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class certification

Amgen v. Connecticut Retirement Plans

Issues

1. To establish a class of investors in a lawsuit alleging securities fraud, must a plaintiff show that the defendant’s allegedly untrue statements materially affected the security’s price?

2. Additionally, to prevent a class from being established, may a defendant present evidence to refute that the alleged fraud materially affected the security’s price?

 

In 2004, biotechnology company Amgen Inc. was selling securities of two drugs that stimulate the production of red blood cells. After the Food and Drug Administration held an advisory committee meeting in May 2004 about the safety of those drugs, the market prices of their corresponding securities dropped. On behalf of the shareowners who suffered, Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds sought to certify the class of investors who held stock in Amgen at that time to sue Amgen for fraud regarding any misrepresentations of the drugs. Amgen argues that this kind of class action requires a plaintiff to show material reliance of the class of investors as part of the question as to whether a class exists. In contrast, Connecticut Retirement argues that during this class certification stage a plaintiff need not go beyond demonstrating that investors share a common question of reliance as a class rather than as individuals. If Amgen wins, then plaintiffs of securities fraud may face an unwieldy burden of proof at an early stage in litigation. If Connecticut Retirement wins, then defendants of securities fraud may face unfair pressures to settle cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether, in a misrepresentation case under SEC Rule 10b-5, the district court must require proof of materiality before certifying a plaintiff class based on the fraud-on-the-market theory.

2. Whether, in such a case, the district court must allow the defendant to present evidence rebutting the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market theory before certifying a plaintiff class based on that theory.

Respondent Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds’ (“Connecticut Retirement”) purchased securities offered by petitioner Amgen, Inc. (“Amgen”), a biotechnology company that manufactures pharmaceutical drugs. See Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1172–73 (9th Cir.

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Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System

Issues

Can a defendant in a securities class action rebut the presumption of class-wide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements to show that the statements had no impact on the price of the security; and does a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption have only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether a defendant in a securities class action may rebut the Basic presumption by pointing to the generic nature of the misstatements and by showing that those misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. argues that courts must consider evidence of the generality of alleged misstatements when determining whether to certify a shareholder class in a securities class action suit. Goldman further argues that defendants only bear the burden of producing some proof that their misstatement did not negatively impact the stock price, while plaintiffs bear the burden of persuading the Court that investors relied on the defendant’s alleged misstatements. The Arkansas Teacher Retirement System counters that the lower courts properly weighed the evidence presented at the class certification stage of the litigation, including the generic nature of the misstatements, when it decided to grant certification of plaintiffs’ shareholder class. ATRS also argues that the defendants implicitly bear both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion when rebutting the presumption because they must make a showing that the particular misrepresentation at issue did not affect the stock’s market price. The outcome of this case will have implications on the availability of class-action lawsuits for investors and the risk of class-action litigation for corporate defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether during the certification stage of a securities class action, a defendant may rebut the Basic presumption by arguing that the generic nature of the alleged misstatements is evidence that such misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities, and whether the defendant bears the burden of persuasion when seeking to rebut the Basic presumption.

Between 2006 and 2010, Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”), an investment bank, made public statements regarding its efforts “to address potential conflicts of interest” and its dedication to “complying fully with the letter and spirit” of laws and ethical standards. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. V. Goldman Sachs Grp at 258.

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Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System

Issues

Can a defendant in a securities class action rebut the presumption of class-wide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements to show that the statements had no impact on the price of the security; and does a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption have only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether a defendant in a securities class action may rebut the Basic presumption by pointing to the generic nature of the misstatements and by showing that those misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. argues that courts must consider evidence of the generality of alleged misstatements when determining whether to certify a shareholder class in a securities class action suit. Goldman further argues that defendants only bear the burden of producing some proof that their misstatement did not negatively impact the stock price, while plaintiffs bear the burden of persuading the Court that investors relied on the defendant’s alleged misstatements. The Arkansas Teacher Retirement System counters that the lower courts properly weighed the evidence presented at the class certification stage of the litigation, including the generic nature of the misstatements, when it decided to grant certification of plaintiffs’ shareholder class. ATRS also argues that the defendants implicitly bear both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion when rebutting the presumption because they must make a showing that the particular misrepresentation at issue did not affect the stock’s market price. The outcome of this case will have implications on the availability of class-action lawsuits for investors and the risk of class-action litigation for corporate defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether during the certification stage of a securities class action, a defendant may rebut the Basic presumption by arguing that the generic nature of the alleged misstatements is evidence that such misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities, and whether the defendant bears the burden of persuasion when seeking to rebut the Basic presumption.

Between 2006 and 2010, Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”), an investment bank, made public statements regarding its efforts “to address potential conflicts of interest” and its dedication to “complying fully with the letter and spirit” of laws and ethical standards. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. V. Goldman Sachs Grp at 258.

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Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.

Issues

Should the fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance be overruled or substantially modified to allow defendants to challenge a class certification by introducing evidence that the alleged fraud did not impact the price of its stock?

In 2002, the Erica P. John Fund, which supports the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, sued Halliburton, an oil-services company, for securities fraud.  The lawsuit accused Halliburton of lying about its asbestos liabilities, overstating its revenues, and building up hype about the company’s merger with Dresser Industries. The lawsuit was brought on behalf of a class consisting of all shareholders of Halliburton. Contesting this class action, Halliburton argues that the lawsuit could not be brought by all shareholders unless individual shareholders actually relied on Halliburton’s alleged fraudulent acts to make their investment decisions. However, the Fund contends that reliance by the individual shareholders is presumed due to the fraud-on-the market theory established by Basic v. Levinson. The theory assumes that all public information provided by a company is incorporated into its stock price. Thus, Halliburton’s fraudulent information harmed all of its shareholders even if not every one of them personally read and relied on the information. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether the fraud-on-the-market theory remains valid. If the Court rejects the theory, then plaintiffs would have a harder time initiating lawsuits for securities fraud, and companies that allegedly commit the fraud would likely pay less in damages.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether this Court should overrule or substantially modify the holding of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), to the extent that it recognizes a presumption of classwide reliance derived from the fraud-on-the-market theory.
  2. Whether, in a case where the plaintiff invokes the presumption of reliance to seek class certification, the defendant may rebut the presumption and prevent class certification by introducing evidence that the alleged misrepresentations did not distort the market price of its stock.

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Facts

The Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“The Fund”) alleges that between June 3, 1999, and December 7, 2001, the Halliburton Company (“Halliburton”) and its top executives misrepresented significant aspects of its operations. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (“Erica v. Halliburton”), 718 F.3d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 2013).

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