Women and Justice: Keywords

Article 3502 lists the persons who can apply to the court for a restraining order, which means a judicial measure that temporarily restricts rights or imposes obligations on a perpetrator of domestic violence and is aimed at ensuring the victim's safety. For example, the court may order a ban on staying in the common residence with the victim of domestic violence; prohibition to approach within a specified distance to the victim’s place of residence, study, work, or other frequently visited locations; prohibition to contact the victim. The following categories of persons are eligible to apply for a restraining order: (i) a person who has suffered from domestic violence, or their representative; (ii) a person who has suffered from gender-based violence, or their representative; (iii) parents and other legal representatives of a child who suffered from domestic violence or gender-based violence; (iv) a guardian representing the interests of an incapable person who has suffered from domestic violence or gender-based violence.

Стаття 3502 містить перелік осіб, які можуть звернутися до суду із заявою про видачу обмежувального припису, що означає встановлений у судовому порядку захід тимчасового обмеження прав чи покладення обов’язків на особу, яка вчинила домашнє насильство, спрямований на забезпечення безпеки постраждалої особи. Наприклад, суд може встановити заборону на перебування у спільному місці проживання з жертвою домашнього насильства; заборону наближатися на визначену відстань до місця проживання, навчання, роботи чи інших місць, які часто відвідує потерпілий; заборону контактувати з потерпілим. Право на подання заяви про видачу обмежувального припису мають наступні категорії осіб: (I) особа, яка постраждала від домашнього насильства, або її представник; (II) особа, яка постраждала від ґендерно зумовленого насильства, або її представник; (III) батьки та інші законні представники дитини, яка постраждала від домашнього або ґендерно зумовленого насильства; (IV) опікун, який представляє інтереси недієздатної особи, яка постраждала від домашнього або ґендерно зумовленого насильства.

The Acts provides that a ‘relevant organisation’ shall not employ/contract/permit any person to undertake relevant work or activities (relating to children or vulnerable persons) on behalf of the organization, unless the organization receives a vetting disclosure from the National Vetting Bureau of An Garda Siochána in respect of that person. The Act defines relevant work or activities as ‘any work or activity which is carried out by a person, a necessary and regular part of which consists mainly of the person having access to, or contact with’ children (Part 1 para. 1) or ‘vulnerable persons’ (Part 2 para. 1) in specified locations (as elaborated in Schedule 1). Penalties include fines of up to €10,000 and/or imprisonment of up to five years.

Marital rape is a crime under the 1990 Act. The 1990 Act deletes the word “unlawful” from the statutory definition of rape (‘unlawful sexual intercourse’ without consent, as set forth in the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981). The amended definition of rape therefore does not exclude ‘lawful’ sexual intercourse (i.e., between married persons). The 1990 Act also explicitly abolished ‘any rule of law by virtue of which a husband cannot be guilty of the rape of his wife’ (Section 5). Section 4 defines rape as any penetration (however slight) of the anus or mouth by the penis or of the vagina by any object held or manipulated by another person, providing for a punishment on conviction of up to life imprisonment (Section 4). Section 7 of the Act also deals with the corroboration rule in the case of sexual offences. In particular, the judge is no longer required to give the jury a corroboration warning, but such warning is not prohibited.

The 1996 Act targets sex tourism. It provides that, where an Irish citizen or a person “ordinarily resident” in Ireland (a) commits an act in another country involving a child (person under the age of 17), and (b) the act constitutes an offence under the law of that country and would constitute an offence in Ireland, then the person will be guilty of the offense under Irish law (Section 2(2)). Other offences include attempted offences (Section 2(3)); procuring, aiding or abetting, and conspiring in an offence (Sections 2(4)–2(6)); transporting persons to enable such offences (Section 3); and publishing information likely to promote offenses (Sections 4). The Act also provides for offenses committed by corporate bodies (Section 5). Penalties are up to a maximum of a £10,000 fine and 5 years imprisonment on conviction on indictment, or up to 12 months’ imprisonment on summary conviction (Section 6).

In addition to abolishing the offence of buggery (sodomy) between adults, this Act codifies the law relating to sex work (referred to as ‘prostitution’), with the starting point being that it does not make prostitution itself illegal. However, the Act does not define ‘prostitute’. Section 1(2) defines ‘prostitution’ as occurring where “a person solicits or importunes another person for the purpose of obtaining that other person’s services as a prostitute,” or where they solicit or importune another person on behalf of a third person for the purposes of prostitution. Section 7A criminalizes paying for sexual favors from any person, and payment can include contracting with another for cash, barter, or other consideration. Section 9 criminalizes living off prostitution in the form of ‘pimping’, providing for an offence where a person controls, organizes, compels, coerces, or directs the activities of ‘a prostitute’ in respect of prostitution for gain. Section 10 further criminalizes living of the earnings of ‘the prostitution of another person.’ Section 11 makes brothel-keeping and management an offence.

The Human Trafficking Amendment Act amends the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here) and the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 (available here). The Act of 2008 defined human trafficking and exploitation for the purposes of trafficking. It also contains specific provisions for the trafficking of children. The Human Trafficking Amendment Act of 2013 amends the 2008 Act by (a) expanding the definitions of “labour exploitation” to include forced begging and of “exploitation” to include forced participation in criminal acts for profit (in line with the EU Human Trafficking Directive) and (b) adding aggravating factors (e.g., where a public official trafficks for sexual or labor exploitation).

The Act provides for recognition of changes of gender, issuance of gender recognition certificates, and conforming amendments to other legislation, including the Adoption Act 2010. Any person of at least 18 years of age who is not married or in a civil partnership, inter alia (Section 9), may apply to the Minister for Social Protection for a gender recognition certificate (Section 8). Where a gender recognition certificate is issued to a person, that person’s gender shall from the date of that issue become for all purposes the ‘preferred’ gender and sex (Section 18). The fact that a gender recognition certificate is issued to a person shall not affect the status of the person as the father or mother of a child born prior to the certificate’s date of the issue (Section 19), or the disposal or devolution of property under a will (including a codicil), or other instrument executed before the date the Act came into operation (Section 20). The Act also provides for “gender specific [criminal] offenses” in relation to the treatment of people with gender recognition certificates. Notably, where a relevant gender-specific sexual offence could be committed or attempted only if the gender of the person with a gender recognition certificate were not the ‘preferred’ gender, that fact does not prevent the sexual offence being committed or attempted (Section 23). Finally, a person who has a gender recognition certificate may apply to the Minister for Social Protection to revoke the certificate (Section 15).

The Illegal Immigrants Act makes it an offense for a person to organize or knowingly facilitate the entry of a person whom the person knows or has reasonable cause to believe to be an illegal immigrant or a person who intends to seek asylum into Ireland. The offence is punishable with fine of up to £1,500 or imprisonment up to 12 months or both on summary conviction; or, a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or both on conviction on indictment (Section 2(1)). This applies to acts or omissions both inside and outside of Ireland (Section 2(3)). However, it does not apply (a) to “anything done by a person otherwise than for gain,” or (b) to “anything done to assist a person seeking asylum by a person in the course of his or her employment by a bona fide organization if the purposes of that organization include giving assistance to persons seeking asylum” (Section 2).

Article 4 (A/1) requires education, health, and social service providers (whether private or public sector) to report known or reported cases of domestic violence to the Juvenile and Family Protection Department. The obligation to report such cases (regardless of the consent of the victim) is in part mitigated by Article 4 (B) which guarantees the protection of victims by forbidding disclosure of their identities unless required by judicial procedures. The Law goes on to grant the police rights in relation to actual or suspected cases of violence or abuse. Additionally, Article 6 (A) obligates the Family Protection Department to act on every report or request of assistance in relation to domestic violence promptly. Article 7 (B) prohibits the Family Protection Department from settling a felony case; instead, such cases shall be referred to the Public Prosecutor for further legal action. Articles 16 further entails multiple measures the court may take including a restraining order from approaching the victim or any of the family members or to provoke another person to do so.

تفرض الفقرة (أ) من المادة 4 على كل من مقدمي الخدمات الصحية أو التعليمية أو الاجتماعية في القطاعين العام والخاص التبليغ عن أي حالة عنف أسري واقعة على فاقد الأهلية أو ناقصها حال علمه أو إبلاغه بها، ونصت الفقرة (ب) من المادة 4 أنه لا يجوز الإفصاح عن هوية مقدمي البلاغ في قضايا العنف الأسري إلا إذا تطلبت الإجراءات غير ذلك. والفقرة (أ) من المادة (6) ألزمت إدارة حماية الأسرة بالاستجابة لكل شكوى أو إخبار أو طلب مساعدة أو حماية تتعلق بالعنف الأسري بالسرعة القصوى، كما ألزمت جميع الجهات حال تلقيها أي شكوى عن أي حالة عنف أسري تحويلها إلى إدارة حماية الأسرة لاتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة بشأنها. يمتنع على إدارة حماية الأسرة إجراء التسوية في حال كان الفعل يشكل جناية وعليها في هذه الحالة إحالته إلى المدعي العام المختص لإجراء المقتضى القانوني وفقًا للفقرة (ب) من المادة 7. وأشارت المادة 16 إلى أنه للمحكمة المختصة أن تصدر حال قناعتها بضرورة حماية المتضرر وأي من أفراد الأسرة وبناء على طلب أي منهما وفي غياب أو حضور مرتكب العنف الأسري عدة إجرائات ومنها أمر حماية بعدم التعرض للمتضرر.

Article 260 of the Penal Code provides that whoever willfully causes an abortion by beating or other violent injuries shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment (meaning imprisonment with hard labor per Article 13) (“Rigorous Imprisonment”). Those who provide medicine or other means of inducing abortion, with or without the consent of the pregnant woman, are subject to imprisonment (Article 261). It is also a crime for women to have an abortion using medicines or other means (Article 262). Any doctor, surgeon, pharmacist, or midwife who provides an abortion is subject to rigorous imprisonment with hard labor. However, attempted abortion is not a punishable offense (Article 264). English translation available here.

Articles 32-53 of this law reinforced the provisions of the French Civil and Criminal Codes to provide enhanced protection to victims of domestic violence, including in relation to custody and housing. Articles 54-55 of the law reinforced the provisions of the French Civil Code preventing forced marriages. Notably, pursuant to Article 55, notwithstanding that each spouse’s “loi personnelle” (i.e., the law of the country of which the spouse is a national) generally determines the criteria and conditions required to marry, each spouse’s consent is required regardless of the spouses’ “loi personnelle.”

Articles 32-53 de la loi renforce les provisions du Code Civil et Code Pénal Français avec le but de renforcer la protection pour les victimes de violences domestiques, en particulier liée à la garde des enfants et du logement. Articles 54-55 de cette loi renforce les provisions du Code Civil Français avec l’objectif d’empêché les mariages forcés. En particulier, selon l’Article 55, même si chaque conjoint a une loi personnelle (la loi de leur pays de citoyenneté), qui normalement détermine les critères et conditions nécessaires pour un mariage, le consentement de chaque conjoint est requis.

Article 8 of the law amended the French Civil Code provisions regarding parental custody. Specifically, it included harassment or violence, whether physical or psychological, by one parent against the other among the factors in custody determinations. Article 31 of the law amended the French Criminal Code as follows: (i) it clarified that psychological violence falls within the scope of violence against the person; and (ii) it introduced a penal offense when the harassment of one’s spouse or partner results in a degradation of that spouse’s or partner’s physical or mental health.

Article 8 modifie les provisions du Code Civile Français qui adresse la garde des enfants. En particulier, l’article inclut le harassement ou la violence, physique ou psychologique, par un parent contre un autre comme un facteur a considéré durant la détermination de la garde d’un enfant. Article 31 modifie le Code Civile Français de deux manières : (i) cela clarifie que la violence psychologique est un type de violence contre un individu ; et (ii) cela introduit une offense pénale quand le harcèlement d’un conjoint, d’un partenaire lié par un pacte civil de solidarité, ou d’un concubin aboutit à la dégradation de leur santé physique ou mentale.

The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention). In part, these amendments increased the punishment for an illegal abortion (meaning that it was conducted by a person who had no special medical education; or forcing an abortion without voluntary consent, which is punishable by a fine of 50-100 tax-free minimum incomes, community service of 100-240 hours, correctional labor for up to two years, or restriction of liberty for up to two years, or imprisonment for the same term. The amendments criminalized forcing an abortion and forced sterilization without consent. Rape (i.e., sexual acts involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration using the genitals or any other item, without voluntary consent) is punishable with imprisonment for three to five years and sexual violence (nonconsensual, non-penetrative sexual assault) is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. Finally, consent is valid if it is a person's exercise of free will, with consideration of attending circumstances.

У грудні 2017 року до Кримінального та Кримінально-процесуального кодексів України були внесені зміни, що містять положення Конвенції Ради Європи «Про запобігання насильству щодо жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з ними» (Стамбульська конвенція), ухваленої у 2011 році. Внаслідок цих змін статтю 134 Кримінального кодексу України, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за незаконне проведення аборту (проведення аборту особою, яка не має спеціальної медичної освіти; примус до проведення аборту без добровільної згоди потерпілої), було змінено, в частині посилення відповідальності за це небезпечне злочинне діяння (тобто тепер незаконний аборт карається штрафом від 50 до 100 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або громадськими роботами на строк від 100 до 240 годин, або виправними роботами за на строк до двох років, або обмеженням волі на строк до двох років, або позбавленням волі на той самий строк). Також криміналізовано примус до аборту без добровільної згоди потерпілої, а також примусову стерилізацію без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи. Змінено статті, які передбачають кримінальну відповідальність за зґвалтування та сексуальне насильство. Зокрема, зґвалтування (тобто вчинення статевих дій, пов’язаних із вагінальним, анальним або оральним проникненням в тіло іншої особи за допомогою статевих органів або будь-якого іншого предмета без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи) карається позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до п’яти років, а також сексуальне насильство (не пов'язане з проникненням в тіло іншої особи без добровільної згоди потерпілої особи) карається позбавленням волі на строк до п'яти років. Примітка: Згода вважається добровільною, якщо вона є результатом вільного волевиявлення особи, з урахуванням супутніх обставин.

Article 3901 provides criminal liability for (i) intentional failure to comply with the restrictive measures applicable to perpetrators of domestic violence (for example, prohibition on cohabitation with a person who has suffered from domestic violence, restriction of communication with the child in the event that domestic violence is committed against the child or in their presence, etc.); (ii) intentional failure to comply with restrictive instructions; or (iii) intended evasion of a court-mandated offender treatment program. A person who commits these socially dangerous culpable acts shall be punished by arrest for a term of up to six months, or restriction of liberty for a term of up to two years.

Стаття 3901 передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за (i) умисне недотримання обмежувальних заходів, які застосовуються до винних у домашньому насильстві (наприклад, заборона спільного проживання з особою, яка постраждала від домашнього насильства, обмеження спілкування з дитиною у випадку, якщо домашнє насильство вчинене щодо дитини або в її присутності тощо); (ii) умисне невиконання обмежувальних приписів; або (iii) умисне ухилення від проходження програми для кривдників особою, щодо якої такі заходи застосовані судом. Особа, яка вчинила ці суспільно небезпечні діяння, карається арештом на строк до шести місяців або обмеженням волі на строк до двох років.

Article 3012 states that involving a minor in: (i) conducting an entertainment show of a sexual nature (i.e., public display in any form of products of sexual nature or stage actions including acts of sexual nature), including with the use of information and telecommunication systems or technologies, or (ii) attending such a show, shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to seven years with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. If the act involved forcing a minor to participate in such a show through deception, blackmail, exploiting a vulnerable condition, or the use of threat of violence, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of seven to ten years with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years.

Стаття 3012 визначає, що залучення неповнолітнього до: (I) проведення видовищного заходу сексуального характеру (тобто публічного показу у будь-якій формі продукції сексуального характеру або сценічних дій, метою яких є втілення сексуальних дій.), у тому числі з використання інформаційно-телекомунікаційних систем або технологій, або (II) відвідування видовищного заходу сексуального характеру, караються позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до семи років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю. терміном до трьох років. Якщо діяння полягало в примушуванні неповнолітнього до участі в такому заході, шляхом обману, шантажу, уразливого стану особи або із застосуванням чи погрозою застосування насильства, винний карається позбавленням волі на строк від семи до десяти років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років.

Article 155 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that an adult who commits acts of sexual nature associated with the vaginal, anal, or oral penetration into the body of a person under the age of 16, using genitals, another body part, or any item, shall be punished by restriction of liberty for a term of up to five years, or imprisonment for the same term. If such acts are committed by close relatives or family members, a person who is responsible for the upbringing or care of the victim; or if they are associated with the provision of monetary or other remuneration to the victim or a third party or with a promise of such remuneration; or where they have caused infertility or any other grave consequences, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five to eight years with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. Article 156 provides criminal liability for debauched actions committed against a person under 16 years of age. This dangerous culpable act shall be punishable by restriction of liberty for a term of up to five years or imprisonment for the same term. If the same acts committed against a child or committed by family members or close relatives, a person who is responsible for the upbringing or care of the victim, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five to eight years with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years. Harassment of a child for sexual purposes is criminalized by the Article 1561. Harassment under this article means proposal of a meeting made by an adult to a person under the age of 16, for the purpose of committing any acts of sexual nature or debauched acts, after which at least one action was taken to ensure that meeting will take place.

Стаття 155 Кримінального кодексу України визначає, що повнолітня особа, яка вчинила дії сексуального характеру, пов’язані із вагінальним, анальним або оральним проникненням в тіло особи, яка не досягла шістнадцятирічного віку, з використанням геніталій, іншого органу чи частини тіла або будь-якого предмета, карається обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. У випадку, якщо ті самі дії, вчинені близькими родичами або членами сім’ї, особою, на яку покладено обов’язки щодо виховання потерпілої особи або піклування про неї, або якщо вони поєднані з наданням грошової чи іншої винагороди потерпілій особі чи третій особі або з обіцянкою такої винагороди, або якщо вони спричинили безплідність чи інші тяжкі наслідки, злочинець карається позбавленням волі на строк від п'яти до восьми років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років або без такого. Стаття 156 передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за розпусні дії, вчинені щодо особи, яка не досягла 16 років. Це суспільно небезпечне винне діяння карається обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. Якщо ті самі дії вчинені щодо малолітньої особи або вчинені членами сім’ї чи близькими родичами, особою, на яку покладено обов’язки щодо виховання потерпілого або піклування про нього, винний підлягає покаранню у вигляді позбавлення волі на строк від п'яти до восьми років з позбавленням права обіймати певні посади чи займатися певною діяльністю на строк до трьох років або без такого. Домагання дитини для сексуальних цілей криміналізовано статтею 1561. Домагання за цією статтею означає пропозицію зустрічі, зроблену повнолітньою особою, особі, яка не досягла 16 років з метою вчинення стосовно неї будь-яких дій сексуального характеру або розпусних дій, у разі якщо після такої пропозиції було вчинено хоча б одну дію, спрямовану на те, щоб така зустріч відбулася.

This law amends Paraguay’s Criminal Code and establishes (among other things) penalties for (i) sexual harassment, article 133; (ii) domestic violence, article 229; (iii) sexual coercion, including sexual abuse without intercourse, article 128; (iv) human trafficking, article 129; (v) sexual abuse of defenseless victims, article 130; and (vi) sexual abuse of persons held in custody, children under 14, and/or persons under guardianship –articles 130, 131, 135, 136, 137 and 230.

Esta ley modifica el Código Penal de Paraguay y establece, entre otras, penas por (i) acoso sexual, artículo 133; (ii) violencia intrafamiliar, artículo 229; (iii) coacción sexual, incluido el abuso sexual sin penetración, artículo 128; (iv) trata de personas, artículo 129; (v) abuso sexual de víctimas indefensas, artículo 130; y (vi) abuso sexual de personas privadas de libertad, menores de 14 años y/o personas bajo tutela –artículos 130, 131, 135, 136, 137 y 230.

This law prevents and punishes human trafficking perpetrated in Paraguayan territory and abroad, in any of its forms. It also protects and assists victims by strengthening public actions as a response against this crime. The law criminalizes with eight years of imprisonment any conduct intended to capture or transport victims with the purposes of sexual exploitation, slavery, or organ trafficking. The years of imprisonment could increase when aggravating circumstances are present. In case of conviction, the law also allows courts to set any compensation for the victim, at the expense of the convicted.

Esta ley previene y sanciona la trata de personas perpetrada en el territorio paraguayo y en el exterior, en cualquiera de sus formas. También protege y asiste a las víctimas fortaleciendo las acciones públicas como respuesta a este delito. La ley tipifica con ocho años de prisión cualquier conducta tendiente a la captura o transporte de víctimas con fines de explotación sexual, esclavitud o tráfico de órganos. Los años de prisión podrán aumentar cuando concurran circunstancias agravantes. En caso de condena, la ley también permite que los tribunales fijen alguna indemnización para la víctima, a expensas del condenado.

This law extended the powers of authorities in investigations of alleged crimes of violence against women as well as amended the domestic violence and food assistance provisions, as contained in articles 229 and 233 of the Criminal Code. With the issuance of this law, the prosecutor is allowed to engage in investigations of the aforementioned crimes at the moment it learns from the conduct in any manner, thus, the prosecutor no longer has to wait until someone presses charges to start the correspondent investigations.

Esta ley amplió las facultades de las autoridades en las investigaciones de presuntos delitos de violencia contra la mujer y modificó las disposiciones sobre violencia doméstica y asistencia alimentaria, contenidas en los artículos 229 y 233 del Código Penal. Con la expedición de esta ley el fiscal puede iniciar investigaciones de los delitos antes mencionados en el momento en que tenga conocimiento de la conducta de cualquier manera, por lo que el fiscal ya no tiene que esperar a que alguien presente cargos para iniciar las investigaciones correspondientes.

This law aims to develop article 42 of the Constitution which establishes standards to prevent, remedy, and punish domestic violence. The Law stipulates the behaviors considered violative of structured harmony/unity within a family, protective measures against domestic violence, medical and physiological assistance for victims, and sanctions by the courts against the aggressor.

Esta ley tiene por objeto desarrollar el artículo 42 de la Constitución que establece normas para prevenir, remediar y sancionar la violencia intrafamiliar. La Ley estipula las conductas consideradas violatorias de la armonía y unidad dentro de un núcleo familia, las medidas de protección contra la violencia doméstica, la asistencia médica y fisiológica a las víctimas y las sanciones judiciales contra el agresor.

The Decree dictates that pregnancy can only be terminated up until 12 weeks. After that, abortion is allowed only when there is a risk to the woman's life or health.

Įstatymas numato, kad nėštumas gali būti nutrauktas tik iki 12 savaičių. Ilgesnis laikotarpis leidžiamas tik tada, kai kyla pavojus asmens gyvybei ar sveikatai.

Section 201 states that a person who coerces another person, by force, deprivation of personal liberty, or by threat to life, to perform or tolerate sexual intercourse, or a sexual act equivalent to sexual intercourse, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 2-10 years. If the act causes serious bodily harm or pregnancy of the raped person, or if the act places the raped person in a state of agony for a prolonged period of time or humiliates that person in an extraordinary way, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 5-15 years. If the act results in the death of the raped person, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of 10 to 20 years or by life imprisonment. Section 202 punishes other forms of sexual violence involving coercion by force or threat of violence with a term of imprisonment of six months to five years.

Nach § 201 wird mit Freiheitsstrafe von 2 bis 10 Jahren bestraft, wer eine andere Person mit Gewalt, unter Entziehung der persönlichen Freiheit oder durch Drohung mit dem Leben dazu nötigt, den Geschlechtsverkehr oder eine dem Geschlechtsverkehr gleichgestellte sexuelle Handlung vorzunehmen oder zu dulden. Führt die Tat zu einer schweren Körperverletzung oder zu einer Schwangerschaft der vergewaltigten Person oder versetzt sie die vergewaltigte Person für längere Zeit in einen Zustand der Agonie oder demütigt sie in außergewöhnlicher Weise, so wird der Täter mit Freiheitsstrafe von 5 bis 15 Jahren bestraft. Führt die Tat zum Tod der vergewaltigten Person, so wird der Täter mit einer Freiheitsstrafe von 10 bis 20 Jahren oder mit lebenslänglicher Freiheitsstrafe bestraft. Andere Formen der sexuellen Gewalt, die eine Nötigung durch Gewalt oder die Drohung mit Gewalt beinhalten, werden nach § 202 mit einer Freiheitsstrafe von sechs Monaten bis zu fünf Jahren bestraft.

Section 85(1) no. 2a provides that a genital mutilation constitutes an assault with severe permanent consequences. While it can be possible to consent to a personal injury, Section 90(3) states that it is not possible for a person to consent to genital mutilation. Furthermore, pursuant to Section 64(1) no. 4a the criminal liability does not require that Austria be the location of the crime as long as, e.g., the perpetrator or the victim is Austrian.

Nach § 85 Abs. 1 Ziff. 2a ist die Genitalverstümmelung eine Körperverletzung mit schweren Dauerfolgen. Zwar kann grundsätzlich in eine Körperverletzung eingewilligt werden, allerdings macht § 90 Abs. 3 klar, dass das nicht für den Fall einer Genitalverstümmelung gilt. Außerdem ist nennenswert, dass § 64 Abs. 1 Ziff. 4a klar macht, dass die Strafbarkeit nicht voraussetzt, dass Österreich der Tatort war, solange z.B. das Opfer oder der Täter österreichische Staatsbürger sind.

Generally, the person performing the abortion and the pregnant woman who consents to the procedure are criminally liable pursuant to Section 96. Under Section 97 the abortion is not punishable, if (i) the abortion is performed by a doctor during the first three months of the pregnancy and after prior consultation with a doctor; (ii) the abortion is necessary to prevent a serious risk to life or serious danger to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or if there is a serious risk that the child will be seriously mentally or physically damaged, or if the pregnant woman was younger than 14 years old at the time of the impregnation, and in all such cases the abortion is performed by a doctor; or (iii) the abortion is performed to save the pregnant woman from an immediate, unavoidable danger to life and in circumstances where medical assistance cannot be obtained in time. Section 98 states that a person who terminates a pregnancy without the consent of the pregnant woman is liable to a term of imprisonment of up to three years. If such an act results in the death of the pregnant woman, the term of imprisonment varies between six months and five years. The abovementioned does not apply where such acts are performed to save the pregnant woman’s life from an immediate, unavoidable danger or where her consent cannot be obtained in time.

Grundsätzlich ist die Person, die die Abtreibung durchführt, wie auch die Frau, die der Prozedur zustimmt strafbar nach § 96. Nach § 97 ist die Abtreibung nicht strafbewährt, wenn (i) sie von einem Arzt während der ersten drei Monate der Schwangerschaft und nach einer vorherigen Beratungssitzung mit einem Arzt durchgeführt wurde; (ii) die Abtreibung notwendig ist, um ein ernstzunehmendes Risiko für das Leben oder die physische oder mentale Gesundheit der schwangeren Frau zu vermeiden, oder wenn ein ernstes Risiko besteht, dass das Kind ernsthafte mentale oder körperliche Schäden haben wird, oder wenn die Schwangere jünger als 14 Jahre alt ist im Zeitpunkt der Befruchtung, und – in all diesen Fällen – die Abtreibung von einem Arzt durchgeführt wird; oder (iii) die Abtreibung durchgeführt wird, um die Schwangere von einer unmittelbaren, unvermeidbaren Lebensgefahr zu retten und die Umstände keine rechtzeitige medizinische Versorgung zulassen. Gemäß § 98 ist eine Person mit bis zu drei Jahren Gefängnis zu bestrafen, wenn sie eine Schwangerschaft ohne die Einwilligung der Schwangeren beendet. Sollte diese Handlung zu dem Tod der Schwangeren führen, ist die Gefängnisstrafe zwischen 6 Monaten und fünf Jahren. Dies findet allerdings keine Anwendung, wenn solche Handlungen vorgenommen wurden, um die schwangere Frau von unmittelbaren, unvermeidbaren Lebensgefahren zu retten oder in Situationen, in denen die Einwilligung der Frau nicht rechtzeitig eingeholt werden konnte.

Article 8 provides that traffickers of adults over 18 are subject to a sentence of not less than six months, a fine of 1,000 – 5,000 (JD), or both. Human trafficking crimes for this purpose are defined in Article 3 (A)(1) to include coercion, threat or force, or through giving or receiving gifts or privileges to secure consent. Article 9 provides for a punishment consisting of temporary imprisonment with hard labor for a not less than 10 years, and a fine between 5000 – 20,000 (JD) if the victim of trafficking is a female under 18, even without any aggravating factors or the use or threat or force (as defined in Article 3). Article 10 further provides that a person will be imprisoned for up to 6 months if he or she becomes aware, by nature of her or his job, of such acts or the intent to commit Article 9 acts and does not report it. Similarly, Article 11 has provisions for juristic persons who commit such crimes stating they will be sentenced to a fine of 1,000 – 50,000 (JC) as well as potential criminal responsibility. Article 13 also provides a provision that consent of the victims is not a consideration under this Law, especially to reduce stipulated penalties in this Law.

ذكرت المادة 8 عقوبة كل من استقطب أشخاص أو نقلهم أو آواهم أو استقبلهم بغرض استغلالهم عن طريق التهديد بالقوة أو استعمالها أو غير ذلك من أشكال الاستغلال أو الاختطاف أو الاحتيال أو القسر أو الخداع (البند 1 من الفقرة أ من ذات القانون) بالحبس مدة لا تقل عن ستة أشهر أو بغرامة ما بين 1000 و5000 دينار أردني أو بكلتا هاتين العقوبتين. كما نصت المادة 9 على العقوبات التي تترتب على كل من اتجر بشخص يقل عمره عن 18 سنة ولو كان ذلك دون استعمال أي شكل من أشكال القوة الموضحة في المادة 3 من ذات القانون. وأوضحت المادة 10 أن عقوبة كل من نمى إلى علمه بحكم وظيفته بارتكاب إحدى الجرائم المنصوص عليها في المادة 9 من ذات القانون أو بوجود مخطط لارتكابها، منها الاتجار بالأشخاص الذي لم يبلغ عمرهم 18 سنة، ولم يقم بإبلاغ الجهات الرسمة ذات الاختصاص. أما المادة 11 فقد عاقبت الشخص الاعتباري المرتكب لأي جريمة منصوص عليها في هذا القانون بغرامة ما بين 10,000 و 50,000 دينار أردني. وذكرت المادة 13 أن رضى المجني عليهم أو المتضررين من جرائم الاتجار بالبشر لا يؤخذ بعين الاعتبار من أجل تخفيض أي من العقوبات المنصوص عليها في هذا القانون.

The Penal Code includes the follow aggravating circumstances if a crime involves discrimination on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, place of birth, sex, sexual orientation, sexual harassment, belief or religion, political or ideological convictions, social ideological convictions, social status or origin, or any other form of discrimination.

O Código Penal inclui as seguintes circunstâncias agravantes: se o crime envolve discriminação com base em raça, cor, etnia, local de nascença, sexo, orientação sexual, assédio sexual, crença ou religião, convicção política ou ideológica, convicção ideológica social, status social ou origem, ou qualquer outra forma de discriminação.

The Penal Code distinguishes and applies different penalties in accordance with the age of the minor. Pursuant to article 192, the prohibition of the perpetration of a sexual act with a minor under 14 years old or leading that minor to practice such acts with a third person is punished with up to 12 years in prison. Again, the law makes a distinction whether the act involved penetration, in which case the maximum punishment increases to 15 years. If the minor is under the age of 16, pursuant to article 193, the perpetration of a sexual act leads to a maximum penalty of five years, which increases to eight years if there was penetration. Article 194 provides penalties for cases in which the minor is in the perpetrator’s custody.. Article 198 punishes the crime of child pornography with up to five years of imprisonment and is defined as to 1) promote, facilitate, or allow minors to participate in any kind of obscene interaction (including films, photographs, talks, recordings, etc.); 2) using minors in pornographic tapings or photos; or 3) giving such tapings, recordings, or pornographic instruments to a minor. The maximum penalty is increased to 10 years in prison in case the child pornography is produced with the intent to be spread through information systems or if the agent offers, makes available, or transmits such child pornography through information systems. An individual who acquires, obtains, or facilitates the access to child pornography is punished with up to five years of imprisonment and, if such agent practices such acts as means of profession, the maximum penalty is increased to 10 years.

O Código Penal distingue e aplica penalidades diferentes de acordo com a idade do menor. De acordo com o artigo 192, a proibição da perpetração do ato sexual com menor de 14 anos de idade ou a orientação ao menor para praticar tais atos com uma Terceira pessoa é punível com até 12 anos de prisão. Novamente, a lei faz uma distinção se o ato envolve penetração, caso em que a punição máxima aumenta para 15 anos. Se o menor tem menos de 16 anos de idade, de acordo com o artigo 193, a perpetração do ato sexual leva a uma penalidade máxima de cinco anos, que aumenta para oito anos se houve penetração. O artigo 194 prevê penalidade para casos em que o menor está sob custódia do perpetrador. O artigo 198 pune o crime de pornografia infantil com até cinco anos de prisão e é definido como 1) promover, facilitar, ou permitir que menores participem de qualquer tipo de interação obscena (incluindo filmes, fotografias, falas, gravações, etc); 2) usar menores em vídeos ou fotos pornográficos; ou 3) dar tais vídeos, gravações, ou instrumentos pornográficos a menores. A penalidade máxima aumenta até 10 anos na prisão no caso em que a pornografia infantil é produzida com a intenção de ser divulgada por meio de sistemas de informação ou se o agente oferecer, disponibilizar, ou transmitir tal pornografia infantil por meio de sistemas de informação. O indivíduo que adquire, obtém, ou facilita o acesso a pornografia infantile é punido com até cinco anos de prisão e, se esse agente pratica tais atos como meios profissionais, a penalidade máxima aumenta para 10 anos.

The law distinguishes the crimes of “sexual aggression” and “sexual aggression with penetration.” A person commits the crime of sexual aggression (article 182) if (i) he or she practices a sexual act by means of coercion, violence, or threat against someone, including a spouse, or (ii) he or she enables another person to commit such act against a third person and the sentence ranges from six months to four years of imprisonment. However, article 183 states that if the coerced sexual act involves penetration, the crime committed is “sexual aggression with penetration,” which entails a higher sentence of up to 10 years in prison. Penetration is defined as “copulation, anal or oral, oral intercourse and vaginal or anal penetration with any part of the body or objects used in circumstances of sexual involvement (article 181(c)). Additional crimes (articles 184-187) involve sexual acts committed (i) against persons with diminished capacity or those unable to consent; (ii) by taking advantage of a position or function in certain sectors or by a person in a position of authority; and (iii) by means of another person’s error. Both “ii” and “iii” carry sentences of up to three years in prison or a fine while (i) carries a sentence of up to 12 years in prison if penetration occurs. Finally, article 188 prohibits artificial procreation without the woman’s consent.

A lei distingue os crimes de “agressão sexual” e “agressão sexual com penetração”. A pessoa realiza o crime de agressão sexual (artigo 182) se (i) ele ou ela pratica ato sexual por meio de coerção, violência, ou ameaça contra alguém, incluindo um cônjuge, ou (ii) ele ou ela permite que outra pessoa realize tal ato contra uma terceira pessoa e a sentença varia entre seis meses e quatro anos de prisão. Entretanto, o artigo 183 estabelece que se o ato sexual coagido envolve penetração, o crime cometido é “agressão sexual com penetração”, que implica uma sentença de até 10 anos na prisão. Penetração é definido como “copulação, anal ou oral, relação oral e penetração anal ou vaginal com qualquer outra parte do corpo ou objetos usados em circunstâncias de envolvimento sexual (artigo 181(c)). Crimes adicionais (artigos 184-187) envolvem atos sexuais cometidos (i) contra pessoas com capacidade diminuída ou aqueles impossibilitados de consentir; (ii) ao tirar vantagem de posição ou função em certos setores ou por uma pessoa em posição de autoridade; e (iii) por meio do erro de outra pessoa. Ambos “ii” e “iii” carregam sentenças de até três anos na prisão ou multa enquanto (i) carrega sentença de até 12 anos de prisão se houver penetração. Finalmente, o artigo 188 proíbe procriação artificial sem o consentimento da mulher.

Articles 154-158 prohibit 1) anyone, without the pregnant woman’s consent, to provoke or cause a miscarriage; 2) anyone, with the pregnant woman’s consent, to perform or assist with an abortion; and 3) any pregnant woman from, by any means, participating or consenting to an abortion. These three felonies carry sentences of 2-8 years, 1-5 years, and 5 years of imprisonment, respectively. (article 154). Article 155 provides for increased sentences if the abortion harms the woman’s physical integrity or causes death. Exempt from criminal liability are abortions carried out with the pregnant woman’s consent to 1) remove the risk of death or great harm, or 2) the fetus’ life is inviable, or 3) the pregnancy is a result of rape and the abortion is done within the first 16 weeks of the pregnancy. All these circumstances must be verified and reported in writing by a doctor ahead of the interruption (article 156). It is also forbidden to promote services for the interruption of pregnancies and any "propaganda" (articles 157 and 158).

Artigos 154-158 proíbe 1) quem, sem o consentimento da mulher grávida, provocar aborto ou interrupção da gravidez; 2) quem, com o consentimento da mulher grávida, realizer aborto ou ajudá-la a fazer; e 3) a mulher gravida que, de qualquer maneira, participar ou consentir com o aborto. Esses três crimes carregam sentenças de 2-8 anos, 1-5 anos, e 5 anos de encarceramento, respectivamente (artigo 154). O artigo 155 prevê aumento de pena se o aborto lesa a integridade física da mulher ou causa a sua morte. Isentos de responsabilidade criminal são os abortos realizados com o consentimento da mulher, na medida em que 1) remove o risco de morte ou grave lesão, ou 2) a vida do feto é inviável, ou 3) a gravidez é resultado de um estupro e o aborto é feito durante as 16 primeiras semanas de gravidez. Todas essas circunstâncias devem ser verificadas e reportadas por escrito ao médico responsável pela interrupção (artigo 156). Também fica proibido promover serviços para interrupção de gravidez ou qualquer propaganda desse tipo de prática (artigos 157 e 158).

Article 163 punishes sexual coercion – to coerce someone to practice a “relevant sexual act” – with imprisonment from one to eight years. Article 164 punishes forcible intercourse (“violação”) with imprisonment from one to six years. Article 168 punishes artificial procreation without a woman’s consent, with imprisonment from one to eight years. Articles 171 and 172 punish sexual abuse of minors of 14 years with imprisonment from 1-10 years. Article 173 punishes sexual acts with adolescents (individuals between 14 and 16 years old) with imprisonment up to three years. Article 174 punishes the practice for “relevant sexual acts” with a minor between 14 and 18 years), upon payment or other type of consideration with imprisonment up to three years. Article 175 punishes facilitating the prostitution of minors with imprisonment from 1-8 years. The term of imprisonment rises to a minimum of two and a maximum of ten years if the crime is committed by means of violence or threat, fraud, authority abuse, or with the intent to profit, or if the victim is vulnerable or mentally incapable. Article 176 punishes child pornography with imprisonment up to five years. The term of imprisonment rises to a minimum of one and a maximum of eight years if the crime is committed by means of violence or threat or with the intent to profit. Article 176-A punishes the act of befriending a minor online with the intent to commit sexual abuse with imprisonment of up to one year. If the act of online befriending effectively leads to an encounter, the conduct is punishable with imprisonment of up to two years. Article 176-B punishes the organization of sexual tourism with imprisonment of up to three years.

O artigo 163 pune a coerção sexual – ato de coagir alguém a praticar um "ato sexual relevante" - com prisão de um a oito anos. O artigo 164 pune as relações sexuais forçadas (violação ou estupro) com prisão de um a seis anos. O artigo 168 pune a procriação artificial sem o consentimento da mulher, com prisão de um a oito anos. O artigo 169 pune a exploração econômica da prostituição por terceiros. Entretanto, a prostituição em si não é um crime em Portugal. O artigo 176-B pune a organização do turismo sexual com pena de prisão de até três anos. Artigos 171 e 172 punem o abuso sexual de menores de 14 anos com prisão de um a dez anos. O artigo 173 pune atos sexuais com adolescentes (indivíduos entre 14 e 16 anos de idade) com prisão de até três anos. O artigo 174 pune a prática de "atos sexuais relevantes" com um menor entre 14 e 18 anos, mediante pagamento ou outro tipo de contraprestação, com prisão de até três anos. O Artigo 175 pune a facilitação da prostituição de menores com prisão de um a oito anos. A pena de prisão é aumentada para um mínimo de dois e um máximo de dez anos se o crime for cometido por meio de violência ou ameaça, fraude, abuso de autoridade ou com a intenção de lucro, ou se a vítima for vulnerável ou mentalmente incapaz. O artigo 176 pune a pornografia infantil com prisão até 5 anos. A pena de prisão é aumentada para um mínimo de um e um máximo de 8 anos, caso o crime tenha sido cometido por meio de violência ou ameaça ou com a intenção de lucrar. O Artigo 176-A pune o ato de fazer amizade com um menor on-line com a intenção de cometer abuso sexual com pena de prisão de até um ano. Se o ato de fazer amizade on-line levar efetivamente a um encontro, a conduta é punível com prisão de até dois anos.

Under Article 140, abortion is considered a “crime against the intra-uterine life,” and someone who causes an abortion without the consent of the pregnant woman may be sentenced from 2-8 years of imprisonment, while the person who performed the abortion and the pregnant woman can be sentence to up to three years of imprisonment. Article 142, however, permits the abortion if performed by a doctor and in the following scenarios: (1) the abortion is the only method to avoid risk of death or grave physical or mental harm to the mother; (2) the abortion is recommended in order to avoid the risk of death or permanent grave physical damage to the mother, up to the 12th week of pregnancy (3) the fetus is at risk of grave illness or malformation, up to the 24th week of pregnancy; (4) the pregnancy was caused by rape or sexual assault, up to the 16th week of pregnancy; (5) by the mother’s choice, up to the 10th week of pregnancy. In cases where the fetus is not viable, abortion can be performed at any time during pregnancy. Any of the conditions above mentioned have to be certified by a doctor, except item 5, case in which the mother has to submit an affidavit to a doctor or clinic stating that her decision was “mindful and responsible.” If the mother is under 16 years old or mentally incapacitated, the consent to perform an abortion has to be provided by the woman’s legal representative (usually parents).

Segundo o artigo 140 do Código Penal Português, o aborto é considerado um "crime contra a vida intrauterina", e quem causar aborto sem o consentimento da grávida pode ser condenado a penas de dois a oito anos de prisão, enquanto quem causar um aborto com o consentimento da grávida, bem como a própria grávida poderá ser condenado a pena de até 3 anos de prisão. A seção 142, entretanto, permite o aborto se realizado por um médico e nas seguintes situações: (1) o aborto é o único método para evitar o risco de morte ou grave dano físico ou mental à mãe; (2) o aborto é recomendado para evitar o risco de morte ou grave dano físico permanente à mãe, até a 12ª semana de gravidez; (3) o feto está em risco de doença grave ou malformação, até a 24ª semana de gravidez; (4) a gravidez foi causada por estupro ou agressão sexual, até a 16ª semana de gravidez; (5) por escolha da mãe, até a 10ª semana de gravidez. Nos casos em que o feto não é viável, o aborto pode ser realizado a qualquer momento durante a gravidez. Qualquer uma das condições acima mencionadas tem que ser certificada por um médico, exceto o item 5, caso em que a mãe tem que apresentar uma declaração juramentada a um médico ou clínica declarando que sua decisão foi "atenta e responsável". No caso de a mãe ser menor de 16 anos ou mentalmente incapacitada, o consentimento para realizar um aborto tem que ser dado por um representante legal da mulher (geralmente os pais).

This section states crimes against sexual freedom, including the conditions under which sexual encounters violate a woman’s safety and the punishments thereafter. Anyone who engages in sexual activity without the woman’s consent by means of violence or physical intimidation, even if an act of artificial procreation, is subject to two to eight years in prison. Those who have sexual encounters with minors face imprisonment of 16-20 years. Anyone who takes advantage of a hierarchical position in a workplace to constrain someone to obtain sexual advantage is punished with imprisonment up to two years and a fine.

Essa seção estabelece os crimes contra a Liberdade sexual, incluindo as condições nas quais os encontros sexuais violam a segurança da mulher e as punições referentes. Aquele que inicia atividade sexual sem o consentimento da mulher por meio de violência ou intimidação física, ainda que seja um ato de procriação artificial, está sujeito a pena de dois a oito anos de prisão. Aquele que mantém encontros sexuais com menores encaram uma prisão de 16-20 anos. Aquele que tira proveito da sua posição hierárquica em um ambiente professional para constranger alguém para obter vantagem sexual é punido com prisão de até dois anos e multa.

This section describes the circumstances and consequences for interrupting a woman’s pregnancy, and formalities for non-punishable abortion. Anyone who aborts a child without the woman’s consent can be imprisoned from three months to two years, and up to one year with her consent. A woman who performs an abortion on herself or a health professional who abuses their position to provide an abortion is punishable with imprisonment up to two years. If there are serious physical consequences, such as death, that resulted from the abortion, the person who performed the operation is subject to 8-12 years in prison. Abortion is not punishable, however, when the fetus is inviable or will be born with a serious incurable illness such as HIV or AIDS, the pregnancy is a result of a sexual assault, or the woman opts to do so within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy.

Essa seção descreve as circunstâncias e consequências de interromper uma gravidez, e as formalidades para abortos sem punição. Quem aborta uma criança sem o consentimento da mulher pode ter uma pena de três meses a dois anos, e até um ano se tiver o seu consentimento. Uma mulher que realiza um aborto em si mesma ou um professional da saúde que abusa da sua posição para realizar um aborto é punido com prisão de até dois anos. Se alguma consequência física séria acontecer, como a morte resultante do aborto, a pessoa que performou a operação está sujeita a 8-12 anos de prisão. O aborto não é punível, entretanto, quando o feto não é viável ou nascerá com uma doença incurável, como HIV ou AIDS, se a gravidez for resultado de abuso sexual, ou se a mulher optou por realizar o procedimento dentro das 12 primeiras semanas de gravidez.

The law includes a set of preventative measures aimed at preventing domestic violence among others crimes and administrative offenses. Art. 1 defines domestic violence as the intentional actions of a physical, psychological, or sexual nature against a family member that violate his or her rights, freedoms, or legitimate interests causing physical and/or mental suffering. Art. 1 further defines family members to include relatives, dependents and other persons that live together in a common household. Art. 5 defines the “actors of prevention,” which include various State agencies and Non-Governmental Agencies. The “actors of prevention” must annually develop and approve comprehensive regional programs for crime prevention, including programs to prevent domestic violence in accordance with Art. 11. Art. 17 provides the basic preventative measures against domestic violence, including identification and elimination of causes of domestic violence, educational and informational work to prevent domestic violence, record-keeping of domestic violence instances, provision of temporary shelters to victims of domestic violence, among others. Finally, Art. 31 allows the issuance of a protective order against a person who has committed domestic violence. A protective order can compel the offender temporarily to leave the premises jointly occupied with the victim and prohibit disposition of joint property.

Art. 199 prohibits the unjustified refusal to hire or the unlawful firing of a person, including a woman for reasons related to her pregnancy. This crime is punishable by a prohibition to occupy certain offices or be engaged in certain activities, correctional labor, or imprisonment for a term of up to three years.

For several crimes set out in the Criminal Code, knowing commission against a pregnant woman is an aggravating circumstance that increases the sentence. Murdering a pregnant woman is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 8 to 12 years, life imprisonment, or the death sentence under Art. 139. Torture of a pregnant woman is punishable by restraint on liberty for a term of one to three years or imprisonment for a term of one to five years under Art. 154. Taking a pregnant woman hostage is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 6 to 12 years under Art. 291.

Art. 166 of the Criminal Code defines rape as “sexual intercourse against the will of the victim with the use of violence” or threat of such violence against the woman or her relatives, or using the woman’s helpless state. Rape is punishable by restraint on liberty for a term of up to four years or imprisonment for a term of three to seven years. Rape in aggravating circumstances, including repeated rape, rape by a group of people, or rape by a person who has previously committed sexually violent acts, is punishable by imprisonment for a term of five to thirteen years and knowing rape of a minor or rape that causes grave consequences (e.g., death, bodily harm, or HIV infection) is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 8-15 years. Art. 167 likewise prohibits violent acts of sexual nature, such as “sodomy” or “lesbianism” against the will of the victim with the use of violence or threat of such violence, or using the victim’s helpless state. The punishments for committing an Art. 167 crime in aggravated circumstances are the same as those for rape. Art. 168 prohibits sexual intercourse and other acts of a sexual nature with a person below the age of 16. This crime is punishable by, in case there are no signs of criminal acts set out above, restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up to four years, with a fine. The punishment, in case the offender has previously committed the crimes described above, has duties owed to the victim, or the crime is committed by a group of persons, is imprisonment for a term of three to ten years. “Depraved acts” committed against a person below the age of 16 are punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to six years under Art. 169. Art. 170 criminalizes the compulsion to commit acts of a sexual nature by means of blackmail, threat of destruction of property, or by using the dependence (workplace, monetary, etc.) of the victim. The crime is punishable by restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up three years, with a fine and prohibition to occupy certain offices. Such a crime knowingly committed against a minor is punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to six years. Arts. 171 and 171 prohibit the organization, use, or creation of conditions for prostitution, including by removing the victim outside of the country; such crimes are punishable by up to ten years of imprisonment.

The Law on Domestic Violence defines and prohibits domestic violence, classifying such practice as a crime for the first time. The definition of domestic violence includes not only physical acts, but also sexual, psychological, verbal abuse, among other forms of abuse, as a form of domestic violence, not being restricted to the family environment. Moreover, the law sets out this type of violence as a “public crime,” which means that any person may report its occurrence to the authorities or police. The Law further grants victims of domestic violence the right to financial, juridical, medical, and other forms of state support, including access to public shelters. It also establishes measures of prevention, support, and protection for the victim, and the procedures relating to complaint, denunciation, and withdrawal, besides recognizing the right to compensation guaranteed to the victim. It is important to mention that this law grants the rights not only to women, but to any person who is submitted to domestic violence.

A lei contra a Violência Doméstica define e proíbe a violência doméstica, classificando essa prática como crime pela primeira vez. A definição de violência doméstica inclui não apenas atos físicos, mas sexuais, psicológicos, abuso verbal, entre outras formas de abuso, como uma forma de violência doméstica, não se restringindo ao ambiente familiar. Além disso, a lei estabelece esse crime como “crime público”, o que significa que qualquer pessoa pode reportar a sua ocorrência para as autoridades ou polícia. A Lei ainda concede às vítimas de violência doméstica o direito a suporte financeiro, jurídico, médico, e outras formas de suporte estatal, incluindo acesso a abrigos públicos. Também estabelece medidas de prevenção, suporte, e proteção para a vítima, e os procedimentos relativos à reclamação, denúncia, e desistência, além de reconhecer o direito à indenização garantido para a vítima. É importante mencionar que essa lei concede direitos não apenas à mulher, mas a qualquer pessoa que é submetida à violência doméstica.

The Maria da Penha Act alters the penal procedure code to allow the judge to order preventive custody when there is risk to the physical or psychological integrity of the woman. (Article 42). Article 45 alters the law of criminal enforcement to allow the judge to determine the obligatory attendance of the aggressor in recovery and re-education programs. The Act orders the creation of special courts for domestic and family violence against women with civil and penal competence to address family issues derived from violence against women. Article 43 amends the Penal Code by including violence against women as an aggravating factor. Article 44 imposes the penalty sentences ranging from three months to three years of detention to domestic violence. If domestic violence is committed against a woman with special needs, the sentence will be increased by 1/3.

A Lei Maria da Penha alterou o Código de Processo Penal para permitir a que juiz decrete prisão preventiva quando há risco à integridade física ou psicológica da mulher (artigo 42). O artigo 45 altera a Lei de Execuções Penais permitindo que o juiz determine o comparecimento obrigatório do agressor a programas de recuperação e reeducação. A LMP prevê a criação de Juizados contra Violência Doméstica e Familiar contra Mulher, com jurisdição civil e penal para tratar sobre assuntos cíveis e criminais. Por fim, o artigo 43 emenda o Código Penal para incluir a violência contra mulheres no rol de circunstância agravantes, enquanto o artigo 44 estabelece pena de 3 meses a 3 anos de detenção para lesão corporal contra ascendente, descendente, irmão, cônjuge ou companheiro, ou com quem conviva ou tenha convivido, ou, ainda, prevalecendo-se o agente das relações domésticas, de coabitação ou de hospitalidade. Nos casos de violência doméstica praticada contra pessoas com necessidades especiais, a pena imposta é acrescida de 1/3.

The law decrees that a judge shall determine, for a defined period of time, the inclusion of the woman in a situation of domestic and family violence in the registry of assistance programs of the federal, state and municipal government. (Article 9). Article 10-A sets guidelines on how the victim's assistance will be handled by the police authority and guarantees specialized police and forensic care to be provided by previously trained officers - preferably female. If there is a current or imminent risk to the life or physical integrity of a woman in a situation of domestic or family violence, or to her dependents, the aggressor must be immediately removed from the home, residence, or place where the victim lives with him/her (Article 12-C). The law prohibits the imposition of pecuniary sentences against the aggressor. (Article 17).

O juiz determinará, por prazo certo, a inclusão da mulher em situação de violência doméstica e familiar no cadastro de programas assistenciais do governo federal, estadual e municipal (Artigo 9º). O artigo 10-A estabelece os procedimentos que deverão ser seguidos pela autoridade policial quando do atendimento das mulheres vítimas de violência doméstica, dentre os quais a garantia de polícia e perícia especializada e treinad e atendimento realizado preferencialmente por mulheres. Na existência de risco atual ou iminente à vida ou à integridade física da mulher em situação de violência doméstica e familiar, ou de seus dependentes, o agressor será imediatamente afastado do lar, domicílio ou local de convivência com a ofendida (artigo 12-C). A LMP ainda proíbe a imposição exclusiva de pena pecuniária contra o agressor (artigo 17).

Under the Brazilian Criminal Code, it is illegal to terminate a pregnancy, as well as to kill a child during childbirth, or shortly thereafter. Under Article 124, it is a crime for someone to cause an abortion on themselves or to allow others to cause it, either of which carries a sentence of 1-3 years of imprisonment. Article 125 prohibits anyone from practicing an abortion on a pregnant woman without her consent and imposes a sentence of 3-10 years of imprisonment. Article 126 imposes a 1-4-year prison sentence to anyone who practice an abortion with pregnant woman’s consent. Pursuant to Article 128, a doctor is not punished for performing an abortion if (i) the pregnant woman’s life is at risk, or (ii) the pregnancy resulted from rape. The Brazilian Supreme Court authorized the practice of an abortion on fetus with anencephaly (Claim of non-compliance with fundamental precept - ADPF 54). Under no circumstances is it permissible for someone to cause an abortion without the consent of the pregnant woman.

Nos termos do Código Penal brasileiro, é ilegal terminar uma gestação, ou matar um recém-nascido. De acordo com o artigo 124, é crime sujeito à detenção de um a três anos provocar aborto em si mesma ou consentir que outrem lhe provoque. O artigo 125 proíbe a prática de aborto sem o consentimento da gestante, impondo pena de reclusão de três a 10 anos de reclusão. O artigo 126 impõe pena de um a quatro anos de reclusão para quem provoca o aborto com o consentimento da gestante. Nos termos do artigo 128, o médico não será punido ao provocar o aborto nas seguintes situações: (i) se não há outro meio de salvar a vida da gestante; ou (ii) se a gravidez resulta de estupro e o aborto é precedido de consentimento da gestante ou, quando incapaz, de seu representante legal. O Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), quando do julgamento da Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental (ADPF) 54, autorizou interrupção da gravidez de feto anencefálico. Ainda, sob nenhuma hipótese é permitido provocar o aborto sem o consentimento da gestante.

Originally enacted in 1995 as the Child and Youth Sexual Transaction Prevention Act, this Act (the “CYSEPA”) was enacted to prevent all forms of sexual exploitation of children and youths and ensure their healthy physical and mental development. The CYSEPA specifies the responsibilities of the relevant authorities and governs the prevention of sexual exploitation of children and youths and the rescue, protection, and counseling of victims. Competent authorities must arrange the placement of the victim in a child and youth welfare institution, foster family, or other appropriate medical or educational institution on an emergency basis; evaluate the necessity of continuing placement within 72 hours; and to apply to the court for longer-term placements. The authorities must also offer counseling, intervention, and assistance with school enrollment, employment, independent living, or other necessary matters for a period of at least one year or until the victim’s 20th birthday. If the offender is the victim’s parent, foster parent, or guardian, the victim, the prosecutors, or other interested parties may apply to a court to stop such person from exercising parental rights over the victim and to appoint another guardian. After becoming aware of any victim or any suspect of a crime covered by the CYSEPA, medical personnel, social workers, educational personnel, caregivers, and personnel of other business or governmental organizations must report the crime to the authorities. Internet platform providers, online application service providers, and telecommunications companies are obligated to remove information relating to suspicious criminal activities, to notify law enforcement, and to provide data to law enforcement and judicial authorities for investigation. The competent authorities are also authorized to require the parents, guardian, or other caregiver of a victim to receive parental education and counseling for a period of up to 50 hours and to attend a family treatment program. Persons found guilty under the CYSEPA are subject to imprisonment as well as to fines up to N.T.10 million, with offenders who intentionally kill the victim subject to the death penalty or life imprisonment. English translation available here.

This Act superseded the Vishakha guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court of India. Before the institution of this Act, a woman facing harassment at the workplace had to lodge a complaint under Section 354 and/or Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code, which dealt with, respectively, assault or use of criminal force with the intent to outrage the modesty of a woman and words, gestures, or acts to outrage the modesty of a woman. This act is important because it obligates the employer to provide an environment free of sexual harassment. This is in contrast to the pre-Vishakha guidelines era during which the female employee would have to lodge complaints with the police authorities. Such obligation is a part of the company’s legal compliance and non-compliance triggers significant penalties. The Act defines various terms like ‘sexual harassment,’ ‘aggrieved woman,’ ‘workplace’ etc., which clarify actions covered under the Act. The Act broadly interprets these terms and efforts have been made to cover as many facets of employment as possible. Significantly, the term workplace has been expanded to include remote and telecommuting work. The Act also includes guidelines regarding the filing of complaints, the formation of the inquiry committee, and the process of conducting inquiries. Lastly, the Act also provides safeguards against malicious complaints.

The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act replaced the Ordinance of the same name which was promulgated in the aftermath of the Kathua Rape case in Jammu & Kashmir region of India in 2018, which involved the rape and murder of an eight-year-old girl. The Act amended various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, Indian Evidence Act, and The Code of Criminal Procedure. Notably, the Act increased the minimum punishment for rape from seven years to ten years of rigorous imprisonment which is extendable to life imprisonment. The penalty for rape of a girl under 16 years of age has also been increased to 20 years of imprisonment extendable to life, a significant increase from the original term of 10 years. Rape of a girl under 12 years of age has been made punishable with imprisonment of minimum 20 years extendable to life or with capital punishment. Lastly, the gang rape of a girl under 12 years of age has been made punishable with life imprisonment or capital punishment. The Act includes measures related to bail restrictions, speedy trial, and strengthening prosecution.

Ratified by BiH in November 2013, this Convention opens the path for creating a legal framework at the pan-European level to protect women against all forms of violence and to prevent, prosecute, and eliminate violence and domestic violence against women. The Convention also establishes the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), which is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Convention. Its members are elected by the state parties. The structure of the treaty is based on the “four Ps”: (1) prevention, (2) protection and support of victims, (3) prosecution of offenders, and (4) integrated policies. The Convention also establishes obligations in relation to the collection of data and supporting research in the field of violence against women. Article 2 of the Convention indicates that the provisions shall apply in time of peace and also in situations of armed conflicts. The treaty came into effect in Bosnia on the 1 August 2014.

Any person forcing another person into prostitution is subject to 5-10 years of imprisonment. If the victim is under 18 years old, the offender is subject to 10-20 years of imprisonment. Human trafficking is defined as the recruitment, moving, transfer or harboring of any person within or across national borders by means of deception, threats, use of force, debt bondage or other means, and using such person in forced labor, prostitution, pornography, or other unlawful acts, or removing body organs of such person, or for other unlawful purposes. The offender is subject to 5-15 years of imprisonment. For victims under 18 years old, any of the above-mentioned acts committed against them is deemed to be human trafficking even if there is no deception, threat, use of force, or debt bondage. When the offender is a “regular” human trafficker or in an organized group, the victims are children, there are two or more victims, the victim is a relative of the offender, or any victim suffers serious injury or becomes an invalid or insane, the offender is subject to 15-20 years of imprisonment. If a victim becomes disabled, infected with HIV, or died, the offender is subject to life imprisonment. Fines for human trafficking range from 10 million to 1 billion kip. If the victim is a woman, provisions of the Law on the Development and Protection of Women may be applicable too.

Rape is defined as using force, armed threats, drugs, or other means to coerce sexual intercourse with a woman against her will (where such woman is not the offender’s spouse), and is subject to three to five years of imprisonment. When the victim is between 15 to 18 years old, or is the offender’s dependent or patient, the offender is subject to 5-10 years of imprisonment. When the victim is under 15 years old, the offender committed battery, or the rape resulted the victim’s disability or caused the victim’s death, the offender is subject to 7-15 years of imprisonment. When the victim is also murdered, the offender is subject to 15-20 years of imprisonment, and may be sentenced to life imprisonment or death penalty. Violators are also subject to fines ranging from 5 million to 70 million kip. Attempted rape is also punishable. "Marital rape" through use of force or threats is also punishable by article 252 ("Sexual Intercourse by Force with a Female Spouse"), but separately and differently from other rape offenses. Violators of article 252 may face three months to one year imprisonment or re-education without imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to 3 million kip. If the rape of a female spouse results in serious injury, the penalties increase to one to five years in prison and a fine of 1 million to 5 million kip. While article 248 includes male victims of rape, article 252's prohibition on marital rape only applies to female spouses. English translation available from the Laos Official Gazette here.

Discrimination against women or restriction of women’s participation in any political, economic, socio-cultural or family activity based on gender reasons is subject to one to three years of imprisonment. Violators are subject to “public criticism,” “re-education without deprivation of liberty,” or imprisonment of one to three years and a fine of 3 million to 10 million kip. English translation available from the Laos Official Gazette here.

The “Equality Act” broadly prohibits almost all forms of gender discrimination. It establishes two groups, the Committee for the Promotion of Gender Equality (the “PGE Committee”) and the Committee on the Determination of the Unfair Gender Discrimination (the “UGD Committee”). The PGE Committee’s powers and duties broadly include prescribing and recommending policy on promoting gender quality, prescribing guidelines for providing assistance and remedy to victims of gender inequality, overseeing the performance of duties under the Equality Act, and promoting study and research into the prevention of gender discrimination. The UGD Committee’s powers and duties include considering problems submitted by petition claiming unfair gender discrimination, prescribing provisional measures before rendering decisions for protection or mitigation, and issuing orders to perform duties or provide compensation. Any person or organization found guilty of an offense shall be ordered to cease and prevent recurrence of unfair gender discrimination. Whoever fails to comply with such an order shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding 20,000 Baht. Under section 17(2) of the Equality Act gender discrimination is permitted on the basis of religious principles or national security. English translation available through External Link.

The “Prostitution Act” criminalizes various activities associated with sex work. The criminalized activities include (see Sections 5 to 13): soliciting oneself in a public place, associating with another in a sex work establishment for the purpose of prostitution, advertising oneself or another for the purpose of sex work, procuring a person for the purpose of prostituting that person, a parent who connives in the prostitution of their child who is under the age of 18, being an owner/manager/supervisor in a prostitution establishment or other controller of sex workers in a prostitution establishment, and detaining a person or threatening in any manner to compel engagement in sex work. The Prostitution Act only criminalizes individuals involved with selling sex, but carries no criminalization or consequences for a customer buying it unless the sex worker is under the age of 18. The penalty for involvement in prostitution ranges from a fine up to a term of imprisonment for life depending on the offense committed. A sex worker could be charged with a fine not exceeding 1,000 Baht and imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month. Over the past few years, police have been conducting raids, sometimes violently, on prostitution establishments. It has been noted that those who exploit women in prostitution are rarely prosecuted and women working in the entertainment sector are often presumed guilty and subject to humiliating treatment following arrest. There are also reports to widespread corruption and official complicity in prostitution and trafficking cases.

English translation available here.

Abortion is legal in the Netherlands when performed by a doctor in an appropriate medical setting as described in the Law on the Termination of Pregnancy. Abortion is criminalized outside these circumstances, and violations carry a penalty of up to four years and six months imprisonment or a fine. A criminal abortion that kills the woman carries a penalty of up to six years in prison or a fine. A criminal abortion performed without the woman's consent carries a penalty of up to 12 years in prison or a fine. A criminal abortion that both kills the woman and is performed without her consent is punishable by up to 15 years imprisonment or a fine. (Unofficial English translation of the Criminal Code as of 2012 available here: https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0024649/2020-07-01)

Several sections of the Criminal Code (in particular, sections 242-243) penalize rape, including spousal rape, and domestic violence. Penalties include imprisonment not exceeding 12 years, a fine not exceeding 78,000 euros ($93,600), or both. For cases involving violence against a spouse, the penalty for various forms of abuse can be increased by one-third. Section 244 and 245 of the Criminal Code penalize statutory rape. Under section 244, in cases where the victim is younger than 12, the term of imprisonment shall not exceed 12 years. In cases where the victim is 12-16 years of age, under section 245, the term of imprisonment shall not exceed eight years. (Unofficial English translation of the Criminal Code as of 2012 available here: http://www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/6533/2014%20seminars/Omsenie/WetboekvanStra...)

Article 1:31 of the Civil Code sets the legal age for marriage at 18 years for both women and men. This Act address instances child and/or forced marriage in the Netherlands. It removed a previous provision that allowed for marriage at the age of 16 under exceptional circumstances. The Act also provides for criminal prosecution in cases of forced marriage involving Dutch nationals and/or non-Dutch national-permanent residents. Dutch nationals and non-Dutch national permanent residents can be prosecuted for a forced marriage abroad even if forced marriage is not a criminal offence in the country where the marriage took place. (English summary of the Act available here: https://www.government.nl/topics/forced-marriage/tackling-forced-marriage)

Abortion is a criminal offense unless there are no other means with which to save the life or health of the pregnant woman, the woman is mentally ill or otherwise challenged, or her pregnancy is the result of sexual assault. Those who perform abortions with the consent of the woman are liable to imprisonment for one to four years, or up to six years if the woman does not survive. Performing an abortion without the consent of the woman is punishable by three to ten years in prison, or up to 15 years if the woman does not survive. In addition to these prison sentences, doctors, surgeons, midwives, and pharmacists who assist or perform an abortion may be disqualified from practicing their profession for twice the period of imprisonment. A person who unintentionally causes an abortion through acts of violence is liable for six months to two years imprisonment. Finally, a woman who causes or consents to an abortion may be sentenced to one to four years imprisonment. An unsuccessful abortion attempt is not a punishable offense, so women who do so should be able to seek medical attention without penalty. (Note: The government of Argentina is voting on legalizing abortion as of December 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/11/argentina-lower-house-appr...)

El aborto es un delito penal a menos que no existan otros medios con los que salvar la vida o la salud de la mujer embarazada, la mujer tenga una enfermedad mental o sufra algún otro problema, o su embarazo sea el resultado de una agresión sexual. Quienes practican abortos con el consentimiento de la mujer pueden ser castigados con una pena de prisión de uno a cuatro años, o hasta seis años si la mujer no sobrevive. Realizar un aborto sin el consentimiento de la mujer se castiga con tres a diez años de prisión, o hasta 15 años si la mujer no sobrevive. Además de estas penas de prisión, los médicos, cirujanos, parteras y farmacéuticos que ayuden o practiquen un aborto pueden ser inhabilitados para ejercer su profesión por el doble del período de prisión. Una persona que provoque involuntariamente un aborto mediante actos de violencia puede ser sancionada con una pena de prisión de seis meses a dos años. Finalmente, una mujer que provoque o consienta en un aborto puede ser condenada a una pena de prisión de uno a cuatro años. Un intento de aborto fallido no es un delito punible, por lo que las mujeres que lo hagan deberían poder buscar atención médica sin sanción. (Nota: El gobierno de Argentina está votando sobre la legalización del aborto a diciembre de 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/11/argentina-lower-house-appr...)

Its objective is to prevent, sanction, and reduce domestic violence and protect victims, especially woman, elders, and children. It defines domestic violence as physical acts and physical abuse committed by a person having a family bond with the victim. The Family Tribunal has jurisdiction over cases where the conduct does not qualify as a crime (according to the Criminal Code) and no prison penalties may be imposed. Article 4 states that enforcement of this law is within the purview of the Minister of Women and Gender Equity.

Su objetivo es prevenir, sancionar y reducir la violencia intrafamiliar y proteger a las víctimas, especialmente a mujeres, ancianos y niños. Define la violencia doméstica como los actos físicos y el abuso físico cometidos por una persona que tiene un vínculo familiar con la víctima. El Tribunal de Familia tiene jurisdicción sobre los casos en que la conducta no califica como delito (según el Código Penal) y no pueden imponerse penas de prisión. El Artículo 4 establece que la aplicación de esta ley es competencia de la Ministra de la Mujer y la Equidad de Género.

Articles 342 to 345 relate to abortion as a crime, other than an abortion under any of the conditions established by Law No. 21,030 of 2017. The penalty varies considerably depending on the circumstances and motives for the abortion, including, for example, whether the abortion was performed by the mother or a third party, whether it was done with or without the consent of the mother, or whether it was done to hide any shame (deshonra). Article 390 of the Criminal Code provides that the killing of a woman who is or used to be in a relationship with the murderer is murder (spousal) (femicidio), the penalty for which is imprisonment from 15 years and one day to qualified perpetual imprisonment. Article 400 increases by one degree penalties for crimes committed in the context of domestic or family violence. Article 411 prohibits acts done with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the entry or exit of individuals who perform sex work within or outside the Chilean borders. The penalty is imprisonment from three years and one day to five years, plus a fine. Article 411 also prohibits acts of violence, coercion, or taking advantage of vulnerability of persons in order to obtain the consent of a person to be sexuality exploited, such as in pornography, slavery, or forced labor. The penalty is imprisonment from five years and one day to 15 years, plus a fine.

Los Artículos 342 al 345 regulan aborto como delito, distinto del aborto en cualquiera de las condiciones establecidas por la Ley N ° 21.030 de 2017. La sanción varía considerablemente según las circunstancias y motivos del aborto, incluyendo, por ejemplo, si el el aborto fue realizado por la madre o una tercera persona, ya sea con o sin el consentimiento de la madre, o para ocultar alguna vergüenza (deshonra). El Artículo 390 del Código Penal establece que el homicidio de una mujer que está o solía estar en relación con el asesino es homicidio (conyugal) (femicidio), cuya pena es de prisión de 15 años y un día a prisión perpetua calificada. El Artículo 400 aumenta en un grado las penas por delitos cometidos en el contexto de violencia doméstica o familiar. El Artículo 411 prohíbe los actos realizados con el propósito de promover o facilitar la entrada o salida de personas que realizan trabajo sexual dentro o fuera de las fronteras chilenas. La pena es de prisión de tres años y un día a cinco años, más una multa. El Artículo 411 también prohíbe los actos de violencia, coacción o aprovechamiento de la vulnerabilidad de las personas para obtener el consentimiento de una persona para ser explotada sexualmente, como en la pornografía, la esclavitud o el trabajo forzoso. La pena es de prisión de cinco años y un día a 15 años, más una multa.

The Domestic Violence Act (the “DVA”) defines and prohibits domestic violence. Here, domestic violence means any act under the Criminal Code 1960 (Act 29) that constitutes a threat or harm to a person within the context of a domestic relationship. This includes specific acts, threats to commit, or acts likely to result in physical, sexual, or economic abuse. Emotional, verbal, or psychological abuse, including harassment, also fall within the definition of domestic violence. After a complaint has been brought, the police have a duty to provide assistance and protection to the victim of domestic violence even though the victim did not file the complaint. Thus, the police will interview the parties and witnesses, record the complaint, help the victim to obtain medical treatment and inform the victim of his or her rights. The victim can then seek a protection order in the court with original jurisdiction.

Chapter 6 of the Criminal Code outlines various sexual offenses criminalized in Ghana. Rape is criminalized in Sections 97 and 98 and is defined as the "carnal knowledge of a female of sixteen years or above without her consent." Rape is classified as a first-degree felony, and a person convicted of rape shall be imprisoned for a minimum of five years and a maximum of 25 years. Section 99 clarifies that "carnal knowledge or unnatural carnal knowledge" is complete upon proof of the least degree of penetration. Statutory rape is outlined in Section 101. It states that a person convicted of having sexual intercourse with a child under 16 years of age, with or without his or her consent, shall be imprisoned for a minimum of seven years and a maximum of 25 years. Similar punishment is outlined in Section 1012 for the defilement of anyone who is considered an "idiot, imbecile or mental patient." It states that a person who has sexual intercourse with a person they know has a mental incapacity commits an offense and shall be imprisoned for a minimum of five years and a maximum of 25 years. Indecent assault is outlined in Section 103. It states that a person commits indecent assault if he or she, without consent, forcibly makes any sexual bodily contact, or sexually violates another person, in any manner not amounting to “carnal knowledge or unnatural carnal knowledge.” Indecent assault is a misdemeanor and carries a minimum of six months imprisonment. “Unnatural carnal knowledge” is outlined in Section 104, which states that a person convicted for having ‘unnatural carnal knowledge’ may face different penalties depending on what act he or she commits. "Unnatural carnal knowledge" is defined as sexual intercourse with a person in an unnatural manner or with an animal. Section 104 has been interpreted as prohibiting homosexuality.

Section 276 (Evidence of complainant’s sexual activity), the so called “rape shield law,” was enacted to prevent evidence of the complainant’s previous sexual history being adduced to support an inference that they were more likely to have consented or that they are less believable. The purpose of the law is to protect the integrity of the trial by excluding misleading and irrelevant evidence and to encourage the reporting of such crimes by protecting the privacy of complainants. Such evidence is only admissible in limited circumstances. In determining whether evidence is admissible, a trial judge must consider certain factors as prescribed by section 276 including the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy. Evidence of prior sexual activity is presumptively inadmissible unless, having followed certain procedures, the trial judge rules otherwise.

Section 268(1) provides that everyone commits an aggravated assault who wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers the life of the complainant. Section 268(3) clarifies that “wound” or “maim” includes to excise, infibulate, or mutilate, in whole or in part, the labia majora, labia minora, or clitoris of a person except where it is performed by a qualified medical practitioner for the benefit of the physical health of the person or the person is over 18 years of age and there is no resulting bodily harm. No consent to excise, infibulate, or mutilate, in whole or in part, the labia majora, labia minora, or clitoris of a person is otherwise possible. Aggravated assault is punishable as an indictable offence and punishment is a prison sentence not exceeding 14 years.

This Act overturned Division 12 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), which criminalised obtaining, performing, or otherwise assisting an abortion. Abortion is now legal in New South Wales until 22 weeks of pregnancy. To procure an abortion after 22 weeks, the procedure must be performed in a hospital by a specialist practitioner in consultation with a second practitioner. Medical providers who have conscientious objections to abortion must provide patients with information about where they can receive an abortion.

The Domestic Abuse Act (Scotland) of 2018 came into force on April 1, 2019. It modifies and expands upon portions of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act of 1995. The act expands the definition of domestic abuse to include psychological abuse and coercive and controlling behavior. It criminalizes both psychological and physical harm directed to a partner or an ex-partner. Section 11.2 defines a “partner” as a spouse or civil partner, a person with whom one lives as a spouse, or a person with whom one is in an “intimate personal relationship.” Section 2 defines abuse as “violent, threatening, or intimidating” behavior that may consist of controlling a victim’s daily activities, causing the victim to become subordinate or dependent on the perpetrator, isolating the victim from friends or family, depriving or restricting a victim’s actions, or frightening, humiliating, degrading, or otherwise punishing the victim. Section 3 contains an extraterritoriality clause covering such conduct occurring partly or wholly outside the country, and thus the abusive behavior need not take place within the United Kingdom. Section 5 creates a is the only UK legislation with a specific statutory sentencing aggravation for the harm that can be caused to children growing up in an environment in which domestic abuse takes place. Section 2.2.n., likewise, includes a victim’s child under the age of 18 as a potential additional victim of abuse. Section 5.3 clarifies that the aggravation can be applied both in cases in which abusive behavior is directed at a child, and in scenarios in which a child “sees or hears, or is present during, an incident of behavior that A directs at B as part of the course of behavior.” The Domestic Abuse Act has been lauded by women’s rights organizations as a “welcome change” that “should increase the opportunity [for victims] to obtain protection and seek justice through the criminal justice system."

Division 10A concerns sexual servitude, which is defined as “the condition of a person who provides sexual services and who, because of the use of force or threats is not free to cease providing sexual services, or is not free to leave the place or area where the person provides sexual services.” Section 80D provides for up to 15 years’ imprisonment for any person causing (willfully or recklessly) or attempting to cause sexual servitude (and up to 20 years if the victim is under 18 or cognitively impaired). Section 80E provides for up to 15 years for any person conducting a business involving the sexual servitude of others, or who knows about, or is reckless as to, sexual servitude (and up to 19 years if the victim is under 18 or cognitively impaired).

Division 10 of the Act prohibits and defines sexual violence against adults and children. A person consents to sexual intercourse if the person freely and voluntarily agrees (§ 61HE(2)). As provided in section 61HE(3), a perpetrator is deemed to know that the other person does not consent if they have actual knowledge, are reckless as to consent, or had no reasonable belief that the other person consented. In determining consent, the trier of fact must consider all of the circumstances, including any steps taken by the person to ascertain whether the other person consents, but not including any self-induced intoxication of the person. There can be no consent if the person is a minor, unconscious or asleep, cognitively incapacitated, under duress, or unlawfully detained.

This is a broad piece of legislation that regulates the prevention, education, social assistance, social security benefits, procedural, criminal, and medical aspects of gender-based violence. The Sexual Violence Law also created specific courts within the judiciary system, like the Courts of Violence Against Women, to hear all cases related to gender-based violence.

Esta es una amplia legislación que regula la prevención, educación, asistencia social, beneficios de seguridad social, aspectos procesales, penales y médicos de la violencia de género. La Ley de Violencia de Género también creó tribunales específicos dentro del sistema judicial, como los Tribunales de Violencia contra la Mujer, para escuchar todos los casos relacionados con la violencia de género.

The Swedish Penal Code includes regulations that defines and prohibits various sexually and/or physically motivated crimes against people. The penalty for kidnapping with intent to injure a person, to force a person into service or to practice extortion is imprisonment for at least four years and at most eighteen years, or for life. When a crime is less serious, the highest imprisonment term is six years. The penalty for human trafficking is imprisonment for 2-10 years. When a crime is less serious, the highest imprisonment term is four years. If a crime is in violation of liberty and peace or a sexual offense and it was committed by a man against a woman with whom he had a close intimate relationship (marriage or cohabitation), then the man will be sentenced for gross violation of a woman’s integrity and imprisoned for at least nine months and at most six years, as opposed to being sentenced for each individual crime committed. This crime was introduced in the Swedish Penal Code in 1998 and the construction of it is unique because several individual criminal offences together can constitute a gross crime. Perpetrators of rape shall be imprisoned for at least two and at most six years. If the rape is considered less aggravated, the sentence drops to at most four years. In the event the rape is “gross”, the sentence is extended to at most 10 years. The penalty for sexual intercourse with a child under 15 years of age (or an act comparable to sexual intercourse) is at least two and at most six years. If the crime is “gross”, the penalty is extended to at least five years and at most ten years. The penalty for sexual coercion is at most two years of imprisonment. Notwithstanding, if the sexual coercion is “gross”, the sentence is extended from at least six months to at most six years. The penalty for intercourse with an offspring is imprisonment for at most two years and for intercourse with a sibling is at most one year. The penalties for crimes of exploitation of a child for sexual posing, purchase of a sexual ct from a child and sexual molestation are sentencing to a fine or imprisonment for at most two years. Except for gross exploitation of a child for sexual posing where the sentence is at least six months and at most six years imprisonment. The penalty for purchase of sexual service is a fine or imprisonment for at most one year. Purchase of sexual service has occurred when a person obtains a temporary sexual relation in return for payment. This also applies if the payment was promised or given by another person. Selling sexual services in Sweden is not criminalized. The penalty for someone who promotes or improperly financially exploits a person’s engagement in temporary sexual relations in return for payment (procuring) is at most four years. In the event the procuring is “gross”, the sentence is 2-10 years. As of 2018, the Penal Code defines rape as any sex without consent, either with words or clear actions. Before the amendment, crimes of rape required the intent to rape someone through violence or threats, or that the victim was in a particularly vulnerable position. Furthermore, the 2018 sex crime reform of the Swedish Penal Code introduced criminal liability for negligent rape (Chapter 6 Section 1a) and negligent sexual abuse (Chapter 6 Section 3). Gross negligence is required for liability under the new regulations, rather than intention, as required for regular rape and sexual abuse in Chapter 6 Section 1 and 2. The penalty for negligent rape or negligent sexual abuse is at most four years.

The LPDV has a broad definition of domestic violence which includes violence between both cohabiting and non-cohabiting partners. The LPDV is gender-neutral in approach. Police powers include the ability to issue restraining orders and temporary or emergency eviction notices that can be extended by up to 30 days. Violations of such orders carry penalties of up to 60 days in prison. The LPDV also imposes a new duty on the public prosecutor’s office to maintain a central register of domestic violence cases. Victims of domestic violence also have the right to free legal aid.

The Criminal Code defines and criminalizes domestic violence under Article 194, which is the main legislation providing for domestic violence prosecution. Domestic violence is defined as the “use of violence, threat of attacks against life or body, insolent or ruthless behaviour [that] endangers the tranquility, physical integrity or mental condition of a member of his family.” The definition of “family member” does not include ex-spouses or unmarried partners who do not live together or have children. The penalties for domestic violence under the Criminal Code are fines or imprisonment for up to 15 years. In 2017, new crimes for stalking (Art. 138a) and sexual harassment (Art. 182a) were added to the Criminal Code. Additionally, the minimum statutory sentence for rape was increased from three years to five years. In 2019, amendments to the Criminal code introduced life imprisonment without conditional release for those who commit crimes of rape or murder of children, pregnant women, or disabled persons. New crimes for stalking, sexual harassment, female genital mutilation, and forced marriage were also introduced. (Unofficial English translation available here.)

This law defines, prohibits, and facilitates the treatment of perpetrators of domestic violence through a system of protection orders. The law stipulates family relationship to exist among persons beyond spouses and parent/child. It includes people who are/were engaged, in an extra-marital union, or co-habitating in a common household, and recognizes domestic violence to include abuses such as causing fear, insults, derogative behavior, and non-consensual sex. The law contemplates various protection measures that can be ordered by the courts, such as those prohibiting the approach or harassment of the victim, mandating medical treatment for substance abuse, and authorizing accompaniment by a police officer. A petition for a protection order or emergency protection order can be submitted by not only the victim and his/her representatives, but also by NGOs. The courts are required to render a decision within 15 days of receipt of a petition for protection order, and within 24 hours after the submission of a petition for emergency protection order. A protection order or emergency protection order shall be issued under the Law where the court suspects the perpetrator shall unavoidably risk the health, safety, or well-being of the protected party. A decision regarding a protection order or emergency protection order may be appealed, but the filing of the appeal does not stay the execution of the order. The Law further provides temporary emergency protection orders, petitions for which can be submitted to the police outside the courts’ working hours, which expire at the end of the next court working day. The police may issue a temporary emergency protection order if the perpetrator poses an immediate threat to the safety, healthy, or well-being of the protected party and the issuance of the order is necessary to protect against such a threat. A violation of a protection order, emergency protection order, or temporary emergency protection order is punishable by a fine of 200 to 2,000 Euros, or imprisonment of up to six months. (Unofficial English version available here.)

The Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act of 2004 was enacted to protect victims of crime and specifically domestic violence. It amends non-molestation orders under Family Law Act 1996 to provide a criminal sanction for non-compliance, with a maximum sentence of five years' imprisonment and fines. See Section 1. It amends the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 to allow restraining orders to be imposed upon even acquitted defendants, if the court “considers it necessary to do so to protect a person from harassment by the defendant.”

The Sexual Offences Act was created “to reform and consolidate the laws relating to sexual offences.” Part II of the Act sets forth the elements of the offenses of rape and sexual assault and defines the meaning of consent, providing that if a defendant raises “consent” as a defense, “the belief must be objectively reasonable” for the defense to succeed. Part II of the Act also defines various categories of sexual offenses against children. Part III of the Act sets parameters for the investigation of sexual offenses, Part IV of the Act defines procedures to be followed at court, and Part V of the Act governs evidentiary standards. Part IX of the Act deals with the prevention of sexual assault and establishes the National Task Force for the Prevention of Sexual Violence.

The amended law aims to harmonize its provisions with the highest international standards. The amendments include a new provision (Article 58 (The Rights of the Victim of the Criminal Offence)), which provides a number of guaranteed rights for victims of gender-based violence in criminal proceedings in accordance with international standards. Article 58 Paragraph 1 includes, among others, the right of access by the victim to various support services (such as psychological assistance, counseling etc.), the right to use his/her own language during the proceedings and the right to be informed at all stages of the proceedings about the arrest and release of the offender and the victim’s right to compensation. Article 58 Paragraph 2 requires the public authority in charge of the criminal procedures to immediately notify the victim of the rights in Paragraph 1 and keep records of such notification. Article 58(b) includes amendments to provisions related to victims of sexual violence and human trafficking. This includes the right to be interviewed by a police officer or prosecutor of the same gender, the right to refuse to respond to questions about his/her private life that are not related to the case, and the right to testify through audio-visual technology. (Unofficial English translation available here.)

Section 47A of the ordinance regulates abortion. Abortion is legal in only a few situations: (i) continuing the pregnancy would risk the health of the woman; (ii) there is a substantial risk that the child would be born with a physical or mental abnormality, making it severely handicapped; (iii) the woman is younger than 16 years; or (iv) the woman is the victim of unlawful sexual intercourse. Section 45 forbids bigamy and polygamy.

The Act’s purpose is to provide means to hinder persons from committing acts of family and domestic or personal violence by imposing restraints on their behavior and activities. Under the section 106B of the Act, restraint orders can be issued against a person who has caused or has threatened to cause injury or damage to another person or property and is likely to do so again or carry out the threat, behaved in a provocative or offensive manner and is likely to do so again, or against a person who has stalked another person. The justice must be satisfied on the balance of probability that the imposed restraints are necessary or desirable to prevent further prohibited behavior. Restraint orders can be issued on an interim or final basis. A person who fails to comply with an order is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding ten penalty units or imprisonment not exceeding six months.

The Act allows abortion by a medical practitioner up to 16 weeks of pregnancy with the woman’s consent. After 16 weeks, pregnancy may be terminated if two medical practitioners reasonably believe the continuation of pregnancy would involve greater risk to the mother’s physical or mental health than termination. At least one of the medical practitioners must specialize in obstetrics or gynaecology. In assessing the physical or mental health, the practitioners must consider the woman’s physical, psychological, economic, and social circumstances. A medical practitioner is not required to perform an abortion unless it is necessary to save the life of a pregnant woman or prevent her serious injury, and a nurse and midwife are required to assist in an emergency. However, a medical practitioner must provide the full range of pregnancy options to a woman. The Act also established “access zones” by criminalising interference, intimidation, recording, and similar behaviour within a radius of 150 meters from abortion clinics.

The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (the “DVPA”) was established in order to prevent acts of domestic violence and to protect the interests of victims. The DVPA defines domestic violence offenses and the family members who might be implicated, specifies the responsibilities and tasks of the various competent authorities, and governs issues such as civil protection orders, criminal procedure, the interests of any minors involved, protection of and support for victims, and educational and prevention measures. Breaches of the DVPA will result in the imposition of a fine or imprisonment.

家庭暴力防治法（即「DVPA」）的制定是為了防範家庭暴力行為並保護被害者的利益。家庭暴力防治法定義了何謂家庭暴力侵犯和可能受牽連的家庭成員，規定各主管機關的職責，並對如民事保護令、刑事訴訟、任何涉及未成年人利益、被害者保護及協助，以及教育和預防措施等議題作出規定。違反家庭暴力防治法的行為將被處以罰金或有期徒刑。

Under Section 55(1), women are prevented from working at night in any industrial or agricultural position. However, under 55(2) female nurses in either sector are allowed to work at night, as are women working in management positions not “ordinarily engaged in manual labour.” Women who work at night because of unforeseeable and nonrecurring work interruptions or who work with materials that require night work because of rapid deterioration are provided with a possible defense to the law. Under Section 56, no woman may be employed in any work that requires time in any underground mine unless they hold positions of management and do not perform manual labor, are employed in health and welfare services, or are working as part of their courses of study. Under Section 57, the Minister, at any time, may prohibit or restrict women from employment in any particular industry or in any process or work carried out. Violations under any of sections 55-56 of the Act carry with them a fine, imprisonment for a term not to exceed one month, or both.

As stated in the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, the Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act aims to “prohibit[] all forms of violence against persons in private and public life, and provide[] maximum protection and effective remedies for victims and punishment of offenders.” The Act provides general protections against offenses including infliction of physical injury, coercion, offensive conduct, willfully placing a person in fear of physical injury, willfully making false statements against another person, damage to property with intent to cause distress, and deprivation of personal liberty. The Act also provides protections against offenses that affect women disproportionately, including a prohibition of female genital mutilation; forceful ejection from home; forced financial dependence or economic abuse; forced isolation; emotional, verbal and psychological abuse; harmful widowhood practices; and spousal battery, among others. Notably, the Act defines the offense of rape in Section 1(1) without an exception for marital rape, which had not traditionally been recognized as an offense (note that the Penal Code Act of 1960 does include an exception for marital rape). The Act provides a procedure for injured parties to apply for a protection order and empowers the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory with jurisdiction to hear and grant applications brought under the Act. As stated in Section 47, the Act is a product of federal legislation enacted in regard to criminal law, a residual matter over which the states have exclusive legislative power pursuant to the Nigerian Constitution. Thus, the VAPP Act applies only to the Federal Capital Territory and is not binding law in a state unless adopted by that state.

Under Section 211 of the Evidence Act, a man charged with rape, attempt to commit rape, or indecent assault may, as a defense, show that the alleged victim against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed was of a “generally immoral character.” The victim is not to be cross-examined on the subject but may be asked whether she has had “connection” with other men, a term not defined but presumably referring to previous sexual relations. The victim’s answer to this question cannot be contradicted. However, the accused may also ask whether the victim has had connection on other occasions with the accused and is permitted to attempt to contradict the victim’s denial should she deny connection.

This Act criminalizes slavery in all forms and provides protection and support for victims of trafficking. As defined by the Act, "'exploitation' includes, at the minimum, induced prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation, forced marriage, forced or bonded services, or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of human organs." The definition of trafficking is comprehensive and defined in Part 2, Section 5(3) of the Act. The Act proscribes further that victims “shall not be liable for crimes committed in connection” to their own trafficking and that “the past sexual behavior of a victim of trafficking is irrelevant and inadmissible for purpose of proving that the victim was engaged in other sexual behavior or to prove sexual predisposition of the victim.” The Act provides an aggravated trafficking designation in cases where the trafficked person dies, becomes disabled physically or mentally, suffers mutilation, contracts a sexually transmitted disease including but not limited to HIV or AIDS, or develops a chronic health condition. The Act also mandates the temporary material support and care for any child victim; provision of accommodation, counseling, and rehabilitation services for victims; and mandates attempted reintegration of adult victims into their families and communities.

The Sexual Offences Act recognises marital rape as a crime. Section 3(3) of the Sexual Offences Act provides that marriage or any other relationship shall not be a defence against a charge under the Act. Section (5)(2) makes criminally liable "a person who induces another to submit to a sexual act through the use of his authority, status, power, privilege, or other undue influence, commits an offence." Other sections provide for compulsory HIV testing of perpetrators of sexual violence and penalize those who commit sexual violence while knowing that they are HIV positive.

The Domestic Violence Act (No. 10 of 2008) seeks to provide survivors of domestic violence with protection. The Act defines domestic violence as "any controlling or abusive behaviour that harms the health or safety of the applicant." The Act empowers Courts including Customary Courts to pass an order (Section 7 of the Act prescribes orders available to applicants such as restraining orders and interim orders) that seeks to immediately protect applicants (victims); Section 9 (2) (b) (i) provides that the order shall direct a member of the Botswana Police to prohibit the respondent (the offender) from committing an act of domestic violence. The Act also outlines the jurisdiction of the courts, describes how an applicant can file an application for an order by the court, details how documents are served to respondents, and explains the nature of proceedings in a domestic violence case.

The law defines and prohibits human trafficking. The penalty for human trafficking is 16 - 20 years imprisonment. Longer prison sentences are recommended when the victim is a woman or a child. The law provides that victims can benefit from witness protection measures and other forms of assistance, such as medical services and counseling.

This Act prescribes measures to prevent and combat trafficking in persons with particular regard to victims who are women and children, and aims to assist victims of trafficking and facilitating efficient investigation of cases of trafficking. The offence of trafficking is committed if a person recruits, transports, transfer, harbors or receives another person within Jamaica, from Jamaica to another country, or from another country to Jamaica. A person found guilty of an offence in terms of the Act is liable to a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years.

Esta ley prescribe medidas para prevenir y combatir la trata de personas con especial atención a las víctimas que son mujeres y niños, y tiene como objetivo ayudar a las víctimas de la trata y facilitar la investigación eficaz de los casos de trata. El delito de trata se comete si una persona recluta, transporta, traslada, alberga o recibe a otra persona dentro de Jamaica, de Jamaica a otro país o de otro país a Jamaica. Una persona declarada culpable de este delito en los términos de la ley puede ser sancionada con una multa o con una pena de prisión por un período no superior a 20 años.

The Offences against the Person Act lists acts recognized in law as punishable offences and details the ways in which the law deals with the offenders under the said acts. Child stealing is recognized as a felony and any person convicted for child stealing shall be imprisoned for a term not exceeding seven years. Kidnapping is recognized as a felony and any person convicted shall be liable to imprisonment for life. Attempts to procure abortion (by virtue of the pregnant woman unlawfully administering any substances to terminate her pregnancy by whatsoever means) is recognized as a felony and shall be liable for imprisonment for life. Infanticide (the act by which a woman willfully causes the death of her child under the age of twelve months) is a punishable offence recognized as the offence of manslaughter of a child.

El Decreto de Ley de Delitos contra la Persona enumera los actos reconocidos por la ley como delitos punibles y detalla las formas en que la ley trata a los que la violan en virtud de dichos actos. El robo de niños se reconoce como delito grave y toda persona condenada por robo de niños será encarcelada por un período no superior a siete años. El secuestro se reconoce como delito grave y cualquier persona condenada será condenada a cadena perpetua. Los intentos de obtener un aborto (en virtud de que la mujer embarazada administre ilegalmente cualquier sustancia para interrumpir su embarazo por cualquier medio) se reconocen como un delito grave y serán sancionados con prisión perpetua. El infanticidio (el acto por el cual una mujer causa intencionalmente la muerte de su hijo menor de doce meses) es un delito punible reconocido como el delito de homicidio involuntario de un niño.

The Sexual Offences Act specifically outlaws many sex-based crimes, including rape, sexual assault, marital rape, sexual touching or interference, inducing or encouraging the violation of a child, indecent assault, violation of persons suffering from mental or physical disabilities, forcible abduction, procuration, unlawful detention with the intent to have sexual intercourse, and living on earnings of prostitution. It also amended certain laws and standards regarding consent. It abolished the common law presumption that a boy under fourteen years of age could not commit rape, and further noted that consent is “immaterial” in any offences involving a child. The Act restricts evidence that can be brought at rape trials, specifically preventing the complainant from being asked about his or her sexual history. It preserves the possibility of anonymity for persons bringing claims under the Sexual Offences Act. Finally, it creates a sex offender registry and mandates registration for persons convicted of sexual offences.

El Decreto de Ley de Delitos Sexuales prohíbe específicamente muchos delitos basados ​​en el sexo, incluyendo la violación, la agresión sexual, la violación conyugal, el contacto o la interferencia sexual, la inducción o el fomento de la violación de un niño, la agresión indecente, la violación de personas que padecen discapacidades mentales o físicas, el secuestro forzoso, procuración, detención ilegal con la intención de tener relaciones sexuales y vivir de las ganancias de la prostitución. También modificó ciertas leyes y normas relativas al consentimiento. Abolió la presunción de derecho consuetudinario de que un niño menor de catorce años no podía cometer una violación y señaló además que el consentimiento es "inmaterial" en cualquier delito que involucre a un niño. La ley restringe las pruebas que pueden presentarse en los juicios por violación, específicamente evitando que se le pregunte al denunciante sobre su historial sexual. Preserva la posibilidad de mantener el anonimato para las personas que presenten demandas en virtud de la Ley de delitos sexuales. Por último, crea un registro de delincuentes sexuales y ordena el registro de personas condenadas por delitos sexuales.

The Domestic Violence Act (“DVA”), originally enacted in 1996 and amended in 2004, aims to provide protections for women and children domestic violence situations. It gives courts the power to grant protection and occupation orders. Applications for such orders can be brought by the victim or, in the case of a child, a parent, guardian, constable, or social worker can bring an application on the child’s behalf. The DVA sets forth the limitations imposed by protective orders, and it states courts can grant such an order if “it is satisfied that” the individual against whom the order is sought used or threatened to use violence, mental or physical, against the person seeking the order. Even without that showing, the court can grant a protective order if it finds the order necessary for the protection of the person “having regard to all circumstances.” The court can grant protection and occupation orders on an ex parte basis if the court deems it necessary. Punishment for violating an order is a fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment for a maximum of six months, or both.

Provides for a criminal penalty of not less than five years for any person who commits certain specified offenses as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, including (1) assuming and exercising a right of ownership over a person, in particular in the form of trafficking in persons, sexual exploitation or forced labor; and (2) raping a person of the female gender or, after she has been forcibly made pregnant, confining her unlawfully with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of a population, forcing a person to tolerate a sexual act of comparable severity or forcing a person into prostitution or to be sterilized. Unofficial English translation available here.

Provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for, among other things, a person who recruits or causes a minor to participate in a pornographic performance, or for any person who produces, imports, stores, markets, advertises, exhibits, offers, shows, passes on or makes accessible to others or possesses pornography that contains sexual acts involving animals, acts of violence involving adults or non-genuine sexual acts with minors. For pornography containing genuine sexual acts with minors, the penalty is imprisonment for not more than five years or a monetary penalty. Criminal penalties are also provided for persons who obtain or produce such pornographic materials for their own use. Unofficial English translation available here.

Art. 188 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any person who sexually exploits his or her relationship with a minor over the age of 16 (which is the age threshold for statutory rape under Penal Code Art. 187) who is dependent on him or her due to a relationship arising from the minor's education, care or employment or another form of dependent relationship, or for any person who encourages such a minor to commit a sexual act by exploiting such a relationship. Unofficial English translation available here.

Art. 118 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than five years or a monetary penalty for any person who terminates a pregnancy with the consent of the pregnant woman or incites or assists a pregnant woman to terminate her pregnancy without the requirements of Penal Code Art. 119 being met. Article 118 also provides for (1) imprisonment from one to 10 years for any person who terminates a pregnancy without the consent of the pregnant woman, and (2) imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any woman who has her pregnancy terminated or otherwise participates in the termination of her pregnancy following the end of the twelfth week and without the requirements of Penal Code Art. 119 being met. Article 119 provides the requirements for legal abortion. The termination is, in the judgment of a physician, necessary in order to be able to prevent the pregnant woman from sustaining serious physical injury or serious psychological distress. The risk must be greater the more advanced the pregnancy is, or the termination must be performed (1) at the written request of a pregnant woman within 12 weeks of the start of the woman’s last period, (2) by a physician who is licensed to practice his profession, and (3) the woman claims that she is in a state of distress. The physician must have a detailed consultation with the woman prior to the termination and provide her with appropriate counsel. If the woman is incapable of judgment, the consent of her legal representative is required. The statute directs the Swiss Cantons to designate the medical practices and hospitals that fulfill the requirements for the professional conduct of procedures to terminate pregnancy and for the provision of counsel. Unofficial English translation available here.

Article 66a provides that a foreign national shall be expelled from Switzerland for a period of five to 15 years if they are convicted of, among other things, female genital mutilation (Penal Code Art. 124, para. 1), forced marriage or forced registered partnership (Penal Code Art. 181a), trafficking in human beings (Penal Art. 182), sexual acts with children (Penal Code Art. 187, para. 1), sexual coercion (Art. 189), rape (Art. 190), sexual acts with persons incapable of judgement or resistance (Art. 191), encouraging prostitution (Art. 195), aggravated pornography (Art. 197, para. 4, second sentence – pornography containing genuine sexual acts with minors), genocide (Art. 264), crimes against humanity (Art. 264a), serious violations of the Geneva Convention of 1949 (Art. 264c), and other war crimes (Art. 264d and 264h). Unofficial English translation available here.

Article 409 of the Belgian Criminal Code criminalizes (i) the execution or facilitation of female genital mutilation which is penalized with imprisonment, ranging from three to five years, and (ii) the attempt, incitement, advertising or the spreading of advertisements, which is penalized with imprisonment ranging from eight days to one year. The Article includes several aggravating circumstances, which will increase the severity of the punishment.

The Act defines and prohibits human trafficking. The PCTP Act adopts a broad definition of human trafficking, namely, that a person is guilty of human trafficking if he or she delivers, recruits, transports, transfers, harbours, sells, exchanges, leases or receives another person, through various means, including the use of force, deception, or coercion, aimed at the person or an immediate family member for the purpose of exploitation. Furthermore, a person who adopts a child, facilitated or secured through legal or illegal means; or concludes a forced marriage with another person, for the purposes of exploitation of that child or person, is guilty of an offence. The PCTP Act criminalizes various acts that constitute or relate to trafficking in persons and imposes harsh penalties, including life imprisonment for trafficking in persons; 15 years’ imprisonment for engaging in conduct that causes a person to enter into debt bondage or benefiting from services of a trafficking victim; and 10 years’ imprisonment for facilitating trafficking. The PCTP Act also provides for severe fines and enables the state to confiscate the assets of traffickers.

Die Wet op Voorkoming en Bestryding van Handel in Persone (2013)

Gedwonge en minderjarige huwelike, seksuele geweld en verkragting, statutêre verkragting of besoedeling, mensehandel​

Die Wet definieer en verbied mensehandel. Die Wet aanvaar ‘n wye definisie van mensehandel, naamlik dat ‘n persoon skuldig is aan mensehandel indien hy of sy betrokke is by die werwing, vervoer, verskuiwing, huisvesting of ontvang van persone of gebruik van dreigemente, geweld of ander vorme van dwang, teen ‘n persoon of familielid met die doel van uitbuiting. Verder, ‘n persoon wat ‘n kind aanneem deur wettig of onwettige middele te gebruik; of ‘n gedwonge troue af te dwing met ‘n ander persoon, met die doel om uitbuiting van die kind of persoon, is skuldig aan ‘n oortreding. Die Wet kriminaliseer verskeie dade wat bestaan uit of verband hou met mensehandel, en dit stel swaar strafmaatrëels daar, insluitend lewenslange tronkstraf vir mensehandel; 15 jaar tronkstraf vir gedrag wat lei tot die skuldigbevinding van ‘n persoon wat betrokke was en voordeel trek uit die dienste van ‘n mensehandel slagoffer; en 10 jaar tronkstraf vir die fasilitering van mensehandel. Die Wet maak ook voorsiening vir strawwe boetes en gee die staat die reg om bates van mensehandelaars te konfiskeer.

The Act was adopted to comprehensively and extensively deal with all sexual offences under a single statute. The act, inter alia, repeals the common law offences of rape and replaces it with an expanded definition of rape applicable to all form of sexual penetration without consent irrespective of gender and repeals other common law offences related to indecent assault and penetration and replaces them with broader statutory offences.

Kriminele Wet (Seksuele Misdrywe en Verwante Aangeleenthede) Wysigings Wet 32 (2007)

Seksuele geweld en verkragting​

Die Wet is aangeneem om alle seksuele misdrywe onder 'n enkele wet volledig en omvattend te hanteer. Die Wet, onder andere, herroep die gemeenregtelike misdrywe van verkragting en vervang dit met 'n uitgebreide definisie van verkragting wat van toepassing is op alle vorme van seksuele penetrasie sonder toestemming, ongeag geslag, en herroep ander gemeenregtelike oortredings wat verband hou met onsedelike aanranding en penetrasie en vervang dit met breër statutêre misdrywe.

The Domestic Violence Act and the Domestic Violence Regulations promulgated thereunder offer complainants (any person in a domestic relationship who alleges she/he is the subject of domestic violence, including a child in the care of the complainant) the maximum protection possible from domestic abuse by imposing obligations on the police and other organs of state to prevent and assist the elimination of domestic violence (defined as including, inter alia, sexual abuse, physical abuse, stalking and harassment). Persons deemed to be in a domestic relationship include, inter alia, persons married by any law or custom, persons living (or who recently lived) together, parents of a child and parties in a romantic or sexual relationship. The Act allows any complainant to obtain a protection order against a respondent by application to the court and allows for interim orders to be granted without the respondent having received notice of such application in certain circumstances. When granting a protection order the court must make an order for the arrest of the respondent and may make an order to confiscate any weapons in the respondent’s possession.

Wet op Gesinsgeweld en die Regulasies vir Gesinsgeweld (1999)

Gesinsgeweld en intieme maatskaplike geweld​

Die Wet op Gesinsgeweld en die regulasies daarvan uitgevaardig bied klaers (enige persoon in ‘n huishoudelike verhouding wat beweer dat hy of sy die onderwerp is aan huishoudelike geweld, insluitend ‘n kind in die sorg van die klaer) die hoogste moontlike beskerming teen huishoudelike geweld aan deur verpligtinge op te lê aan die polisie en ander staatsorganisasies om die uitskakeling van huishoudelike geweld te voorkom (omskryf as, onder andere, seksuele mishandeling, fisiese mishandeling, agtervolging en teistering.) Persone wat geag word om ‘n huishoudelike verhouding te hê is, onder andere, persone wat getroud is volgens enige wet of gewoonte, persone wat saamwoon (of wat onlangs saam gewoon het), ouers van ‘n kind en partye in ‘n romantiese of seksuele verhouding. Die Wet laat enige klaer toe om ‘n beskermingsbevel teen ‘n respondent te kry deur aansoek by die hof en laat toe in sekere omstandighede dat tussentydse bevele toegestaan kan word sonder dat die respondent kennis gegee word vir sodanige aansoeke. By die toestaan van 'n beskermingsbevel moet die hof 'n bevel maak vir die inhegtenisneming van die respondent en kan 'n opdrag gee om enige wapens in die respondent se besit te konfiskeer.

if the continuation of the pregnancy is a serious threat to the mother’s health; (iii) if there is a serious risk that, if the child is born, it will suffer from a physical or mental defect that will cause the child to be severely disabled; (iv) where the pregnancy is a result of unlawful intercourse. Unlawful intercourse includes rape (this does not include marital rape), incest and mental handicap. However, a legal abortion can only be performed by a medical practitioner in a designated institution with the written permission of the superintendent of the institution. In cases where the mother’s life is in danger, the superintendent will not give permission until they have two different medical opinions regarding the danger to the mother. In circumstances of rape/incest, the superintendent must give permission after he receives written confirmation from a magistrate that the woman complained about the rape or the incestuous conduct. Contravention of the act by a medical practitioner in terminating a pregnancy or superintendent in providing permission not in accordance with the TPA constitutes an offense for which they could be liable for a fine not exceeding USD 5000, and/or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years.

This statute prohibits production, reproduction, distribution, transfer and knowing possession of child pornography through any medium, device or format.

A person is guilty of first-degree child molestation sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual penetration with a person 14 years of age or under.

This statute makes it illegal to harass or to knowingly and repeatedly follow another person with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of bodily injury. Under the statute, stalking is a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years, by a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.

This section of the Virginia Code provides that a cause of action resulting from sexual abuse during incapacity or infancy accrues upon the later of the removal of incapacity or infancy or when facts of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed physician or psychologist.

Virginia law prohibits that any person, except law enforcement officers acting in the capacity of the official duties, and registered private investigators acting in the course of their legitimate business, who on more than one occasion engages in conduct with the intent to place, or when that person knows or reasonably should know that the conduct places another person in reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury to that other person or to that other person’s family or household member is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. If the person contacts or follows or attempts to contact or follow the person after being given actual notice that the person does not want to be contacted or followed, such actions are a prima facie evidence that the person intended to place that other person, or reasonably should have known that the other person was placed, in reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury to himself or a family or household member.

Under Virginia law, it is a Class 4 felony to cause destruction of a unborn child, abortion, or miscarriage through medical procedure, drugs, or other means. There is an exception for physicians who are licensed by the Board of Medicine to practice medicine and surgery, to terminate a pregnancy or assist in performing an abortion or causing a miscarriage during the first trimester of pregnancy, among other exceptions. Informed written consent is required for an abortion under Virginia law, subject to civil penalties. It is also a Class 3 misdemeanor to encourage an individual to have an abortion prohibited by Virginia law.

Under Rhode Island’s statute criminalizing sexual assault, anyone other than the victim with knowledge or reason to know that a first-degree sexual assault or attempted first-degree sexual assault is taking place or has taken place shall immediately notify the police. Anyone who knowingly violates this statute is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for no more than one year, a $500 fine, or both (§ 11-37-3.3.).

If a defendant who is charged with sexual assault intends to introduce evidence at trial that the victim has engaged in sexual activities with other persons, he or she must give prior notice to the court of the intention to introduce such evidence. The notice must be given orally and out of the hearing of any other spectators or jurors. Upon receiving such notice, the court must order the defendant to make a specific offer of the proof that he or she intends to introduce, and the court will rule on the admissibility of the evidence before it can be offered at trial. The purpose of this “rape shield” statute is to encourage victims to report crimes without fear of inviting unnecessary probing into the victim’s sexual history.

The aim of this Act is to achieve equal employment opportunities through affirmative action plans to redress the conditions of designated persons in the Act who have been previously disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws and practices with the aim of eliminating discrimination in the workplace. The Act also establishes an Employment Equity Commission. Women are specifically mentioned as a designated group. An affirmative action plan achieves its purpose by obliging employers to make equitable efforts to accommodate and further the employment opportunities of those in designated groups. Employers must also fill positions of employment by giving priority and preferential treatment to those in designated groups. Where employers do not adhere to the Act, they may be referred to the Commission or to mediation, and may be placed under review. Furthermore, any person who discriminates against a person who has participated in the proceedings provided for in the Act, or obstructs or prevents compliance with the Act by any party, or fails to comply with certain provisions of the Act can be held criminally liable and on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding N$16,000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 4 years or both.

The Combating of Rape Act (the “Act”) seeks to prevent rape and provides minimum imprisonment sentences for rape. It also abolishes the previous law, which presumed that a boy under the age of 14 was incapable of rape and sexual intercourse. This Act also regulates the granting of bail to perpetrators to further protect the rights of the victim, and provides protection to victims of rape and sexual abuse. Finally, it abolishes the customary rule, common among rural areas, that marriage is a justification for, or a defense to, rape.

In 2015, Alabama amended its gun legislation to prohibit anyone who has been convicted of a misdemeanor offense of domestic violence or is subject to a domestic abuse protective order from possessing a firearm. The amended statute provides: “No person who has been convicted in this state or elsewhere of committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence, misdemeanor offense of domestic violence, violence offense as listed in Section 12-25-32(14), anyone who is subject to a valid protection order for domestic abuse, or anyone of unsound mind shall own a firearm or have one in his or her possession or under his or her control.”

Article 144-A bans female genital mutilation and imposes a prison sentence of 2-10 years. Article 145 imposes greater penalties for offenses against physical integrity and female genital mutilation if the crime is committed, among other special circumstances, against the current or former spouse or a person with whom the perpetrator has a romantic relationship, regardless of sex and gender; if the victim is pregnant; or if the crime is committed due to the victim’s gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity. Article 118 provides that the statute of limitations on crimes of sexual violence and female genital mutilation against minors do not expire until the victim is at least 23 years old. Article 152 establishes the crime of domestic violence, punishable with imprisonment from 1-5 years. The crime consists of mental or physical abuse, including mistreatment, corporal punishment and sexual offenses, inflicted once or repeatedly on the following victims (1) a current or former spouse; (2) a person with whom the perpetrator has or had a relationship akin to a spousal relationship; (3) a parent of the perpetrator’s child; (4) a person who is incapable to defend him/herself due to age, disability, pregnancy, illness or economic dependency to the perpetrator. In addition, under Article 152, (1) the minimum imprisonment penalty is increased from one to two years if the perpetrator publicizes the victim’s personal information or any other private information (including information stored on audio or video) via Internet or other means available; (2) the perpetrator may be prohibited of having contact with the victim; (3) the perpetrator may be prohibited from being granted a gun license; (4) the perpetrator may lose parenting rights for up to 10 years. Also, Article 152 imposes a sentence of 2-8 years imprisonment if the domestic violence results in serious physical injury, which increases to imprisonment to 3-10 years if the domestic violence results in death.

O artigo 114 proíbe a realização de mutilação genital feminina, impondo pena de prisão de dois a 10 anos. O artigo 145 estabelece penas maiores aos crimes de ofensa contra a integridade física e mutilação genital feminina, se o crime for cometido, dentre outras circunstâncias, contra cônjuge ou ex-cônjuge ou contra pessoa no qual o agente tenha estabelecido um relacionamento romântico, independente do gênero ou do sexo, se a vítima estiver grávida ou se o crime for cometido em razão do gênero, orientação sexual ou identidade de gênero da vítima. O artigo 118 estabelece que os crimes contra a liberdade e autodeterminação sexual de menores, bem como no crime de mutilação genital feminina sendo a vítima menor, o procedimento criminal não se extingue, por efeito da prescrição, antes de o ofendido perfazer 23 anos. O artigo 152 versa sobre o crime de violência doméstica, punível com prisão de um a cinco anos. O crime consiste em abuso mental ou físico, incluindo maus-tratos, castigos corporais e ofensas sexuais, infligidos uma ou várias vezes às seguintes vítimas (1) atual ou ex-cônjuge; (2) uma pessoa com a qual o agente tem ou teve uma relação semelhante a uma relação conjugal; (3) um dos pais do filho do agente; (4) uma pessoa incapaz de se defender devido à idade, deficiência, gravidez, doença ou dependência econômica do agente. Além disso, nos termos do artigo 152, (1) a pena mínima de prisão é aumentada de um para dois anos se o agente divulgar as informações pessoais da vítima ou qualquer outra informação privada (inclusive informações armazenadas em áudio ou vídeo) via Internet ou outros meios disponíveis; (2) o agente pode ser proibido de entrar em contato com a vítima; (3) o agente pode ser proibido de receber uma licença de porte de arma; (4) o agente pode perder os direitos parentais por até 10 anos. Além disso, o Artigo 152 pune com prisão de dois a oito anos caso a violência doméstica resulte em sérios danos físicos e pune com prisão de três a dez anos se a violência doméstica resultar em morte.

Article 75(2) of this law prohibits abortion except for the case of medical emergency or rape.

Pasal 75(2) dari peraturan ini melarang aborsi kecuali berdasarkan indikasi kedaruratan medis atau perkosaan.

This law criminalizes the act of human trafficking and sets out minimum and maximum sentencing standards (up to 15 years) for its various permutations, such as in assisting or abetting such a crime. It also states that Indonesia will cooperate with regional and international authorities in order to thwart any actions relating to human trafficking and sexual exploitation.

Peraturan ini mengkriminalisasikan tindak pidana perdagangan orang dan menetapkan standar hukuman minimum dan maksimum (maksimal 15 tahun) untuk berbagai bentuknya, seperti dalam membantu dan bersengkongkol tindak pidana tersebut. Peraturan juga menyatakan bahwa Indonesia akan bekerja sama dengan otoritas regional dan internasional untuk menggagalkan setiap tindakan yang berkaitan dengan perdagangan manusia dan eksploitasi seksual.

Article 260 punishes spouses who conceal from their spouse a legal barrier to marriage with a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment. Article 284 punishes adulterous spouses and their partners, regardless of their marital status. The penal code only criminalizes acts of rape outside marriage unless the wife is underage and incurs injuries as a result. Articles 285 prohibits forcing or threatening force a woman to have sexual intercourse outside of marriage and punishes violators with a maximum penalty of 12 years. Article 286 punishes sexual intercourse with an unconscious or helpless woman with a maximum of nine years imprisonment. If there is a complaint, Article 287 imposes a maximum sentence of nine years imprisonment for “carnal knowledge” of a girl outside of marriage when the man knows or reasonably should presume that she is less than 15 years of age. Prosecutions are triggered automatically when the girl is less than 12 years of age. Article 288 punishes husbands that have “carnal knowledge” of their wives who “are not yet marriageable” if it results in injury (four years imprisonment), serious injury (eight years), or death (12 years). Article 292 punishes adults that have carnal knowledge of those they know to be or reasonably should know to be minors of the same sex with a maximum of five years imprisonment. Article 293 punishes sexual abuse of a minor with a maximum of five years imprisonment. Incest is punishable by a maximum of seven years imprisonment pursuant to Article 294. Article 297 prohibits trafficking in woman and boys, which carries a maximum sentence of six years imprisonment. Article 299 imposes a four-year maximum sentence for abortion and provides for a one-third increase in sentencing for professionals (e.g., doctor, midwife) who perform abortions.

Belize enacted the Domestic Violence Act #19 in 2000 to provide greater protection and assistance to domestic violence victims. It was enacted in recognition of the pervasive nature of domestic violence in Belize society in order to increase the resources available to deal with domestic violence cases. The Domestic Violence Act defines domestic violence and governs protective orders, occupation orders, tenancy orders, other orders relating to counselling, the use of furniture and household effects, payment of rent, mortgage, utilities and compensation for any monetary loss due to domestic violence. Where a protective order or interim protective order is violated, the individual violating the order may be liable to a fine of up to $5,000 or to imprisonment for up to six months. (Section 21)

In the Northern Territory a person is guilty of a crime if he/she has sexual intercourse with another person without the other person’s consent and knows about, or is reckless as to, the lack of consent. Consent is defined as “free and voluntary agreement.” Circumstances in which a person does not consent to sexual intercourse include circumstances where: force is used; the victim fears force or harm to themselves or someone else; the victim is unconscious or not capable of free agreement; or the victim is unable to understand the sexual nature of the act. In addition, consent is no longer assumed where the victim is married to the accused. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew that the victim was not consenting or was reckless as to whether the victim was consenting. Recklessness includes not giving any thought to whether the person is consenting to sexual penetration. A defendant is not guilty of the offence if he or she mistakenly believed that consent had been given.

An interim protection order (IPO) protects survivors during police investigation, while a protection order (PO) protects survivors during criminal court proceedings. The amendments specify when an IPO ends, and when a PO begins, so survivors won’t be left without protection between police investigations and court proceeding. Pursuant to the amendments, an IPO can include additional safeguards, like prohibiting an abuser from coming near a survivor so police can intervene before further violence happens. The expanded definition of domestic violence will protect against: misappropriating property, which causes distress; threatening, which causes distress or fear for safety; or communicating (including electronically) with the survivor to insult modesty. A court can no longer order a survivor to attend reconciliatory counseling with the abuser, which could put the survivor in danger. Instead, the abuser can be ordered to complete a rehabilitation program. If a court grants a survivor occupancy of a shared residence, it must grant the survivor exclusive occupancy rather than just a specified part of the residence. The police officer must keep survivors informed on the status of investigation, status of IPO and PO, and important court dates. The amendments also create the Emergency Protection Order (EPO), which helps survivors get protection faster. EPOs are issued by social welfare officers who are easily accessible. Survivors no longer have to make a police report to get an EPO, which is valid for seven days.

The Act regulates sexually transmitted diseases including HIV, provides information for treatment of HIV, and provides punishment for violations. §18.3 of the Act provides that the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Youth and Sports shall provide education on the prevention and control of HIV. §18.4-18.5 provide that educating the public regarding HIV and AIDS is part of the national response, and the government shall train all relevant personnel. While §18.7 provides that all employees shall receive the HIV training regarding the prevention and control of HIV and AIDS. Several portions of the act speak to the rights of women and girls specifically. §18.9(a) of the Act notes that when providing HIV and AIDS service to women and girls differences in sex and gender should be considered. §18.9(b) directs the government agencies, when implementing the strategies, policies and programs to address the following issues: protection of the equality of women in private and public life, to address their rights to refuse sex and to access reproductive services independently, to address men’s equal responsibilities in sexual and reproductive health, to increase educational, economic, and employment opportunities to women, to reduce inequalities in laws regarding marital issues, and to protect women’s rights in religious contexts. §18.9(c) covers pregnant women with HIV and grants them the right to marry. The government shall provide them with consultation and information regarding future pregnancy decisions and the protection of future children from HIV. Section 18.9(d) requires the government to implement national education and training to health care providers to reduce HIV infection caused by sexual assault, protect the confidentiality of the HIV test result, report the sexual violence, and assist the investigation of such violence, and to develop and implement education and training for security personnel and prosecuting authorities in conducting investigations and prosecutions about the sexual violence. §18.27 provides that willful transmission of HIV by an infected person who knows his or her HIV test constitutes first degree felony. §18.28 prohibits discrimination on the basis of HIV status.

This act defines human trafficking and provides punishment for and methods of preventing human trafficking. §1.100-§1.102 of the act define human trafficking as including recruitment, transportation, and retention of a person by force or coercion for the purpose of slavery, forced labor, keeping a person in a state of servitude, prostitution, other commercial sexual exploitation, and removal of human organs. §3 provides that a person that commits trafficking must pay restitution to the victim. §7 provides that the Court shall sentence a person convicted of human trafficking to prison for at least one year, and that the offender can be sentenced to prison for longer periods under different situations. §8 provides that the fact that the victim was old enough to consent to sex shall not serve as a defense to the human trafficking offense. While §9 provides that the victim is immune from the prostitution or other criminal offenses caused by human trafficking. Art. II, §1 provides that the President shall implement a National Plan to prevent human trafficking and shall appoint members to a task force on implementation, which shall be led by the Minister of Labor. The Law also provides that a victim has a right to restitution including damages to compensate for costs of medical treatment, rehabilitation, transportation costs, lost income, legal fees, and general compensation for distress and pain as well as any other loss suffered. Compensation is paid by the defendant directly to the victim upon conviction. The right to restitution is not affected by the victim returning to his or her home country or by the victim not being present in Liberia. Section 9 provides immunity to any immigration offence that may have been committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Additionally, under Section 8, the Law confirms that consent to sex is not a valid defence to trafficking when violence is used to commit the crime. The Law also imposes corporate liability on international transport companies that fail to verify that passengers in company vehicles which enter other countries have the requisite travel documentation. A company may be fined for failing to comply. Additionally, a company that knowingly facilitates trafficking is liable for the cost of accommodating and providing meals to the victim and any dependent.

Federal Law No. 11.340/2006 commonly known as “Lei Maria da Penha” (or Maria da Penha Act) creates a new body of legal provisions regarding domestic and familiar violence against women in Brazil and requires that public authorities develop policy and measures that aim to guarantee women's human rights within the scope of domestic and family relations. The law also addresses urgent protective measures for victims. In addition, it provides for the creation of equipment essential to its effectiveness: Specialized Police Stations to Assist Women, Shelters, Women's Reference Centers, and Courts for Domestic and Family Violence against Women, among others. Brazil enacted this law after its namesake brought a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”), arguing that Brazil effectively condoned domestic violence that culminated in her irreversible paraplegia by failing to properly investigate, prosecute, and punish the perpetrator. The IACHR criticized the practices of the Brazilian criminal justice system and urged reform at the national level. Title II, Title III, Title IV, Title VII

A Lei Federal n. 11.340/1006, conhecida como “Lei Maria da Penha” (LMP) criou uma série de mecanismos legais para combate à violência doméstica e familiar sofrida por mulheres no Brasil. A lei impõe que as autoridades públicas desenvolvam políticas e procedimento que objetivem a garantia dos direitos das mulheres dentro de suas relações domésticas e familiares. A lei ainda prevê a os procedimentos para concessão de medidas protetivas de urgência das vítimas. Além disso, a LMP institui a criação de mecanismos necessários para efetivação do combate à violência doméstica tais como a criação de: (i) delegacias especializadas em atendimento da mulher vítima de violência doméstica, (ii) casas-abrigos e centro de referência para atendimento as mulhers em situação de violência doméstica e familiar, bem como (iii) a criação de Juizados de Violência Doméstica e Familiar contra a mulher, além de outras disposições. Importa recordar que a Lei Maria da Penha foi promulgada após a própria Maria da Penha denunciar perante a Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos (CIDH) que o sistema judiciário brasileiro era condescendente com violência sofrida pelas mulheres em ambiente familiar e que, em razão da inefetividade da justiça brasileira em investigar, processar e punir o agressor, ela acabou vítima de uma paraplegia irreversível. Título II, Título III, Título IV, Título VII

The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) adopted in 2011. As a result of these amendments, forced marriage (i.e. forcing a person to marry or to continue being in a forced marriage, or to enter into a cohabitation without official registration of marriage, or to continue such cohabitation) is punishable by restraint of liberty for up to three years or imprisonment for the same period and domestic violence (i.e. deliberate systematic violence against a spouse or ex-spouse or other person with whom the perpetrator is in family or intimate relationship, leading to physical or psychological suffering, disorder of health, disability, emotional dependence) is punishable with a sentence of public work for up to 240 hours, detention for up to six months, restraint of liberty for up to five years, or imprisonment for up to two years. In addition, the amendments: (i) introduce new crimes, such as “illegal abortion or sterilization” (i.e., performed by a person without medical education or without consent of the victim) which is punishable by imprisonment for up to 3 years; (ii) establish punishment for rape of a spouse or ex-spouse or other person with whom the perpetrator is in a family or intimate relationship (imprisonment for up to 10 years); and (iii) increase punishment for sexual violence to up to 15 years, if such acts resulted in serious consequences.

Article 147 of the Islamic Penal Code specifies that the age of maturity triggering criminal responsibility is 15 Islamic lunar calendar years for boys, but only nine Islamic lunar calendar years for girls. This signifies that young girls can be charged as criminally responsible adults in Iran before they reach the age of puberty. Articles 237-239 forbid same-sex kissing and touching, which will be punished by 31-74 lashes. Female genital touching (musaheqeh) is punished by 100 lashes. Article 225 mandates the death penalty for adultery (zina), which international commentators have noted is disproportionately applied to women (e.g., UN Special Rapporteur for Violence Against Women report: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/A-68-340.pdf). Article 199 describes the number and gender of witnesses needed to prove various crimes; no crimes may be proven with female witnesses alone and any female witness requires corroboration of a man and another woman. (Full Persian version of the Penal Code available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=103202)

The Penal Code (the “Code”) covers Japanese criminal law and sentencing. The relevant provisions with respect to gender justice issues in the Code are Rape, Gang Rape, Forcible Indecency, and Inducement to Promiscuous Intercourse. Rape was initially classified as a crime only involving female victims, but was amended to include men in 2017. The Code states that a person who commits one of more of the listed crimes shall be punished by imprisonment with work for life, or for a definite term corresponding to the gravity of a crime. Further, based on the “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” adopted by the United Nations, the Code was amended in 2005 to include the crime of Human Trafficking. Under the amendment, selling or purchasing a human is a crime, with the criminal punishment being more severe in cases with the purpose of profit, indecency, or marriage.

刑法は、犯罪と刑罰を規定している法律である。刑法の中で、ジェンダー・ジャスティスに関連する条項は、強姦、集団強姦、強制わいせつ、淫乱性交誘引が含まれる。強姦は当初、女性の被害者のみを対象とした犯罪として分類されていたが、2017年に男性も対象とされるよう刑法が改正された。同法では、列挙された犯罪の1つ以上を犯した者は、終身刑または罪の重さに応じた有期懲役に処される。 さらに、国連の「国際的な組織犯罪の防止に関する国際連合条約を補足する人（特に女性及び児童）の取引を防止し、抑止し及び処罰するための議定書」に基づき、2005年に刑法が改正され、人身売買が追加された。本改正により、人身売買が犯罪となり、営利目的、わいせつ目的、結婚目的で人身売買した場合は刑事罰がさらに重くなる。

The defendant was convicted rape, with the trial court finding that he followed the complainant to her house, suggested sexual intercourse, attacked her when she declined, and raped her. The defendant, a first-time offender, received a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. A judge reviewed the sentence and sent it to the High Court for consideration on the grounds that the sentence necessitated judicial remand due to manifest inadequacy. In concluding the lack of necessity of remand, the High Court reviewed the approach to sentencing for criminal offenses, which must regard the specific circumstances of the offense, the offender and the victim, and the public interest. The High Court discussed a few factors that must be taken into consideration in sentencing in rape cases, namely the victim’s age, the effect of the rape on the victim, and whether the perpetrator i) used violence above the minimum force to commit the rape, ii) used a weapon to intimidate or wound the victim, iii) repeatedly raped the victim, iv) premeditated and planned the rape, v) had previous convictions for sexual or other violent offences, and vi) subjected the victim to additional sexual indignities or perversions. The High Court affirmed precedent suggesting that three years is the minimum sentence for an adult convicted of rape without aggravating or mitigating factors. Specifically, the Court cited English precedent, which suggested five years as the threshold sentence, before citing the Malawi High Court suggesting that the threshold should be three years because of prison conditions in Malawi. In applying precedential sentencing standards to the specific circumstances of the case, the High Court determined that the lower court’s sentence did not qualify as manifestly inadequate, and therefore did not warrant intervention.

The defendant was charged the defilement of the complainant, a 17-year-old girl. In his defence, the accused claimed that he could not get an erection (albeit, apparently, only after the magistrate raised the question himself). During the proceedings, a woman stood up in court and volunteered to ascertain whether the accused could obtain an erection. One week later, the magistrate, prosecutor, court interpreter, accused, complainant, and the woman who had volunteered met in the magistrate’s chambers to witness whether the woman could touch the defendant sexually until he obtained an erection. The magistrate observed, after approximately 30 minutes of sexual contact, that the accused’s “penis got a bit hard but not very hard.” Following a complaint from the complainant’s parent, the High Court was requested to review the conduct of the magistrate to determine the veracity of the complaint. At this point, the magistrate had not reached a verdict. By way of a preliminary conclusion, the High Court noted that “this illegal show seemed to come out of the blue” and found that the manner of investigation into the accused’s ability to obtain an erection was “raised by the magistrate, thereby making the [High] Court conclude that there were extra judicial discussions” between the accused and the magistrate. The Court also expressed serious concern about secondary victimisation, given that the sexual act occurred in the presence of the complainant. The Court then outlined its reasons for arriving at its ultimate decision, focusing on two matters: the existence of bias and judicial stereotyping. Regarding the first issue, the Court cited caselaw from across common law jurisdictions and the European Court of Human Rights relating to actual or perceived bias. Regarding the second issue, the Court highlighted the significant dangers associated with gender stereotyping on the part of the judiciary. The Court emphasised that judges should be alive to the concerns of victims of sexual offences, specifically that gender stereotypes harm such victims and contribute to further violations of their rights. Presiding officers are obliged to ensure that the courts offer equal access to men and women. In this context, it was emphasised that it matters not only how judges conduct themselves, but also how their conduct could be perceived during a trial. A judicial officer has to be aware of the negative results of displaying condescension toward women in court. In this case, the complainant was concerned about judicial bias, corruption, and/or collusion with the accused. The decision implied that the magistrate’s conduct could have arisen from his bias against, and stereotyping of, the complainant as a complainant in a sexual offence case. The Court highlighted that the judiciary could not condone the perpetuation of “structural gender-based violence, where courts instill fear in women and girls who are victims of sexual offences, using the criminal justice system.” Therefore, in order to create a discrimination-free judicial system that victims can rely on, it is incumbent on the judiciary to remain cognisant of its own biases and stereotypes, especially in the context of victims of sexual offences, and conduct cases in a manner which counteracts such biases and stereotypes. In conclusion, the High Court ordered a retrial under a different magistrate, and that the complainant and her family be provided with the resources needed to ensure her attendance at court. The Court referred (i) the magistrate’s conduct in the trial and (ii) the wider question of gender bias among judicial officers to the Judicial Service Commission. Finally, the Court recommended that the Chief Justice, through the judiciary’s training committee, should develop training programmes to avoid a matter like this re-occurring in the future.

The defendant physically attacked and raped the victim. The court of the first instance found the defendant guilty of rape (part 1 of Article 152 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine - after this The Criminal Code) and sentenced him to three years of imprisonment. However, the appellate court released the defendant from serving the sentence and instead imposed a three-year probationary period (Article 75 of the Criminal Code). In accordance with Article 75, the court may decide to release a person from serving a sentence with probation if the maximum sentence for a criminal offense does not exceed five years of imprisonment (the maximum imprisonment for rape is five years). The prosecutor noted that the punishment was disproportionate to the gravity of the crime. The victim demanded actual imprisonment because, as a result of the attack, she developed depression and needed a rehabilitation course with a psychologist. The Supreme Court noted that a person who has committed a crime must be given a punishment that is necessary, proportionate to the crime, and sufficient for his correction and prevention of new crimes (50, 65 of the Criminal Code). The Supreme Court annulled the appellate decision due to the court’s failure to take into account the gravity of the crime and the consequences for the victim. Thus, the Supreme Court ordered a new trial, ordering that the court apply the law on a more serious criminal offense or increase the punishment. This means that Article 75 (exemption from punishment with the appointment of probation and probationary period) cannot be applied, and instead the punishment should be imposed in accordance with Article 152 (rape): from three to five years in prison. This case is important because it emphasizes the severity of rape, the need for proportionate punishment, and consideration of the consequences for the victim.

Особа 2 напав на Особу 1 та зґвалтував із застосуванням фізичного насильства. Судом першої інстанції Особу 2 було визнано винним у вчиненні зґвалтування (ч. 1 ст. 152 Кримінального Кодексу України - далі КК) та призначено покарання у виді позбавлення волі на строк 3 роки, але рішенням апеляційного суду Особу 2 було звільнено від відбування призначеного покарання з випробуванням та іспитовим строком тривалістю 3 роки (ст. 75 КК). Прокурор зазначив, що покарання є невідповідним тяжкості злочину; потерпіла вимагала покарання у вигляді реального позбавлення волі, бо внаслідок вчинення злочину щодо неї вона перебуває у стані депресії, проходить курс реабілітації у психолога. Верховний Суд зазначив, що особі, яка вчинила злочин, має бути призначене покарання, необхідне і достатнє для її виправлення і попередження нових злочинів ( 50, 65 КК); виходячи з вказаної мети й принципів справедливості, співмірності та індивідуалізації, покарання повинно бути співмірним характеру вчинених дій та їх небезпечності. Рішення апеляційної інстанції було скасовано, через неврахування тяжкості злочину та наслідків для потерпілої; було призначено новий розгляд справи у зв'язку з необхідністю застосування закону про більш тяжке кримінальне правопорушення або посилення покарання. Ця справа є важливою, бо наголошує на тяжкості згвалтування, необхідності співмірного покарання та урахування наслідків для жертви.

While intoxicated, the defendant committed lewd acts against a minor (under 14 years old) by forcing her to expose herself and photographing her naked. He also took the photographs, which were recognized as a pornographic product. According to the courts of the first and second instance, the illegal actions qualified as corruption of a minor (Article 156 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) and the production of child pornography for which he was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment. In his complaint to the Supreme Court, the prosecutor demanded a longer sentence, arguing that the sentence was disproportionate to the crime and emphasizing the defendant’s criminal history. The Supreme Court noted that the court of the first instance considered the severity of the crimes, the personal information about the offender, the defendant’s attitude towards the crimes, the defendant’s partial recognition of his guilt, and the aggravating circumstance of intoxication. Thus, by imposing a penalty of imprisonment near the maximum allowable sentence, the Supreme Court held that court of the first instance complied with the requirements of proportionality and fairness. In this case, the prosecutor's complaint was dismissed.

Чоловік в стані алкогольного сп’яніння вчинив відносно малолітньої (до 14 років) потерпілої розпусні дії (ст. 156 КК), які виразились у її примушуванні до оголення та фотографуванні в оголеному вигляді; він також створив фотознімки з таким зображенням потерпілої (було визнано продукцією порнографічного характеру). За результатами розгляду справи судом першої та другої інстанції протиправні дії було кваліфіковано як розбещення малолітньої особи та виготовлення дитячої порнографії та засуджено до 7 років позбавлення волі. Прокурор у своїй скарзі до Верховного Суду вимагає скасування рішення та призначення нового розгляду через невідповідність призначеного покарання скоєному злочину та неврахування особи винного, що неодноразово притягувався до адміністративної відповідальності. Верховний Суд зазначає, що суд першої інстанції, призначаючи покарання у виді позбавлення волі, врахував ступінь тяжкості вчинених злочинів, ставлення до вчиненого, часткове визнання своєї винуватості, наявність обставини, що обтяжує покарання - вчинення злочину в стані алкогольного сп'яніння, а також дані про його особу. Таким чином, суд першої інстанції, призначаючи покарання у виді позбавлення волі в розмірі, наближеному до максимального (передбаченого за інкриміновані правопорушення), дотримався вимоги співмірності та справедливості. Скарга прокурора не підлягає задоволенню.

This decision provides that complaints of domestic violence must be channeled through the ‘Permanent Attention Office’ (Oficina de Atención Permanente). This Office is responsible of receiving all types of domestic or intra-family violence claims, without making any distinction based on the sex or age of the victims. Since violence against women constitutes a violation of human rights, the creation of the Office is intended to streamline judicial proceedings, serving victims of physical or mental abuse in a timely and efficient manner.

Esta decisión establece que las denuncias de violencia intrafamiliar deben canalizarse a través de la Oficina de Atención Permanente. Esta Oficina es la encargada de recibir todo tipo de denuncias por violencia doméstica o intrafamiliar, sin distinción alguna en razón de sexo o edad de las víctimas. Dado que la violencia contra la mujer constituye una violación de los derechos humanos, la creación de la Oficina tiene por objeto agilizar los procesos judiciales, atendiendo a las víctimas de maltrato físico o psíquico de manera oportuna y eficiente.

The case concerned sexual abuse involving an underage victim. The court ruled in accordance with article 135.1º, 4º of the Criminal Code, on sexual abuse of minors, finding the defendant guilty and sentencing him to eight years in prison. It was argued that the defendant had several sexual encounters with the plaintiff, who was a minor. For such purposes, the defendant used to pick the plaintiff up at school and take her in his car to empty places to have sexual intercourse. The court held that the plaintiff as a victim shall be protected against all forms of sexual abuse and violence, as established by the national Constitution. Because she was a minor, her consent to enter into such relations was void and, therefore, must not be considered a reason to leave her without protection.

El caso se refería al abuso sexual de una víctima menor de edad. El tribunal resolvió el caso de conformidad con el artículo 135.1º, 4º del Código Penal, sobre abusos sexuales a menores, declarando culpable al acusado y condenándolo a ocho años de prisión. Se argumentó que el acusado mantuvo varios encuentros sexuales con la demandante, quien era menor de edad. Para tales efectos, el imputado recogía a la demandante en la escuela y la llevaba en su automóvil a lugares solitarios para tener relaciones sexuales. El tribunal sostuvo que la denunciante como víctima debe ser protegida contra toda forma de abuso y violencia sexual, tal como lo establece la Constitución Nacional. Por ser menor de edad, su consentimiento para entablar tales relaciones fue nulo y, por tanto, no se considera motivo para dejarla sin protección.

The case concerned abortion, the right to life, the right to health, and the right to self-determination. The court ruled for the partial decriminalization of abortion and set circumstances under which voluntary termination of pregnancy would be permissible. The Criminal Code previously criminalized voluntary abortion with one to three years of imprisonment. The plaintiffs argued that the criminalization of abortion violated women’s constitutional rights to life and dignity, physical integrity, equality, liberty, and unhindered development of personality, health, and reproductive self-determination. The Colombian Constitutional Court determined that abortion shall not be considered a crime in any of the following three circumstances: (i) a physician certified that pregnancy could threaten the woman’s health or life; (ii) a physician concluded that the fetus would suffer from serious malformations that could eventually endanger or terminate his life; and (iii) if the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or non-consensual artificial insemination, as long as the criminal act was lawfully reported to the competent authorities. The court found that articles 32.7, 122, 123, and 124 were constitutional, subject only to the aforementioned criteria. This case is of paramount importance because it established for the first time the right of women to terminate their pregnancy under the three specific scenarios. The scope of this decision was recently modified under Decision C-055-22 by the Constitutional Court, which has been announced but not yet published as of April 2022. This decision decriminalized voluntary abortion under any circumstances until 24 weeks of pregnancy. Voluntary abortions carried out after week 24 will not be deemed criminal offenses only if they are performed under any of the three events previously recognized by the Constitutional Court in the Decision C-355-06.

El caso se refería al aborto, el derecho a la vida, el derecho a la salud y el derecho al libre desarrollo de la personalidad. La Corte Constitucional falló a favor de la despenalización parcial del aborto y fijó las circunstancias bajo las cuales sería permisible la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo. El Código Penal tipificaba como delito el aborto voluntario con uno a tres años de prisión. Los demandantes argumentaron que la penalización del aborto violaba los derechos constitucionales de las mujeres a la vida y la dignidad, la integridad física, la igualdad, la libertad, el libre desarrollo de la personalidad, la salud y la libre determinación reproductiva. La Corte Constitucional de Colombia determinó que el aborto no sería considerado delito en ninguna de las siguientes tres circunstancias: (i) cuando un médico certifique que el embarazo puede poner en peligro la salud o la vida de la mujer; (ii) cuando un médico concluya que el feto sufriría de graves malformaciones que eventualmente podrían poner en peligro o acabar con su vida; y (iii) si el embarazo fue producto de violación, incesto o inseminación artificial no consentida, siempre que el hecho delictivo haya sido legalmente denunciado ante las autoridades competentes. El tribunal consideró que los artículos 32.7, 122, 123 y 124 eran constitucionales condicionados a los criterios antes mencionados. Este caso es de suma importancia porque estableció por primera vez el derecho de la mujer a interrumpir su embarazo bajo los tres supuestos específicos. El alcance de esta decisión fue modificado recientemente mediante la Sentencia C-055-22 de la Corte Constitucional. Esta decisión despenalizó el aborto voluntario bajo cualquier circunstancia hasta la semana 24 de embarazo. Los abortos voluntarios practicados después de la semana 24 no serán considerados delitos si se realizan bajo cualquiera de los tres supuestos previamente reconocidos por la Corte Constitucional en la Sentencia C-355-06.

This judicial review concerned domestic violence. The court ruled that there ought to be greater criminal sanctions for domestic violence offenses. The law provides for four to eight years of imprisonment in cases of domestic violence, irrespective of the magnitude of the injuries. The plaintiff claimed that the article went against the proportionality principle set forth by the Colombian Constitution. The Constitutional Court held that special protection should be provided to families and especially to those who are more vulnerable to domestic violence and are in need of enhanced protective measures. The court pointed out that the family unit shall be preserved, among others, by virtue of the State’s powers and sanctions in accordance with article 42 of the Constitution. That is to say, the Colombian State is obliged to enact and establish a number of strict legal provisions allowing for the investigation and adequate punishment of any sort of domestic violence. To that end, the legislature had the power to discourage the forms of violence that may affect the family unit by increasing sanctions for domestic violence offenses, as provided in article 229 of the Criminal Code –and amended by article 33 of Law 1142 of 2007.

Esta demanda de constitucionalidad se refería a la violencia doméstica. La Corte Constitucional dictaminó que debería haber mayores sanciones penales para los delitos de violencia doméstica. La ley prevé de cuatro a ocho años de prisión para casos de violencia intrafamiliar, independientemente de la magnitud de las lesiones. La demandante alegó que el artículo contravenía el principio de proporcionalidad consagrado en la Constitución Política de Colombia. La Corte Constitucional sostuvo que se debe brindar protección especial a las familias y especialmente a aquellas que son más vulnerables a la violencia doméstica y necesitan mayores medidas de protección. El tribunal señaló que la unidad familiar se debe preservar, entre otras, a través de las facultades del Estado y de regímenes sancionatorios de conformidad con el artículo 42 de la Constitución. Es decir, el Estado colombiano está obligado a promulgar y establecer una serie de estrictas disposiciones legales que permitan investigar y sancionar adecuadamente cualquier tipo de violencia intrafamiliar. Para tal efecto, el legislador tenía la facultad de desalentar cualquier forma de violencia que pueda afectar la unidad familiar mediante el aumento de las sanciones por delitos de violencia intrafamiliar, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 229 del Código Penal –y reformado por el artículo 33 de la Ley 1142 de 2007.

The court reviewed a decision made by the ‘Family Commissioner’ (Comisario de Familia) and endorsed by the Family Judge (Juzgado de Familia), denying the plaintiff’s request for precautionary measures against the defendant, based on physical and psychological aggressions. The Commissioner estimated that there was not enough evidence as to affirm that the risk to the plaintiff’s life or integrity. Given the parties’ mutual aggression, the Commissioner advised the couple to cease all acts of violence against each other. The plaintiff alleged that the Commissioner did not take into consideration a medical report by the Institute of Legal Medicine (Instituto de Medicina Legal) acknowledging the existing risks to the plaintiff’s physical integrity. The judge who initially heard the case endorsed the Commissioner’s decision. The Constitutional Court ultimately overturned the court’s decision based on the special protections granted to women in the context of domestic violence. Such special protection arises out of the historical disadvantages that women have had to face within society, especially within the family environment. On this note, the Court ruled that any failure by the competent authorities to provide protection measures against domestic violence violates the fundamental rights of women, understood as a vulnerable group within society.

In this case, the defendant, the mayor of a Colombian town, was convicted of rape and non-consensual abortion. The penalty was 261 months of imprisonment and 20 years of disqualification from exercising political roles in the public sector. The prosecutor argued that the defendant had several sexual encounters with the plaintiff, a minor, against her will and, as a result, she got pregnant. The defendant forced the plaintiff to terminate the pregnancy. The defendant argued before the Supreme Court of Justice that the appellant court omitted at least seven fundamental testimonies. The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff’s testimony, as well as some of the testimonies from other witnesses, was inconsistent. The plaintiff declared out-of-court that the defendant raped her and forced her to abort, however, during the appellate trial she testified that the lawsuit was a stratagem designed by her uncle, who was a candidate and political opponent of the defendant, to discredit the defendant. However, the appellate court learned that defendant, in order to obtain an acquittal, extorted, threatened, and attempted to bribe the plaintiff, plaintiff’s relatives, and other witnesses involved in the case. The Supreme Court of Justice found that even though the plaintiff changed her testimony, the other evidence suggested that the defendant was guilty of the charges. Therefore, the Court ultimately upheld the defendant’s conviction.

En este caso, el acusado, alcalde de un pueblo colombiano, fue condenado por acceso carnal violento y aborto no consentido. La pena fue de 261 meses de prisión y 20 años de inhabilitación para ejercer cargos públicos. El fiscal argumentó que el acusado tuvo varios encuentros sexuales con una víctima menor de edad, en contra de su voluntad y, como consecuencia, quedó embarazada. La víctima fue obligada por el acusado a interrumpir el embarazo. El acusado alegó ante la Corte Suprema de Justicia que la corte de segunda instancia omitió al menos siete testimonios fundamentales para el caso. También afirmó que el testimonio de la víctima, así como algunos de los testimonios de otros testigos, eran inconsistentes. La víctima declaró extrajudicialmente que el acusado la violó y la obligó a abortar, sin embargo, durante el juicio de apelación declaró que la demanda fue una estrategia diseñada por su tío, quien era candidato y opositor político del acusado, para desacreditar al acusado. Sin embargo, la corte de segunda instancia se enteró que el acusado extorsionó, amenazó e intentó sobornar a la víctima, a los familiares de la víctima y a otros testigos involucrados en el caso, con el fin de obtener una absolución. La Corte Suprema de Justicia encontró que, a pesar de que la víctima cambió su testimonio, la evidencia sugería que el acusado era culpable de los cargos que se le imputaban. Por lo tanto, la Corte finalmente confirmó la condena del acusado.

The Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred in finding that the appellant’s professional activity of assisting with childbirth at home is prohibited. Instead, it specified that the circumstances of her working without a license and necessary qualifications, such as being a doctor, an obstetrician-gynecologist, or a midwife, made this type of activity illegal.

Aukščiausiasis Teismas nusprendė, kad apeliacinis teismas suklydo konstatuodamas, jog apeliantės profesinė veikla—pagalba gimdyti namuose, yra draudžiama. Vietoj to, Teismas nurodė, kad šio darbo be licencijos ir būtinų kvalifikacijų aplinkybės padarė tokio pobūdžio veiklą neteisėtą. Sveikatos apsaugos ministras 2019 m. patvirtino įsakymą Nr. V-10 dėl gimdymo namuose priežiūros paslaugos teikimo tvarkos aprašo patvirtinimo.

This judgment was issued as part of the assessment proceedings subsequent to a judicial review by the state. This review investigated systemic and individual failures resulting in police officers committing widespread violent and traumatic sexual assaults and rapes of women and girls during the civil unrest in October 2019. The court was tasked with assessing the amount of compensation to be awarded to the 18 applicants on whose behalf the review was conducted. The basis for this award was the previous judgment of the court that: (i) failures by the Inspector General of Police resulted in violence, torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment against the applicants in violation of section 19(3) of the Constitution; (ii) failures by the Inspector General of Police further resulted in violations of the right of applicants to dignity and equality under sections 19(1) and 20 of the Constitution; and (iii) failures by the Clerk of the National Assembly and the Malawi Police Service to investigate and prosecute the allegations of violence and rape resulted in violations of the right of access to justice under section 41 of the Constitution. The court also found numerous violations of domestic laws, including the Police Act, as well as Malawi’s obligations under human rights treaties, including CEDAW. Under section 46(4) of the Constitution, the courts have the power to award compensation to any person whose rights or freedoms have been unlawfully denied or violated. The court applied the principle of restitution intergrum, or making the victim whole as they would have been prior to the violation, and turned to international precedents when evaluating appropriate amounts. The court noted that any amount should be elevated when caused by a “constitutional duty bearer,” such as the police, and that lack of investigation was an aggravating factor. The court awarded different amounts to each applicant depending on the circumstances of their particular harm, ranging from K4,500,000-10,000,000, in addition to costs.

The appellant pleaded guilty to raping and impregnating a 12-year-old girl for which he was originally sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with hard labor. On appeal, the appellant argued that his sentence was excessive in light of mitigating factors. While recognizing the victim’s age and pregnancy as aggravating factors, the appeals court reduced his sentence to nine years imprisonment. The court articulated several rules regarding mitigation in favor of this outcome based on the citation of cases from the appellant. First, the court stated that guilty pleas should reduce a sentence by one-third, even in the case of serious crimes. Second, citing in Rep v. Bamusi Mkwapatira, the court stated that all first-time offenders, regardless of the severity of the offense, should benefit from mitigation. Finally, the court identified the appellant, who was 33 years old at the time of the offense, as “youthful,” asserting that “men especially grow slowly mentally and at 35 they are at their prime experimenting with life.” Cautioning against mitigating too significantly, however, the court explicitly recognized the victim’s pregnancy, which “disturbed [her] life […] physically and psychologically,” and her very young age as aggravating factors. Thus, the court reduced the sentence by one-quarter, resulting in a nine-year sentence, rather than one-third or more.

The Plenum of the Supreme Court explained (i) that rape (Art. 166 of the Criminal Code) can be committed against women only, while violent sexual acts (Art. 167 of the Criminal Code) can be committed against both women and men, and (ii) that the victim’s circumstances, for example previous commission of a crime, lifestyle, or marital relationship to the offender, do not prohibit conviction of the offender for these crimes. The Plenum further held that “violence,” which is one of the conditions for commission of rape or violent sexual acts, shall be understood as a physical act against the victim (or relatives of the victim in case of rape). Examples of violence include tearing the victim’s clothes, causing physical pain, beating, strangulation, making the victim take alcohol or drugs against his or her will, restricting the victim’s freedom by tying, or locking the doors. Threat of violence shall be understood as specific words, actions, or gestures showing the intention of the offender to harm the victim. The Plenum noted that non-violent acts, such as obtaining consent by deception or abuse of trust (such as the promise to marry or to reward sexual favors) do not qualify under Arts. 166-167 of the Criminal Code. The Plenum further explained that “using the helpless state of the victim,” which is the alternative condition to violence or threat of violence for the commission of rape or violent sexual acts, shall mean that the victim due to young age, mental disorder, loss of consciousness, alcohol or drug intoxication could not understand the nature of actions performed with him or her or that due to a physical disability could not oppose it. The Plenum noted that it does not matter whether the offender made or witnessed the victim take alcohol or drugs or other intoxicating substances, rather the offender simply has to be aware of the intoxication that renders the victim helpless. The Plenum also explained that a person is not guilty of attempted rape or commission of violent acts of sexual nature if that person voluntary abandons the commission of the crime. Abandonment caused by circumstances beyond the control of the offender, such as resistance by the victim, third party interference, or physiological inability to commit the crime is not voluntary.

The appellant was convicted of two accounts of domestic violence in the form of sexual assault of two minors (11 and 9-years-old) and sentenced to 8 years in prison, in addition to payment of a compensation to the victims. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant 1) claimed that the accusation was based merely on the victims’ testimony, which he alleged untrue and made with the sole purpose of monetary gain by their mother (his partner at the time of the crimes), 2) denied having any kind of sexual intercourse with the victims, and 3) claimed the conviction violated his constitutional rights because the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. The Supreme Court argued that there was enough physical evidence that the defendant violated both victims, including evidence that proved anal rape. However, as the evidence and testimony of the victims showed, the assault had not occurred through vaginal penetration, but solely anal. Therefore, the type of crime perpetrated had not been correctly invoked by the lower court, as the configuration of sexual assault requires vaginal penetration under Angolan law. Under that paradigm, the Supreme Court ruled that the crime committed was indecent exposure and, consequently, domestic violence and that such criminal offense is punishable with a sentence lower than 12 years in prison. The Supreme Court then found the defendant amnestied and, consequently, extinguished the criminal proceedings against him, without prejudice of the monetary compensation for damages. In 2016, Angola published an amnesty law (Lei nº 11/16) in which it pardoned common crimes punishable by a prison sentence of up to 12 years. Although the amnesty law excludes sexual crimes, the crime committed in this case does not fit the exception, precisely because of the absence of vaginal penetration. At the end of 2020, a new Angolan Penal Code was enacted, which has been in effect since February 2021. The new Penal Code considers both vaginal and anal penetration to be sexual penetration.

O apelante foi condenado por duas ocorrências de violência doméstica na forma de abuso sexual de dois menores (11 e 9 anos de idade) e sentenciado a 8 anos na prisão, com adição de pagamento de indenização às vítimas. Na apelação para o Tribunal Supremo, o apelante 1) afirmou que as acusações foram feitas somente com base nos depoimentos das vítimas, os quais ele alegou serem falsos e feitos com o único propósito de ganho financeiro pela mãe (a sua parceira no momento dos crimes), 2) negou ter qualquer tipo de relação sexual com as vítimas, e 3) afirmou que a condenação violou os seus direitos constitucionais porque a evidência não foi suficiente para provar a sua culpa. O Tribunal Supremo argumentou que havia evidência física suficiente para provar que o réu violou ambas as vítimas, incluindo evidência que provou estupro anal. Entretanto, como a evidência e o depoimento mostraram, o abuso não foi feito por penetração vaginal, mas somente anal. Assim, o tipo do crime perpetrado não tinha sido corretamente aplicado pela corte inferior, já que a configuração de abuso sexual na legislação de Angola requer penetração vaginal. Sob este paradigma, o Tribunal Supremo deliberou que o crime foi de atentado ao pudor e, consequentemente, violência doméstica e esse tipo penal é punido com sentença menor que 12 anos de prisão. O Tribunal Supremo então declarou o réu anistiado e, portanto, extinguiu os procedimentos criminais contra ele, sem prejuízo da indenização por danos. Em 2016, Angola publicou uma lei de anistia (Lei nº 11/16) em que perdoou crimes comuns que são puníveis com penas de até 12 anos. Ainda que a lei de anistia excluda crimes sexuais, o crime neste caso não se encaixa nessa exceção, precisamente por causa da abstinência da penetração vaginal. No fim de 2020, um novo Código Penal Angolano foi promulgado, o qual está em vigor desde Fevereiro de 2021. O novo Código Penal considera ambas penetrações vaginal e anal como penetração sexual.

The defendant appealed from a lower court decision convicting him to 12 years of imprisonment for committing the crimes of domestic violence, child mistreatment and sexual abuse, and aggravated coercion. The defendant sought to reduce his sentence, arguing that the lower court erred in applying the law to the facts, since there was no evidence that his actions could be characterized as domestic violence. The Court of Appeals of Coimbra denied the appeal, concluding that the record demonstrated that defendant had treated his spouse inhumanely over the years, through repeated physical, psychological, and moral humiliations and aggressions. The Court of Appeals did not find the 12-year imprisonment sentencing excessive, noting that the defendant’s overall conduct was particularly egregious and manifestly inconsistent with the social values that criminal law seeks to protect (sexual self-determination and human dignity).

O Defendente apresentou Recurso em face da decisão proferida em 1ª instância, o qual o condenou a 12 anos de prisão pelos crimes de violência doméstica, maus-tratos e sexual abuso contra seus filhos e coerção agravada. O Defendente buscou no recurso a redução da sua pena, sob a justificativa de que a decisão em 1ª instância errou ao aplicar a lei aos fatos, em razão da inexistência de provas que caracterizariam o crime de violência doméstica. O Tribunal de Relação de Coimbra negou provimento ao recurso, concluindo que as provas nos autos demonstravam que o Defendente tratava sua esposa de forma desumana ao longo dos anos, a partir de repetidas humilhações e agressões verbais, físicas, psicológicas e morais. Além disso, o Tribunal entendeu correta a aplicação de pena de 12 anos de prisão, ressaltando que a conduta do Defendente foi particularmente grave e manifestamente inconsistente com os valores sociais que o direito penal procura proteger (autonomia sexual e dignidade humana).

In 2004, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) considered a claim brought by the National Trade Union of Health Workers and ANIS (Institute of Bioethics, Human Rights, and Gender) to determine whether terminating a pregnancy in which the fetus suffers from anencephaly (absence of major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp) violates the prohibition on abortion as set forth in Brazil’s Penal Code. On April 12, 2012, the STF rendered an 8-2 decision (with one abstention) that abortion in the circumstance of anencephaly is not a criminal act under the Penal Code. The majority extended a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy to cases of anencephalic fetuses because the fetus does not have the potential for a viable life outside of the womb, and to force a woman to carry such a pregnancy to term is akin to torture. Justice Marco Aurelio and the majority held that to interpret the Penal Code to prohibit such abortions would violate a woman’s constitutional guarantees of human dignity, autonomy, privacy, and the right to health. A woman therefore may seek and receive treatment to terminate the anencephalic pregnancy without risk of criminal prosecution and without judicial involvement.

Em 2004, a Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF, quando da análise do Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental 54 formalizada pela Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Saúde – CNTS, determinou que a interrupção da gravidez de feto anencefálico não viola as proibições de realização de aborto trazidas no Código Penal. Em abri de 2012, o Pleno do STF entendeu, por 8-2 votos (com uma abstenção), pela descriminalização do aborto realizado em razão da anencefalia do feto. A maioria estendeu o direito da mulher de interromper sua gravidez a casos de fetos anencefálicos porque o feto não tem potencial para uma vida viável fora do útero, e forçar uma mulher a levar tal gravidez adiante é semelhante a tortura. O Juiz Marco Aurélio e a maioria dos juízes sustentou que interpretar o Código Penal para proibir tais abortos violaria as garantias constitucionais de dignidade humana, autonomia, privacidade e o direito à saúde da mulher. Assim, a mulher poderá procurar e receber tratamento para interromper a gravidez anencefálica sem risco de processo criminal e sem envolvimento judicial.

The defendant-husband, who had joint parental authority with his wife, forcibly took his son away from his mother. The court held that the defendant's act constituted kidnapping, as there were no special circumstances which made the defendant's actions necessary, and the act was "violent and coercive." In addition, the court found that the act of kidnapping the child could not be justified even though the defendant had parental authority.

本件は、被告人である夫が、他方親権者である妻から息子を強制的に連れ去った事件である。最高裁は、被告人である夫がそのような行為に出ることを必要とする特段な事情が認められないことから、その行為はが粗暴で強引であるとして、被告人が親権を持っていたとしても、子の略取は正当化できないとし、未成年者略取罪の成立を認めた。

The defendant was indicted under the Stalker Regulation Law on a charge of stalking his former girlfriend. The defendant demanded many times by email and phone that she repay costs he incurred while they were dating. The defendant sent a letter to her threatening to distribute nude photos of her if she did not unblock him on her cell phone. The Supreme Court determined that, even though he sent the letter only once, his conduct amounted to “stalking” under the Stalker Regulation Law since his conduct was as a whole persistent and repetitive.

被告人は、元交際相手に対し、交際中にかかった費用の返済をメールや電話で何度も要求し、携帯電話のブロックを解除しなければヌード写真をばら撒くと脅す手紙を送った。最高裁は、手紙を送ったのが1回だけであっても、「つきまとい等」の行為が反復することから、ストーカー規制法の「ストーカー行為」に該当すると判断した。

The respondent pleaded guilty to two charges of indecent assault and two charges of defilement for repeatedly raping his wife’s 12-year-old granddaughter. When the girl reported the rapes to her grandmother, the respondent’s wife, he apologized. Later, the respondent wanted the victim to sleep with him and the victim’s grandmother told her to do so. The respondent again raped the victim. The High Court, in sentencing the respondent to two years imprisonment, considered his early plea, the seriousness of the case, and his apology to the girl. Counsel for the Republic appealed on the grounds that the two-year sentence was manifestly inadequate. The Republic argued that due to the rising prevalence of sexual offences in Kiribati, sentencing guidelines were needed. She further contended that the High Court erred in considering the respondent’s apology to the girl a mitigating factor. Relying on Kimaere v The Republic, a Kiribati Court of Appeal decision from 2005, and sentencing standards of New Zealand and Australia, the Court found that a five-year prison sentence was an appropriate starting point in defilement cases. The Court noted that in cases involving multiple offenses, it is more important that the overall sentence appropriately reflect the entirety of the defendant’s conduct rather than adding together the sentences for each offense. Determining that the respondent’s conduct justified a prison sentence of seven to eight years, the Court then reduced his sentence for his early plea to a total of five years. The Court found that the sentencing judge incorrectly weighted the respondent’s apology as a mitigating factor. The Court also held that the starting point for the indecent assault charges would have been two-and-a-half years before accounting for mitigating factors.

In this interpretation, the Taiwan Constitutional Court upheld a criminal penalty provision of the Child and Juvenile Sexual Transaction Prevention Act (subsequently amended and retitled as the Child and Youth Sexual Exploitation Prevention Act, or “CYSEPA”) that provided for imprisonment and monetary fines for parties publishing, broadcasting, or otherwise spreading information that may by any means induce a person to engage in an unlawful sexual transaction. The Court cited its earlier precedents holding that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech was not absolute and that lawmakers may impose restrictions through clear and unambiguous laws. With regard to the Constitution’s Article 23 proportionality principle, the Court addressed the broad scope of the criminal penalty provision, which did not require that the information in question specifically involve or result in underage sexual transactions or inducement of children or juveniles to engage in sexual transactions. The Court noted that children and juveniles are still in danger of becoming objects of sexual transactions because of the wide distribution of such information and, therefore, distribution of such information constitutes a crime. The Court held that the criminal penalty provision in question was a rational and necessary means of achieving the significant state interest of protecting children and juveniles from becoming objects of sexual transactions and therefore was consistent with the principle of proportionality. The Court nonetheless directed competent authorities to design a “classified management system” so that readers and viewers of such information “can be strictly differentiated in light of the technological developments so as to comply with the principle of proportionality.” The current version of this criminal penalty provision, as reflected in the CYSEPA, has a narrower scope and applies to “messages that are deemed to be sufficient to seduce, arrange, suggest, or cause a child or youth to be subjected” to sexual exploitation. English translation available here.

The plaintiffs were two female criminal defendants who chose to be tried by a jury and objected to the Juries Act of 1927, which excluded all women from jury pools except those who opted to be part of the potential jurors list. The Supreme Court ruled the Juries Act unconstitutional because it constituted invidious discrimination on the basis of sex.

The issue on appeal in this case was whether the doctrine of common purpose can be applied to the common law crime of rape. Under the common law, rape is an instrumentality offense, which means that the perpetrator must have committed the act himself or facilitated the offense by his conduct. The doctrine of common purpose, however, is applied when a crime is committed by a group of people “with a mutual objective intended to produce a specific result against a targeted victim.” In this case, a group of young men terrorized a township, breaking into homes, attacking occupants, and several of the attackers repeatedly raped eight women. The men were charged and convicted of eight counts of rape, respectively, seven of which were imposed based on the doctrine of common purpose. The Constitutional Court reasoned that it is unsustainable to simply characterize rape as an act of a man inserting his genitalia into an unconsenting woman’s genitalia, especially in a group rape context where the mere presence of the group results in power and dominance over the victim. Thus, it held, the law must dispose of the misguided idea that rape is only a sex crime. The Court, therefore, declared that the instrumentality approach perpetuates gender inequality and promotes discrimination because it seeks to absolve those who may not have committed the crime itself but who contributed toward the commission of the crime from liability. The Court further reasoned that the doctrine of common purpose should apply to rape because the object and purpose of the doctrine is to “overcome an otherwise unjust result… by removing the element of causation from criminal liability and replacing it with the imputing deed which cased the [crime] to all the co-perpetrators.” It observed that it is “irrational and arbitrary” to not apply the doctrine to common law rape, as opposed to murder and assault, based on the distinction that a genital organ must be used to perpetrate rape. It argued that courts should be aiming to afford the constitutional principles of equality, dignity, and the protection of bodily and psychological integrity to victims of sexual assault. Therefore, in this case, the Court observed that the applicants knowingly and with the requisite intention participated in the activities of the group and fully associated themselves with its criminal designs. Thus, the Court held them guilty of rape based on the doctrine of common purpose.

The appellant was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison for the attempted murder of his spouse, and the conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal. On appeal, the appellant claimed that the lower court erred by (1) failing to consider the facts as exposed by the appellant, (2) failing to take into account that the wounds suffered by the victim were not deadly, (3) refusing to consider the “voluntary and timely abandonment of the act”, (4) failing to set out its reasoning in reaching its conclusions as to the events and the injuries suffered by the victim, and (5) imposing an excessive sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the Trial Court considered witness testimony and set out the facts underlying the decision, which were sufficient to uphold the decision and sentence. It also found that the fact that the wounds suffered by the victim were not fatal was not inconsistent with the crime charged. Finally, it upheld the Trial Court’s determination that the appellant did not voluntarily “abandon[…] the act”, but instead was interrupted by the victim fleeing and seeking assistance from her neighbors, which were independent of the appellant’s actions. Therefore, the appellant never ended his attempt to commit the murder. The Court of Appeals upheld the sentence. (External Link leads to the website for the Chilean Judicial System. The case is available by searching for the case number.)

El recurrente fue declarado culpable y condenado a siete años de prisión por el intento de asesinato de su cónyuge, y la condena fue confirmada por el Tribunal de Apelación. En la apelación, el apelante alegó que el tribunal inferior incurrió en error al (1) no considerar los hechos expuestos por el apelante, (2) no tener en cuenta que las heridas sufridas por la víctima no eran mortales, (3) negarse a considerar el “abandono voluntario y oportuno del acto,” (4) no exponer su razonamiento para llegar a sus conclusiones sobre los hechos y las lesiones sufridas por la víctima, y ​​(5) imponer una pena excesiva. El Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la decisión del tribunal de primera instancia y determinó que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia consideró el testimonio de los testigos y expuso los hechos subyacentes a la decisión, que fueron suficientes para confirmar la decisión y la sentencia. Asimismo, concluyó que el hecho de que las heridas sufridas por la víctima no fueran mortales no contradecía el delito imputado. Finalmente, confirmó la determinación del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de que el recurrente no “abandonó […] el acto” voluntariamente, sino que fue interrumpido por la víctima que huyó y solicitó la asistencia de sus vecinos, quienes ayudaron, y no fue el recurrente quien detuvo el acto por si mismo. Por tanto, el recurrente nunca puso fin a su intento de cometer el asesinato. El Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la sentencia. (Enlace externo conduce al sitio web del Sistema Judicial chileno. El caso está disponible buscando el número de caso).

The accused was charged with first degree murder of an Indigenous woman who was sex worker. The deceased was found in his hotel room. The cause of death was found to be loss of blood due to an 11cm wound in the victim’s vagina. In its opening address, the prosecution referred to the deceased as a “prostitute” and discussed how she and the accused had struck up a working relationship the night before her death. In addition, without ordering a separate hearing or considering the relevance of the evidence as is required pursuant to section 276 of the Criminal Code (evidence of complainant’s sexual history), the trial judge allowed the accused to testify at length about his previous sexual activity with the deceased. The jury acquitted the accused, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on first degree murder. In the Supreme Court, the majority agreed that a new trial should be ordered, but on the lesser charge of unlawful act manslaughter. This was because the trial judge’s mistakes in not considering the relevance of evidence did not affect the decision on murder. The Supreme Court said that defences to sexual assault cannot rely on things that support myths about women and consent. The first myth being that a woman’s consent to previous sexual activity means she consents to the current act in question and the second myth being that such women might not tell the truth.

The appellants were charged with the murder of a 13-year-old girl. The Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the prosecutor proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. The victim was found hanging by rope in the appellants’ bathroom and died the same day in the hospital. The appellants brought the victim to the hospital prior to her death. Evidence showed that she had bruises on the left and right side of her neck, and she had sexual intercourse prior to her death. The grand jury indicted the appellants in the circuit Court. The Judge granted the appellants’ motion for bail. In the trial, the appellants produced multiple witnesses to testify that they were in the same house when the incident occurred. The prosecutors had two autopsy reports proving that the victim’s death was caused by sexual abuse or homicide. The Circuit Judge convicted the appellants for murder and sentenced them to death by hanging. The appellants filed a petition for the writ of certiorari for a crime not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that in the case of murder, the prosecutors are required to overcome the presumption of innocence. Here, the government failed to establish each element of the crime of murder, specifically, the government failed to prove that each of the appellants choked the victim to death, failed to prove that each of the appellants hanged her body in the bathroom in their house, and failed to prove the missing belt, which was used to tie the victim belonged to the appellants. The Supreme Court also explained that the government failed to produce the DNA specimens from the victim to test after taking the appellants’ DNA for testing, and could not produce any evidence that linked the hanging to the appellants. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment for the lower court to reconsider.

The accused pled guilty to one count of conducting a business involving sexual servitude, in contravention of section 270.6(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995. Between August 2005 and March 2008, the accused recruited and facilitated the placement of 11 Thai women in brothels in various Australian cities. Each of the women (except for those who worked for one particular brothel) transferred a portion of their net earnings to the accused to repay the debts they were told they owed. She was sentenced to two years and three months imprisonment.

The case concerns the defendants, a married couple, who kept five Thai women as slaves in a secret room in the basement of their licensed brothel in Sydney. The defendants purchased the Thai women through contacts in Thailand (for between AUD 12,500 – 15,000). Upon arriving in Australia, four of the women were informed that they owed between AUD 35,000 and 45,000 that they had to repay by working in the brothel (one of the victims was told about the debt in Thailand). The defendants confiscated the women’s passports and kept them in locked confinement either at the brothel or at their residence. The women worked extremely long hours, seven days a week. The defendants were each found guilty of five counts of intentionally possessing a slave and five counts of intentionally exercising ownership authority over a slave, in violation of section 270.3(1)(a) of the Criminal Code Act 1995. The court sentenced Mr. McIvor to 12 years’ imprisonment and Ms. Tanuchit to 11 years’ imprisonment.

After pleading guilty to defensive homicide and being sentenced, the applicant appealed her sentence. The applicant’s violent and abusive partner, Mr. Mifsud, had compelled the applicant to kill the victim, Mr. Nankervis, by threatening to kill her family unless she killed Mr. Nankervis. The sentencing judge described the applicant’s offense as a “very grave example” of defensive homicide on the basis that Mr. Nankervis was innocent, Mr. Mifsud was absent at the time of the killing so the applicant could have gone to the police, and because the attack on Mr. Nankervis was extremely violent and disturbing. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentence (10 years imprisonment) imposed by the judge was manifestly excessive. The Court of Appeal had regard to the litany of cruel, humiliating, and violent acts that Mr. Mifsud had subjected the applicant to throughout their 12-month relationship, and Mr. Mifsud’s substantial criminal history. The Court of Appeal also considered the applicant’s youth (she was 19 at the time of the offense), her contrition in pleading guilty, and the effect of the violence on her state of mind, which made it “exceptionally difficult” for her to resist the requests of those in positions of influence. The Court of Appeal found that there was no basis for drawing an adverse inference from the disproportionate violence used to kill Mr. Nankervis. Instead, against the background of family violence, the violence was indicative of the applicant’s fear that Mr. Mifsud would kill her family.

The defendant had been found guilty of murdering his estranged wife in her home. This decision concerned his sentence. The court noted that “family violence” or “gender-based violence” are not separate crimes, but instead categorical descriptions of the relevant crime (here, murder), and that standard sentencing principles apply. The court condemned “family violence in the strongest possible terms” and stressed that general deterrence, denunciation, and just punishment were strong sentencing considerations. In accordance with the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), the court considered factors such as the gravity of the offense of murder, the premeditated nature of the offense, as well as the trauma that the victim’s death had imposed upon her family members and friends. The court also gave weight to the fact that a family-violence intervention order had been in place for the victim’s safety, and that the defendant showed no remorse and maintained his innocence. The court discussed the approach adopted by the police and the courts in relation to family violence, and noted that the evolution of society’s values in relation to the treatment of women must be taken into account in sentencing. The court sentenced the defendant to 30 years’ imprisonment (without parole-eligibility for 25 years).

This decision concerned the admissibility in a murder trial of expert evidence regarding the effects of family violence. The defendant argued self-defense, claiming that because of the deceased’s physical and verbal violence towards him, he reasonably believed that he had to kill her in order to prevent her from killing or seriously injuring the defendant or his father. The expert evidence in question was a general report on family violence, which considered (among other things) the cumulative psychological and social effects of family violence on an abused person. The Court found that the evidence was admissible on the basis of section 9AH of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). This section of the Crimes Act was enacted on the recommendation of the Victorian Law Reform Commission in 2004, to ensure that juries have the benefit of the current state of knowledge regarding family violence. The Commission expressed the view that, although community awareness about family violence was improving, there was “widespread misunderstanding about the nature and dynamics of abusive relationships and their impact.”

This case is a cassation appeal from a lower court judgment. The judge found the defendant guilty of attempted femicide in violation of Article 45 of the Special Comprehensive Law for a Violence-free Life for Women (Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia) (“LEIV”) and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. In the underlying case, the defendant rammed the plaintiff, his ex-girlfriend, with his car against the wall twice, causing her grave injuries. A court of appeals upheld the trial court’s verdict on the basis that (1) the LEIV was the appropriate law to apply (ins the Penal Code) and (2) there was sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant had the mental state required for a conviction of attempted femicide. The defendant further appealed the verdict to the cassation court on the grounds that the LEIV is innapplicable in that it regulates acts that are already regulated by the Penal Code, which conflicts with it Article 478. Additionally, he argues that Article 45 of the LEIV states that it is indeed a double regulation of the Penal Code and may not substitute it. He concludes his appeal by arguing that as per §1 of the Penal Code, it is the exclusive form of criminal regulation, which should have been applied. The court upheld the lower court’s rulings on the basis that the decision to charge the defendant under the LEIV (as opposed to the Penal Code) was based on a determination of the specific facts, and not as a matter of law. The court added that the appeal was based on theory of the law rather than on specific law-to-facts application. Furthermore, the defendant did not argue the specific facts, which, in his opinion, made the statute inapplicable to his case. The sentence was upheld.

Este caso es la apelación de la sentencia del tribunal inferior. El juez declaró al acusado culpable de intento de femicidio, en violación del Artículo 45 de la Ley Integral Especial para una Vida Libre de Violencia para la Mujer ("LEIV") y lo sentenció a 10 años en prisión. En el caso subyacente, el acusado embistió a la demandante, su ex novia, con su automóvil contra la pared dos veces, causándole graves heridas. Un tribunal de apelaciones confirmó el veredicto del tribunal de primera instancia sobre la base de que (1) el LEIV era la ley apropiada para aplicar (en el Código Penal) y (2) había pruebas suficientes para demostrar que el acusado tenía el estado mental requerido para una condena por intento de femicidio. El acusado apeló una vez mas el veredicto ante el tribunal de casación, alegando que el LEIV no era la ley aplicable, ya que regula actos que ya están regulados por el Código Penal, lo cual hace que entre en conflicto con el artículo 478. Además, el acusado argumenta que el artículo 45 de la LEIV se establece a si mismo como una doble regulación del Código Penal y no puede sustituirlo. Concluye su apelación argumentando que, según §1 del Código Penal, es la forma exclusiva de regulación penal, que debería haberse aplicado. El tribunal afirmó las decisiones del tribunal inferior sobre la base de que la decisión de acusar al acusado bajo el LEIV (en oposición al Código Penal) se basó en una determinación de los hechos específicos, y no como una cuestión de derecho legal. El tribunal agregó que la apelación se basó en la teoría de la ley y no en la aplicación específica de la ley a los hechos. Además, el acusado no argumentó los hechos específicos, lo que, en su opinión, hizo que la ley no fuera aplicable a su caso. La sentencia fue afirmada.

Appellate Court decision (271-2013, Camara de Segunda Instancia de la Tercera Deccion de Oriente) available here: http://www.jurisprudencia.gob.sv/DocumentosBoveda/D/1/2010-2019/2014/02/B6F78.PDF

Trial Court decision (262-2013, Tribunal de Sentencia de Union) available here: http://www.jurisprudencia.gob.sv/busqueda/showFile.php?bd=1&data=DocumentosBoveda%2FD%2F1%2F2010-2019%2F2013%2F11%2FB7B6F.PDF&number=752495&fecha=12/11/2013&numero=262-2013&cesta=0&singlePage=false

M.N. was convicted for attempting to purchase sexual services from a woman, which is a criminal act under Chapter 6 Section 11 and Chapter 23 Section 1 of the Swedish Penal Code. The court considered whether the “attempt point” had been reached, which is a prerequisite for the attempt to be punishable. To constitute a criminal attempt, it is required that the offender begin the crime without reaching its completion. There must also be a risk that the act will lead to the completion of the crime. For purchases of sexual services the attempt point is reached when an offer of payment has been made. Here, the parties agreed to have sex in the woman’s apartment and agreed on the price. M.N. had access to money and they were on their way to the woman’s apartment when the police stopped them. Therefore, the Court ruled that M.N. had begun the crime and that the attempt point had been reached. The Court also found that the danger of completing the crime was imminent. Thus, M.N. was sentenced to 40 daily fines for his attempt to purchase sexual services.

R.Z. sexually assaulted his female partner, C.J., with his fingers. During this action, R.Z. threatened to hurt her. In their testimony, the parties both said that he had done so to check whether the plaintiff had been cheating. The question was thus whether the act could be considered non-sexual. However, under the Swedish Penal Code, one of the prerequisites for an act to be classified as rape (Chapter 6 Section 1 first paragraph) or the subsidiary, sexual compulsion (Chapter 6 Section 2), is that it must be sexual. The Supreme Court considered whether the defendant’s intention could affect whether the act was a sexual act under the Swedish Penal Code. The Supreme Court ruled that it was inherently sexual. The intention behind the act does not matter. Furthermore, without the victim’s consent, the act constitutes a serious violation of her sexual integrity. The Supreme Court further found that the sexual act can be compared to sexual intercourse, which is another prerequisite for the act to be considered rape. Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that R.Z.’s act should be classified as rape.

A man, W.B.F., put his cell phone camera under a woman’s skirt and took pictures of her on an escalator in a subway station in Stockholm. The woman, F.L., did not notice the picture being taken, but was made aware of it shortly thereafter. Under Swedish law, taking insulting pictures of another person is prohibited only if the person being photographed is inside a house or in another location especially purposed for privacy. However, under Chapter 6 Section 10 of the Swedish Penal Code, one who by word or act molests another person in a sense that is intended to violate the person’s sexual integrity may be convicted for sexual molestation. The assessment must be made objectively. The Supreme Court found that the regulation must include situations where the offender does not physically touch the victim, and the victim does not notice the violation. If the act constitutes a clear offense of the victim’s right over his or her body, it should be equated with an act that involves physical touch. Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that W.B.F. should be convicted for sexual molestation and sentenced him to 60 daily fines of SEK 50 each, an amount which was based on his economic situation.

A 16-year-old girl, R.A., a resident of Sweden, was taken to Iraq by her family, where she lived in a marriage-like relationship with a man for eight months before she was allowed to return to Sweden. According to Chapter 4 Section 4(c) of the Swedish Penal Code, a person is convicted for forced marriage for inducing another person into a marriage-like relationship, if it is concluded under rules that apply within a group and means that the parties are considered to be spouses and to have rights and obligations towards each other. In Iraq, R.A. took part in a wedding ceremony, during which, according to her relatives, she married the man in question. After the ceremony, she was brought to a room where she had intercourse with the man. After the wedding, R.A. and the man lived together in the same room. During R.A’s stay in Iraq, it was a part of her obligations to have a sexual relationship with the man and to, in the daytime, take care of him and the household. The Svea Court of Appeal ruled that R.A. had been a victim of forced marriage. The court sentenced the parents, S.B. and N.I. to compensate R.A. with SEK 120,000 for forced marriage and SEK 5,000 for unlawful threat.

The court held that “Basic Law” (Grundgesetz, also referred to as the German constitution) protects the rights of unborn fetus. In order to protect these rights, the court held that termination of a pregnancy should be viewed as categorically wrong and prohibited by law. The court notes that there may be situations where the rights of the unborn fetus conflict with the rights of the mother (as similarly protected by Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law). In such a case, the court says that the rights of the mother will not be protected because such protection involves the act of “killing” the unborn fetus. The court notes that is “exceptional” circumstances it may be permissible to allow a woman to terminate a pregnancy. The court says that it is up to the legislature to determine what constitutes an exceptional circumstance. The court further holds that it would be permissible for the state to abstain from criminally punishing abortion, so long as the state implemented a counseling system designed to talk women out of terminating a pregnancy. According with the court, termination of a pregnancy will only be considered justified (not illegal) if it is determined upon counseling that there are exceptional circumstances. This case is significant because it demonstrates that, although abortion is still technically illegal in Germany, the state has allowed it to go unpunished in certain circumstances.

The appellant, M.N., was charged with attempt to procure abortion, contrary to Section 158 of the penal code, which provides the “any person who, with intent to procure miscarriage of a woman, whether she is or is not with child, unlawfully administers to her or causes her to take any poison or other noxious thing, or uses any force of any kind, or uses any other means whatever is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years.” Four witnesses testified for the prosecution, including complainant, who was 15 years old, told the court that the appellant, who was her teacher, invited her to his home on several occasions and made advances at her. She also testified that they eventually had sexual intercourse, which led to her pregnancy, and that the appellant provided a “doctor”, who was never arrested or charged, to procure an abortion. The complainant’s grandmother, one of the witnesses, testified that she also observed the “doctor”, but gave a different account of his actions than the complainant’s. The complainant later gave birth to a healthy baby. The appellant denied having a sexual relationship with the complainant and attempting to procure an abortion. The court held that the trial court convicted appellant based on its suspicion that he was responsible for the complainant’s pregnancy and that he provided the “doctor” who attempted to procure an abortion, but that suspicion was insufficient to sustain the conviction. The High Court thus set aside the conviction and sentence.

In R v. R, the House of Lords determined that spousal rape is not exempt from criminal punishment. The defendant, R, was convicted of attempting to rape his wife. He appealed the conviction pursuant to the marital rape exemption under common law, arguing it was not legally possible for a husband to rape his wife. Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords upheld the rape conviction, holding that no marital rape exemption exists under English law.

The defendant was convicted of assault, violence against women, and domestic violence. He appealed, arguing that the court lacked sufficient objective evidence for conviction. The Supreme Court denied the appeal, noting that the lower court did not only consider the victim’s testimony, but also examined medical evidence submitted by the National Institute of Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses). The medical evidence demonstrated that the victim suffered injuries, that the defendant caused those injuries, and that the victim suffered from battered women’s syndrome, also caused by the defendant. The Supreme Court found that this evidence constituted sufficient grounds for the conviction and that there had been no error—procedural or substantive—in the lower court’s findings. This decision provides a helpful description of the types of evidence required to secure a conviction for domestic violence in the Dominican Republic.

El acusado fue condenado por agresión y violencia contra la mujer y por violencia doméstica. Apeló, argumentando que el tribunal carecía de pruebas objetivas suficientes para la condena. La Corte Suprema denegó la apelación, señalando que el tribunal de primera instancia no solo había considerado el testimonio de la víctima, sino que también examinó las pruebas médicas presentadas por el Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses. Las pruebas médicas demostraron que la víctima había sufrido lesiones, que el imputado causó esas lesiones y que la víctima padecía el síndrome de la mujer maltratada, también causado por el imputado. La Corte Suprema determinó que estas pruebas constituían un fundamento suficiente para la condena y que no había habido error, procesal o sustantivo, en las conclusiones del tribunal inferior. Esta decisión proporciona una descripción útil de los tipos de pruebas necesarias para asegurar una condena por violencia doméstica en la República Dominicana.

Four defendants were charged with War Crimes against the Civilian Population in violation of Article 152 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo and the Geneva Conventions, for variously beating “A” and “B,” both Kosovar Albanian female civilians, raping A, and subjecting them to a mock execution. All the defendants were acquitted by the Basic Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Basic Court’s acquittal of two of the defendants as the victims could not positively testify about their participation, and no other evidence conclusively linked them to the crimes. However, the panel held that the lower court failed to fully adjudicate the mock execution charge. It also dismissed as “incomprehensible” the first instance court’s ruling that there was no credible evidence that the victims had direct contact with S.S. (one of the remaining defendants who allegedly beat them), noting the victims’ testimony indicated they were certain of the identity of the defendant. The tribunal held that the lower court’s refusal to allow an in-court identification of S.S. was a violation of the Criminal Procedure Code. While the appellate court agreed that witness identification should be approached with great caution, here the victims had the opportunity to see the defendant clearly for an extended time. The panel disagreed that witness testimonies are by default unreliable, explaining that they are entitled to the same evidentiary value and analysis as any other evidence and in certain cases the victim’s testimony is the only available evidence. The appellate court then pointed out the lower court’s contradiction with regard to the rape charge: it accepted that A was kidnapped, and also that there were intercourses while she was in captivity, yet then assumed that the intercourses may have occurred with consent, only because A and H.2. (the defendant accused of raping her), had an earlier intimate relationship. The tribunal held that it was absurd to assume that someone in captivity would be able to validly express consent, and even if A did consent due to the Stockholm Syndrome, a traumatic bonding of that kind would be a psychological condition and “any consent expressed by a victim in such circumstances would hardly be considered legally valid.” The appellate court further ruled that the events took place during a war, and consent in such a coercive environment would be “void by default,” citing the definition of rape in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. On the question of whether H.2.’s actions constituted a war crime, the panel held that it was irrelevant whether he had any association with the military. The relevant factors were instead whether there was an ongoing armed conflict, whether it was governed by international or domestic conflict norms, whether the victims were protected persons under international law, and whether there was a causal link between the armed conflict and the offense. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Basic Court to clarify facts on the mock execution and the involvement of H.2. in the alleged rape, and to conduct an in-court identification of S.S. (Also available in English.)

The defendant husband held enduring suspicions that the late victim, his wife, was involved in an extramarital affair, and required her to seek permission to leave their home without his or their children’s accompaniment. The victim one day attempted to leave the house without the defendant’s permission, resulting in an argument in which he shot and killed her. The defendant was charged with Aggravated Murder under Article 147 of the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, found guilty, and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the offense is Murder Committed in a State of Mental Distress (Art. 148) rather than Aggravated Murder, because he at the time of the shooting had reacted to the victim’s insult and did not act out of jealousy. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and ruled that the court of first instance correctly qualified the crime as Aggravated Murder rather than Murder Committed in a State of Mental Distress. The court reasoned that the offense of Murder Committed in a State of Mental Distress did not apply because Article 148 requires that the mental distress happen through no fault of the accused, whereas in this case the victim’s insult was a reaction to the defendant’s previous false accusations, personal offenses, and even physical mistreatment. The tribunal further held that the court of first instance correctly found that the defendant had killed his wife for base motives as required for Aggravated Murder under Article 147, explaining that the defendant did not only kill his wife out of jealousy, but also because she had “dared” to attempt to leave the house without his permission. This reaction demonstrates the defendant’s belief that he was entitled to decide his wife’s right to exist, a “ruthlessly selfish concept” that showed “utmost disrespect for the natural right of another human being to live and is as such a base motive.” Accordingly, the sentence was appropriate. (Also available in English.)

The victim, a minor of the age of 15, was trafficked by men including defendants I.I. and Sh. G, from Albania to Kosovo, where she was imprisoned and forced to work as dancer at multiple restaurants. She eventually escaped and met two men who helped her find accommodations and work as a waitress. One of the men, S.B., had sexual intercourse with her, as did D.B., the manager who hired her as a waitress. I.I., Sh. G., and the men involved in the victim’s trafficking and employment were convicted of Trafficking in Persons contrary to Article 139 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo, and S.B. and D.B. were additionally convicted of Sexual Abuse of Persons under the Age of 16 contrary to Article 198. On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the court of first instance’s ruling that the fact that the victim perceived I.I. as a person who had helped her was a mitigating circumstance, and agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on I.I. was very lenient, noting that I.I. had participated in the victim’s trafficking despite his awareness of the victim’s age and vulnerable situation, including her dependency on narcotics, presence alone in a foreign country, and lack of options to return home. The court accordingly increased I.I.’s sentence from one year to two years. The tribunal then dismissed Sh. G.’s argument that he was found guilty based only on the statement of the victim, holding that in the case of human trafficking, “it is the injured party who is the most reliable person.” The Supreme Court also agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on S.B. was very lenient, considering that he had intercourse with the victim, being aware of her age and vulnerable situation, and thus increased S.B.’s sentence from one year and one month to one year and six months. Finally, the court agreed with the prosecutor that the punishment imposed on D.B. was very lenient. The tribunal held that the trafficking of minors need not involve the use of force or violence, and that a conviction of sexual abuse of a minor could stand even if it was proven that it was done with the permission of the victim. The court accepted that the victim may have shown gratitude to D.B. for his assistance, but dismissed it as the “distorted perception” of a “vulnerable victim” and held that the gratitude did not change the criminal nature of the act or serve as an exculpatory circumstance. D.B.’s sentence was accordingly increased from two years to two years and four months. (Also available in English.)

The defendants, both Serbs and a police officer, were accused of forcibly abducting a Kosovar Albanian civilian female and raping her, thus committing the offense of War Crime Against the Civilian Population, in violation of Article 153 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo in addition to other offences. The court of first instance acquitted both defendants of war crimes, but the acquittal was annulled by the appellate court, which sentenced them to 10 and 12 years of imprisonment respectively. Both defendants appealed. The Supreme Court held that minor discrepancies of a witness’s statement should not be treated as discrediting. The tribunal found it proven that two Serbs did rape the victim, determined that the victim’s and witnesses’ statements were credible insofar as they did not relate to the identification of the suspects, and disagreed that the lack of medical report raised doubts that the rape occurred at all because such a report’s absence was well justified by the prevailing circumstance of an armed conflict. However, the court held that it had not been proven beyond any reasonable doubt, as required by law, that the defendants were the persons who committed the rape due to deficiencies in the suspect identification process. For example, the initial process had been carried out by the KLA MP years ago, and the court lacked evidence on how the process was carried out, the photos shown to the victim, and whether statements by the KLA blurred the victim’s memory. Subsequent identification was deficient because the defendants’ photos were obviously dissimilar from the other photos shown and the victim and witnesses thereby may have been guided in identifying the perpetrators. Further, the victim’s and witnesses’ description of the perpetrators were either general and not sufficient to conclude that the defendants were the perpetrators, or not sufficiently corroborated by other evidence. As a result, the tribunal granted the defendants’ appeal and acquitted the defendants. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The deceased victim D.K. met her partner A.J. in secondary school, formed a union with him, and gave birth to a daughter. D.K. subsequently filed a claim to dissolve the union and for child custody at the Municipal Court because of a deterioration in her relationship with A.J. She also took their daughter to live with her parents. Following continuous threats by A.J., D.K. submitted a request to the Municipal Court for an emergency protection order under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence. The court did not act within the statutorily mandated 24 hours of the request, and A.J. shot and killed D.K. several weeks later. The Kosovo Judicial Council (“KLJ”, the body which administers the judiciary) disciplinary committee issued a decision to discipline the responsible Municipal Court judge in response to a request by the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel, but D.K.’s parents were not party to the disciplinary proceedings. D.K.’s parents submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging the Municipal Court by its inaction violated D.K.’s rights under the Constitution of Kosovo, including Article 25 (Right to Life), Article 32 (Right to Legal Remedies), and Article 54 (Judicial Protection of Rights), as well as under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), including Article 2 (Right to Life) and Article 13 (Right to Effective Remedy). The Constitutional Court observed that ECHR caselaw stresses that it is the duty of state authorities to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. This includes a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive measures to (i) protect one whose life is at risk from another, (ii) where the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from a criminal offense, but (iii) failed to take measures which reasonably might have been expected to avoid the risk. The court found the Municipal Court ought to have known about the real risk in existence when D.K. requested the emergency protection order since she had explained the deterioration of her relationship with A.J., specifically his death threats and her reports to the police. Furthermore, the Municipal Court was handling D.K.’s case for the dissolution of union and child custody. Accordingly, the tribunal concluded that the Municipal Court was responsible for acting under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and that its inaction was a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the ECHR. The court also found that the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and the statute governing the judiciary do not offer effective legal remedies for the protection of the applicants’ rights, because the former does not contain measures for addressing court inaction, and the latter does not allow the applicants to participate in any disciplinary investigation or procedure. Thus, the inaction of the Municipal Court and the KJC’s practice of not addressing judicial inaction violated the deceased’s and applicants’ right under Articles 32 and 54 of the Constitution and Article 13 of the ECHR. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The petitioners were found guilty of violating several provisions of the Austrian Criminal Code after the regional court found that they acted as a criminal organization to recruit victims by means of extortion, massive violence, penalties for not performing sex work, and threats, and arranged for the victims’ transfer and accommodation in brothels in Austria. After an appeal on procedural grounds, the Austrian Supreme Court upheld the convictions. The Regional Court Leoben’s decision from April 28, 2009 [13 Hv 122/08x-492] was not available at the time of publication.

Die Beschwerdeführer wurden vom Landgericht Loeben für schuldig befunden verschiedene Sexualstraftatbestände des Österreichischen Strafgesetzbuches verwirklicht zu haben. Hierbei haben sie als kriminelle Vereinigung gehandelt, um ihre Opfer als Prostituierte zu rekrutieren, die sie dann erpressten, massiver Gewalt aussetzten und bestraften, wenn sie der Sexarbeit nicht nachkamen. Sie haben ihre Opfer bedroht und bereits vor dem Transfer nach Österreich, den sie organisierten derartiger Gewalt ausgesetzt, dass sie in ihrer Entscheidungsfreiheit stark eingeschränkt waren. Gegen dieses Urteil gingen die Beschwerdeführer aufgrund von Verfahrensfehlern vor. Der Oberste Gerichtshof wies die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde zurück und hat die Verurteilungen aufrechterhalten.

The appellant was found guilty of raping his stepdaughter AAA six times by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. As a result, AAA gave birth to a baby in 2001. On appeal, the appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, stating that (1) there was no sign that AAA was outraged and defended her honor with courage and (2) of the three instances of intercourse he admits to, such instances were consensual and between lovers. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for the following reasons: (1) victim’s failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not mean the victim was consenting, and victim’s physical resistance is not an element of proving rape, and (2) a romantic relationship does not negate rape. The required elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, (I) accused had carnal knowledge of the victim and (II) accomplished the act through force or intimidation, or when the victim was deprived of reason or unconscious, or under age 12, or demented. The court found that the prosecution proved all elements by providing: AAA’s credible testimony, the results of AAA's medical examination, the appellant's use of a knife and bolo to threaten physical violence, and his moral influence as stepfather over AAA. The court sentenced the appellant to reclusión perpetua and ordered him to pay P225,000 in moral damages, civil indemnity, and exemplary damages to AAA.​

The appellant was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals of raping a 13-year-old girl by dragging her to a nearby farm, raping her and later threatening her with retaliation if she did not stay silent. The appellant appealed, pointing to inconsistencies in the number of times the victim testified as being raped and arguing that the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. According to the court, the victim making inconsistent statements about the number of times the appellant raped her did not harm her credibility, given the fear and distress the victim suffered, and the frequency is also not an element of the crime. The required elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) offender had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age, or demented. The medical examination and victim’s credible testimony meets the first element. The element of force or intimidation is met by the fact that the appellant dragged her and pushed her to the ground to abuse her. The appellant also intimidated her after the act. Thus, the required elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are met. The appellant’s alibi or denials were weak and uncorroborated.