INTENT

Elonis v. United States

Issues

Does a conviction for threatening another person in interstate communications require proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten and, if not, does the First Amendment prevent a conviction based only on a showing that a reasonable person would regard the statement as threatening?

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address a circuit split on the question of whether the 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (“§ 875(c)”) requires a showing of subjective intent in order to convict and, if not, whether conviction based only on a showing that a reasonable person would regard the statement as threatening violates the First Amendment. In this case, Anthony D. Elonis was convicted for publishing a series of Facebook posts describing committing acts of violence towards various people in violation of § 875(c). Elonis contends that the government must offer proof of a subjective intent to threaten, and that his speech is protected by the First Amendment. The United States, however, argues that § 875(c) requires only proof of general intent and that threats as defined in § 875(c) should not receive First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case could affect free speech rights as well as the rights of those who are victims of threats.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

It is a federal crime to “transmit[] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing * * * any threat to injure the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Numerous states have adopted analogous crimes. The question presented is:

Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), conviction of threatening another person requires proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a “reasonable person” would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort.

IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: “Whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, conviction of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. §875(c) requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten.”

Anthony D. Elonis was indicted with five counts of making threats in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (“§ 875(c)”). United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 327 (3rd Cir. 2013). Section 875(c) provides that it shall be illegal to transmit “in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing . . .

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U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc.

Issues

Is a defendant’s subjective believe about the lawfulness of its conduct relevant to whether it “knowingly” violated the False Claims Act?

This case asks the Court to determine whether the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729, which punishes individuals who “knowingly present[], or cause[] to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,” applies if, regardless of their subjective belief about the lawfulness of their conduct, defendants’ conduct is consistent with an objectively reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute. The United States argues that, under common law and the FCA’s text, when individuals make arguments that they believe are false, they can be liable even if they did not definitively know they were lying. The United States further argues that individuals receiving government funds have a duty to ask for clarification and determine the proper law, and thus are liable for advancing false claims against the government. In opposition, SuperValu argues that an individual’s subjective belief is irrelevant under the FCA because interpretations of ambiguous statutes cannot be objectively verified; thus, an individual is not liable if the statute is ambiguous, and the individual’s interpretation is objectively reasonable. SuperValu also states that, because the FCA is a punitive statute, the burden is on the government to clarify the statute and give individuals notice. This case touches on issues of efficient government fraud prosecution, separation of powers, and Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether and when a defendant’s contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it “knowingly” violated the False Claims Act.

This case arises from the consolidation of two cases, United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. and United States ex rel. Proctor v. Safeway, Inc, which are factually similar and present an identical question of law. Both cases stem from the same question regarding the False Claims Act (FCA) as it relates to reimbursements under Medicare and Medicaid.

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