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Miranda warnings

Florida v. Powell

Issues

Must police officers expressly advise a suspect of his or her right to an attorney during questioning?

Court below

 

Kevin Powell was arrested on suspicion of illegally owning a firearm and, after allegedly waiving his rights to counsel as required by Miranda v. Arizona, confessed during questioning. Powell was convicted on the basis of that confession. On appeal, Powell's conviction was overturned on the ground that the warnings read to Powell failed to adequately inform him of his right to have an attorney present during questioning. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a suspect must be expressly advised of his or her right to have an attorney present while he or she is being questioned. The Supreme Court's decision will clarify Miranda’s requirements regarding advising a suspect of his or her right to counsel during questioning. This case will resolve a circuit split on the issue and affect law enforcement practices during interrogations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the decision of the Florida Supreme Court holding that a suspect may be expressly advised of his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, conflicts with Miranda v. Arizona and decisions of federal and state appellate courts.

(2) And if so, does the failure to provide express advice of the right to the presence of counsel during questioning vitiate Miranda warnings which advise of both (a) the right to talk to a lawyer “before questioning” and (b) the “right to use” the right to consult a lawyer “at any time” during questioning?

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Additional Resources

· Annotated U.S. Constitution: Fifth Amendment

· Stephen Brunette, Miranda Warning Under Scrutiny, Brunette Law Blogs (Jan. 29, 2009)

· Crawford, Kimberly A. Constitutional Rights to Counsel During Interrogation: Comparing Rights Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 71 The FBI Law Enforcement Bull. 28 (2002)

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Howes v. Fields

Issues

Did the state court violate clearly established Supreme Court precedent, and thereby provide grounds for granting a petition for habeas corpus, by admitting statements Fields made without the benefit of Miranda warnings, while he was sequestered from the general prison population and questioned?

 

While Randall Fields was incarcerated, officers unaffiliated with the prison questioned him regarding activities unrelated to his incarceration. Fields made incriminating statements to the officers, and was convicted after these statements were admitted into evidence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted Fields' petition for habeas corpus relief, holding that the state court decision was in conflict with clearly established Supreme Court precedent forbidding the admission of statements made without the protection of Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a prisoner is "in custody," and thus entitled to Miranda protections, any time the prisoner is separated from the general prison population and questioned. Petitioning Warden Carol Howes contends that habeas should not be granted because the state court’s decision is not in conflict with any clearly established precedent of the Supreme Court. In contrast, Respondent Fields argues that there is a clearly established rule granting Miranda protection to prisoners anytime they are isolated and questioned. Howes maintains that recognizing a Supreme Court precedent requiring Miranda rights to be issued any time a prisoner is questioned will grant prisoners greater protections than those given to ordinary citizens. Fields counters that requiring officers to issue Miranda warnings is essential to protecting prisoners’ Fifth Amendment rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether this Court's clearly established precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 holds that a prisoner is always "in custody" for purposes of Miranda any time that prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct occurring outside the prison regardless of the surrounding circumstances.

On December 23, 2001, prison officials removed Respondent Randall Fields, who was incarcerated for disorderly conduct, from his cell and brought him to a conference room. See Fields v. Howe, 617 F.3d 813, 815 (6th Cir.

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J.D.B. v. North Carolina

Issues

Does the age of an individual questioned by police affect whether that individual is in custody and must receive Miranda warnings?

 

Petitioner J.D.B. was a thirteen-year-old boy suspected of being involved in two break-ins. The police questioned him while he was at school without giving him a Miranda warning, and J.D.B. made incriminating statements. At his trial, J.D.B. moved to suppress those statements, arguing that he had been subjected to custodial interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona. Specifically, J.D.B. argued that a court should take account of his age when determining whether he was in custody. The North Carolina trial court and appellate courts all held that J.D.B. was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and allowed the statements into evidence. J.D.B. was convicted, placed on 12 months’ probation, and ordered to pay restitution. J.D.B. appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that age should be a factor in determining whether he was in custody for Miranda purposes. North Carolina contends that age is a subjective factor and should not be part of the objective custody inquiry. This case will determine what personal characteristics should be considered when determining whether a subject is in custody, and, therefore, whether a Miranda warning is necessary prior to questioning.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a court may consider a juvenile's age in a Miranda custody analysis in evaluating the totality of the circumstances and determining whether a reasonable person in the juvenile's position would have felt he or she was not free to terminate police questioning and leave?

On September 24, 2005, police spotted and interviewed Petitioner J.D.B. in the vicinity of two break-ins in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. See In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 136 (N.C.

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Additional Resources

· Education Week, Mark Walsh: High Court to Weigh Miranda Rights of Juveniles at School (Nov. 1, 2010)

· All Business, Kimberly Atkins: U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Miranda Age Factor (Nov. 1, 2010)

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Salinas v. Texas

Police in Houston, Texas questioned Genovevo Salinas in 1992 during a murder investigation. Salinas answered all of their questions until the police asked whether he thought that casings found at the murder scene would match the shotgun the police found in his house. In response, Salinas remained silent. Later, he was charged with murder, tried, and convicted partially on the basis of evidence that he had remained silent during police questioning before he was arrested and given his Miranda warnings. Salinas claims that the Texas trial court should not have admitted evidence of his silence because of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He argues that allowing evidence of his silence would violate the Fifth Amendment by forcing him to speak or have his silence used against him. The State of Texas argues that the evidence was appropriately admitted and outside the protection of Fifth Amendment privilege because Salinas’s silence was non-testimonial and the police questioning was non-coercive. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine the scope of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and, more specifically, whether it extends to the protection of a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda statements to the police.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether or under what circumstances the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause protects a defendant’s refusal to answer law enforcement questioning before he has been arrested or read his Miranda rights.

Issue

Do prosecutors violate an accused criminal’s Fifth Amendment’s right against forced self-incrimination when they use evidence of his silence against him even when the evidence comes from questioning conducted before he was taken into police custody?

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Vega v. Tekoh

Issues

Can a person bring a claim for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon a police officer’s failure to provide a Miranda warning? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a hospital employee, who was not given a Miranda warning by a deputy before he confessed to assaulting a patient, may sue the individual officer for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioner Deputy Carlos Vega contends that he did not violate Terence Tekoh’s Fifth Amendment rights because a Miranda violation is not a de facto constitutional violation. Thus, Vega asserts that Tekoh has failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Respondent Terence Tekoh counters that Supreme Court precedent has established a constitutional requirement for police officers to issue Miranda warnings. Therefore, Tekoh argues a prosecutor’s introduction of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda establishes a constitutional violation redressable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for public safety and the protection of constitutional rights. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a plaintiff may state a claim for relief against a law enforcement officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based simply on an officer’s failure to provide the warnings prescribed in Miranda v. Arizona

On March 14, 2014, a patient at Los Angeles County/USC Medical Center accused hospital orderly Terence Tekoh (“Tekoh”) of sexual assault. Brief for Petitioner, Carlos Vega at 5. Deputy Carlos Vega (“Vega”) responded to investigate. Tekoh v. Cnty.

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