recidivism

Erlinger v. United States

Issues

Does it violate a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to due process or Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury when a sentencing judge, rather than a jury, determines whether a defendant’s prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to define the contours of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights when subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984’s (“ACCA”) occasions clause in light of the Court’s decision in Wooden v. United States. The ACCA authorizes enhancing a criminal defendant’s sentence when the defendant’s three prior convictions were committed “on occasions different from one another.” Under Wooden, that clause requires determining whether the previous offenses occurred on different occasions or, rather, arose “from a single criminal episode.” Paul Erlinger argues that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment prohibit a sentencing judge from making that determination, rather a jury must decide the factual questions necessary under the ACCA beyond a reasonable doubt.  Nick Harper, court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below, counters that the Constitution does not require the occasions clause to be decided by a jury because history and Supreme Court precedent authorize legislatures to assign recidivism-related determinations to sentencing judges. The outcome of this case has implications for criminal defendants’ rights at sentencing.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Constitution requires a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant’s prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Petitioner Paul Erlinger (“Erlinger”) pled guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) on April 20th, 2018.

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McNeill v. United States

Issues

Whether a court determining the “seriousness” of a defendant’s prior drug offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act should look to the maximum possible sentence for that offense at the time of the defendant’s prior conviction or at the time of the individual’s current federal sentencing.

 

In 2009, Petitioner Clifton Terelle McNeill was convicted and sentenced for the possession with intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine and for the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The district court determined that McNeill qualified for a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") because of his two prior convictions for common law robbery and felony assault, as well as six convictions for selling cocaine and possession of cocaine. The ACCA applies to “serious drug offenses,” which are defined as crimes that carry a maximum imprisonment term of at least ten years. McNeill argues that the ACCA did not apply because, although his drug offenses did carry a maximum of at least ten years when they were committed, North Carolina had since lowered its drug sentences by the time of his current sentencing. Conversely, the United States insists that because North Carolina decided not to make its drug sentencing change retroactive, the ACCA does in fact apply to McNeill.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the plain meaning of "is prescribed by law" which ACCA uses to define a predicate "serious drug offense" requires a federal sentencing court to look to the maximum penalty prescribed by current state law for a drug offense at the time of the instant federal offense, regardless of whether the state has made that current sentencing law retroactive.

The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) imposes a mandatory minimum prison sentence of fifteen years to any criminal defendant convicted of a crime with a prison sentence exceeding one year who has had three prior convictions for a violent felony or “serious drug offense.” See United States v. McNeill, 598 F.3d 161, 163 (4th Cir.

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Additional Resources

· The Drug Policy Alliance: Mandatory Minimum Sentences

· Congressional Research Service, Charles Doyle: Armed Career Criminal Act: An Overview (Oct. 13, 2010)

· North Carolina Bar Association, Carl Horn III The Changing Landscape Governing Armed Career Criminal Sentences (June 8, 2010)

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United States v. Rodriquez

Issues

The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) provides for an increased sentence, with a mandatory minimum of fifteen years, for felons convicted of firearm possession if the offender has three prior convictions for specified types of crimes. These crimes include state drug offenses punishable by a maximum prison term of ten years or more. This case considers whether a state drug offense still qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense if it is punishable by a maximum ten-year sentence only because of sentence increases based on the offender's status as a repeat offender.

 

The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), applies to felons convicted of firearms possession who have previously been convicted of three or more serious crimes, including state drug offenses with a maximum sentence of ten or more years. A federal district court sentenced Gino Rodriquez to 92 months' imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of possessing a firearm as a felon. The Government appealed, arguing the court should have applied the ACCA, which requires a minimum fifteen-year sentence. The ACCA does not tell federal judges how to determine what the maximum possible sentence for an underlying crime was under state law. The Government argues that when a crime is committed by a repeat offender, or "recidivist," at the time of their prior conviction, the court should include in the maximum any sentence enhancements imposed based on the offender's recidivism. Rodriquez argues the maximum sentence should be only the statutory maximum for the crime charged, excluding such enhancements. The sentence in question here is a 1995 drug conviction Rodriquez received under Washington State law. The Government said the conviction qualified as an ACCA predicate because in 1995 Rodriquez was a repeat offender and Washington law provided a ten-year peak sentence for such offenders. The district court ruled that Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedents required it to consider only the sentence for the underlying crime without additional penalties for recidivism. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. In this case, the United States Supreme Court will clarify how federal courts should treat recidivist sentence enhancements when determining the maximum sentence for a state drug conviction for ACCA purposes. This decision will add to the Court's rapidly developing interpretation of the ACCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), provides for an enhanced sentence for felons convicted of possession of a firearm, if the defendant has three prior convictions for, inter alia, a state-law controlled substance offense "for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law." 18 U.S. C. 924(e)(2)(A)(i). The question presented is: Whether a state drug-trafficking offense, for which state law authorized a ten-year sentence because the defendant was a recidivist, qualifies as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).

The following information is from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Rodriquez and the Joint Appendix, Petition for Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 2007 WL 3286637 (U.S.):

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