self-incrimination

City of Hays v. Vogt

Issues

Does the prosecution’s use of allegedly compelled statements at a pretrial hearing, not at a criminal trial, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause?

This case asks the Supreme Court to review the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, particularly the clause’s applicability to probable cause hearings. Petitioner, the City of Hays, argues that the privilege against self-incrimination applies only during a criminal trial and that they should therefore not be civilly liable for the introduction of an incriminatory statement during a pretrial hearing. Respondent Matthew Vogt contends that his Fifth Amendment right applies to an entire “criminal case,” which includes pretrial proceedings. This case may resolve questions about the scope of defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights, as well as issues relating to judicial efficiency and internal workplace investigations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Fifth Amendment is violated when allegedly compelled statements are used at a probable cause hearing but not at a criminal trial.

In 2013, Matthew Vogt, a police officer in the City of Hays, Kansas, applied for a new position with the City of Haysville’s police department. See Vogt v. City of Hays, Kansas, 844 F.3d 1235, 1238 (10th Cir. 2017). In his application to the City of Haysville police department, Vogt acknowledged that he had kept a knife which he had obtained while working as a Hays police officer. See id.

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Florida v. Powell

Issues

Must police officers expressly advise a suspect of his or her right to an attorney during questioning?

Court below

 

Kevin Powell was arrested on suspicion of illegally owning a firearm and, after allegedly waiving his rights to counsel as required by Miranda v. Arizona, confessed during questioning. Powell was convicted on the basis of that confession. On appeal, Powell's conviction was overturned on the ground that the warnings read to Powell failed to adequately inform him of his right to have an attorney present during questioning. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a suspect must be expressly advised of his or her right to have an attorney present while he or she is being questioned. The Supreme Court's decision will clarify Miranda’s requirements regarding advising a suspect of his or her right to counsel during questioning. This case will resolve a circuit split on the issue and affect law enforcement practices during interrogations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the decision of the Florida Supreme Court holding that a suspect may be expressly advised of his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, conflicts with Miranda v. Arizona and decisions of federal and state appellate courts.

(2) And if so, does the failure to provide express advice of the right to the presence of counsel during questioning vitiate Miranda warnings which advise of both (a) the right to talk to a lawyer “before questioning” and (b) the “right to use” the right to consult a lawyer “at any time” during questioning?

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Additional Resources

· Annotated U.S. Constitution: Fifth Amendment

· Stephen Brunette, Miranda Warning Under Scrutiny, Brunette Law Blogs (Jan. 29, 2009)

· Crawford, Kimberly A. Constitutional Rights to Counsel During Interrogation: Comparing Rights Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 71 The FBI Law Enforcement Bull. 28 (2002)

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Maryland v. Shatzer

Issues

Is a confession made by a criminal defendant more than two years and six months after invoking his or her Fifth Amendment right to counsel admissible in court?

 

In 2003, Michael Shatzer (“Shatzer”), an inmate at the Maryland Correctional Institution, invoked his Miranda rights, refusing to speak about alleged sexual child abuse without an attorney present. The investigation into Shatzer’s alleged sexual child abuse was closed later that year. In 2006, upon further evidence, the police opened a new investigation on the same matter and re-interrogated Shatzer, who had remained incarcerated for an unrelated offense during the entire interval. Shatzer waived his Miranda rights and made certain admissions. At trial, Shatzer moved to suppress the statements he made in 2006, arguing that the police’s re-interrogation violated the Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arizona, which held that, once a suspect requests counsel, the police and/or prosecutor may not subject that suspect to further interrogations until counsel is made available. Maryland argues that this presumption does not apply here due to (1) a break in police custody and (2) a substantial passage of time between Shatzer’s request for counsel and the subsequent interrogation. The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with Shatzer, holding that the Circuit Court for Washington County erred by admitting Shatzer’s statements. The Supreme Court’s decision will likely impact the manner in which the police and prosecutors approach and interview suspects who have invoked their right to counsel.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Is the Edwards v. Arizona prohibition against interrogation of a suspect who has invoked the Fifth Amendment right to counsel inapplicable if, after the suspect asks for counsel, there is a break in custody or a substantial lapse in time (more than two years and six months) before commencing reinterrogation pursuant to Miranda?

In 2003, the Hagerstown Police Department (“Police Department”) began investigating Respondent, Michael Shatzer (“Shatzer”), for alleged sexual abuse of his three-year-old son. See Shatzer v. Maryland, 954 A.2d 1118, 1120 (Md. Ct. App.

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Salinas v. Texas

Police in Houston, Texas questioned Genovevo Salinas in 1992 during a murder investigation. Salinas answered all of their questions until the police asked whether he thought that casings found at the murder scene would match the shotgun the police found in his house. In response, Salinas remained silent. Later, he was charged with murder, tried, and convicted partially on the basis of evidence that he had remained silent during police questioning before he was arrested and given his Miranda warnings. Salinas claims that the Texas trial court should not have admitted evidence of his silence because of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He argues that allowing evidence of his silence would violate the Fifth Amendment by forcing him to speak or have his silence used against him. The State of Texas argues that the evidence was appropriately admitted and outside the protection of Fifth Amendment privilege because Salinas’s silence was non-testimonial and the police questioning was non-coercive. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine the scope of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and, more specifically, whether it extends to the protection of a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda statements to the police.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether or under what circumstances the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause protects a defendant’s refusal to answer law enforcement questioning before he has been arrested or read his Miranda rights.

Issue

Do prosecutors violate an accused criminal’s Fifth Amendment’s right against forced self-incrimination when they use evidence of his silence against him even when the evidence comes from questioning conducted before he was taken into police custody?

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self-incrimination

Self-incrimination is the intentional or unintentional act of providing information that will suggest your involvement in a crime, or expose you to criminal prosecution.

White v. Woodall

Issues

Does a trial court’s rejection of a non-testifying defendant’s request for a no-adverse-influence instruction during the sentencing phase of a capital punishment trial violate that defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when the defendant has pled guilty to all of the alleged crimes and aggravating circumstances?

Robert Keith Woodall pled guilty to the murder, rape, and kidnapping of a sixteen-year-old victim. At the penalty phase, Woodall put on fourteen witnesses but did not himself testify. The trial court rejected his request for a no-adverse-inference jury instruction regarding his decision not to testify. The jury recommended the death penalty, and the trial court accepted this recommendation. After exhausting state court avenues, Woodall filed for and received habeas corpus relief from a federal district court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the trial court violated Woodall’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by rejecting his request for a no-adverse-inference jury instruction. In this case, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to consider whether the rejection of a request for a no-adverse-inference at the penalty phase of a trial, even where the defendant has pled guilty to all charged crimes, violates the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. This case will impact the rights of criminal defendants charged with capital crimes and will clarify prior Supreme Court precedent. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Robert Keith Woodall, amidst overwhelming evidence of his guilt, pled guilty to kidnapping, raping, and murdering a 16-year-old child, and thus pled guilty to all aggravating circumstances. At the penalty phase trial, the prosecutor elected to present evidence of guilt and the circumstances of the crimes. Woodall did not testify; and his request that the jury be instructed not to draw any adverse inference from his decision not to testify (a "no adverse inference instruction") was denied. He was sentenced to death by a Kentucky jury. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. 

Even though this Court has never held that a defendant is entitled to a no adverse inference instruction at the sentencing phase of a trial where the defendant has pled guilty to the offense and all aggravating circumstances, the Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief to Woodall on the ground that the trial court's failure to provide such an instruction violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The questions presented are: 

  1. Whether the Sixth Circuit, violated 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) by granting habeas relief on the trial court's failure to provide a no adverse inference instruction even though this Court has not "clearly established" that such an instruction is required in a capital penalty phase when a non-testifying defendant has pled guilty to the crimes and aggravating circumstances. 
  2. Whether the Sixth Circuit violated the harmless error standard in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), in ruling that the absence of a no adverse inference instruction was not harmless in spite of overwhelming evidence of guilt and in the face of a guilty plea to the crimes and aggravators.

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Facts

A grand jury indicted Respondent Robert Keith Woodall for the murder, kidnapping, and rape of a sixteen-year-old female victim, and Woodall pled guilty in Kentucky state court to all of the charges and aggravating circumstances.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John H. Blume of Cornell Law School for his insights into this case.

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