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recusal

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., et al.

Issues

Must a judge recuse himself in a case where a substantial campaign contributor is a party?

 

The judge, aloof in his black robes, sits as the incarnation of the nation's courts and of the ideals those courts are meant to embody: impartiality, fairness, and, above all, justice.  However, judges are also human and liable to err; as such, they are themselves judged by those involved in or reporting on legal proceedings. Consequently, the avoidance of bias, apparent or otherwise, has been a matter of concern for those regulating the courts-chiefly the judges themselves. While a judge may well be able to administer justice even when a personal bias exists, the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires judges and tribunals to avoid even the mere appearance of bias. This case concerns an elected justice-that is, a judge sitting on the highest court of a state judicial system-who remained at the bench to administer a case involving a company whose CEO had contributed substantially to that justice's election campaign. Petitioner Hugh M. Caperton argues that this individual, Justice Brent Benjamin, ought to have recused himself and not administered the trial because of the appearance of bias, especially as he was the deciding figure in this case. Conversely, Respondent Massey Coal Co. contends that Justice Benjamin was in compliance with due process and that he stood to gain nothing from the outcome of the trial. This case offers the Supreme Court the opportunity to set the standards by which judges will be required to recuse themselves from cases involving apparent bias.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Justice Brent Benjamin of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia refused to recuse himself from the appeal of the $50 million jury verdict in this case, even though the CEO of the lead defendant spent $3 million supporting his campaign for a seat on the court--more than 60% of the total amount spent to support Justice Benjamin's campaign-- while preparing to appeal the verdict against his company. After winning election to the court, Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote in the court's 3-2 decision overturning that verdict. The question presented is whether Justice Benjamin's failure to recuse himself from participation in his principal financial supporter's case violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    In 1998 the Petitioners, Hugh M. Caperton, Harman Development Corporation, Harman Mining Corporation, and Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc. sued Respondent A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc. and several affiliated companies to recover damages in the Circuit Court of Boone County, West VirginiaSee Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., No. 33350, 2008 WL918444 at *4 (W. Va.

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    Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan

    Issues

    What level of scrutiny should a reviewing court apply to a state’s ethics provision regarding when an elected official must recuse himself from a vote?

    Court below

     

    The Nevada Commission on Ethics (“Commission”) censured Michael Carrigan, a city council member, for voting to issue a permit to a company employing his friend and campaign manager as a consultant. The Commission alleges that Carrigan violated a catch-all recusal provision requiring an official to disqualify himself when faced with a personal interest in a matter “substantially similar” to several enumerated interests. Carrigan argues that the provision is an impermissible burden on his First Amendment rights of expression and association and must be subject to strict scrutiny. The Commission contends that any infringement on the First Amendment is incidental, and therefore the United States Supreme Court should eschew strict scrutiny in favor of a lower standard of review. The Supreme Court of Nevada applied strict scrutiny and struck down the provision as unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court’s decision could affect the level of scrutiny at which recusal provisions are reviewed nationwide and the freedom of states to establish independent legislator voting restrictions.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the First Amendment subjects state restrictions on voting by elected officials to (i) strict scrutiny, as held by the Nevada Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit, (ii) the balancing test of Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), for government-employee speech, as held by the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits, or (iii) rational-basis review, as held by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits.

    In 1999, Respondent Michael Carrigan was elected to the Sparks City Council and has since been re-elected twice. See Carrigan v.

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    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

    Additional Resources

    • New York Times, Adam Liptak: Justices to Hear Case on Recusal Laws (Jan. 7, 2011)

    • First Amendment Center, David L. Hudson, Jr.: Garcetti Would Be Unwelcome Element in Nevada Case (Jan. 11, 2011)

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    Williams v. Pennsylvania

    Issues

    Do the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require an appellate judge’s recusal in a capital punishment appeal when the judge, previously a district attorney, oversaw the office that prosecuted the same case?

     

    In 1984, Terrance Williams was sentenced to death for the murder of Amos Norwood. After successfully receiving post-conviction sentencing relief in 2012, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed and reinstated Williams’ sentence. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require the recusal of an appellate judge—here Pennsylvania Chief Justice Ronald Castille—from participation in a capital punishment appeal when the judge led the District Attorney’s Office that prosecuted the same case. Williams argues that due process compels recusal, given the risk of potential bias and partiality that may taint both the judge’s decision-making and the reviewing tribunal’s impartiality. However, Pennsylvania argues that Justice Castille’s recusal was not constitutionally required under the Court’s holding in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), nor was his presence on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This case will impact an appellate judge’s ability to make discretionary determinations regarding his or her own recusal.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    1. Whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments violated where the presiding Chief Justice of a state supreme court declines to recuse himself in a capital case where he had personally approved the decision to pursue capital punishment against Petitioner in his prior capacity as elected District Attorney and continued to head the District Attorney’s office that defended the death verdict on appeal; where, in his state supreme court election campaign, the Chief Justice expressed strong support for capital punishment, with reference to the number of defendants he had “sent” to death row, including Petitioner; and where he then, as Chief Justice, reviewed a ruling by the state post-conviction court that his office committed prosecutorial misconduct under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when it prosecuted and sought death against Petitioner?
    2. Whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments violated by the participation of a potentially biased jurist on a multimember tribunal deciding a capital case, regardless of whether his vote is ultimately decisive?

    On June 11, 1984, Terrance Williams and Marc Draper robbed and murdered Amos Norwood.  See Brief for Petitioner at 4.  The Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, under the leadership of then-District Attorney Ronald Castille, prosecuted the defendants.  

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