drug trafficking

Issues

In two separate and unrelated cases, Kevin Abbott and Carlos Rashad Gould were convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) by possessing weapons in the furtherance of a violent or drug trafficking crime. Abbott and Gould were also sentenced for their underlying crimes, both of which required a minimum sentence of greater than five years. Abbott's and Gould's respective sentencing judges both included an additional five-year sentence for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), on the grounds that this was a mandatory minimum sentence. Abbott and Gould appealed, arguing that they qualified for an exception to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because the minimum sentences for their underlying offenses were greater than five years. The appeals courts affirmed the lower courts' decisions. Certiorari was granted to answer which federal criminal statutes that carry a minimum sentence greater than five years, if any, trigger the "except" clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

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On April 14, 2010, Marcus Burrage sold heroin to Joshua Banka, who used the heroin and a cocktail of other drugs, and was found dead the next day. Medical and toxicology reports indicated that the heroin contributed to Banka’s death, but neither report said that Banka would have lived if he had not taken the heroin. Burrage was convicted of distribution of heroin causing death under 21 U.S.C. § 841, andhe appealed arguing that the jury instructions were erroneous. In particular, Burrage challenged the causation instruction under § 841, arguing that the statute required the government to prove that the heroin was the proximate cause of death, and not just a contributing factor. The district court concluded, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the “contributed to” instructions were consistent with Eighth Circuit precedent. The Supreme Court will now clarify the causation standard for the federal crime of distribution of drugs causing death. This standard will determine when a person who distributes drugs can be held criminally responsible for the death of the drug user, and what the government must prove in such cases. 

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Humberto Cuellar was convicted of international money laundering after officers found large sums of illegal money hidden in a vehicle Cuellar intended to drive across the U.S. border into Mexico. A jury found Cuellar guilty under 18 U.S.C. � 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), which makes money laundering a federal crime. An en banc panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, affirmed Cuellar's conviction and Cuellar appealed. In this case, U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether an attempt to create the appearance of legitimate wealth is necessary to support a money laundering conviction. Cuellar argues that his conviction cannot stand because he did not attempt to create the appearance of legitimate funds. The United States argues that a money laundering conviction is appropriate if a criminal defendant physically concealed illegal funds during cross-border transportation. The Court's decision will resolve the current circuit split and clarify the scope of the federal money laundering statute.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) prohibits expert testimony about the mental states of a group that the defendant is a member of. Diaz was convicted of knowingly importing drugs into the United States after a government expert testified that “in most circumstances, the driver knows they are hired . . . to take the drugs from point A to point B.” Diaz argues that such testimony is impermissible under Rule 704(b) because it is functionally equivalent to stating an opinion that she had a certain mental state. The United States counters that the rule only restricts an expert from explicitly concluding or directly opining on whether a defendant had a certain mental state. The outcome of this case will affect how the government goes about proving its criminal cases, how effectively parties can rebut expert testimony, and how juries make decisions about mental states.

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On August 26, 2007, Justus Rosemond and two acquaintances drove to a local park where they planned to sell a pound of marijuana to Ricardo Gonzales and Coby Painter. The deal went awry, and Gonzales and Painter fled with the marijuana without paying. As Rosemond and his cohorts chased after Gonzales and Painter, someone from Rosemond’s car fired a gun at Gonzales. Rosemond was charged with aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. The issue before the Court is what level of intent the government must prove. Rosemond argues that he is liable as an accomplice only if he intentionally facilitated or encouraged the use of the firearm. The United States maintains, and the Tenth Circuit ruled, that his knowledge that a cohort used a firearm during the crime is enough to impose accomplice liability. This case raises important concerns regarding the scope of prosecutorial discretion under § 924(c), as well as the burden of proof to establish accomplice liability for aggravating offenses.

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Following a transaction in which he exchanged illegally-obtained prescription drugs for a firearm, Petitioner Watson was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) for "use" of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. In addition to sentences imposed under other federal statutes, Watson received a mandatory consecutive five year sentence, imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D). Watson pled guilty but reserved the right to challenge whether the agreed-upon facts supported his conviction. The Fifth Circuit confirmed his conviction, finding that receiving a firearm constitutes "use" under the statute and under Supreme Court law set forth in Bailey v. United States, which defined "use" as "active employment" of the firearm. Watson argues that receiving a firearm is insufficient to constitute use, while the United States contends that both receiving and offering a firearm constitute "active employment" and therefore "use" under the statute. The Court's decision will set uniform standards of punishment throughout the country. A finding for Watson could reduce crowding in an already overburdened prison system, while a decision for the United States could reduce the strain on a similarly overburdened court system.

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