accomplice liability
Rosemond v. United States
Issues
In order to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence or a drug-trafficking crime, does the government need to prove that the defendant intentionally facilitated or encouraged the use of the firearm, or merely that the defendant knew that the principal used a firearm during the crime?
On August 26, 2007, Justus Rosemond and two acquaintances drove to a local park where they planned to sell a pound of marijuana to Ricardo Gonzales and Coby Painter. The deal went awry, and Gonzales and Painter fled with the marijuana without paying. As Rosemond and his cohorts chased after Gonzales and Painter, someone from Rosemond’s car fired a gun at Gonzales. Rosemond was charged with aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. The issue before the Court is what level of intent the government must prove. Rosemond argues that he is liable as an accomplice only if he intentionally facilitated or encouraged the use of the firearm. The United States maintains, and the Tenth Circuit ruled, that his knowledge that a cohort used a firearm during the crime is enough to impose accomplice liability. This case raises important concerns regarding the scope of prosecutorial discretion under § 924(c), as well as the burden of proof to establish accomplice liability for aggravating offenses.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Whether the offense of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 2, requires proof of (i) intentional facilitation or encouragement of the use of the firearm, as held by the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, or (ii) simple knowledge that the principal used a firearm during a crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime in which the defendant also participated, as held by the Sixth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits.
Facts
This case revolves around a drug deal gone awry. On August 26, 2007, Vashti Perez arranged to meet and sell a pound of marijuana to Ricardo Gonzales and Coby Painter. See United States v. Rosemond, 695 F.3d 1151, 1152 (10th Cir. 2012). The marijuana belonged to Ronald Joseph and Justus Rosemond, the defendant and Petitioner in this case.
Edited by
Additional Resources
- Barbara Leonard, Courthouse News Service, Justices to Sort Out Gunshots in Drug Deal, (May 28, 2013).
- University of Virginia Law School, Supreme Court to Hear Federal Gun Law Case from UVA Law School Clinic, (May 29, 2013).
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Waddington v. Sarausad
Issues
When reviewing a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is a federal court required to accept a state court determination of the constitutionality of jury instructions?
In 1994, respondent Cesar Sarausad was convicted of second degree murder in Washington State Court for his role as a driver in a gang-related shooting. At trial, the prosecution argued in its closing that Sarausad could be found guilty of murder under the Washington accomplice liability statute because, even though he only drove the car, if he was "in for a dime," he was "in for a dollar." After repeated requests for clarification on the accomplice liability rule, which the trial judge answered only by referring the jurors back to the Washington accomplice liability statute, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict. Sarausad was convicted; he argued unsuccessfully on direct appeal that the instruction relieved the state of its burden to prove each element of the offense charged. Sarausad eventually sought federal habeas corpus relief, which the Ninth Circuit granted. The State of Washington, seeking to reinstate Sarausad's conviction, petitioned for certiorari from the Supreme Court. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court may determine if a federal court is required to defer to state court determination of state law when interpreting the constitutionality of jury instructions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
The Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly approved of the pattern accomplice liability jury instructions given in Sarausad’s trial, which mirror the statutory language on accomplice liability under state law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found a violation of due process based its independent conclusion that the instructions were ambiguous, and that there was a reasonable likelihood a jury could misapply the instructions so as to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. In reviewing a due process challenge to jury instructions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, must the federal courts accept the state court determination that the instructions fully and correctly set out state law governing accomplice liability?
2. Where the accomplice liability instructions correctly set forth state law, is it an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law to conclude there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the instructions so as to relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving all the elements of the crime?
In 1994, respondent Cesar Sarausad and other 23rd Street Diablos gang members drove to a Seattle high school to confront a rival gang. See Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume for his assistance in understanding federal habeas corpus.
Additional Resources
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