In tort law, actual damages, also known as compensatory damages, are damages awarded by a court equivalent to the loss a party suffered. If a party’s right was technically violated but they suffered no harm or losses, a court may instead grant nominal damages.
Are App Store customers “direct purchasers” of Apple who have standing to bring a suit alleging antitrust violations?
In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether customers of the iPhone’s App Store are considered direct purchasers of Apple. The question of direct purchaser status under the Illinois Brick doctrine is necessary to grant standing and proceed with an antitrust class action accusing Apple of monopolizing the market for iPhone apps. The Ninth Circuit held, and the class action representatives now argue, that customers of the App Store are direct purchasers because Apple functions as a distributor for app developers. Apple disagrees, arguing that it sells its distribution services to app developers, who are its direct purchasers; moreover, Apple asserts that it does not possess key price-setting power. The Court’s decision in this case will have implications for who may bring antitrust actions, potentially opening the door to duplicative damages and excessive private litigation.
Whether consumers may sue for antitrust damages anyone who delivers goods to them, even where they seek damages based on prices set by third parties who would be the immediate victims of the alleged offense.
In 2007, Apple released the original iPhone. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 315–16 (9th Cir. 2017). One year later, Apple launched the “App Store,” through which iPhone users may purchase and download applications (“apps”).
Does a lawsuit against a bank satisfy the Fair Housing Act’s “zone of interest” and proximate cause requirements, where a municipality alleges harm to its fiscal interests from urban blight stemming from foreclosures caused by the bank’s discriminatory lending practices?
In this consolidated action, the Supreme Court will decide whether a city can sue a bank under the Fair Housing Act for discriminatory lending practices, and whether it can recover lost property tax revenues and funds spent addressing widespread foreclosures that the bank’s discriminatory practices allegedly caused. The City of Miami alleges, based on statistical analyses, that loans by Bank of America and Wells Fargo & Co. to minority borrowers were more than five times as likely to result in foreclosures than loans to white borrowers. The banks argue that the City of Miami falls outside the zone of interests required to obtain standing under the Fair Housing Act, and that any alleged causal relationship between the City’s financial losses and the discriminatory housing practices of the banks is too far a stretch to support a valid lawsuit. The City responds that it meets the broad standing requirements of the Fair Housing Act and should recover for its injuries because they are foreseeably and directly linked to the discriminatory lending practices of the banks. A victory by Miami could potentially overburden the courts with similar lawsuits and overextend judicial power; however, Miami’s defeat could leave the FHA under-enforced and cities underfunded to battle urban blight.
Miami brought a Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) lawsuit against Bank of America, Countrywide Financial Corporation, Countrywide Home Loans, and Countrywide Bank (collectively, “Bank of America” or “the Bank”) on December 13, 2013, for discriminatory mortgage lending practices and unjust enrichment at the expense of Miami. See Miami v. Bank of America Corp., No.
Does a lawsuit against a bank satisfy the Fair Housing Act’s “zone of interest” and proximate cause requirements, where a municipality alleges harm to its fiscal interests from urban blight stemming from foreclosures caused by the bank’s discriminatory lending practices?
In this consolidated action, the Supreme Court will decide whether a city can sue a bank under the Fair Housing Act for discriminatory lending practices, and whether it can recover lost property tax revenues and funds spent addressing widespread foreclosures that the bank’s discriminatory practices allegedly caused. The City of Miami alleges, based on statistical analyses, that loans by Bank of America and Wells Fargo & Co. to minority borrowers were more than five times as likely to result in foreclosures than loans to white borrowers. The banks argue that the City of Miami falls outside the zone of interests required to obtain standing under the Fair Housing Act, and that any alleged causal relationship between the City’s financial losses and the discriminatory housing practices of the banks is too far a stretch to support a valid lawsuit. The City responds that it meets the broad standing requirements of the Fair Housing Act and should recover for its injuries because they are foreseeably and directly linked to the discriminatory lending practices of the banks. A victory by Miami could potentially overburden the courts with similar lawsuits and overextend judicial power; however, Miami’s defeat could leave the FHA under-enforced and cities underfunded to battle urban blight.
Miami brought a Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) lawsuit against Bank of America, Countrywide Financial Corporation, Countrywide Home Loans, and Countrywide Bank (collectively, “Bank of America” or “the Bank”) on December 13, 2013, for discriminatory mortgage lending practices and unjust enrichment at the expense of Miami. See Miami v.
Respondent Caroline Behrend et al., cable television subscribers, brought an antitrust class action against Petitioner Comcast Corporation alleging anticompetitive activity. In order to be certified as a class, Respondents had to present evidence that they suffered damages on a class-wide basis. The evidence they submitted consisted of a damages model prepared by their expert witness. Comcast challenges the District Court’s reliance upon that evidence, claiming that it is inadmissible under standards set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993). In this case, the Supreme Court will address whether evidence presented in support of class certification must be admissible under those standards. The decision will likely significantly impact the ability of plaintiffs to certify as a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and it may also affect underlying commercial conduct, such as the future use of territory-swapping and clustering agreements.
May a district court certify a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence to show that they may be awarded damages on a class-wide basis?
May a district court certify a class action without resolving “merits arguments” that bear on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s prerequisites for certification, including whether purportedly common issues predominate over individual ones under Rule 23(b)(3)?
The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.
Are damages for emotional distress available under the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act?
This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether compensatory damages are available for emotional distress in victims of discrimination cases. Jane Cummings (“Cummings”) is deaf and legally blind, and she requested an ASL interpreter for physical therapy sessions. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. (“Premier”) denied Cummings’ request for an ASL interpreter. Petitioner Cummings argues that under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the statutes that incorporate its remedies for victims of discrimination, such as the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act, compensatory damages are available for emotional distress. Respondent Premier counters that emotional distress damages are not appropriate remedies under the Rehabilitation Act and Affordable Care Act. The outcome of this case has important implications for victims of discrimination as well as for federal funding recipients.
Whether the compensatory damages available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the statutes that incorporate its remedies for victims of discrimination, such as the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act, include compensation for emotional distress.
In October 2016, Petitioner Jane Cummings contacted Respondent Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. (“Premier”) seeking physical therapy services. Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. at 674. Cummings was born deaf and legally blind, and she primarily communicates through American Sign Language (“ASL”) due to her difficulties speaking, reading, and writing in English.
In civil cases, damages are the remedy that a party requests the court award in order to try to make the injured party whole. Typically damage awards are in the form of monetary compensation to the harmed party. Damages are imposed if the court finds that a party breached a duty under contract or violated some right.
Can a judge include the profits of corporate affiliates who are not named as defendants in a trademark infringement case when calculating damages under the Lanham Act?
This case asks the Supreme Court if a judge can include profits of corporate affiliates, not named as defendants in a trademark infringement case when calculating how much to award in damages. Dewberry Group argues that under the Lanham Act, only the profits of the named defendant can be used in this calculation. Dewberry Group further argues that if the non-party affiliates’ profits were to be used, there should be an opportunity to litigate the matter of corporate separateness. Dewberry Engineers, on the other hand, counters that the Lanham Act consists of a two-step process where the second step allows the judge to award a “just sum” that may include the non-party affiliates’ profits. Additionally, Dewberry Engineers contends that there is no need for a separate legal analysis to disregard corporate separateness because the Lanham Act allows a judge to consider all relevant evidence including the non-party affiliates’ profits. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact future trademark infringement cases, particularly how the corporate form will be considered in awarding damages under the Lanham Act.
Whether an award of the “defendant’s profits” under the Lanham Act can include an order for the defendant to disgorge the distinct profits of legally separate non-party corporate affiliates.
The Lanham Act protects trademark holders against other individuals and corporations from reproducing, counterfeiting, copying, or imitating their registered trademark by allowing the registrants to file a lawsuit against infringers. Dewberry Eng’rs v.
The authors would like to thank Professors Oskar Liivak and Charles K. Whitehead for their insights into this case.
May a private citizen sue a state agency in a foreign state’s court? If so, must that state’s court treat the foreign state agency at least as favorably as it would a similar agency from its own state?
The Supreme Court must determine the boundaries of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and comity as applied to a state that has been unwillingly brought into another state’s courts. See Brief for Petitioner, Franchise Tax Board of the State of California at 1. The Franchise Tax Board of the State of California (“FTB”) looks to reverse Nevada v. Hall by expanding sovereign immunity to suits brought by private citizens in other states or, alternatively, to find that Nevada violated principles of full faith and credit, comity, and equality, by treating the FTB differently than it would a similar Nevada agency. See id. at 25. Conversely, Hyatt argues that Nevada v. Hall must be upheld as a matter of stare decisis and that the privilege of comity does not require the forum state, in all circumstances, to treat another state’s agency the same as the forum state’s equivalent agency. See Brief for Respondent, Gilbert P. Hyatt at 17. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine where states may be haled into court by a private citizen and to what degree states can be civilly liable for violating the law. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Multistate Tax Commission in Support of Petitioner at 4, 6.
In 1991, Gilbert P. Hyatt (“Hyatt”) began to receive large amounts of income from licensing fees for a computer chip patent. See Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 335 P.3d 125, 131 (Nev.
Should patentees have to show that defendants willfully infringed their patents to receive enhanced damages?
In this consolidated case, the Supreme Court must determine the correct interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 284, which provides enhanced damages in patent infringement cases. Currently, plaintiffs must show that defendants “willfully infringed” to obtain enhanced damages. Courts employ a two-prong test, with subjective and objective elements. The objective element requires plaintiffs to show “by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted” patent infringement. In separate actions, petitioners Halo Electronics Inc. and Stryker Corp. sued respondents Pulse Electronics Inc. and Zimmer Inc. respectively for patent infringement. In each case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that Halo and Stryker failed to satisfy the objective prong of the willfulness test. But Halo and Stryker argue that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of objective willfulness is unfairly burdensome and should be replaced by a totality-of-the-circumstances standard. Pulse and Zimmer contend that the objective willfulness standard properly allows only culpable infringers to pay punitive damages, in accord with the historical purpose of punitive damages. The Court’s decision may affect how plaintiffs prove infringement, and whether culpable infringers escape liability.
Did the Federal Circuit err by applying a rigid, two-part test for enhancing patent infringement damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284, that is the same as the rigid, two-part test this Court rejected last term in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) for imposing attorney fees under the similarly-worded 35 U.S.C. § 285?
Halo Electronics Inc. (“Halo”) and Pulse Electronics Inc. (“Pulse”) make surface mount transformers, a component in electronic devices such as internet routers. See Halo Electronics Inc. v. Pulse Electronics Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Prior to the 1990s, surface mount transformers would often overheat and crack, causing the device to fail.
Robert H. Fischer and Whitney L. Meier, The Supreme Court Grants Certiorari to Review the Standards for Recovery of Enhanced Patent Damages, Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto (Oct. 20, 2015).
Joe Mullin, Supreme Court Takes 1st Patent Case of Term, and Plaintiffs Could Benefit, Ars Technica (Oct. 20, 2015).
