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This consolidated case provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to resolve a conflict over the application of the “church plan” exemption of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). The parties disagree over whether the exemption applies to a pension plan maintained by a church-affiliated entity but not established by a church. Petitioners Advocate Health Care Network et al. (“Advocate”) argue that historical evidence and the statutory text establish that the exemption covers pension plans created by church agencies in addition to plans created by churches themselves. Advocate contends that a contrary interpretation would invite impermissible government interference with and discrimination between religious denominations. Maria Stapleton and fellow Respondents (“Stapleton”) contend that the language and purpose of the “church plan” exemption illustrate that it was not meant to cover a pension plan that was not created by a church. Stapleton also asserts that exempting the pension plans of church-affiliated entities from ERISA violates the Establishment Clause and puts thousands of church-agency employees at risk of losing their retirement benefits. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 924(j) allow for cumulative punishments for a singular criminal act that violates both provisions of this statute. Sections 924(c) and (j) punish the use of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime or drug trafficking. Dwayne Barrett contends that § 924(c) and (j) are not separate crimes because they punish the same underlying singular act, and Congress has authorized cumulative sentences for the same act. Charles L. McCloud, as court-appointed amicus curiae, argues that § 924(c) and (j) are two separate crimes, and Congress intended to allow for cumulative punishments for a single act that violates both statutes. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case raises concerns regarding the justice of sentencing to punish multiple violations involving a singular act and the duties of the legislative and judicial branches in determining the scope of criminal punishment. 

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Petitioner Carol Anne Bond was arrested in 2007 for attempts to poison a romantic rival, which culminated in a minor burn to the rival’s thumb. A federal district court sentenced Bond to six years in prison and five years of supervised release, and ordered her to pay a fine and make restitution, under the authority of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act. Congress passed that statute to implement an international arms-control agreement to prohibit chemical warfare. Bond challenged her conviction, claiming the statute’s application to her domestic conduct exceeded Congress’ limited and enumerated powers. In reviewing her challenge, the Third Circuit held that Congress’ power to implement treaties validated the statute and Bond’s conviction. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case will affect not only how broadly federal criminal statutes apply, but also the scope of Congress’ authority to implement treaties.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide two questions about the interpretation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). First, does 28 U.S.C. § 2255 incorporate 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)’s restrictions on second or successive motions to federal prisoners? Second, are the courts of appeals the final forum for federal prisoners seeking authorization to file such motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e), or can the Supreme Court review these gatekeeping decisions? The Petitioner, Michael Bowe, argues that extending both the restrictions on second or successive motions and the bar on Supreme Court review to federal prisoners goes against congressional intent and creates an unnecessary roadblock to federal prisoner’s claims to be fairly adjudicated by the courts. Kasdin Mitchell, whom the Supreme Court appointed to defend the judgment below because the United States declined to do so, argues that allowing for second or successive motions will burden the courts with unnecessarily and largely erroneous filings. For its part, the United States argues that the bar on Supreme Court review in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e) should extend to federal prisoners because they have other avenues, beyond AEDPA, to appeal their convictions. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the fairness of habeas procedures and judicial economy.

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Respondents Wanda Greenwood, Ladelle Hatfield, and Deborah McCleese each applied for an Aspire Visa credit card that petitioner CompuCredit Corporation marketed. Petitioner Synovus Bank issued the Aspire Visas after each respondent signed an agreement containing a binding arbitration provision. When respondents were charged card-related fees, they filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated alleging that petitioners engaged in deceitful marketing in violation of the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679 et seq. (“CROA”). CompuCredit moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the pre-dispute arbitration agreement. The district court acknowledged the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, but held that the CROA created a non-waivable right for consumers to sue in court. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the decision that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable under the CROA. Petitioners argue that the contract between the parties should be honored and the binding arbitration clause enforced. Respondents contend, however, that Congress intended to preserve the right to bring a claim in court when it enacted the CROA. The Supreme Court’s decision will consider the balance between consumers’ right to contract and providing adequate protections for vulnerable consumers. This decision will affect the enforceability of consumer contracts’ pre-dispute arbitration agreements and the extent to which arbitration may act as an acceptable substitute for an individual’s access to court.

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This case asks whether a service provider can be held liable for materially contributing to copyright infringement if it has mere knowledge of another’s direct infringement, and whether such knowledge alone makes infringement willful under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Cox contends that providing technology at arm’s length is not a material contribution and that its response to customer infringement was not willful unless it knew its own conduct was infringing. Sony argues that supplying a product to known infringers qualifies as a material contribution and that awareness of facilitating illegal activity meets the willfulness standard of § 504(c). The outcome of this case has implications for consumer fairness and innovation incentives. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the definition of an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) as set forth under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”). The statute defines an ATDS as equipment that “has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Employing a grammatical analysis, Respondent Facebook contends that a system is an ATDS only when it can automatically call phone numbers that were produced or stored using a random number generator. Also using a grammatical analysis, Petitioner Noah Duguid counters that an ATDS encompasses a system that can store and automatically call phone numbers, irrespective of whether the system uses a random number generator. The outcome of this case has significant implications in determining the type of devices and systems that could qualify as an ATDS and what callers could be subject to the $1,500-per-call statutory liability under the TCPA. 

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The issue in this case involves whether the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) overtime-pay exemption for “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles,” contained in 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A), also exempts service advisors. Encino Motorcars argues that the plain language and structure of § 213(b)(10)(A) unambiguously exempt service advisors from the FLSA’s overtime requirements. Navarro argues that the plain language and structure of § 213(b)(10)(A) clearly do not exempt service advisors from the FLSA’s overtime requirements and that Congress’s intent in enacting the exemption and the FLSA as a whole support this interpretation. From a policy perspective, this case is significant because a decision favoring Navarro could force dealerships across the United States to alter their payment systems for service advisors, of which there are around 100,000. Such an outcome could also expose dealerships to retroactive liability and back-pay in order to settle FLSA claims concerning overtime. 

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The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) generally allows access to, and disclosure of, federal information and records to those who requested them, subject to some exceptions, including one for a disclosure that would constitute an invasion of “personal privacy.” Following a recent investigation of Respondent AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”) by Petitioner the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), Respondent CompTel, a non-profit trade association, requested under FOIA all of the records and information pertaining to the FCC’s investigation. In allowing disclosure of some of the information, the FCC rejected AT&T’s argument that such disclosure would constitute an invasion of “personal privacy,” holding that this exception was strictly limited to individuals. AT&T appealed to the Third Circuit, which held that a corporation may have “personal privacy” interests and remanded to the FCC. AT&T argues that the term “personal privacy” applies to corporations as well as individuals, and the FCC argues that such a term is limited to individuals. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will determine the amount of protection given to corporations under FOIA and will likely affect the amount of access the public has to certain private corporate information.

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Congress enacted the Controlled Substance Act ("CSA") in 1970 as part of a comprehensive federal scheme to regulate and control certain drugs and other substances. A 1984 Amendment to the Act authorized the Attorney General to prohibit medical practitioners' use of a controlled substance if that use was "inconsistent with the public interest." 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4). In 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft determined that Oregon physicians' use of a federally registered controlled substance to facilitate physician-assisted suicide was not a legitimate medical purpose, despite an Oregon statute which authorized such use. In Oregon's suit, brought to enjoin Ashcroft from giving any legal effect to his directive, the District Court ruled for Oregon and issued a permanent injunction, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Oregon argues that since states traditionally regulate medical practices, Gonzales (the new Attorney General, replacing Ashcroft) must show that Congress expressly intended to authorize the Attorney General to make such a determination. Gonzales argues that the Attorney General's reasonable interpretation of a federal regulation is entitled to deference, even without a clear statement of legislative intent, and that Ashcroft's interpretation of the CSA is reasonable. In the alternative, Gonzales argues that Ashcroft's interpretation is consistent with Congress's intent in passing the CSA and the 1984 Amendment. This case will decide the fate the Oregon statute by either expanding or limiting the federal government's authority over traditionally state-regulated medical practices. This case also has far-reaching moral and ethical implications that go beyond the scope of states' rights.

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