PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

Carey v. Musladin

Issues

Did the Ninth Circuit overstep its bounds by applying circuit court precedents, rather than Supreme Court precedents, to determine that Musladin was entitled to habeas relief?

 

 

 

Mathew Musladin was convicted in California state court of the first-degree murder of his ex-wife’s fiancé, Tom Studer. During the trial, Studer’s family members wore large buttons, visible to the jury, bearing a photograph of Studer. Musladin appealed his conviction on the grounds that the buttons influenced the jury and eroded his presumption of innocence. When his appeal failed, Musladin filed a habeas corpus petition with the federal District Court, which was also rejected. Relying on another Ninth Circuit case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court should have granted Musladin’s petition. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal court may only overturn a state court’s decision on habeas grounds if the state decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Since the Ninth Circuit’s decision to overturn Musladin’s conviction relied heavily on Ninth Circuit case law, not a Supreme Court decision, the Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will determine what role, if any, circuit court opinions can play in the interpretation of  federal  law under AEDPA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the absence of controlling Supreme Court law, did the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit exceed its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) by overturning respondent’s state conviction of murder on the ground that the Courtroom spectators included three family members of the victim who wore buttons depicting the deceased?

On May 13, 1994, Mathew Musladin went to the home of his estranged wife, Pamela, to pick up their son for scheduled visitation. Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Shannon Nelson and Louis Alonzo Madden v. Colorado

Issues

Is Colorado’s requirement that defendants must prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence after reversal of conviction of a crime, in order to have various monetary penalties returned to them, consistent with due process?

This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide the constitutionality of a statute requiring a defendant to initiate a civil case to obtain reimbursement of costs, fees, and restitution after the reversal of conviction of a crime. This case arises out of Shannon Nelson’s conviction for sexual assault, which was overturned after she served prison time and paid various fees. The Colorado Supreme Court found that due process did not require a refund because a defendant could receive compensation by filing a civil suit under the Exoneration Act. Nelson argues that Colorado’s requirement improperly places the burden of proof on the defendant to prove his or her innocence in order to recover fees paid for a conviction that was later overturned. Colorado asserts that Nelson did not necessarily have an automatic right to the refund of her criminal penalties and that, even if she did, Colorado’s requirement satisfies due process. This case poses questions about a state’s ability to affect the presumption of innocence through statutes that influence the scope of due process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Colorado, like many states, imposes various monetary penalties when a person is convicted of a crime. But Colorado appears to be the only state that does not refund these penalties when a conviction is reversed. Rather, Colorado requires defendants to prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence in a separate civil proceeding to get their money back. The Question Presented is whether this requirement is consistent with due process.

Petitioner Shannon Nelson was convicted in 2006 of sexual assault offenses against her children for which she began serving a prison term and incurred monetary charges, which the state of Colorado imposes on defendants who have been convicted. See Colorado v. Nelson, 2015 CO 68, No. 13SC495 (Colo. Dec. 21, 2015) at ¶2.

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