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SECURITIES FRAUD

Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo

 

Dura Pharmaceuticals is a publicly traded company that developed and marketed prescription pharmaceuticals for the treatment of allergies and asthma. Investor plaintiffs brought a class action securities fraud action against Dura under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, alleging that Dura knowingly misrepresented the success of the clinical trials for one of their asthma products, transferred the losses incurred from product development to subsidiary corporations in order to perpetuate the perception of high earnings for the parent company, and made repeated public statements regarding the success of its drug sales when sales were actually declining. The plaintiffs also claimed that Dura executives sold approximately $400 million of their personally-held Dura stock, actions which raise suspicions of insider trading.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the pleading requirements of §10(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the lower court misinterpreted the loss causation element of §10(b) and that the lower court should have considered the plaintiffs' allegations collectively in order to determine whether the pleading requirements had been met. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to provide a clear standard on these two pleading requirement issues.

The Supreme Court will now resolve the question of whether or not plaintiff investors met the pleading requirements to bring a cause of action for federal securities fraud under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act against Dura Pharmaceuticals.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a securities fraud plaintiff invoking the fraud-on-the-market theory must demonstrate loss causation by pleading and proving a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the investment's subsequent decline in price.

Defendant Dura Pharmaceuticals ("Dura") is a publicly traded company that develops and markets prescription pharmaceuticals for the treatment of allergies and asthma. The plaintiffs are investors who purchased Dura stock between April 15, 1997 and February 24, 1998. Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir., 2003).
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Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank

Issues

Does a company mislead investors when it discloses a future risk without mentioning that the potential bad event has happened before?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a company’s risk disclosure to investors is false or misleading when the company does not disclose a risk that has materialized in the past, even when that past event poses no risk of ongoing or future harm to the company. In this case, Facebook failed to disclose a past data breach, the Cambridge Analytica Scandal, in its 2016 10-K disclosures. Shareholders sued the company and its executives, arguing that the failure to disclose this information was false or misleading. On one hand, Facebook argues that it does not have to disclose such past events in the form at issue because risk disclosures are forward-looking and investors understand that. On the other hand, Amalgamated Bank contends that companies must disclose information about past bad events because stating a risk as a hypothetical event could mislead investors into believing there have been no past bad events. The outcome of this case will affect the requirements of risk disclosures, which could impact the quantity and quality of disclosure information, how much companies must disclose, and whether investors’ demands are met.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether risk disclosures are false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm

In 2014, Professor Aleksandr Kogan created an app that paid users for taking a psychological test. Amalgamated Bank v. Facebook, Inc. at 11–12. The app also collected data on the quiz takers and their Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) friends resulting in data collection from over 30 million Facebook profiles. Id.

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Gabelli v. Securities and Exchange Commission

“Time zone arbitrage” is an investment practice that takes advantage of the time difference between markets in the United States and abroad but that may harm international institutional investors. In its initial action against defendants, Marc J. Gabelli and Bruce Alpert (collectively, “Gabelli”), the SEC alleged that Gabelli allowed a single investor in the mutual fund they managed to engage in a time zone arbitrage.  The SEC argued that Gabelli committed securities fraud by allowing such a practice while simultaneously representing to the directors and investors of the mutual fund that time zone arbitrage would not be tolerated. The SEC action was dismissed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for having exceeded the statute of limitations. However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, stating that the period did not begin running for statute of limitations purposes until the SEC discovered the alleged misconduct, rather than when the alleged misconduct first occurred. The defendants now appeal, arguing that potential targets of government enforcement actions should not have to live under the constant threat of penalty for conduct long since passed. The SEC counters that wrongdoers should not benefit by virtue of their conduct being more difficult to uncover. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case will have long lasting implications on the government’s efforts to regulate the securities market.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 2462 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that “except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress” any penalty action brought by the government must be “commenced within five years from the date when the claims first accrued.” (emphasis added). This Court has explained that “[i]n common parlance a right accrues when it comes into existence.” United States v. Lindsay, 346 U.S. 568, 569 (1954).

Where Congress has not enacted a separate controlling provision, does the government's claim first accrue for purposes of applying the five-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 when the government can first bring an action for a penalty?

Issue

Whether the five-year limitation for government enforcement actions begins running when the government discovered an alleged violation or when the alleged violation took place.

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Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System

Issues

Can a defendant in a securities class action rebut the presumption of class-wide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements to show that the statements had no impact on the price of the security; and does a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption have only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether a defendant in a securities class action may rebut the Basic presumption by pointing to the generic nature of the misstatements and by showing that those misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. argues that courts must consider evidence of the generality of alleged misstatements when determining whether to certify a shareholder class in a securities class action suit. Goldman further argues that defendants only bear the burden of producing some proof that their misstatement did not negatively impact the stock price, while plaintiffs bear the burden of persuading the Court that investors relied on the defendant’s alleged misstatements. The Arkansas Teacher Retirement System counters that the lower courts properly weighed the evidence presented at the class certification stage of the litigation, including the generic nature of the misstatements, when it decided to grant certification of plaintiffs’ shareholder class. ATRS also argues that the defendants implicitly bear both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion when rebutting the presumption because they must make a showing that the particular misrepresentation at issue did not affect the stock’s market price. The outcome of this case will have implications on the availability of class-action lawsuits for investors and the risk of class-action litigation for corporate defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether during the certification stage of a securities class action, a defendant may rebut the Basic presumption by arguing that the generic nature of the alleged misstatements is evidence that such misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities, and whether the defendant bears the burden of persuasion when seeking to rebut the Basic presumption.

Between 2006 and 2010, Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”), an investment bank, made public statements regarding its efforts “to address potential conflicts of interest” and its dedication to “complying fully with the letter and spirit” of laws and ethical standards. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. V. Goldman Sachs Grp at 258.

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Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System

Issues

Can a defendant in a securities class action rebut the presumption of class-wide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements to show that the statements had no impact on the price of the security; and does a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption have only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether a defendant in a securities class action may rebut the Basic presumption by pointing to the generic nature of the misstatements and by showing that those misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. argues that courts must consider evidence of the generality of alleged misstatements when determining whether to certify a shareholder class in a securities class action suit. Goldman further argues that defendants only bear the burden of producing some proof that their misstatement did not negatively impact the stock price, while plaintiffs bear the burden of persuading the Court that investors relied on the defendant’s alleged misstatements. The Arkansas Teacher Retirement System counters that the lower courts properly weighed the evidence presented at the class certification stage of the litigation, including the generic nature of the misstatements, when it decided to grant certification of plaintiffs’ shareholder class. ATRS also argues that the defendants implicitly bear both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion when rebutting the presumption because they must make a showing that the particular misrepresentation at issue did not affect the stock’s market price. The outcome of this case will have implications on the availability of class-action lawsuits for investors and the risk of class-action litigation for corporate defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether during the certification stage of a securities class action, a defendant may rebut the Basic presumption by arguing that the generic nature of the alleged misstatements is evidence that such misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities, and whether the defendant bears the burden of persuasion when seeking to rebut the Basic presumption.

Between 2006 and 2010, Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”), an investment bank, made public statements regarding its efforts “to address potential conflicts of interest” and its dedication to “complying fully with the letter and spirit” of laws and ethical standards. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. V. Goldman Sachs Grp at 258.

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Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders

Issues

Whether, in a private right-of-action, primary liability applies to an investment adviser for alleged participation in the issue of material misstatements by the client funds that it advises despite the lack of aiding-and-abetting liability claims in private actions under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Security Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.

 

A 2003 investigation by the New York State Attorney General revealed that Janus Capital Management, an investment adviser, had secretly allowed several hedge funds to engage in market-timing trades using the assets of the Janus Investment Fund, which were publicly marketed toward long-term investors. Subsequently, First Derivative Traders, a stockholder in Janus Capital Management’s parent company, brought a private securities fraud action against the Janus companies, alleging that Janus Capital Management was responsible for misleading statements in the Janus Funds’ prospectuses. Though Janus Capital Management argued that its status as a mere outside service provider precluded liability, the Fourth Circuit allowed First Derivative Traders to move forward with its claim. In a decision that will affect the scope of secondary liability in private securities-fraud actions, the Supreme Court is now asked to decide whether an investment adviser can be held responsible for misstatements that appear in its client’s offering documents.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

There is no aiding-and-abetting liability in private actions brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). Thus, a service provider who provides assistance to a company that makes a public misstatement cannot be held liable in a private securities-fraud action. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific- Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). In the decision below, however, the Fourth Circuit held that an investment adviser who allegedly "helped draft the misleading prospectuses" of a different company, ''by participating in the writing and dissemination of [those] prospectuses," can be held liable in a private action "even if the statement on its face is not directly attributed to the [adviser]." App., infra, 17a- 18a, 24a (emphases added). The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in concluding-in direct conflict with decisions of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits-that a service provider can be held primarily liable in a private securities fraud action for "help[ing]" or "participating in" another company's misstatements.

2. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in concluding-in direct conflict with decisions of the Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits-that a service provider can be held primarily liable in a private securities-fraud action for statements that were not directly and contemporaneously attributed to the service provider.

On September 3, 2003, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer filed a complaint against a hedge fund for making secret arrangements with Janus Capital Management (“JCM”) to benefit from market-timing. See First Derivative Traders v. Janus Capital Group, Inc., 566 F.3d 111, 128 (4th Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Charles Whitehead for his insights into this case.

Additional Resources

· New York Times, Peter J. Henning: The Hurdles to Suing Outside Advisers for Fraud (Oct. 27, 2010).

· Wall Street Journal, Brent Kendall: High Court Requests White House Views on Janus Appeal (Jan. 11, 2010)

· American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, Eric Zitzewitz: How Widespread is Late Trading in Mutual Funds?

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Lorenzo v. SEC

Issues

Can a defendant who sent emails containing misstatements to potential investors be held liable under a fraudulent-scheme claim where the evidence showed that the defendant merely forwarded the emails at the direction of another?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the scope of Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, as well as the extent of liability for securities professionals who play a supportive role in fraudulent-scheme claims. Francis Lorenzo contends that the Supreme Court should apply a narrow definition of primary liability to Rule 10b-5 securities actions. Lorenzo argues that he is not culpable for securities fraud under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) because, in forwarding emails that were written by his superior, he did nothing more than provide “substantial assistance” to those who defrauded investors with misleading financial statements. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) counters that Lorenzo played a primary role in advancing the fraud because he signed the emails as the director of investment banking, and he told the potential investors to contact him for information about the financial health of his brokerage firm’s clients. This case will determine the ease with which the SEC can bring claims against securities professionals accused of fraud.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a misstatement claim that does not meet the elements set forth in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders can be repackaged and pursued as a fraudulent-scheme claim.

In 2009, Francis Lorenzo (“Lorenzo”) was appointed director of investment banking for Charles Vista, LLC (“Charles Vista”), a brokerage firm in New York City. Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission at 3. Lorenzo oversaw the account of Charles Vista’s largest client, a startup company called Waste2Energy Holdings, Inc. (“W2E”).

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Skilling v. United States

Issues

Is the federal statute making it a crime for someone to “deprive another of the intangible right of honest services” unconstitutionally vague?

When an entire community is outraged by the events giving rise to a criminal trial, is it possible to draw a jury that does not share the community’s presumed prejudice? If so, what standard should a court use to determine if the presumption of prejudice has been overcome?

 

Former Enron Corporation executive Jeffrey K. Skilling was convicted by a federal jury in Houston, Texas of numerous counts of conspiracy, securities fraud and insider trading relating to Enron’s bankruptcy. After the Fifth Circuit upheld Skilling’s conviction, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve two key issues. First, the court will determine the scope and constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which makes it a crime for an employee of a corporation to fraudulently deprive the corporation of that employee’s “intangible honest services.” Second, the Court will determine whether and to what extent the government was required to prove—to the satisfaction of the parties and the district court—that no member of the Houston jury that convicted Skilling was actually prejudiced by the widespread negative media attention the Enron bankruptcy received in the Houston area before and during Skilling’s initial trial. The rulings on these issues may give much needed guidance to the lower courts in dealing with vague statutes, and may affect the scope of Sixth Amendment rights for every criminal defendant.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the federal "honest services" fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, requires the government to prove that the defendant's conduct was intended to achieve "private gain" rather than to advance the employer's interests, and, if not, whether § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague.

2. When a presumption of jury prejudice arises because of the widespread community impact of the defendant's alleged conduct and massive, inflammatory pretrial publicity, whether the government may rebut the presumption of prejudice, and, if so, whether the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no juror was actually prejudiced.

Jeffrey K. Skilling, former President, COO and CEO of the now-defunct Enron Corporation, was convicted by a federal jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on numerous counts of conspiracy, securities fraud, making false representations to auditors, and insider trading, all relating to his role in the highly-publicized failure of Enron. See U.S. v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 534 (5th Cir.

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