42 U.S.C. § 1983

Issues

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a pretrial detainee’s § 1983 excessive force claim requires a showing that the force used by the state actor was objectively unreasonable and that the use of force was deliberate. Petitioner, Michael Kingsley, argues that an excessive force claim brought by a pretrial detainee requires only a showing that the force used was objectively unreasonable. Respondents, represented by Stan Hendrickson, argue that an excessive force claim brought by a pretrial detainee requires a showing of the state actor’s subjective intent to be reckless or deliberate. The Court’s decision will impact the means by which pretrial detainees bring excessive-force claims and the policies that govern prisons.

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Issues

Respondent Harvey N. Levin was an Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”) for the state of Illinois until his employment was terminated in May 2006. Levin sued Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan and other state Petitioners under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the Equal Protection Clause via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Madigan argues the ADEA precludes Levin’s § 1983 claim. Levin contends the ADEA does not preclude a § 1983 claim for age discrimination and even if the ADEA does preclude such a claim, the ADEA does not apply to him because he is not an “employee” for ADEA purposes. In contrast with four other circuit decisions, the Seventh Circuit held that the ADEA does not preempt § 1983 claims. If the lower court’s ruling stands, Levin will be able to pursue his age discrimination claim in court. The Supreme Court can decide what avenues government workers have to pursue age discrimination claims. The decision will also impact the volume of cases that states, and other levels of government, will need to defend.

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This case asks the Court to determine when an individual, private right is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. South Carolina’s executive order deems abortion clinics enrolled in the Medicaid program as unqualified to provide family planning services. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic and its patient, Julie Edwards, contend that the executive order violates Ms. Edwards’s right to choose a qualified provider under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23), the any-qualified-provider provision. South Carolina counters that the any-qualified-provider fails to create a private right of action enforceable through § 1983 because Congress did not use unambiguously clear rights-creating language. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for Medicaid beneficiaries and providers, the implementation of state and federal healthcare policy goals, and the litigation of private rights. 

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Issues

After being assaulted while serving time in a federal prison, Michelle Ortiz sued two prison guards for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on a defense of qualified immunity, and the case went to trial. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Ortiz, but the Sixth Circuit reversed on the basis of qualified immunity. Ortiz argues that the Sixth Circuit did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal based on qualified immunity because the issue, originally raised on summary judgment, was not preserved for appeal after final judgment was entered at trial. Jordan argues that by filing a motion for summary judgment, the issue was preserved. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will give guidance to litigants on how to preserve for appeal an issue that was the subject of a denied summary judgment motion.

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