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City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation

Issues

Basic Governing Principles as Noted by the Second Circuit

The Second Circuit cited three basic principles that govern the issues at hand. The first is the Oneida's right of occupancy on Indian country, which "may extend from generation to generation, and will cease only by dissolution of the tribe, or their consent to sell to the party possessed of the right of pre-emption." Oneida Indian Nation, 337 F.3d. at 152 (citing In re New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761, 771 (1866)). The second, codified in the Non-Intercourse Act, represents federal preeminence over the disposition of land in Indian country, since "Congress alone has the right to say when the [United States'] guardianship over the Indians may cease." Id. (citing United States v. Boylan, 265 F. 165, 171 (2d. Cir. 1920)).  The sale or conveyance of reservation land can only be made with congressional sanction, that is, "by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution." Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000)). The third principle is federal preemption, which prohibits states from imposing property taxes upon Indian reservation land without congressional approval. Id. (citing In re New York Indians, 72 U.S. at 771).

 

In 1997 and 1998, the Oneidas re-purchased title to parcels of aboriginal land within Sherrill, New York, in open market transactions. Sherrill subsequently assessed property taxes, which the Oneidas ignored, asserting that the properties are contained within the Oneida Indian Reservation and therefore are considered to be "Indian Country", which is nontaxable by state municipalities. Sherrill sent the Oneidas notices of tax delinquency, held a tax sale where Sherrill repurchased the parcels, then initiated eviction proceedings. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York found in favor of the Oneidas. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court and also found that the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, 7 Stat. 550, did not require the Oneidas to abandon their lands in the state of New York in exchange for land in Kansas, and further, that a reservation continues to exist even if a tribe ceases to exist and is protected under the Non-Intercourse Act. The Supreme Court must now assess the Second Circuit Court's interpretations.

This case consists of four separate questions, which ultimately address whether properties reacquired by the Oneida Indian Nation of New York are subject to taxation by the City of Sherrill, New York and Madison County, New York.

1. Whether alleged reservation land is Indian Country pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and this Court's decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) where the land was neither set aside by the federal government nor superintended by the federal government?

2. Whether alleged reservation land was set aside by the federal government for purposes of Indian Country analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't where the alleged reservation was established by the State of New York in the 1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler, and not by any federal treaty, action or enactment?

3. Whether the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which required the New York Oneidas to permanently abandon their lands in New York, resulted in the disestablishment of the Oneida's alleged New York reservation?

4. Whether alleged reservation land may (i) remain Indian Country or (ii) be subject to the protections of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, or Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, if the tribe claiming reservation status and Non-Intercourse Act protection ceases to exist?

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether alleged reservation land is Indian Country pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and this Court's decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) where the land was neither set aside by the federal government nor superintended by the federal government?

2. Whether alleged reservation land was set aside by the federal government for purposes of Indian Country analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't where the alleged reservation was established by the State of New York in the 1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler, and not by any federal treaty, action or enactment?

3. Whether the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which required the New York Oneidas to permanently abandon their lands in New York, resulted in the disestablishment of the Oneida's alleged New York reservation?

4. Whether alleged reservation land may (i) remain Indian Country or (ii) be subject to the protections of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, or Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, if the tribe claiming reservation status and Non-Intercourse Act protection ceases to exist?

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Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community

Issues

  1. Can a federal court exercise jurisdiction over a state suit alleging violations of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act where the gaming activity is not located on Indian lands?
  2. Does tribal sovereign immunity bar a state from suing a tribe in federal court for violations of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act?

In 2010, Bay Mills Indian Community used funds acquired through the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act to purchase property away from the tribe’s reservation and used the property to open a casino. Michigan sought an injunction to stop operation of the casino, which the state contends violates the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") because it is not located on Indian lands. The district court granted an injunction to stop the gambling activities occurring  away from the reservation. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over Michigan's suit because IGRA only establishes federal court jurisdiction when the gaming is conducted on Indian lands. The Sixth Circuit further concluded that Bay Mills was immune from suit because Congress did not expressly authorize such suits and Bay Mills did not waive its immunity. Michigan argues that the IGRA can grant federal court jurisdiction and abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. Bay Mills argues that the IGRA cannot abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, and even if it could it would only apply to suits on Indian lands. This case could substantially alter the relationship between states and tribes, and impact the creation and regulation of off-reservation gaming. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s resolution of the sovereign immunity question could reshape the status of federally recognized tribes and impact the economic development of all federally recognized tribes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (IGRA), authorizes an Indian tribe to conduct class III gaming under limited circumstances and only on "Indian lands." 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). This dispute involves a federal court's authority to enjoin an Indian tribe from operating an illegal casino located off of "Indian lands." The petition presents two recurring questions of jurisprudential significance that have divided the circuits: 

  1. Whether a federal court has jurisdiction to enjoin activity that violates IGRA but takes place outside of Indian lands. 
  2. Whether tribal sovereign immunity bars a state from suing in federal court to enjoin a tribe from violating IGRA outside of Indian lands.

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Facts

Casino-style, or Class III, gaming is lawful on Indian lands under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) if certain requirements are met. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 695 F.3d 406, 410 (6th Cir.

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