argues that it is essential to our governmental structure that the judicial power remain entirely independent from the legislative and executive powers. The Pacific Legal Foundation (“PLF”), in support of Johnson, elaborates, contending that agencies are not neutral and have reasons to delay or quash constitutional challenges and perpetuate claimants’ injuries. PLF argues further that because subjecting a party to an unconstitutional agency proceeding itself causes injury, facial challenges must be resolved independently.
The Government responds that the separation of powers is better served by preventing district courts from hearing constitutional claims about veterans’ benefits. The Government argues that the ability of Congress to channel specific types of claims into specialized courts is critical to checking the power of the judiciary. Likewise, the Government claims that the Executive Branch has an “independent obligation[] to interpret and uphold the Constitution,” which also balances against judicial power. The Government argues that, if the BVA is barred from deciding constitutional questions, then it opens the possibility that the BVA would be prevented from refusing to apply clearly unconstitutional statutes. Furthermore, the Government contends that undermining the VJRA’s structure would be an unjustifiable substitution of judicial judgment on a policy issue.
Conclusion
Authors
Written by: Timothy Kovacs and Finn McGaan
Edited by: Andrew R. Davis
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Professor Michael C. Dorf for his insights into this case.
Additional Resources
● Linda Hersey, Incarcerated veteran’s challenge to keep disability benefits heads to Supreme Court, Stars & Stripes (June 17, 2026).
● Nick Mordowanec, Supreme Court to Rule Whether Veterans can Bypass VA to Secure Benefits, Military.com (June 19, 2026).
● Andrew Rice, U.S. Supreme Court agrees to hear veterans’ benefit challenge, The Center Square (April 6, 2026).
● Justin Wise, Justices to Consider Path for Veteran’s Challenge of VA Benefits, Bloomberg Law (April 6, 2026).