OMISSION

Delligatti v. United States

Issues

Is attempted murder a crime of violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether one can commit attempted murder without using, attempting to use, or threatening to use physical force against another person or their property. If no, attempted murder is a “crime of violence” and can serve as the basis for sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); if yes, it cannot—regardless of whether an individual defendant actually used physical force against another person. Salvatore Delligatti, who was convicted of attempted murder and seeks to challenge the enhancement of his sentence for that offense, argues that attempted murder does not inherently involve the action of using physical force because even completed murder can be committed through inaction. The United States counters that intentionally causing the death of another person, even through inaction, inherently involves the use of whatever physical force causes that other person’s death. The outcome of this case will determine the continued viability of Congress’s four-decade-old mechanism to crack down on gun violence, the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

The federal criminal code provides for heightened minimum sentences when someone uses or possesses a firearm “in relation to any crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). That same section defines a “crime of violence” as a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C.

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Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P.

Issues

Can investors bring a private claim of action against an issuer under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act based on the omission of information required under Item 303 of Regulation S-K when the omitted information is not accompanied by a misleading statement?

This case asks the court to determine whether investors may bring a private claim against an issuer under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for an omission without an associated misleading statement, known as a “pure omission,” based on the disclosure requirements set by Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K. Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation argues that investors cannot bring a private claim for a pure omission because the text and statutory context of § 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Item 303 do not support such claims. In opposition, Moab Partners, L.P. argues that investors may bring a private claim for a pure omission because Supreme Court precedent and statutes comparable to § 10(b) indicate that investors may bring such claims. This case touches on important questions regarding disclosure requirements, issuer liability for omissions, and the suitability of enforcement of securities regulations through private lawsuits.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit erred in holding that a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K can support a private claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even in the absence of an otherwise misleading statement.  

Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation (“Macquarie”) is a publicly traded holding company managed by MIMUSA, with several subsidiaries. City of Riviera Beach Gen. Emples. Ret. Sys. v.

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