The 33-year-old defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment by a First Grade Magistrate for defilement after luring a nine-year old girl to his house and raping her. Subsequent medical examinations revealed that the defendant was HIV-positive, as well as injuries and other evidence of the crime on the victim, who did not contract HIV. The State appealed the sentence, arguing that it was insufficient due to the nature of the crime. The High Court agreed, citing 2013 precedent recommending that 14 years’ imprisonment should be the starting point for defilement sentences. However, the High Court noted the increase of defilement cases in Malawi – 2,155 convictions for defilement by July 2020 – indicated that 14 years was an insufficient deterrent. Instead, the High Court recommended that 20 years be the minimum sentence for defilement, noting the recent trend of High Court judges increasing such sentences similarly. In reviewing the defendant’s sentence, the Court considered numerous factors, including that: i) defilement cases against young girls had been on the rise in recent years in Malawi, which justified harsher sentences to protect young girls; ii) statutory rape of a girl under 16 is a serious offence; and iii) the defendant was HIV-positive and could have infected the victim. Ultimately, the High Court ordered that the defendant’s 10-year sentence be increased to 40 years’ imprisonment.
Women and Justice: Keywords
Domestic Case Law
R. v. Makuluni High Court of Malawi (2002)
The defendant was convicted rape, with the trial court finding that he followed the complainant to her house, suggested sexual intercourse, attacked her when she declined, and raped her. The defendant, a first-time offender, received a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. A judge reviewed the sentence and sent it to the High Court for consideration on the grounds that the sentence necessitated judicial remand due to manifest inadequacy. In concluding the lack of necessity of remand, the High Court reviewed the approach to sentencing for criminal offenses, which must regard the specific circumstances of the offense, the offender and the victim, and the public interest. The High Court discussed a few factors that must be taken into consideration in sentencing in rape cases, namely the victim’s age, the effect of the rape on the victim, and whether the perpetrator i) used violence above the minimum force to commit the rape, ii) used a weapon to intimidate or wound the victim, iii) repeatedly raped the victim, iv) premeditated and planned the rape, v) had previous convictions for sexual or other violent offences, and vi) subjected the victim to additional sexual indignities or perversions. The High Court affirmed precedent suggesting that three years is the minimum sentence for an adult convicted of rape without aggravating or mitigating factors. Specifically, the Court cited English precedent, which suggested five years as the threshold sentence, before citing the Malawi High Court suggesting that the threshold should be three years because of prison conditions in Malawi. In applying precedential sentencing standards to the specific circumstances of the case, the High Court determined that the lower court’s sentence did not qualify as manifestly inadequate, and therefore did not warrant intervention.
Cправа № 149/1596/16-к (Case No. 149/1596/16-к) Верховний Суд (Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2019)
The defendant physically attacked and raped the victim. The court of the first instance found the defendant guilty of rape (part 1 of Article 152 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine - after this The Criminal Code) and sentenced him to three years of imprisonment. However, the appellate court released the defendant from serving the sentence and instead imposed a three-year probationary period (Article 75 of the Criminal Code). In accordance with Article 75, the court may decide to release a person from serving a sentence with probation if the maximum sentence for a criminal offense does not exceed five years of imprisonment (the maximum imprisonment for rape is five years). The prosecutor noted that the punishment was disproportionate to the gravity of the crime. The victim demanded actual imprisonment because, as a result of the attack, she developed depression and needed a rehabilitation course with a psychologist. The Supreme Court noted that a person who has committed a crime must be given a punishment that is necessary, proportionate to the crime, and sufficient for his correction and prevention of new crimes (50, 65 of the Criminal Code). The Supreme Court annulled the appellate decision due to the court’s failure to take into account the gravity of the crime and the consequences for the victim. Thus, the Supreme Court ordered a new trial, ordering that the court apply the law on a more serious criminal offense or increase the punishment. This means that Article 75 (exemption from punishment with the appointment of probation and probationary period) cannot be applied, and instead the punishment should be imposed in accordance with Article 152 (rape): from three to five years in prison. This case is important because it emphasizes the severity of rape, the need for proportionate punishment, and consideration of the consequences for the victim.
Особа 2 напав на Особу 1 та зґвалтував із застосуванням фізичного насильства. Судом першої інстанції Особу 2 було визнано винним у вчиненні зґвалтування (ч. 1 ст. 152 Кримінального Кодексу України - далі КК) та призначено покарання у виді позбавлення волі на строк 3 роки, але рішенням апеляційного суду Особу 2 було звільнено від відбування призначеного покарання з випробуванням та іспитовим строком тривалістю 3 роки (ст. 75 КК). Прокурор зазначив, що покарання є невідповідним тяжкості злочину; потерпіла вимагала покарання у вигляді реального позбавлення волі, бо внаслідок вчинення злочину щодо неї вона перебуває у стані депресії, проходить курс реабілітації у психолога. Верховний Суд зазначив, що особі, яка вчинила злочин, має бути призначене покарання, необхідне і достатнє для її виправлення і попередження нових злочинів ( 50, 65 КК); виходячи з вказаної мети й принципів справедливості, співмірності та індивідуалізації, покарання повинно бути співмірним характеру вчинених дій та їх небезпечності. Рішення апеляційної інстанції було скасовано, через неврахування тяжкості злочину та наслідків для потерпілої; було призначено новий розгляд справи у зв'язку з необхідністю застосування закону про більш тяжке кримінальне правопорушення або посилення покарання. Ця справа є важливою, бо наголошує на тяжкості згвалтування, необхідності співмірного покарання та урахування наслідків для жертви.
Ministério Público v. Muchami Ngula Câmara Criminal do Tribunal Supremo de Angola (Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Angola) (2019)
The appellant was convicted of statutory rape of his partner’s 8-year-old daughter and sentenced to 10 years in prison as well as of payment of a compensation to the victim. Before the trial, the appellant confessed having sexual relations with the minor, arguing that it only happened because he was under the influence of alcohol and had mistaken her for his partner. In his appeal, he, however, 1) denied all accusations against him, 2) argued that no evidence was produced against him, and 3) alleged that his partner had convinced the victim to accuse him of the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, ruling that there was enough physical evidence through gynecological examination that the appellant sexually assaulted the minor more than one time. In deciding to increase the appellant’s sentence and compensation order, the court noted that he waited for his partner to go to sleep before entering another room with the intent and will to perpetrate the morally reprehensible crime against his stepdaughter.
O apelante foi condenado por estupro da filha de 8 anos da sua parceira e sentenciado a 10 anos de prisão, assim como ao pagamento de indenização para a vítima. Antes do julgamento, o apelante confessou ter tido relações sexuais com a menor, argumentando que isso só aconteceu porque ele estava sob a influência do álcool e tinha confundido ela pela sua parceira. Na sua apelação, no entanto, ele 1) negou todas as acusações contra ele, 2) arguiu que não havia evidência produzida contra ele, e 3) alegou que sua parceira havia convencido a vítima a acusá-lo do crime. O Tribunal Supremo reafirmou a decisão da corte inferior, decretando que o exame ginecológico mostrava evidência física suficiente de que o apelante abusou sexualmente da menor mais de uma vez. Ao decidir que a sentença e a ordem de indenização fossem aumentadas, a corte notou que ele esperava a sua parceira dormir para entrar em outro quarto com intenção e vontade de cometer o crime moralmente repreensível contra a sua enteada.
Ministério Público v. Joao Bernardo Nelson Câmara Criminal do Tribunal Supremo de Angola (Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Angola) (2018)
The trial court convicted the accused of one count of murder and sentenced him to 17 years in prison, in addition to financial compensation the victim’s family. The circumstances of the case showed that the accused and the victim were consuming drugs by a local river when, for unrevealed reasons, he pushed her over the stairs which led to the river, at a height of approximately five meters. The victim ended up by the water with bruises on her face and a broken neck, which was stated as the cause of death. Afterwards, the accused took off the victim’s wig and clothes, subsequently burning them. The prosecution argued that his intent was to make it appear as though the victim had suffered sexual assault. There was no autopsy and the evidence was based on 1) the death certificate, 2) photographs, and 3) eye-witnesses who saw both individuals together on that day. The accused confessed during interrogation, but denied the charges during trial. On appeal, the accused argued for a lower sentence. However, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision. The penalty for murder was increased due to the following circumstances: (i) surprise, (ii) deserted place, and (iii) superiority by reason of gender, under Article 34 of the 1982 Penal Code.
O tribunal de julgamento condenou o acusado por homicídio e sentenciou ele a 17 anos de prisão, em adição a indenização à família da vítima. As circunstâncias do caso mostraram que o acusado e a vítima estavam consumindo drogas perto do rio local quando, por razões não reveladas, ele a empurrou das escadas que levava ao rio, de uma altura de aproximadamente cinco metros. A vítima acabou dentro da água com machucados no rosto e pescoço quebrado, que foi a causa declarada da morte. Após, o acusado retirou a peruca e as roupas da vítima, subsequentemente queimando-as. A acusação argumentou que sua intenção era de fazer parecer com que a vítima tivesse sofrido agressão sexual. Não houve autópsia e a evidência foi baseada em 1) certidão de óbito, 2) fotografias, e 3) testemunhas que viram ambos os indivíduos juntos naquele dia. O réu confessou durante a interrogação, mas negou as acusações durante o julgamento. Na apelação, o acusado pleiteou uma sentença menor. Entretanto, o Tribunal Supremo manteve a decisão da corte inferior. A penalidade por homicídio foi aumentada pelas seguintes circunstâncias: (i) surpresa, (ii) lugar deserto, e (iii) superioridade por razão de gênero, sob o Artigo 34 do Código Penal de 1982.
Attorney-General v. Mataua Kiribati Court of Appeal (2019)
The respondent was convicted of two charges of defilement of a 13-year-old girl and sentenced to four years and six months of imprisonment even though the maximum punishment for each charge was life imprisonment. The Attorney General of Kiribati appealed this sentence as “manifestly inadequate.” The Court of Appeal of Kiribati allowed the appeal and delineated the proper framework for sentencing in the context of this offense. First, the court noted that the minimum sentence for defilement should be five years and that any aggravating or mitigating factors must be accounted for in the final sentencing decision. Second, a court must make an upward adjustment for any aggravating factors external to the criminal act such as a person’s relevant criminal record. Third, a court should allow a reduction of the sentence where there are mitigating factors, such as guilty pleas, expressions of genuine remorse, prior good character, cooperation with police, or the youth of the offender. Fourth, a court should reduce the sentence based on the amount of time the offender spent in custody prior to sentencing. Finally, where a sentence would be less than two years, the court should consider a suspended sentence. Considering the aggravating factor of the multiple instances of sexual abuse against the victim and the mitigating factor of the respondent’s record of past good character, the court found the initial sentence manifestly inadequate and adjusted it to six years and six months imprisonment.
State v. Gudyanga (2015)
This was a review of a sentence imposed by a trial magistrate at the request of the regional magistrate. In the opinion of the regional magistrate, the sentence imposed by the trial magistrate was too harsh and a community service sentence would have been just in the case. The accused was charged with physical abuse as defined under the DVA. The 20-year-old accused assaulted the complainant, his18-year-old wife, over a denial of conjugal rights. He was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment with a further two months suspended. The issue to be determined on review was whether the trial magistrate, by imposing a custodial sentence on a repeat violator of the DVA, erred in the exercise of discretion. The court found no misdirection on the part of the magistrate, holding that a custodial sentence is not required because the purpose of the DVA was to bring families closer together. Rather, the court explained that judges should apply a multi-factor sentencing analysis that includes, among other factors, considering both the DVA’s purpose to bring families together and whether the accused was a repeat offender. The DVA makes repeat offenders liable for imprisonment not exceeding five years. Here, the accused was a repeat offender, and therefore, liable for a custodial sentence at the discretion of the trial magistrate.
Kalenga v. The People Supreme Court for Zambia (2012)
Kalenga, the Defendant, told his 70 year-old grandmother, the Victim, that he had collected some firewood in the bush and offered to give her some. When she followed him into the bush, she found that no firewood had been collected, and instead, Kalenga took off his clothes and had intercourse with her without her consent. The Victim returned home and reported the crime to the head of the village and then to the police. While in police custody, he denied the charge, but admitted to having gone into the bush to collect firewood. At trial the Defendant did not testify. The Trial Magistrate found the Victim’s story to be corroborated by the fact that no firewood had been collected and found no reason why the Victim would fabricate such a story involving her grandson. As this evidence went unchallenged by Kalenga, the Trial Magistrate convicted him. The Trial Magistrate committed Kalenga for sentencing to the High Court, which sentenced him to 16 years imprisonment with hard labor. Kalenga appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that there was no finding of corroborative evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that his admission to escorting the Victim into the bush, the lack of motive of the Victim to lie, and the unlikelihood of mistaken identity constituted “something more” to corroborate the Victim’s testimony. The Supreme Court further found the age of the Victim to be an aggravating circumstance and increased his sentence from 16 years to 20 years.
Hara v. The People Supreme Court for Zambia (2014)
The Defendant, Hara, broke into the house of a twelve-year-old girl, forced her down and raped her. He pleaded guilty to defilement, a crime with the sentence of fifteen years to life imprisonment, and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment with hard labor. Hara appealed the sentence on the grounds that (1) thirty years was too severe absent any aggravating circumstances (i.e. the victim did not sustain any physical injuries, become infected with a sexually transmitted disease or become pregnant) and (2) the lower court did not take into account mitigating circumstances (i.e. the defendant was a first time offender who readily plead guilty). Reasoning that “young girls are no longer safe even in their homes”, the Supreme Court rejected the Hara’s arguments that the absence of factors, such as physical injuries and pregnancy, should reduce his sentence. The Supreme Court further held that the lower court properly considered the Hara’s status as a first time offender, and therefore, the Supreme Court upheld his thirty-year sentence.
Legislation
Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Act 2013 (2013)
The Human Trafficking Amendment Act amends the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here) and the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 (available here). The Act of 2008 defined human trafficking and exploitation for the purposes of trafficking. It also contains specific provisions for the trafficking of children. The Human Trafficking Amendment Act of 2013 amends the 2008 Act by (a) expanding the definitions of “labour exploitation” to include forced begging and of “exploitation” to include forced participation in criminal acts for profit (in line with the EU Human Trafficking Directive) and (b) adding aggravating factors (e.g., where a public official trafficks for sexual or labor exploitation).
Article 267 of the Penal Code provides for a punishment of rigorous imprisonment (meaning imprisonment with hard labor) for anyone who rapes a woman, which shall be permanent if the perpetrator is a “Specified Perpetrator, meaning an ancestor of the victim, other person responsible for her upbringing or having power over her, or a paid servant of the victim or the perpetrator . Article 267 does not address rape of men. Article 268, however, is gender-neutral. It prescribes three to seven years of rigorous imprisonment with hard labor for indecent assault of a person by force or threat, or an attempt to do so. The punishment for indecent assault may increase if (i) the victim was less than 16 years old, or (ii) the perpetrator is a Specified Perpetrator. The punishment for indecent assault increases to permanent rigorous imprisonment with hard labor when a Special Perpetrator indecently assaults a person under 16 years old. Finally, Article 269 provides that anyone who indecently assaults a minor under 18 years of age without force or punishment is subject to imprisonment. If the victim was less than seven years of age or the perpetrator is a Specified Perpetrator, the penalty is rigorous imprisonment with hard labor. Article 290 provides that kidnapping a woman is punished with permanent rigorous imprisonment with hard labor. If the kidnapper also rapes the woman, the sentence is death. English translation available here.
Section 201 states that a person who coerces another person, by force, deprivation of personal liberty, or by threat to life, to perform or tolerate sexual intercourse, or a sexual act equivalent to sexual intercourse, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 2-10 years. If the act causes serious bodily harm or pregnancy of the raped person, or if the act places the raped person in a state of agony for a prolonged period of time or humiliates that person in an extraordinary way, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 5-15 years. If the act results in the death of the raped person, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 10 to 20 years or by life imprisonment. Section 202 punishes other forms of sexual violence involving coercion by force or threat of violence with a term of imprisonment of six months to five years.
Nach § 201 wird mit Freiheitsstrafe von 2 bis 10 Jahren bestraft, wer eine andere Person mit Gewalt, unter Entziehung der persönlichen Freiheit oder durch Drohung mit dem Leben dazu nötigt, den Geschlechtsverkehr oder eine dem Geschlechtsverkehr gleichgestellte sexuelle Handlung vorzunehmen oder zu dulden. Führt die Tat zu einer schweren Körperverletzung oder zu einer Schwangerschaft der vergewaltigten Person oder versetzt sie die vergewaltigte Person für längere Zeit in einen Zustand der Agonie oder demütigt sie in außergewöhnlicher Weise, so wird der Täter mit Freiheitsstrafe von 5 bis 15 Jahren bestraft. Führt die Tat zum Tod der vergewaltigten Person, so wird der Täter mit einer Freiheitsstrafe von 10 bis 20 Jahren oder mit lebenslänglicher Freiheitsstrafe bestraft. Andere Formen der sexuellen Gewalt, die eine Nötigung durch Gewalt oder die Drohung mit Gewalt beinhalten, werden nach § 202 mit einer Freiheitsstrafe von sechs Monaten bis zu fünf Jahren bestraft.
Section 106(a) states that a person who coerces another person to marry or establish a registered partnership, by force or by dangerous threat or threat of breaking off family contacts, is liable to a term of imprisonment of six months to five years. The same punishment applies to the act of coercing a person or forcing a person by dangerous threat of threat of interruption or withdrawal of family contacts, to move to another state or transports them to another state, with the intention of coercing the person to marry or establish a registered partnership in such other state. If the conduct results in a suicide (including an attempt) of the victim, the term of imprisonment is 1-10 years (Section 106a(3) in connection with Section 106(2)). The principle of territoriality does not apply under Section 64(1) no. 4a – even if the location of the crime is outside of Austria, a perpetrator is liable under Austrian law when he or the victim is Austrian.
Gemäß § 106a ist eine Person mit 6 Monaten bis zu fünf Jahren Freiheitsstrafe zu bestrafen, wenn sie eine andere Person mit Gewalt oder Drohung zur Eingehung einer Ehe oder eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft nötigt. Dies gilt ebenso, wenn eine Person eine andere Person durch Täuschung, Gewalt oder Drohung in einen anderen Staat bewegt, wo die Eheschließung oder Eintragung einer Partnerschaft erzwungen wird. Wenn dieses Verhalten dazu führt, dass sich das Opfer umbringt oder versucht sich umzubringen, erhöht sich die Gefängnisstrafe auf 1-10 Jahre (§ 106a Abs. 3 i.V.m. § 106 Abs. 2). Das Territorialitätsprinzip findet auch hier keine Anwendung. Vielmehr gilt nach § 64 Abs. 1 Ziff. 4a, dass der Täter auch strafbar hiernach ist, wenn der Tatort außerhalb von Österreich liegt, aber das Opfer zum Beispiel österreichischer Staatsangehöriger ist.
Art. 343 prohibits the production and distribution of pornographic materials or items of a pornographic nature depicting minors, which is punishable by correctional work for up to two years, administrative arrest, restraint on liberty, or imprisonment for a term of up to four years, and by a term of up to eight years in case of aggravating circumstances.
Criminal Code Chapter 20: Crimes Against Sexual Inviolability or Sexual Freedom (1999)
Art. 166 of the Criminal Code defines rape as “sexual intercourse against the will of the victim with the use of violence” or threat of such violence against the woman or her relatives, or using the woman’s helpless state. Rape is punishable by restraint on liberty for a term of up to four years or imprisonment for a term of three to seven years. Rape in aggravating circumstances, including repeated rape, rape by a group of people, or rape by a person who has previously committed sexually violent acts, is punishable by imprisonment for a term of five to thirteen years and knowing rape of a minor or rape that causes grave consequences (e.g., death, bodily harm, or HIV infection) is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 8-15 years. Art. 167 likewise prohibits violent acts of sexual nature, such as “sodomy” or “lesbianism” against the will of the victim with the use of violence or threat of such violence, or using the victim’s helpless state. The punishments for committing an Art. 167 crime in aggravated circumstances are the same as those for rape. Art. 168 prohibits sexual intercourse and other acts of a sexual nature with a person below the age of 16. This crime is punishable by, in case there are no signs of criminal acts set out above, restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up to four years, with a fine. The punishment, in case the offender has previously committed the crimes described above, has duties owed to the victim, or the crime is committed by a group of persons, is imprisonment for a term of three to ten years. “Depraved acts” committed against a person below the age of 16 are punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to six years under Art. 169. Art. 170 criminalizes the compulsion to commit acts of a sexual nature by means of blackmail, threat of destruction of property, or by using the dependence (workplace, monetary, etc.) of the victim. The crime is punishable by restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up three years, with a fine and prohibition to occupy certain offices. Such a crime knowingly committed against a minor is punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to six years. Arts. 171 and 171 prohibit the organization, use, or creation of conditions for prostitution, including by removing the victim outside of the country; such crimes are punishable by up to ten years of imprisonment.
Several sections of the Criminal Code (in particular, sections 242-243) penalize rape, including spousal rape, and domestic violence. Penalties include imprisonment not exceeding 12 years, a fine not exceeding 78,000 euros ($93,600), or both. For cases involving violence against a spouse, the penalty for various forms of abuse can be increased by one-third. Section 244 and 245 of the Criminal Code penalize statutory rape. Under section 244, in cases where the victim is younger than 12, the term of imprisonment shall not exceed 12 years. In cases where the victim is 12-16 years of age, under section 245, the term of imprisonment shall not exceed eight years. (Unofficial English translation of the Criminal Code as of 2012 available here: http://www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/6533/2014%20seminars/Omsenie/WetboekvanStra...)
Código Penal de la Nación Argentina: Artículos 142, 170 (delitos contra mujeres embarazadas) (1984)
A person who takes, hides, or imprisons a pregnant woman in order to force the woman or a third party to do, not do, or tolerate something against his or her will is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. A person who kidnaps or hides a pregnant woman to obtain a ransom is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. If perpetrator obtains the desired gain, the minimum penalty will be raised to eight years.
La persona que toma, esconde o encarcela a una mujer embarazada con el fin de obligar a la mujer o a una tercera persona a hacer, no hacer o tolerar algo en contra de su voluntad está sujeta a pena privadora de libertad de 10 a 25 años. La persona que secuestra u oculta a una mujer embarazada para obtener un rescate está sujeta a una pena de prisión de entre 10 y 25 años. Si el agresor obtiene la ganancia deseada, la pena mínima se elevará a ocho años.
A man who kills a woman through an act of gender violence is liable for life imprisonment ("reclusión perpetua o prisión perpetua").
Un hombre que mata a una mujer mediante un acto de violencia de género es condenado a cadena perpetua ("reclusión perpetua o prisión perpetua").
Nigeria Penal Code Act (1960)
The Penal Code applies to the northern states of Nigeria. Section 55(1)(d), subject to customs that have been recognized as lawful, allows a husband to “correct[] his wife” as long as it does not amount to “grievous hurt.” Section 55(2) goes on to state that the correction must be reasonable in kind or degree with regards to the age, physical, and mental conditions of the person being corrected. Grievous hurt is defined in section 241 as “(a) emasculation; (b) permanent deprivation of the sight of an eye, of the hearing of an ear or the power of speech; (c) deprivation of any member or joint; (d) destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; (e) permanent disfiguration of the head or face; (f) fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth; (g) any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.” The law concerning abortion is found in sections 232. Referenced in the law as the causing of a miscarriage, abortion is only legal to save the life of the mother. Any person, including the mother, can be guilty of the offense and will be punished with up to 14 years in prison, a fine, or both. Sections 233-235 discuss the causing of a miscarriage intentionally or unintentionally through acts against the mother. These offenses also carry a penalty of imprisonment, fines, or both. Section 282 discusses rape and specifies that sexual intercourse by a man with his wife is not rape if she has gone through puberty. No longer available at External URL. Please contact the Women & Justice Collection for a PDF copy.
As stated in the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, the Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act aims to “prohibit[] all forms of violence against persons in private and public life, and provide[] maximum protection and effective remedies for victims and punishment of offenders.” The Act provides general protections against offenses including infliction of physical injury, coercion, offensive conduct, willfully placing a person in fear of physical injury, willfully making false statements against another person, damage to property with intent to cause distress, and deprivation of personal liberty. The Act also provides protections against offenses that affect women disproportionately, including a prohibition of female genital mutilation; forceful ejection from home; forced financial dependence or economic abuse; forced isolation; emotional, verbal and psychological abuse; harmful widowhood practices; and spousal battery, among others. Notably, the Act defines the offense of rape in Section 1(1) without an exception for marital rape, which had not traditionally been recognized as an offense (note that the Penal Code Act of 1960 does include an exception for marital rape). The Act provides a procedure for injured parties to apply for a protection order and empowers the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory with jurisdiction to hear and grant applications brought under the Act. As stated in Section 47, the Act is a product of federal legislation enacted in regard to criminal law, a residual matter over which the states have exclusive legislative power pursuant to the Nigerian Constitution. Thus, the VAPP Act applies only to the Federal Capital Territory and is not binding law in a state unless adopted by that state.
This Act criminalizes slavery in all forms and provides protection and support for victims of trafficking. As defined by the Act, "'exploitation' includes, at the minimum, induced prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation, forced marriage, forced or bonded services, or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of human organs." The definition of trafficking is comprehensive and defined in Part 2, Section 5(3) of the Act. The Act proscribes further that victims “shall not be liable for crimes committed in connection” to their own trafficking and that “the past sexual behavior of a victim of trafficking is irrelevant and inadmissible for purpose of proving that the victim was engaged in other sexual behavior or to prove sexual predisposition of the victim.” The Act provides an aggravated trafficking designation in cases where the trafficked person dies, becomes disabled physically or mentally, suffers mutilation, contracts a sexually transmitted disease including but not limited to HIV or AIDS, or develops a chronic health condition. The Act also mandates the temporary material support and care for any child victim; provision of accommodation, counseling, and rehabilitation services for victims; and mandates attempted reintegration of adult victims into their families and communities.
Art. 189 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a monetary penalty for any person who uses threats, force or psychological pressure on another person or makes that other person incapable of resistance in order to compel him or her to tolerate a sexual act similar to intercourse or any other sexual act. If the offender acts with cruelty, and if the offender used an offensive weapon or other dangerous object, the penalty is imprisonment for not less than three years. Art. 190 provides that a person can be sentenced to between 1 and 10 years in custody or a fine for using violence, threats, or psychological pressure to force a female to engage in a sexual act, or for making her incapable of resisting. Art. 191 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a monetary penalty for any person who, in the knowledge that another person is incapable of judgement or resistance, has sexual intercourse with, or commits an act similar to sexual intercourse or any other sexual act on, that person. Art. 192 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any person who, by abusing a dependent relationship with a person in institutional care, an inmate of an institution, a prisoner, a detainee or a person on remand, induces the dependent person to commit or submit to a sexual act. Art. 193 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any person who induces another to commit or submit to a sexual act by exploiting a position of need or a dependent relationship based on employment or another dependent relationship. Unofficial English translation available here.