Learning Resources v. Trump (2026)

Learning Resources v. Trump, 607 U.S. 229 (2026) is a U.S. Supreme Court case regarding separation of powers, taxing power, and the statutory interpretation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The primary question was whether IEEPA gave the President the authority to impose tariffs. The Supreme Court held that IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose tariffs. See also: LII Supreme Court Bulletin Preview on Learning Resources v. Trump. 

The controversy in Learning Resources involved tariffs set by President Trump in response to two emergencies. The first emergency was the threat posed by the flow of illegal narcotics from Canada, China, and Mexico. See: Executive Order No. 14194 (declaring national emergency pertaining to illegal narcotics from Mexico). The second emergency was the “large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits.”  See: Executive Order No. 14257. With respect to the emergency that stemmed from the illegal flow of narcotics, President Trump initially imposed 25% tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada, and initially 10% on most Chinese imports, later increased to 20%. With respect to the emergency created by the trade deficit, President Trump imposed duties “on all imports from all trading partners,” starting at 10% with higher rates for dozens of countries

Two groups separately challenged the legality of the tariffs. One group, two small businesses, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The second group, five small businesses and twelve states, challenged the tariffs in the Court of International Trade. The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases. 

Opinion

In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the U.S. Supreme Court held 6-3 that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The Court began its analysis with a discussion of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. In particular, the Court highlighted Article I, Section 8, Clause 1: “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” The Court noted that “it was no accident that this power” appeared first. Chief Justice Roberts explained that this placement is consistent with the Framers’ intent that the power to impose tariffs be part of the taxing power, and that the Constitution did not vest that taxing power in the Executive Branch.

In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), the Supreme Court also held that the act of imposing tariffs is a “branch of the taxing power.” Since the President has no inherent authority to impose tariffs, the government’s argument rested solely on the language of the IEEPA. Specifically, Section 1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA, which authorizes the President to “regulate … importation.”

The Court then turned to the issue of statutory interpretation. Justices Roberts, Gorsuch and Barrett applied the major questions doctrine, which posits that Congress would not delegate a “highly consequential power” through ambiguous language. Therefore, for the President to exercise the “highly consequential power” such as the power to tax, as seen here, there must be “clear congressional authorization.” In this case, the Court found that the inclusion of the words “regulate” and “importation” did not rise to the level of a “clear congressional authorization.” The Court noted that in the past when Congress delegated its tariff powers, it did so in explicit terms, and subject to strict limits. Additionally, in the near 50 year history of the IEEPA, no President has used it to impose tariffs of any kind. This along with its history of regular usage for other purposes indicate that IEEPA did not delegate the power to tariff.

Notwithstanding the plurality’s application of the major question doctrine, the rest of the 6-3 majority joined in the Court’s opinion. Applying the typical tools of statutory interpretation, the Court examined whether the power to “regulate … importation,” in IEEPA gave the President the power to impose tariffs. Instances of past Congressional delegations of the power to tariff that contained explicit language such as “duty” or “import surcharge.” More substantively, the Court's argument is not merely that IEEPA omitted the word “tariff.” The Court emphasized that § 1702(a)(1)(B) contains a list of specific powers authorizing distinct actions by the President to: “investigate,” “block,” “regulate,” “direct and compel,” “nullify,” “void,” “prevent,” and “prohibit,” and tariffs are conspicuously absent from that list

The Court looked to prior Congressional usage of the word “regulate” and in no instance did the word “regulate” confer unbridled power to tax. The government cited United States v. Yoshida Int’l Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (1975), where the words “regulate..importation” in an earlier version of the IEEPA allowed for President Nixon to impose “a limited surcharge as a temporary measure." The majority rejected the government’s argument that Yoshida gave “regulate … importation” the meaning of allowing the President to impose tariffs. The Court agreed that it may assume the incorporation of a judicial definition in legislation. However, only when the meaning of a word or phrase is “well-settled before the adoption.” Yoshida was the only judicial decision identified as having interpreted “regulate … importation” to authorize tariffs, and its circumstances were limited enough that the meaning could not be treated as well-settled in this context. Justice Kavanaugh's dissent relied heavily on Yoshida, the history of the predecessor statute, and the case Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976). He argued that tariffs were historically understood as a means of regulating imports. However, the majority decision refused to assume Congress incorporated the meaning set forth in that decision. 

[Last reviewed in August of 2026 by the Wex Definitions Team]

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