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Aereo is a company that offers subscribers the ability to watch and record local broadcast television over the internet for a monthly fee. Aereo retransmits the programming without a license and without paying a fee to copyright holders. ABC and other television broadcasters sued Aereo for copyright infringement and moved for a preliminary injection. The district court and Second Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ motion because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits in their infringement action. The Supreme Court will decide whether a company that retransmits programming to paid subscribers without obtaining the owner’s permission violates the Copyright Act. The Court’s decision could upend the traditional business model of broadcast television and will affect the relationship between technological innovation and content distribution.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a work of art that visually resembles its source material but transforms its meaning constitutes fair use under copyright law. The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts (AWF) argues that several screenprints created by Andy Warhol, which derive from an original photograph by Lynn Goldsmith, are transformative and constitute fair use because they portray a significantly different message than Goldsmith’s original photograph. Goldsmith argues that since her photograph is recognizable in Warhol’s prints and the works share the same purpose, the prints are not fair use but rather infringe her copyright in her photo. The outcome of this case carries implications for copyright holders’ economic incentives, marginalized artists’ commercial prospects, and creative expression.

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This case asks whether a service provider can be held liable for materially contributing to copyright infringement if it has mere knowledge of another’s direct infringement, and whether such knowledge alone makes infringement willful under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Cox contends that providing technology at arm’s length is not a material contribution and that its response to customer infringement was not willful unless it knew its own conduct was infringing. Sony argues that supplying a product to known infringers qualifies as a material contribution and that awareness of facilitating illegal activity meets the willfulness standard of § 504(c). The outcome of this case has implications for consumer fairness and innovation incentives. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the prerequisites for suing to enforce copyright and asks whether a copyright owners can sue after submitting the registration application to the Copyright Office, or if they must wait until after the Copyright Office acts on the application. Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation argues that the language, structure, and history of the Copyright Act require only that the copyright owner submit a registration application, deposit, and fee before suing for copyright infringement. Wall-Street.com, however, maintains that the Copyright Act unambiguously requires that the Copyright Office act on the registration application before the copyright owner can sue, and that a change in this law should be made by Congress rather than the Court. The outcome of this case will affect the ability of authors, artists, and other creators to protect their original works against copying, the means by which Congress obtains works and makes them publicly accessible, and the methods used by courts and litigants to resolve copyright infringement disputes.

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PATENT, INFRINGEMENT, INDUCEMENT, STATE OF MIND

Respondent SEB S.A. owns a patent for a deep fryer featuring an inexpensive, insulated plastic outer shell. In 1997, Petitioner Pentalpha Enterprises, LTD, a subsidiary of petitioner Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. (collectively, “Global-Tech”), developed and manufactured a deep fryer that copied features of SEB's deep fryer. On August 27, 1999, SEB sued Global-Tech for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The jury found Global-Tech liable for direct and active inducement of patent infringement, and Global-Tech appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. That court affirmed, holding that Global-Tech acted with deliberate indifference to the risk of infringing SEB's patent. Global-Tech appealed, arguing that the Federal Circuit applied the wrong standard for the mental-state element of actively inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Global-Tech asserts that the proper standard is “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct to encourage an infringement,” the standard the Supreme Court articulated in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. On the other hand, SEB argues that a patent infringer does not need to have actual knowledge of a patent to be liable for actively inducing patent infringement. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect patent litigation, the extent and cost of patent searches, and market competition and innovation.

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Akamai Technologies, Inc. (“Akamai”) sued Limelight Networks, Inc. (“Limelight”) for allegedly infringing a patent for a method of delivering web content. Limelight had performed all but one step of the patented method, leaving its customers to perform the remaining step. The Federal Circuit held that Limelight’s conduct constituted infringement by inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). The Federal Circuit ruled that the combined conduct of multiple entities may constitute patent infringement where a party performs all but one step of a patented method and knowingly induces another party to perform the remaining step of the method. Akamai argues that the Federal Circuit’s new standard more comprehensively protects the rights of patent owners. However, Limelight counters that the standard too broadly expands the scope of patent infringement liability and could lead to more abusive patent litigation. Limelight argues that to be a violation of § 271(b), a single entity must directly infringe on a patent under § 271(a), and that no such violation is present here. On the other hand, Akamai argues that the Supreme Court should re-instate the jury’s verdict, which found that Limelight controlled a third party’s conduct sufficient to satisfy § 271(a). Additionally, Akamai argues that the Federal Circuit’s new rule is consistent with common law tort principles and with Supreme Court precedent.

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In a traditional patent infringement suit, the patent owner has the burden of proving infringement. In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a patent licensee could bring a declaratory judgment action against a licensor without violating the agreement. Here, Petitioner Medtronic entered a license agreement with Respondent Mirowski Family Ventures (“MFV”) that allowed Medtronic to challenge the validity, enforceability, and scope of a medical device patent in a declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court will decide who—the patent owner or the licensee—has the burden of proving infringement in such an action. Medtronic argues that the traditional burden of proof (i.e., burden on the owner) should apply in the declaratory judgment context, as this would promote fairness and consistency in judgments, further the public interest in determining the scope of a patent, and avoid reaching issues of substantive law in declaratory judgment actions. MFV argues that the burden of proving noninfringement should be on the licensee because it is the party seeking relief and because this would incentivize patent owners to enter into license agreements. The Court’s ruling in this case will reshape the incentives for entering into and litigating license agreements, and thereby impact the litigation practices in declaratory judgment actions involving patent licenses.

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Since the 1990s, Nautilus and Biosig Instruments have had a series of patent disputes. Their current dispute involves a new model of heart rate monitors mounted onto exercise equipment. Nautilus contends that Biosig’s patent is indefinite as a matter of law and therefore invalid. Further, Nautilus argues that patents must provide sufficiently clear notice to protect the public, promote innovation, and reduce costs to the judicial system. Biosig counters that its patent is valid because it is sufficiently clear and specific to meet the standards of definiteness set by precedent. Biosig further argues that a patent should be broad enough to protect innovators and their still-developing products. The Federal Circuit held that Biosig’s patent was valid because it was not “insolubly ambiguous.” The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the requirements inventors and drafters must meet to patent new technologies.

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In the latest Supreme Court case on patent law, LG Electronics, Inc. (LGE) sued Quanta Computers, Inc. (Quanta) for patent infringement. A patent license agreement between LGE and Intel allowed Intel to use LGE's patents but required Intel to notify its customers, including Quanta, that its license did not extend to third-party purchasers' combinations of Intel and non-Intel components. LGE alleges that Quanta infringed LGE's patents by combining Intel and non-Intel components. LGE argued that Intel's sale to Quanta did not exhaust LGE's rights as a patent holder, allowing LGE to sue Quanta. Quanta, however, argued that Intel's authorized sale to Quanta exhausted LGE's patent rights. The Federal Circuit agreed with LGE, holding that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply because the notice provided by Intel to Quanta created a conditional sale, and that sales of patented devices do not exhaust a patent holder's methods claims. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether a patent holder can sue customers who use patented components purchased from licensees. The outcome of this case will clarify the exhaustion doctrine generally and will help define the scope of patent holders' rights, including their ability to collect royalties from and sue downstream users of their patents.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a copyright plaintiff can recover damages for infringements over three years before the filing of a lawsuit if the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the infringement within three years of the filing of the lawsuit. Petitioners Warner Chappell Music, Inc., and Artist Publishing Group, LLC, contend that the discovery rule, which provides that a claim accrues when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the infringement, is inapplicable because the statute of limitations commences at the time of infringement, marking the completion of the cause of action. Additionally, Petitioners assert that applying the discovery rule would contravene Congress’s intent, as the language pertaining to the discovery rule is intentionally absent from the copyright provision. On the other hand, Respondents Nealy and Music Specialist, Inc. argue that Petitioners’ challenge on the discovery rule exceeds the scope of the issue presented to the Supreme Court, as the lower courts already presumed the application of the discovery rule in this case. Respondents also posit that introducing a separate damages bar—a cap on damages that can be awarded to a plaintiff—in federal copyright cases would undermine Congress’s purpose, as copyright law does not impose such a bar. This case will affect the scope of infringement cases initiated by copyright holders and alter the burden of proof for each party in future copyright cases.

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