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42 U.S.C. § 1983

Kingsley v. Hendrickson

Issues

Does a pretrial detainee need to show that a state actor applied force recklessly and acted with reckless disregard for his or her rights?

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a pretrial detainee’s § 1983 excessive force claim requires a showing that the force used by the state actor was objectively unreasonable and that the use of force was deliberate. Petitioner, Michael Kingsley, argues that an excessive force claim brought by a pretrial detainee requires only a showing that the force used was objectively unreasonable. Respondents, represented by Stan Hendrickson, argue that an excessive force claim brought by a pretrial detainee requires a showing of the state actor’s subjective intent to be reckless or deliberate. The Court’s decision will impact the means by which pretrial detainees bring excessive-force claims and the policies that govern prisons.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the requirements of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claim are satisfied per se by a showing that the state actor deliberately used force against the pretrial detainee and the use of force was objectively unreasonable.

On May 20, 2010, a deputy performing a cell check ordered Michael Kingsley, a pretrial detainee at Monroe County Jail, to take down a piece of paper covering the light above his cell bed. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2013). Kingsley refused to do so.

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Madigan v. Levin

Issues

Does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act provide the sole vehicle for age discrimination claims under federal law or are the claims covered under the Equal Protection Clause via 42 U.S.C. § 1983?

Respondent Harvey N. Levin was an Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”) for the state of Illinois until his employment was terminated in May 2006. Levin sued Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan and other state Petitioners under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the Equal Protection Clause via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Madigan argues the ADEA precludes Levin’s § 1983 claim. Levin contends the ADEA does not preclude a § 1983 claim for age discrimination and even if the ADEA does preclude such a claim, the ADEA does not apply to him because he is not an “employee” for ADEA purposes. In contrast with four other circuit decisions, the Seventh Circuit held that the ADEA does not preempt § 1983 claims. If the lower court’s ruling stands, Levin will be able to pursue his age discrimination claim in court. The Supreme Court can decide what avenues government workers have to pursue age discrimination claims. The decision will also impact the volume of cases that states, and other levels of government, will need to defend.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Seventh Circuit erred in holding, in an acknowledged departure from the rule in at least four other circuits, that state and local government employees may avoid the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act's comprehensive remedial regime by bringing age discrimination claims directly under the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Facts

In 2000, at the age of 55, Levin began working as an AAG for the state of Illinois. See Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 609 (7th Cir. 2012). After six years and a promotion to Senior AAG, Madigan’s office terminated Levin’s employment.

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Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic

Issues

Does the Medicaid Act’s any-qualified-provider provision give Medicaid beneficiaries a private right to choose their provider?

This case asks the Court to determine when an individual, private right is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. South Carolina’s executive order deems abortion clinics enrolled in the Medicaid program as unqualified to provide family planning services. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic and its patient, Julie Edwards, contend that the executive order violates Ms. Edwards’s right to choose a qualified provider under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23), the any-qualified-provider provision. South Carolina counters that the any-qualified-provider fails to create a private right of action enforceable through § 1983 because Congress did not use unambiguously clear rights-creating language. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for Medicaid beneficiaries and providers, the implementation of state and federal healthcare policy goals, and the litigation of private rights. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Medicaid Act’s any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider.

The Medicaid Act provides medical assistance to certain individuals and families who cannot cover the cost of necessary medical services due to insufficient income and resources. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. Medina, 95 F.4th 152 at 156 (4th Cir.

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Ortiz v. Jordan

Issues

Can an appellate court review a denial of summary judgment when the party failed to appeal the denial before trial or failed to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law after the jury verdict?

 

After being assaulted while serving time in a federal prison, Michelle Ortiz sued two prison guards for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on a defense of qualified immunity, and the case went to trial. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Ortiz, but the Sixth Circuit reversed on the basis of qualified immunity. Ortiz argues that the Sixth Circuit did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal based on qualified immunity because the issue, originally raised on summary judgment, was not preserved for appeal after final judgment was entered at trial. Jordan argues that by filing a motion for summary judgment, the issue was preserved. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will give guidance to litigants on how to preserve for appeal an issue that was the subject of a denied summary judgment motion.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May a party appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits if the party chose not to appeal the order before trial?

Petitioner Michelle Ortiz (“Ortiz”) is a former prisoner of the Ohio Reformatory for WomenSee Ortiz v. Jordan, 316 Fed. Appx. 449, 450 (6th Cir.

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