Astrue v. Ratliff
Issues
Whether, under the Equal Access to Justice Act, fee awards are payable to attorneys or to their clients.
Petitioner, Michael J. Astrue (“Astrue”), argues that an award of fees and other expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), is payable to the prevailing party in Social Security cases. Respondent, Catherine G. Ratliff (“Ratliff”), counters that an award of attorneys’ fees should go to the prevailing party’s attorney as compensation for services rendered. Astrue asserts that an award of attorneys’ fees is subject to an administrative offset to satisfy the prevailing party’s debt, if any, to the United States. Ratliff argues that because the award belongs to the party’s attorney and not to the party itself, the award of attorneys’ fees cannot be subject to an offset for a debt that is not his or her own. The Eighth Circuit held that Congress intended attorneys’ fees awarded under EAJA to go to the prevailing party’s attorney and not to the prevailing party. The Supreme Court must resolve whether an award of attorneys’ fees under EAJA is payable to the prevailing party rather than the party’s attorney and, therefore, is subject to an administrative offset for a pre-existing debt owed by the prevailing party to the federal government.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Whether an "award of fees and other expenses" under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d), is payable to the "prevailing party" rather than to the prevailing party's attorney, and therefore is subject to an offset for a pre-existing debt owed by the prevailing party to the United States.
Respondent, Catherine G. Ratliff (“Ratliff”), an attorney, successfully represented two claimants seeking benefits from the Social Security Administration. See Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2008). Ratliff then moved for an award of fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C.