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False Claims Act

Allison Engine Co. v. United States

Issues

The False Claims Act has a number of subsections under which contractors may be found liable for defrauding the federal government. Contractors may be found liable under subsection (a)(1) only if someone presented a fraudulent bill to the federal government. Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) do not spell out the same  "presentment" requirement in explicit terms. Do these subsections still include a "presentment" requirement that there be proof that a false bill was sent to the government, or is it enough to show that the fraudulent bill was paid with federal funds?  

 

In 1985, the U.S. Navy contracted with two shipyards for the production of a new fleet of destroyers. Each destroyer required an electrical generator set to provide electricity. Several companies became involved in the project to build the generator sets. None of these companies billed the federal government, but rather billed the company directly above them in the chain of production. The company directly above them did not include these bills when submitting for payment from the government. This case began when two whistleblowers sued their former employer and other government subcontractors under the False Claims Act. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed their claim after holding that no FCA violation could occur without evidence that the federal government actually relied on a fraudulent bill. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the case should continue because the False Claims Act does not categorically require proof that the fraudulent bill was actually presented to the federal government. The ultimate decision by the Supreme Court could have important economic consequences for taxpayers, government contractors, and any party who seeks to file suit under the False Claims Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a plaintiff asserting a cause of action under Section 3729(a)(2) or Section 3729(a)(3) of the False Claims Act is required to prove that a false claim was submitted to the federal government, or whether it is sufficient to establish that the claim was paid using federal funds.

In 1863, Congress passed the False Claims Act ("FCA") to address problems associated with private contractors who had cheated the federal government throughout the Civil War. United States v. Allison Engine Co., 471 F.3d 610, 614 (6th Cir.

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Cochise Consultancy Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt

Issues

In a False Claims Act qui tam action in which the United States government does not intervene, under what circumstances may the relator rely on the statute of limitations set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2)?

This case asks whether relators can benefit from the longer of the False Claims Act’s two statutes of limitations. The False Claims Act (“FCA”) contains two statutes of limitations, and circuits are split as to whether both statutes of limitations apply to private individuals. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. and the Parsons Corporation contend that, based on a contextual interpretation of the FCA, only the Act’s six-year statute of limitations, from when the cause of action occurs, should apply to relators. Billy Joe Hunt, the relator in this suit, counters that the plain language of the statute permits relators to benefit from the FCA’s three-year statute of limitations, which begins when an official of the United States learns the materials facts of the action, even when the United States is not a party. This case will likely impact the number and costs of suits brought under the FCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a relator in a False Claims Act qui tam action may rely on the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2) in a suit in which the United States has declined to intervene and, if so, whether the relator constitutes an “official of the United States” for purposes of Section 3731(b)(2).

In 2006, Respondent Billy Joe Hunt worked for the Parsons Corporation (“Parsons”) in Iraq to fulfill Parson’s $60 million munitions clean-up contract with the Department of Defense. United States ex rel. Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. at 1083–84. Parsons sought bids from subcontractors and initially awarded a contract to ArmorGroup.

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Graham County Soil v. United States

Issues

Does the Federal Claims Act jurisdictional bar apply only to publicly disclosed federal reports, audits, and investigations, or does it apply to publicly disclosed state reports, audits, and investigations as well?

 

Respondent, the United States ex rel. Karen Wilson ("Wilson"), brought a qui tam action against two North Carolinian counties, Graham and Cherokee (collectively the “Counties”), for allegedly filing fraudulent reimbursement claims with the federal government. The Counties argue that, under the False Claims Act, no court has jurisdiction over Wilson's suit, because the State of North Carolina had previously publicly disclosed the information on which Wilson relies in her suit. Wilson counters that the False Claims Act’s public disclosure bar refers only to federal reports, audits, and investigations. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether, under the False Claims Act, a publicly disclosed state audit and investigation may preclude jurisdiction over a qui tam action.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an audit and investigation performed by a State or its political subdivision constitutes an “administrative . . . report . . . audit, or investigation” within the meaning of the public disclosure jurisdictional bar of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).

In February 1995, petitioners, Graham County and Cherokee County (collectively, the “Counties”), applied for federal assistance under the Emergency Watershed Protection Program (the "EWP Program"), a United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) federal disaster assistance program. See United States ex rel. Wilson v. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 528 F.3d 292, 296 (4th Cir.

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·      Legal Information Institute: Graham County Soil v. United States (I)

·      Wex: Law about False Claims Act

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Rockwell International Corp. v. U.S.

Issues

Did the Tenth Circuit incorrectly decide in favor of a whistleblower on the basis of a lenient construction of the False Claims Act’s definition of an “original source”?

 

The federal False Claims Act permits private citizens and company employees, known as relators, to bring suit in the name of the United States (known as a qui tam suit) against a corporation that has committed fraud against the government, and to share in any judgment thereon. James Stone, a former engineer for Rockwell International, brought a qui tam suit against Rockwell for environmental health and safety violations at the Rocky Flats weapons facility. However, Rockwell claimed that Stone was ineligible to bring suit because the knowledge he had was not sufficiently “direct and independent” to qualify him as an “original source” under the statute. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will resolve a split among the circuit courts regarding precisely what level of “direct and independent knowledge” a potential qui tam plaintiff must have to qualify as an original source. The Court’s decision will ultimately affect any business that contracts with the federal government or participates in government programs, and could make it either substantially easier or more difficult for potential whistleblowers to bring suit under the False Claims Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Tenth Circuit erred by affirming the entry of judgment in favor of a qui tam relator under the False Claims Act, based on a misinterpretation of the statutory definition of an “original source” set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)?

The Rocky Flats weapons production facility, near Denver, Colorado, manufactured plutonium triggers for nuclear weapons from 1953 to 1988. Between 1975 and 1989, Petitioner Rockwell International operated the site for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under a Management and Operating contract. See U.S. v.

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Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States, ex rel. Daniel Kirk

Issues

Under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), do FOIA responses produced by a federal agency qualify as publicly disclosed reports, which are barred from use in claims of fraud against the government under the False Claims Act?

 

Daniel Kirk, a Vietnam War veteran, filed a qui tam suit against Schindler Elevator Corporation ("Schindler"), alleging that Schindler violated the False Claims Act ("FCA") through its failure to comply with The Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustments Assistance Act ("VEVRAA"). Section 3730(e)(4) of the FCA expressly states that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over claims based upon “public disclosure of . . . administrative . . . report[s] . . . or investigation[s].” Kirk's FCA claim utilized information requested from the Department of Labor under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the case, holding that information obtained through a FOIA request constitutes a “report” or “investigation” under the FCA, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. In doing so, the Second Circuit rejected the Third Circuit’s method of focusing upon the dictionary definitions of “report” and “investigation” and instead adopted the Ninth Circuit’s method of considering the “nature of the [FOIA] document itself.” Schindler appealed, claiming that FOIA responses, by virtue of being produced by federal agencies, are "reports” or “investigations" and therefore fit the FCA public disclosure bar. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on whether a federal agency's FOIA disclosure is a "report" or "investigation" under Section 3730(e)(4).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal agency's response to a Freedom of Information Act request is a "report ... or investigation" within the meaning of the False Claims Act public disclosure bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4).

In 2004, Respondent Daniel Kirk filed a complaint with the Department of Labor ("DOL") against his former employer, Petitioner Schindler Elevator Corporation (“Schindler”), alleging that Schindler had violated the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act ("VEVRAA”). 

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State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. United States ex rel. Rigsby

Issues

What are the consequences of violating the False Claims Act’s seal requirement?

Cori and Kerri Rigsby sued State Farm Fire & Casualty Company under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), alleging that State Farm defrauded the federal government while paying out claims related to the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. The district court and the Fifth Circuit found that the Rigsbys’ attorney violated the FCA’s seal requirement by distributing documents to several news outlets, but declined to dismiss the Rigsbys’ suit after applying a three-part balancing test to evaluate whether dismissal was warranted. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over what standard governs the decision to dismiss a relator’s claim for violation of the FCA’s seal requirement. The United States, on behalf of the Rigsbys, points to the FCA’s test, structure, legislative history, and purpose, to argue that only discretionary sanctions apply to a violation of the seal requirement. State Farm maintains that a violation of the seal requirement must result in mandatory dismissal of the suit, rather than a discretionary balancing test. This decision may affect the prevalence of qui tam FCA suits and the government’s ability to recover from defrauding parties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

What standard governs the decision whether to dismiss a relator’s claim for violation of the False Claims Act’s seal requirement, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)?

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (“State Farm”) participated in the National Flood Insurance Program’s “Write Your Own” Program. See United States ex rel. Rigsby v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 794 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir. 2015). This program allows private insurance companies to offer government-backed flood insurance policies to geographic areas where it would otherwise not be economical to do so.

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U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc.

Issues

Is a defendant’s subjective believe about the lawfulness of its conduct relevant to whether it “knowingly” violated the False Claims Act?

This case asks the Court to determine whether the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729, which punishes individuals who “knowingly present[], or cause[] to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,” applies if, regardless of their subjective belief about the lawfulness of their conduct, defendants’ conduct is consistent with an objectively reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute. The United States argues that, under common law and the FCA’s text, when individuals make arguments that they believe are false, they can be liable even if they did not definitively know they were lying. The United States further argues that individuals receiving government funds have a duty to ask for clarification and determine the proper law, and thus are liable for advancing false claims against the government. In opposition, SuperValu argues that an individual’s subjective belief is irrelevant under the FCA because interpretations of ambiguous statutes cannot be objectively verified; thus, an individual is not liable if the statute is ambiguous, and the individual’s interpretation is objectively reasonable. SuperValu also states that, because the FCA is a punitive statute, the burden is on the government to clarify the statute and give individuals notice. This case touches on issues of efficient government fraud prosecution, separation of powers, and Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether and when a defendant’s contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it “knowingly” violated the False Claims Act.

This case arises from the consolidation of two cases, United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. and United States ex rel. Proctor v. Safeway, Inc, which are factually similar and present an identical question of law. Both cases stem from the same question regarding the False Claims Act (FCA) as it relates to reimbursements under Medicare and Medicaid.

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U.S., Ex Rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York

Issues

If the United States decides not to intervene when a party files a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, should the party be allowed a 60-day time limit to file its notice of appeal because the United States is technically a party, or should they be subject to the standard 30-day time limit?

 

Fifty-four days after the Southern District of New York dismissed Irwin Eisenstein's qui tam action against the City of New York, Eisenstein filed a notice of appeal with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Second Circuit asked the parties to brief whether the notice of appeal was timely filed. According to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, parties only have 30 days to file a notice of appeal, and this will be extended to 60 days when the United States is a party.  Eisenstein claimed that, even though the United States declined to intervene, it was a "real party of interest" and therefore he was entitled to the 60 day limit. The City of New York conceded that, while the United States was a "party of interest", they were not a party for the purpose of measuring the timeline on appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the relator in a qui tam action is entitled to the extended 60 day time limit for appeal when the United States chooses not to intervene in the action.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the 30-day time limit in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) for filing a notice of appeal, or the 60-day time limit in Rule 4(a)(1)(B), applies to a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, where the United States has declined to intervene in that action.

    Eisenstein's Underlying Complaint

    Irwin Eisenstein was an employee of the City of New York ("the City"), and during his employment he lived in both New Jersey and the City. See U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v.

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    United States, ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc.

    Issues

    Does the government have the authority to dismiss a qui tam action brought under the False Claims Act after declining to proceed with the action at the outset; and, if so, what showing must it make to have the action dismissed?

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the government may dismiss a qui tam action over the objections of the relator when the government chooses not to proceed with the action at the outset. Jesse Polansky argues that the text, structure, history, and purpose of the False Claims Act indicate that when the government chooses not to pursue an action at the outset of a case, the relator has the exclusive right to decide whether to proceed with an action or request its dismissal. Polansky maintains that the government cannot retain its right to dismiss after it declines to proceed at the outset. Executive Health Resources, Inc. counters that the False Claims Act allows the government to dismiss a qui tam action at any time because the Constitution vests executive power in the President. Executive Health Resources contends that delegating executive power to relators, as Polansky suggests, would be unconstitutional. The case has significant policy implications because litigating qui tam actions is costly for all parties involved, and a ruling for unrestricted governmental dismissal authority could chill relators from bringing future qui tam actions, whereas a ruling for limited government dismissal authority could burden the government with meritless qui tam actions.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the government has authority to dismiss a False Claims Act suit after initially declining to proceed with the action, and what standard applies if the government has that authority.

    Respondent Executive Health Resources, Inc. (“EHR”) is a “physician advisor” company that certifies health care services as having been properly billed for Medicare reimbursement. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res. at 380–81.

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    Universal Health Services, Inc. v. Escobar

    Issues

    Should the scope of the False Claims Act be expanded to include noncompliance of staffing regulations?  

     

    The U.S. Supreme Court will consider whether the False Claims Act (“FCA”) applies to fraudulent misrepresentation in payment claims due to violations of staffing regulations for medical centers. Petitioner Universal Health Services argues that the basis for liability stemming from the FCA does not allow for the implied certification theory, under which liability may be based on merely filing for payment, and thus should merit reversal of the judgment below. On the other hand, respondent Escobar contends that UHS knowingly and materially committed fraud under the FCA provisions notwithstanding the absence of an express fraudulent statement. This case will determine whether businesses that provide services to the government will be subject to FCA liability and will establish the range of remedies available to qui tam litigants under the FCA.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    1. Is the “implied certification” theory of legal falsity under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., viable?
    2. If the “implied certification” theory is viable, can a government contractor’s reimbursement claim be legally false under that theory if the provider failed to comply with a statute, regulation, or contractual provision that does not state that it is a condition of payment; or does liability for a legally false reimbursement claim require that the statute, regulation, or contractual provision expressly state that it is a condition of payment?

    Yarushka Rivera (“Rivera”), the daughter of relators Carmen Correa and Julio Escobar (“Escobar”), was a member of MassHealth, Massachusetts’ Medicaid program, and in 2007 received mental health support at Arbour Counseling Services (“Arbour”), which was owned and operated by petitioner Universal Health Services (“UHS”). See 

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