appeals

BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

Issues

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), may a court of appeals review any issue in an order to remand a case as long as one of the grounds for remand is federal-officer or civil-rights jurisdiction?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) allows courts of appeals to review an entire order remanding a removed case back to state court. Normally, Section 1447(d) forbids courts of appeals from reviewing remand orders, except when a federal officer seeks removal or the case involves civil rights. Based on a plain reading of the text and the purpose of the exceptions, BP argues that if a defendant asserts either jurisdictional ground, Section 1447(d) permits a court to review the entire order. Baltimore contends that this reading contravenes the purpose and historical understanding of the proper scope of review. This case has implications for state and federal jurisdiction, climate change, and congressional delegation of power.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) permits a court of appeals to review any issue encompassed in a district court’s order remanding a removed case to state court when the removing defendant premised removal in part on the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, or the civil-rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443.

In July 2018, the Mayor and City of Baltimore (collectively, “Baltimore”) filed suit in Maryland state court against twenty-six oil and gas companies, alleging that these companies knowingly contributed to climate change by “producing, promoting, and (misleadingly) marketing fossil fuel products long after learning the dangers associated with them.” Mayor & City Council of Balt. v.

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Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund

Issues

Can a district court’s decision that does not resolve a request for contractual attorney’s fees be a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291?

On June 17, 2011, a federal district court issued a decision on a dispute between Ray Haluch Gravel Company and the Central Pension Fund (“CPF”). Although this order addressed the central issue of whether or not Haluch owed certain contributions to CPF, it did not address attorney’s fees and costs. The district court issued a second order on June 25, 2011 on attorney’s fees and costs. CPF filed an appeal on both orders, but the thirty day statute of limitations for notice of appeal had expired on the first order. The First Circuit accepted the appeal, stating that the first order was not a “final judgment” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the contractual attorney’s fees decided in the second order were an issue on the merits, rendering the second order the final judgment. Haluch argues that under Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Company, attorney’s fees should always be considered collateral to the merits, and a separate judgment on the merits should be considered final. CPF argues that Budinich applies only to statutory fees, which are considered costs, whereas contractual fees are considered damages and therefore part of the merits, rendering any judgment that does not resolve an issue concerning the merits—i.e., damages in the form of contractual fees—a non-final judgment. The Court’s decision will clarify what constitutes a “final judgment” and guide litigants seeking to make timely appeals.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988), this Court held that a district court’s decision on the merits that left unresolved a request for statutory attorney’s fees was a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The question presented in this case, on which there is an acknowledged conflict among nine circuits, is whether a district court’s decision on the merits that leaves unresolved a request for contractual attorney’s fees is a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

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Facts

Petitioner Ray Haluch Gravel Company (“Haluch” or “the Company”) began as a gravel company and later became a landscape supply company. See Cent. Pension Fund of Int’l Union of Operating Engineers & Participating Employers v. Ray Haluch Gravel Co., 695 F.3d 4 (1st Cir.

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