In civil cases, damages are the remedy that a party requests the court award in order to try to make the injured party whole. Typically damage awards are in the form of monetary compensation to the harmed party. Damages are imposed if the court finds that a party breached a duty under contract or violated some right.
Whether the term “appropriate relief” as provided in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act should be interpreted to include monetary damages or instead should be interpreted to include only injunctive and declaratory relief?
Harvey Leroy Sossamon, III is an inmate at a Texas state prison. The prison warden refused to allow cell-restricted inmates to attend religious services and denied all inmates use of the prison chapel for religious purposes. In 2006, Sossamon filed suit against the State of Texas and various state and prison officials, alleging that the Texas prison violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). Sossamon sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Texas, holding that Texas has sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment and is not liable for damages. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Sossamon argues here that the words “appropriate relief,” as provided by RLUIPA, unambiguously waives the state's immunity from damages. Texas counters that “appropriate relief” does not amount to clear notice which is required before a state may waive its sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine the protection afforded to states under RLUIPA and may deter states from implementing policies which violate the Act.
Whether an individual may sue a state or state official in his official capacity for damages for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000cc et seq. (2000 ed.).
Petitioner Harvey Leroy Sossamon, III has been an inmate of the Robertson Unit of the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice since 2002. See Brief of Respondents, Texas et al.
· Department of Justice: Report on the Tenth Anniversary of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
· Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Derek Gaubatz: RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions
1. Can a court certify a class action lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) where the class action members bring claims for back pay?
2. Does the class defined by the district court meet all the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)?
Respondent Betty Dukes and other women have brought a Title VII employment discrimination case against Petitioner Wal-Mart Stores. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California certified a class action comprised of all women employed at any Wal-Mart store since December 26, 1998 who may have been or will be subjected to Wal-Mart’s allegedly discriminatory practices and policies. Wal-Mart appealed, challenging the class certification, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. Wal-Mart now appeals to the Supreme Court, arguing that the class certification does not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). Wal-Mart also claims that class certification was improper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) because the employees primarily seek monetary compensation in the form of back pay, and Rule 23(b)(2) does not authorize certification of claims seeking monetary relief. On the other hand, the employees assert that they meet the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) because all female employees face the same Wal-Mart policies and share the common issue of discriminatory treatment under those policies. The employees further argue that class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2) are not precluded from seeking monetary relief, and deny that back pay is a form of monetary compensation. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect the evidence required to bring an employment discrimination class action suit, the relief available to plaintiffs in a class action, and employers’ willingness to settle to avoid liability in class actions.
1. Whether claims for monetary relief can be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) - which by its terms is limited to injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief - and, if so, under what circumstances.
2. Whether the class certification ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with Rule 23(a).
Petitioner Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. opened its first store in Rogers, Arkansas in 1962. See Walmart.com, About Us. The company now boasts nearly 9,000 retail locations in 15 countries and employs over two million people. See id.
· Wex: Class Actions
· N.Y. Times, Adam Liptak and Steven Greenhouse: Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Wal-Mart Appeal (Dec. 6, 2010)
· Summary Judgments, Michael Waterstone: The Future of Employment Discrimination Class Actions (Jan. 10, 2011)
