SOCIAL SECURITY

Astrue v. Ratliff

Issues

Whether, under the Equal Access to Justice Act, fee awards are payable to attorneys or to their clients.

 

Petitioner, Michael J. Astrue (“Astrue”), argues that an award of fees and other expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), is payable to the prevailing party in Social Security cases. Respondent, Catherine G. Ratliff (“Ratliff”), counters that an award of attorneys’ fees should go to the prevailing party’s attorney as compensation for services rendered. Astrue asserts that an award of attorneys’ fees is subject to an administrative offset to satisfy the prevailing party’s debt, if any, to the United States. Ratliff argues that because the award belongs to the party’s attorney and not to the party itself, the award of attorneys’ fees cannot be subject to an offset for a debt that is not his or her own. The Eighth Circuit held that Congress intended attorneys’ fees awarded under EAJA to go to the prevailing party’s attorney and not to the prevailing party. The Supreme Court must resolve whether an award of attorneys’ fees under EAJA is payable to the prevailing party rather than the party’s attorney and, therefore, is subject to an administrative offset for a pre-existing debt owed by the prevailing party to the federal government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an "award of fees and other expenses" under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d), is payable to the "prevailing party" rather than to the prevailing party's attorney, and therefore is subject to an offset for a pre-existing debt owed by the prevailing party to the United States.

Respondent, Catherine G. Ratliff (“Ratliff”), an attorney, successfully represented two claimants seeking benefits from the Social Security Administration. See Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2008). Ratliff then moved for an award of fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C.

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Babcock v. Kijakazi

Issues

Under the Social Security Act’s Windfall Elimination Provision, does the uniform-services exemption apply to Civil Service Retirement System payments derived from service as a dual-status technician?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the uniformed services exemption under the Social Security Act applies to the Civil Service Retirement System pensions of dual-status technicians. Petitioner David Babcock argues that the entirety of his service as a dual-status technician was as a uniformed member of the National Guard and he thus should entirely fall under the exemption. The Social Security Administration, under Acting Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi, argues that the portion of Babcock’s service as a dual-status technician that was compensated by the Civil Service Retirement System pension was performed in his capacity as a civilian employee and therefore it should not fall under the exemption. The outcome of this case will impact the benefits available to dual-status technicians and clarify the distinction between dual-status technicians and other military personnel.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a civil service pension received for federal civilian employment as a “militarytechnician (dual status)” is “a payment based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service” for the purposes of the Social Security Act’s windfall elimination provision.

From 1975 to 2014, Petitioner David Babcock (“Babcock”) was employed as a National Guard dual-status technician. Babcock v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. at 1–2. A dual-status technician, under 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a)(1) and 32 U.S.C.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Jed Stiglitz for his guidance and insights

into this case.

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Biestek v. Berryhill

Issues

Can a vocational expert’s testimony in a Social Security disability benefits hearing constitute substantial evidence of job availability if the vocational expert does not provide the data underlying their conclusions upon the applicant’s request?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a vocational expert’s testimony can constitute substantial evidence of job availability when a Social Security disability claimant requests but is not suppled with the data underlying that expert’s testimony. Petitioner Michael J. Biestek contends that the substantial evidence standard requires vocational experts to produce the underlying data upon an applicant’s request; otherwise, the expert’s testimony is unverifiable and allows the expert’s word to be unlawfully substituted for actual substantial evidence. Respondent Nancy A. Berryhill, the acting Commissioner of Social Security, counters that the substantial evidence standard focuses on the contents of the hearing record, not the procedure used to make that record. Additionally, Berryhill responds that plaintiffs already effectively undercut a vocational expert’s testimony on cross-examination and thus do not need to review the expert’s data. The outcome of this case will have large implications on litigation strategy in Social Security disability claims, for both claimants and the government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a vocational expert’s testimony can constitute substantial evidence of “other work,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), available to an applicant for social security benefits on the basis of a disability, when the expert fails upon the applicant’s request to provide the underlying data on which that testimony is premised

In March 2010, Biestek applied to the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) for Supplemental Social Security Income and benefits under 40 C.F.R. § 404, alleging that he had been disabled and unable to work since October 2009. Biestek v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. at 2.

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Richard Culbertson v. Nancy Berryhill

Issues

Does 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) limit attorney’s fees to 25 percent for fees incurred in representing a claimant before a court and before the Social Security agency; or, does the 25-percent limit only apply to fees related to representation before the agency?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide how to calculate attorney’s fees for representation in court and before the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Richard Culbertson sought an attorney’s fee of 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded to the Social Security claimants whom he represented in court. Culbertson contends that § 406(b)’s 25-percent cap applies only to his representation before a court. The Court of Appeals applied § 406(b)’s 25-percent cap to the sum of attorney’s fees under § 406(a) and § 406(b). Berryhill agrees with Culbertson’s position, while the Supreme Court-appointed amicus curiae supports the Court of Appeals. This case will impact Social Security claimants’ protections from overbilling and the financial incentives allowing claimants to access competent legal representation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether fees subject to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)’s 25-percent cap related to the representation of individuals claiming Social Security benefits include, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th, 9th, and 10th Circuits hold, only fees for representation in court or, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 4th, 5th, and 11th Circuits hold, also fees for representation before the agency.

This case consolidated four actions brought by Richard Culbertson, who represented claimants Katrina Wood, Celalettin Akarcay, Bill Westfall, and Darleen Schuster, each of whom was denied disability benefits by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). Wood v.

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Smith v. Berryhill

Issues

When the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council dismisses a disability claim for not being filed on time, does that dismissal qualify as an agency’s “final decision” subject to judicial review under Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)?

The Supreme Court will determine whether a decision by the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council rejecting a claim for disability benefits on untimeliness grounds is a “final decision,” and therefore subject to judicial review under Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act. Petitioner Ricky Lee Smith, supported by Respondent Acting Commissioner Nancy A. Berryhill, contends that the plain text of Section 405(g), as well as the Supreme Court’s interpretation of other administrative decisions, demonstrate that a decision on untimeliness grounds is a final decision for the purposes of judicial review. Amicus Curiae Deepak Gupta, who the Supreme Court to defend the Sixth Circuit’s judgment that such a decision does not constitute a “final decision” under Section 405(g), counters that Section 405(g)’s specific statutory context mandates that final decisions be understood only as decisions on the merits, not decisions on procedural grounds. This case will have important implications for untimeliness determinations, courts’ interpretations of final decisions, and social security litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the decision of the Appeals Council—the administrative body that hears a claimant’s appeal of an adverse decision of an administrative law judge regarding a disability benefit claim—to reject a disability claim on the ground that the claimant’s appeal was untimely is a “final decision” subject to judicial review under Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Petitioner Ricky Lee Smith received disability benefits from Social Security between 1988 and 2004, until his financial resources increased to the point that he was no longer eligible for the benefits.  Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 880 F.3d 813, 815 (6th Cir. 2018).

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United States v. Quality Stores Inc.

Issues

Are supplemental unemployment benefits paid to laid-off employees considered “wages” under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), and therefore taxable as income?

In 2001, Quality Stores made severance payments to employees who were involuntarily terminated after Quality Stores filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Quality Stores later argued that the payments should not have been taxed as wages under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA). When the IRS did not respond to Quality Stores’ claim seeking a $1 million refund in FICA taxes, Quality Stores commenced an adversary action in bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court ruled for Quality Stores, concluding that the severance payments were non-taxable supplemental unemployment benefits (SUBs). The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court will determine whether severance payments to involuntarily terminated employees are taxable wages under FICA. The Court will resolve a circuit split between the Sixth and Federal Circuits in a decision that will affect all employers who provide severance pay. At stake are billions of dollars in FICA tax refunds to employers and their former employees.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether severance payments made to employees whose employment was involuntarily terminated are taxable under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”), 26 U.S.C. 3101 et seq.

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Facts

In October 2001, involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings commenced against Quality Stores, the largest agriculture-specialty retailer in the United States at the time. See In re Quality Stores, Inc., et al., 693 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012).

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