Trump v. Cook

    Issues

    Whether the president’s removal of a member of the Federal Reserve comported with the relevant procedural requirements and whether the removal was for sufficient cause.

    Oral argument:
    January 21, 2026
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

    This case considers whether the removal of Lisa Cook, a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, by President Donald J. Trump, comported with constitutional and statutory requirements. The Court must address a temporary restraining order leaving Cook in her position after President Trump sought the first-ever (attempted) presidential removal of a Federal Reserve Board of Governors member, citing an alleged incident of prior fraud by Cook. The parties disagree about what, if any, cause is required for a president to remove a Board member. Trump argues that he has broad discretion to remove a Board member, with only minimal procedural protections required, whereas Cook construes the presidential removal power narrowly, and argues for robust procedural protections against removal. This dispute could reshape the relationship between the president and the Federal Reserve, potentially limiting or ending the Federal Reserve’s longstanding independence in setting monetary policy.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the Supreme Court should stay a district court ruling preventing the president from firing a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.

    Facts

    Congress established the Federal Reserve (“the Fed”) by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.  The Fed is responsible for monetary policy and other financial regulation. A seven-member Board of Governors oversees the Fed. Governors are nominated by the President and, once confirmed by the Senate, serve a fourteen-year term “unless sooner removed for cause by the President.” The term “for cause” is not defined in the Federal Reserve Act or its amendments, including the Banking Act of 1935, the source of the statutory language at issue.  

    Lisa Cook, respondent, serves on the Board of Governors; her term of service expires in 2038. On August 25, 2025, President Donald Trump purported to “remove” Cook from her position on the Board of Governors “for cause.” As cause, President Trump cited allegations that, before Cook was nominated to the Board of Governors, she made false statements on a mortgage application. 

    Cook sought a temporary restraining order against President Trump in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.  She argued that—contrary to constitutional and statutory requirements— President Trump failed to give her notice of and opportunity to respond to his claim that there was cause to remove her. Cook also argued that, in any case, under the Federal Reserve Act, President Trump had no valid cause to remove her. 

    The district court treated Cook’s request for a temporary restraining order as motion for a preliminary injunction. On September 9, 2025, the district court enjoined President Trump from removing Cook, ruling that Cook met the four requirements for a preliminary injunction to issue. Specifically, according to the district court, Cook showed (1) that she has “a substantial likelihood of success on the merits” of her case at trial, (2) that she “would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted,” (3) “that an injunction would not substantially injure other interested parties,” and (4) “that the public interest would be furthered by the injunction.” The district court held that there were two independent bases giving Cook a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits.  First, President Trump had no valid cause to remove Cook.  Second, President Trump likely denied Cook her constitutional due process right to notice and a hearing before removal.                   

    President Trump then sought a stay of the district court’s preliminary injunction at the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.  On September 15, 2025, the Court of Appeals denied the stay request, leaving the District Court’s injunction in effect. The Court of Appeals held that the district court properly granted the preliminary injunction and largely agreed with the district court’s reasons for doing so. Specifically, the Court of Appeals agreed that President Trump “very likely” violated Cook’s due process rights to notice and hearing, but it declined to address whether President Trump had valid cause to remove Cook.    

    President Trump further sought a stay of the district court’s injunction at the United States Supreme Court.  On October 1, 2025, the Supreme Court deferred a ruling on the stay application pending oral arguments.  

    Analysis

    PROCEDURAL ISSUES: DUE PROCESS AND THE BANKING ACT

    President Trump claims that the Due Process Clause does not entitle Cook to a hearing prior to her removal because her position at the Fed is not “life, liberty, or property,” the only things that the Due Process Clause protects.  , This is confirmed, President Trump asserts, by numerous previous Supreme Court cases holding that public officials serving for a predetermined term or under the threat of for-cause removal do not have a sufficient interest in their office for the Due Process Clause to attach. President Trump contends that more recent cases holding differently for lower-ranking members of the civil service, like teachers and security guards, are irrelevant because executive officers like Cook are different. President Trump contends lower courts have adopted this reading interpreting both lines of cases. President Trump alternatively argues that even if Cook has a due process interest in her office, she received sufficient process here because she did not dispute any of the relevant facts, making a hearing unnecessary.

    President Trump argues that the Banking Act of 1935 (“Banking Act”) similarly does not require a hearing before removing Cook. President Trump preliminarily asserts that because the Banking Act itself only requires that Cook be removed for-cause and does not explicitly impose any additional procedural hurdles, requiring a hearing would be atextual. President Trump claims that courts should not superimpose additional requirements into statutes, especially when Congress has explicitly imposed hearing requirements in other analogous statutes. President Trump contends that the phrase “for-cause” does not carry an unspoken hearing requirement with it because hearings were traditionally only required when Congress explicitly listed out the permissible types of “cause,” not, as is the case here, when they give the president significant discretion to define cause.

    Cook counters that the Due Process Clause applies to her removal. Cook claims that the Due Process Clause was originally intended to entitle removed officials to “some form of [a] pretermination hearing to present their side of the story.” Cook argues that the Supreme Court cases President Trump relies upon are better understood as allowing Congress to modify an official’s statutorily prescribed role that Congress had the greater power to create in the first place. Cook further asserts that she was not given sufficient process because she had no opportunity to refute the claims against her, and there was no hearing to determine crucial factual disputes.

    Cook claims that the Banking Act likewise requires a hearing before a member of the Fed can be removed. Cook asserts that the Supreme Court has twice already held as much. Cook quotes Reagan v. United States, an 1895 Supreme Court case, which held that “where causes of removal are specified by Constitution or statute, as also where the term of office is for a fixed period, notice and hearing are essential.” Cook maintains that other statutes which explicitly require a hearing are examples of Congress being overly cautious that the background rule of a pretermination hearing is followed. Cook argues that the canon of constitutional avoidance—which directs courts to interpret statutes in ways that avoid potential constitutional issues when other reasonable interpretations are available—supports this interpretation because holding that the Banking Act does not require a hearing would raise serious constitutional issues.  

    DEFINING FOR-CAUSE

    President Trump also claims that a president’s finding of sufficient cause is unreviewable by courts. President Trump asserts that courts cannot second-guess a president’s findings of fact or whether some act constitutes sufficient cause. President Trump also contends that Cook has not carried her burden of an ultra vires claim, which requires a showing of exceeding statutory authority, because the Banking Act gave him significant discretion determining what constitutes sufficient cause.

    President Trump argues that even if the removal is reviewable, there was cause to fire Cook here. President Trump asserts that when Congress enacted the Banking Act, for-cause meant “relating to the conduct, ability, fitness, or competence of the officer.” President Trump contends that for-cause is a lower standard than the “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” standard that Congress has used to protect other executive officers and that Congress deliberately chose the lesser standard to apply to the Fed. Under this definition, President Trump claims that Cook’s “deceitful and potentially criminal conduct” directly relates to her qualifications to hold office. Trump additionally asserts that removal decisions are entitled to a presumption of regularity, which makes inquiries into potential pretextual motivations inappropriate.

    Cook maintains that for-cause removal decisions are reviewable by courts. Cook claims that founding-era history shows that officer removal decisions have traditionally been subject to judicial review. Cook asserts that the Supreme Court has invalidated for-cause removals repeatedly from the founding onward. Cook argues that if removal decisions were not justiciable, then the removal protections and Board independence would be meaningless as long as the president claimed cause

    Additionally, Cook asserts that her removal was without a legally sufficient cause. Cook claims that since “for-cause” and “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” were used synonymously by Congress when the Banking Act was passed, the same understanding should apply here. Cook maintains that Congress using both phrases in other statutes, but not the Banking Act, does not imply a different definition of cause, because the legislative history of the Banking Act shows that Congress thought they were utilizing the synonymous standards. . Cook alternatively argues that even if the for-cause standard were lower here, “allegations of private, pre-office misconduct” are insufficient. Cook claims this is so because cause needs to bear a relation to the relevant position and, thus, must relate to “acts occurring during the term of the officeholder.”

    FEDERAL COURTS EQUITABLE POWERS

    President Trump also argues that even if Cook’s removal was in error, a stay is nonetheless warranted because the district court did not have the power to reinstate Cook while the suit proceeded. President Trump argues that the greater power to remove Cook necessarily includes the lesser power to suspend her while the lawsuit is ongoing. President Trump asserts that the Supreme Court has historically disallowed lower federal courts from reinstating federal officers at all, especially at the preliminary stage of a lawsuit. Finally, President Trump claims that the Civil Service Reform Act “provides a comprehensive scheme of remedies for federal officers and employees but deliberately excludes Senate-confirmed officers from relief” which indicates that even if federal courts could reinstate Cook, Congress took that power away.

    Cook counters that preliminary relief is intended to preserve the status quo while the lawsuit proceeds, which is exactly what the district court did in this case. Cook argues that the district court did not “reinstate” her at all; rather, the court prevented her removal in the first place until a final judgment could be issued. Cook asserts that this ruling was consistent with “more than a century” of precedent protecting officers during a lawsuit to determine their right to office. Cook further asserts that focusing on the Civil Service Reform Act misses the point because all staffing decisions relating to the Fed are instead governed by the Federal Reserve Act.

    THE EQUITIES

    President Trump asserts that the issues in this case are important enough to eventually grant certiorari “given the significance of the removal power to the President’s ability to supervise the Executive Branch and the importance of the Federal Reserve Board as a federal agency.” President Trump contends that the government also faces a risk of irreparable harm by allowing an improper officer to continue exercising executive power. This harm, President Trump argues, outweighs any harm Cook may suffer because she can be made whole through back-pay were she to win the lawsuit.

    Cook argues that the Supreme Court is unlikely to eventually grant certiorari because the accelerated litigation has led to an under-developed factual record, making accurate judgement impossible. Cook claims that President Trump will not suffer irreparable harm in this case because the Fed is not directly under his control and, therefore, Cook is not exercising executive powers. On the other hand, Cook asserts that issuing a stay would cause irreparable harm by threatening the Fed’s independence, leading to unstable economic conditions and market disruptions.

    Discussion

    IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL RESERVE INDEPENDENCE AND POLICYMAKING

    In support of President Trump, the New Civil Liberties Alliance (“NCLA”) argues that the Fed’s independence from presidential control is not necessarily desirable. The NCLA suggests that, as a general matter, policy is better made by “democratically elected officeholders” rather than “wholly independent, unaccountable… ‘experts’” The NCLA asserts that, in this particular application, preventing President Trump from removing Cook would tend to harm the quality of monetary policy by limiting democratic accountability. Azoria Capital, Inc. and Azoria’s CEO James T. Fishback, in support of President Trump, argue that credibility and integrity of the Fed could also be harmed by disallowing a warranted, for cause removal by signaling to the financial bodies that the Fed seeks to regulate that they are held to a higher standard of honesty and credibility than the Fed itself. Also supporting President Trump, the Separation of Powers Clinic at The Catholic University of America’s Columbus School of Law (“Separation of Powers Clinic”) argues that the District Court’s interpretation of for-cause removal could carry serious practical consequences for those serving on the Board of Governors and for those serving on other bodies whose officials are subject to for-cause removal. Specifically, the Clinic claims that barring removal based on pre-confirmation conduct would force a “President … to literally imprison a federal official just to remove her from office.”  The Clinic claims that this would be “an unnecessary and extreme escalation” on the part of the President against Board members, however necessary to maintain credibility of the Fed, and that such an escalation could be avoided by broadly construing the for-cause removal power.  

    Supporting Cook, seven former members of the Board of Governors argue that robust for-cause protection allows the Fed to set monetary policy that benefits the nation in the long term, even against a president who would prefer different policy on short-term political grounds, citing historical examples, from both the United States and abroad, where politically-motivated executives interfered with monetary policy causing long-term inflation and economic recession. The Chamber of Commerce, supporting neither party, notes that political interference already negatively impacts monetary policy—due to reelection pressures, political actors are not incentivized to pursue long-term stability, but rather “have an incentive [to] combat inflation early in their term and then work towards full employment on the eve of the next election,” which would only be emphasized by a politically charged removals.   Supporting Cook, a coalition of former Treasury Secretaries, Fed Board Chairs and Governors, Chairs of the Council of Economic Advisers, and other economists (“former Treasury Secretaries et al.”) makes the related point that weakening removal protections would hurt the credibility of the Fed’s policymaking among the public. According to the former Treasury Secretaries et al., public confidence in the Fed’s independence is crucial to the Fed’s ability to limit inflation through sound monetary policy.  The former members of the Board of Governors also note that presidential interference in Fed policymaking would make those with the “rare expertise required to manage the nation’s monetary policy” less willing to serve as Governors.    

    IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL POWER

    Supporting President Trump, the Separation of Powers Clinic argues that allowing President Trump to remove Cook is consistent with principles of presidential accountability to the public. The Clinic contends that strong presidential control over the execution of the laws—including monetary policy—is important so that voters know who to hold accountable for policy successes and failures. According to the clinic, this accountability, in turn, ensures that individual liberty is protected.   

    Supporting Cook, seven former members of the Board of Governors dispute that strong for-cause protections limit democratic accountability. According to the former members of the Board of Governors, the Board of Governors “embraces” and “takes public responsibility for” their policy choices—and consequently, the public understands that “on monetary policy, the buck stops with the Board of Governors.” Therefore, according to the former members of the Board of Governors, there is no danger that the public will mistakenly blame (or credit) the president for the nation’s monetary policy. 

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    Garrett Taylor and Daniel Lempert

    Edited by:      Sierra Berry

    Additional Resources