pleading standard

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly

Issues

Is a complaint alleging that defendants engaged in parallel conduct and that they participated in a "conspiracy" sufficient to state a claim under section 1 of the Sherman act, 15 U.S.C .  § 1, even if the complaint does not assert any factual allegations that, if proven true, would necessarily establish the existence of a conspiracy?

 

Plaintiff, Twombly, brought a class action antitrust suit against local telephone and internet providers (Bell Atlantic) alleging the defendants had agreed not to compete with each other and conspired to prevent the entry of competitors within their respective territories. The District Court granted Bell Atlantic’s 12(b)6 motion to dismiss on the grounds that Twombly’s complaint failed to include a factual allegation that would “tend to exclude” independent self-interest as an explanation for defendants’ parallel conduct.  On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded on the grounds that a heightened pleading standard does not apply in the context of antitrust litigation. Bell Atlantic argues that application of the “tend to exclude” standard is necessary to filter frivolous lawsuits.  Twombly responds that the “tend to exclude”  standard  is contrary to the pleading requirements  under  the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and would unfairly block meritorious antitrust suits.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a complaint states a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, if it alleges that the defendants engaged in parallel conduct and adds a bald assertion that the defendants were participants in a "conspiracy," without any allegations that, if later proved true, would establish the existence of a conspiracy under the applicable legal standard.

Plaintiff, William Twombly, brought a class action in the Southern District of New York on behalf of all individuals who purchased local telephone and internet service in the continental United States between February 8, 1996, and the present. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F.Supp.2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin Clermont for his insights into this case.

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Wood v. Moss

Issues

  1. Should Secret Service agents receive qualified immunity from claims that they violated the First Amendment rights of anti-Bush demonstrators, where the agents moved anti-Bush, but not pro-Bush demonstrators, to protect the President?  
  2. Did anti-Bush demonstrators who were moved away from the President, adequately plead viewpoint discrimination if Secret Service agents had security reasons to move them?

In 2004, President Bush made an unannounced campaign stop at the Jacksonville Inn in Jacksonville, Oregon. Expecting the President to appear only at the nearby Honeymoon Cottage, pro-Bush and anti-Bush demonstrators arranged lawful demonstrations in the area. When the President changed his plans, Secret Service agents ordered local law enforcement to clear the area where the anti-Bush protestors were demonstrating. The anti-Bush demonstrators sued for viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. Secret Service agents Wood and Savage argue that the Ninth Circuit’s generalization of the protestors’ constitutional rights incorrectly deprived them of qualified immunity. Wood and Savage also argue that protestors failed to adequately plead a plausible claim because the complaint shows that the agents had a permissible security motive. Respondent Moss argues that the Ninth Circuit properly denied Wood and Savage qualified immunity because the agents moved the protesters because of the content of their speech. Moss also argues that he adequately pleaded viewpoint discrimination by laying out facts that plausibly establish the agents’ discriminatory motive. This case will determine whether law enforcement agents are able to account for demonstrators’ viewpoints when protecting public officials and the general public during political events. Additionally, this case will help define the parameters of the Court’s previous Iqbal ruling. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the court of appeals erred in denying qualified immunity to Secret Service agents protecting the President by evaluating the claim of viewpoint discrimination at a high level of generality and concluding that pro- and anti-Bush demonstrators needed to be positioned an equal distance from the President while he was dining on the outdoor patio and then while he was travelling by motorcade.
  2. Whether respondents have adequately pleaded viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment when no factual allegations support their claim of discriminatory motive and there was an obvious security-based rationale for moving the nearby anti-Bush group and not the farther-away pro-Bush group.

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Facts

During his 2004 presidential campaign, President Bush made an unannounced stop at the Jacksonville Inn in Jacksonville, Oregon. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 711 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2012). The President was scheduled to appear at the nearby Honeymoon Cottage, so both pro-Bush and anti-Bush groups were prepared to demonstrate in the area.

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