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Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., et al.

Issues

Must a judge recuse himself in a case where a substantial campaign contributor is a party?

 

The judge, aloof in his black robes, sits as the incarnation of the nation's courts and of the ideals those courts are meant to embody: impartiality, fairness, and, above all, justice.  However, judges are also human and liable to err; as such, they are themselves judged by those involved in or reporting on legal proceedings. Consequently, the avoidance of bias, apparent or otherwise, has been a matter of concern for those regulating the courts-chiefly the judges themselves. While a judge may well be able to administer justice even when a personal bias exists, the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires judges and tribunals to avoid even the mere appearance of bias. This case concerns an elected justice-that is, a judge sitting on the highest court of a state judicial system-who remained at the bench to administer a case involving a company whose CEO had contributed substantially to that justice's election campaign. Petitioner Hugh M. Caperton argues that this individual, Justice Brent Benjamin, ought to have recused himself and not administered the trial because of the appearance of bias, especially as he was the deciding figure in this case. Conversely, Respondent Massey Coal Co. contends that Justice Benjamin was in compliance with due process and that he stood to gain nothing from the outcome of the trial. This case offers the Supreme Court the opportunity to set the standards by which judges will be required to recuse themselves from cases involving apparent bias.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Justice Brent Benjamin of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia refused to recuse himself from the appeal of the $50 million jury verdict in this case, even though the CEO of the lead defendant spent $3 million supporting his campaign for a seat on the court--more than 60% of the total amount spent to support Justice Benjamin's campaign-- while preparing to appeal the verdict against his company. After winning election to the court, Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote in the court's 3-2 decision overturning that verdict. The question presented is whether Justice Benjamin's failure to recuse himself from participation in his principal financial supporter's case violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    In 1998 the Petitioners, Hugh M. Caperton, Harman Development Corporation, Harman Mining Corporation, and Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc. sued Respondent A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc. and several affiliated companies to recover damages in the Circuit Court of Boone County, West VirginiaSee Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., No. 33350, 2008 WL918444 at *4 (W. Va.

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    New York State Board of Elections v. Torres

    Issues

    Does New York's system of selecting judicial nominees violate the First Amendment rights of the candidates and their supporters, and if so, did the District Court violate the principals of judicial restraint and respect for legislative intent by ordering that judicial nominations be determined by primary?

     

    Margarita Lopez Torres, nine other judicial candidates, and voters sued the New York State Board of Elections in federal court, claiming that state election laws regulating judicial elections violated the First Amendment rights of party members and candidates. Torres claimed that the state-mandated system by which parties elect nominees makes it impossible, in practice, for candidates without party backing to gain access to the party nomination ballot. In particular, Torres argued that the system enables party leaders to exert control over the nomination process, creating an environment ripe for abuse of judicial independence. As an example of such abuses, Torres offered her experiences as a judicial candidate: despite enjoying popular support in civil court elections, she failed in multiple district elections to receive the nomination of her party after refusing to follow the demands of party leaders.

    After reviewing evidence of the lack of competitive elections and the difficulty of gaining access to the nomination ballot without party support, the Eastern District of New York agreed that New York's election laws violated the First Amendment associational rights of voters and candidates. The district granted a preliminary injunction mandating primary elections for party voters to select candidates. The Second Circuit affirmed, ruling that the District Court had acted within its discretion. The New York State Board of Elections ("New York State Board") now appeals, arguing that political parties' First Amendment rights are infringed by the lower courts' holding. The New York State Board further argues that the district court's remedy violates the First Amendment rights of political parties to control their intra-party nomination process. At issue in this case are the competing First Amendment rights of party members, candidates, and political parties during a party's candidate selection process. The Supreme Court decision will better define the scope of these rights in a unique situation: an intra-party nomination convention that is mandated and closely regulated by state law.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    1. In American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974), this Court held that it is "too plain for argument" that a State may require intra-party competition to be resolved either by convention or primary. Did the Second Circuit run afoul of White by mandating a primary in lieu of a party convention for the nomination of candidates for New York state trial judge?

    2. What is the appropriate scope of First Amendment rights of voters and candidates within the arena of intra-party competition, and particularly where the State has chosen a party convention instead of a primary as the nominating process?

    (a) Did the Second Circuit err, as a threshold matter, in applying this Court's decision in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) and related ballot access cases, which were concerned with the dangers of "freezing out" minor party and non-party candidates, to internal party contests?

    (b) If Storer does apply, did the Second Circuit run afoul of Storer in holding that voters and candidates are entitled to a "realistic opportunity to participate" in the party's nomination process as measured by whether a "challenger candidate" could compete effectively against the party-backed candidate?

    3. In Bachur v. Democratic National Party, 836 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987) and Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) the Fourth and D.C. Circuits applied a rational basis balancing test to weigh the coequal, but competing First Amendment rights of political parties in setting delegate selection rules against those of voters and candidates. Did the Second Circuit err in preferring the First Amendment rights of voters and candidates by first determining that New York's convention system severely burdened those rights and then subjecting the party's rights to strict scrutiny review?

    One Judicial Candidate's Electoral Experience

    During her tenure, New York civil court judge Margarita L�pez Torres refused to hire individuals recommended to her by local Democratic party leaders. Brief for Margarita L�pez Torres et al., at 12-13 ("Brief for Torres"). Party leaders explicitly told her that her refusal would have consequences if she ran for Supreme Court Justice, essentially stating that party leaders controlled the nomination process.&

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