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TEXTUALISM

Cunningham v. Cornell University

Issues

Must a plan fiduciary establish that services were necessary and paid for at a reasonable cost as an affirmative defense to a 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) prohibited transaction claim, or must a plaintiff plead and prove that services were unnecessary or unreasonably costly as an element of their prohibited transaction claim? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether an employee can state a claim that their employer violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) by alleging that the employer had third parties such as accountants, auditors, and financial managers provide services for their employee retirement plan. If yes, the burden of proof lies on employer defendants to establish that such services were necessary for the operation of the plan and paid for at reasonable cost if they wish to avoid liability. If no, a plaintiff alleging only that a prohibited transaction was entered into cannot survive a motion to dismiss. Casey Cunningham and other Cornell University Employees (“Cunningham”) stress that § 1106(a)(1)(C) of ERISA prohibits all transactions between plan fiduciaries such as employers and parties in interest such as service providers, regardless of whether other sections of ERISA create exemptions, so a plaintiff should not have to plead anything more than that such a prohibited transaction took place — at least to state a claim and survive a motion to dismiss. Cornell counters that common sense and other sections of ERISA — one of which § 1106(a) itself refers to — show that ERISA cannot mean even to presumptively prohibit transactions between plan fiduciaries such as employers and service providers such as accountants, auditors, and financial managers. The outcome of this case will resolve a split between the Courts of Appeals and determine how easily employee beneficiaries of retirement plans will be able to sue their employers for suspected mismanagement of those plans.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision’s text.

Editor’s Note: The staff of the Legal Information Institute, including the students who wrote and edited this Preview, are employees of Cornell University.

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Delligatti v. United States

Issues

Is attempted murder a crime of violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether one can commit attempted murder without using, attempting to use, or threatening to use physical force against another person or their property. If no, attempted murder is a “crime of violence” and can serve as the basis for sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); if yes, it cannot—regardless of whether an individual defendant actually used physical force against another person. Salvatore Delligatti, who was convicted of attempted murder and seeks to challenge the enhancement of his sentence for that offense, argues that attempted murder does not inherently involve the action of using physical force because even completed murder can be committed through inaction. The United States counters that intentionally causing the death of another person, even through inaction, inherently involves the use of whatever physical force causes that other person’s death. The outcome of this case will determine the continued viability of Congress’s four-decade-old mechanism to crack down on gun violence, the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

The federal criminal code provides for heightened minimum sentences when someone uses or possesses a firearm “in relation to any crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). That same section defines a “crime of violence” as a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C.

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