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VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION

Shurtleff v. City of Boston

Issues

Whether the City of Boston violated the First Amendment by denying a private party’s application to fly a Christian flag on a flagpole in front of Boston City Hall when the City had approved all 284 previous flag-raising applications; whether the flagpole is a designated public forum for the purposes of the First Amendment; and whether designating a private party’s flag in a public forum government speech inappropriately expands the definition of government speech.

In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether the City of Boston violated the First Amendment by refusing to fly a flag bearing a Latin cross on a flagpole in front of City Hall. Boston allowed private parties to apply for permission to raise and display their flags on one of three flag poles in front of City Hall. Before Boston rejected Petitioner Harold Shurtleff’s application to fly a flag bearing a Latin cross, it had approved every one of the 284 applications it received. Shurtleff argues that Boston designated the flagpole as a public forum for private speech and committed unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by refusing to fly Shurtleff’s flag because it bore a Christian symbol. Boston responds that, because the flags flown in front of City Hall are government speech, not private speech, Boston could evaluate flag-raising applications with reference to content and viewpoint, without running afoul of the First Amendment. Interested parties on either side of the case warn of potential chilling effects on private speech, as well as the risk of hostility from the government or from private parties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s failure to apply the Supreme Court’s forum doctrine to the First Amendment challenge of a private religious organization that was denied access to briefly display its flag on a city flagpole, pursuant to a city policy expressly designating the flagpole a public forum open to all applicants, with hundreds of approvals and no denials, conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedents holding that speech restrictions based on religious viewpoint or content violate the First Amendment or are otherwise subject to strict scrutiny and that the establishment clause is not a defense to censorship of private speech in a public forum open to all comers;

(2) whether the First Circuit’s classifying as government speech the brief display of a private religious organization’s flag on a city flagpole, pursuant to a city policy expressly designating the flagpole a public forum open to all applicants, with hundreds of approvals and no denials, unconstitutionally expands the government speech doctrine, in direct conflict with the court’s decisions in Matal v. TamWalker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. and Pleasant Grove City v. Summum; and

(3) whether the First Circuit’s finding that the requirement for perfunctory city approval of a proposed brief display of a private religious organization’s flag on a city flagpole, pursuant to a city policy expressly designating the flagpole a public forum open to all applicants with hundreds of approvals and no denials, transforms the religious organization’s private speech into government speech, conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedent in Matal v. Tam, and circuit court precedents in New Hope Family Services, Inc. v. PooleWandering Dago, Inc. v. DestitoEagle Point Education Association v. Jackson County School District and Robb v. Hungerbeeler.

The City of Boston (“Boston”) owns and operates three flagpoles in City Hall Plaza, all of which stand conspicuously in front of the seat of its municipal government. Shurtleff v. City of Boston, at 82. The first flagpole flies the United States and POW/MIA flags, the second flies the Commonwealth of Massachusetts flag, and the third typically flies Boston’s flag. Id.

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Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans

Issues

Do the messages and symbols on state-issued specialty license plates qualify as government speech and has Texas engaged in viewpoint discrimination by rejecting the license-plate design proposed by the Sons of Confederate Veterans?

The Supreme Court will determine whether states may limit the messages and symbols on state-issued specialty license plates and whether Texas committed viewpoint discrimination in rejecting the Sons of Confederate Veterans license plate design that included a logo of the confederate battle flag. Walker argues that the messages and symbols on state-issued license plates constitute government speech—which allows the government to restrict the speech and evade the requirement of viewpoint neutrality—and that Texas did not engage in viewpoint discrimination in refusing the confederate design because it did not issue any plates disparaging the confederacy. SCV counters that the messages and symbols are private speech protected under the First Amendment right to free speech, and that Texas committed viewpoint discrimination by rejecting the confederate license plate design. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case implicates states’ ability to favor certain viewpoints on state-issued license plates. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Do the messages and symbols on state-issued specialty license plates qualify as government speech immune from any requirement of viewpoint neutrality?  
  2. Has Texas engaged in “viewpoint discrimination” by rejecting the license-plate design proposed by the Sons of Confederate Veterans, when Texas has not issued any license plate that portrays the confederacy or the confederate battle flag in a negative or critical light? 

Texas provides drivers with the opportunity to purchase and utilize specialty license plates. See Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, 759 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2014).

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Wood v. Moss

Issues

  1. Should Secret Service agents receive qualified immunity from claims that they violated the First Amendment rights of anti-Bush demonstrators, where the agents moved anti-Bush, but not pro-Bush demonstrators, to protect the President?  
  2. Did anti-Bush demonstrators who were moved away from the President, adequately plead viewpoint discrimination if Secret Service agents had security reasons to move them?

In 2004, President Bush made an unannounced campaign stop at the Jacksonville Inn in Jacksonville, Oregon. Expecting the President to appear only at the nearby Honeymoon Cottage, pro-Bush and anti-Bush demonstrators arranged lawful demonstrations in the area. When the President changed his plans, Secret Service agents ordered local law enforcement to clear the area where the anti-Bush protestors were demonstrating. The anti-Bush demonstrators sued for viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. Secret Service agents Wood and Savage argue that the Ninth Circuit’s generalization of the protestors’ constitutional rights incorrectly deprived them of qualified immunity. Wood and Savage also argue that protestors failed to adequately plead a plausible claim because the complaint shows that the agents had a permissible security motive. Respondent Moss argues that the Ninth Circuit properly denied Wood and Savage qualified immunity because the agents moved the protesters because of the content of their speech. Moss also argues that he adequately pleaded viewpoint discrimination by laying out facts that plausibly establish the agents’ discriminatory motive. This case will determine whether law enforcement agents are able to account for demonstrators’ viewpoints when protecting public officials and the general public during political events. Additionally, this case will help define the parameters of the Court’s previous Iqbal ruling. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the court of appeals erred in denying qualified immunity to Secret Service agents protecting the President by evaluating the claim of viewpoint discrimination at a high level of generality and concluding that pro- and anti-Bush demonstrators needed to be positioned an equal distance from the President while he was dining on the outdoor patio and then while he was travelling by motorcade.
  2. Whether respondents have adequately pleaded viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment when no factual allegations support their claim of discriminatory motive and there was an obvious security-based rationale for moving the nearby anti-Bush group and not the farther-away pro-Bush group.

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Facts

During his 2004 presidential campaign, President Bush made an unannounced stop at the Jacksonville Inn in Jacksonville, Oregon. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 711 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2012). The President was scheduled to appear at the nearby Honeymoon Cottage, so both pro-Bush and anti-Bush groups were prepared to demonstrate in the area.

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