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SEXUAL ORIENTATION

Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia

Issues

Does employment discrimination on the basis of an employee’s sexual orientation constitute a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act?

This case consolidates two lawsuits, each containing a claim by an employee alleging that he was terminated by his employer because of his sexual orientation. These employees argue that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which proscribes discrimination “because of . . . sex,” inherently prohibits sexual orientation discrimination because one’s sexual orientation necessarily depends on one’s sex. To further support this argument, the employees contend that Title VII’s plain language, statutory and judicial history, and other provisions all support interpreting the statute to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The employers counter that the plain meaning of “because of . . . sex” at the time of Title VII’s enactment, and courts’ reliance on this plain meaning in their past decisions, indicate that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. The case’s outcome will have heavy implications for LGBT workers and business’ bottom lines.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

This case consolidates two cases: the first brought by Gerald Lynn Bostock (“Bostock”) and the second by Altitude Express, Inc. and Raymond Maynard (collectively “Altitude Express”).

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