Strict Liability

Burrage v. United States

Issues

Can a defendant who sells drugs to someone who dies of an overdose be held criminally liable for that person’s death if the drug contributed to the victim’s death but was not the sole cause?

On April 14, 2010, Marcus Burrage sold heroin to Joshua Banka, who used the heroin and a cocktail of other drugs, and was found dead the next day. Medical and toxicology reports indicated that the heroin contributed to Banka’s death, but neither report said that Banka would have lived if he had not taken the heroin. Burrage was convicted of distribution of heroin causing death under 21 U.S.C. § 841, andhe appealed arguing that the jury instructions were erroneous. In particular, Burrage challenged the causation instruction under § 841, arguing that the statute required the government to prove that the heroin was the proximate cause of death, and not just a contributing factor. The district court concluded, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the “contributed to” instructions were consistent with Eighth Circuit precedent. The Supreme Court will now clarify the causation standard for the federal crime of distribution of drugs causing death. This standard will determine when a person who distributes drugs can be held criminally responsible for the death of the drug user, and what the government must prove in such cases. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether a person can be convicted for distribution of heroin causing death utilizing jury instructions, which allow a conviction when the heroin that was distributed "contributed to," death by "mixed drug intoxication," but was not the sole cause of death of person. 
  2. Whether the crime of distribution of drugs causing death under 21 U.S.C. § 841 is a strict liability crime, without a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement. 

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Facts

On November 17, 2009, Breanna Brown, a confidential informant cooperating with the Central Iowa Drug Task Force, conducted a controlled buy of heroin from suspected drug dealer “Lil C.” See United States v. Burrage, 687 F.3d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 2012). Various officers later identified Lil C as Petitioner Marcus Burrage, but at trial Burrage denied ever selling drugs to Brown.

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Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett

After receiving a prescription for sulindac, the generic version of Clinoril, Karen Bartlett developed Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and toxic epidermal necrolysis, rare skin disorders that causes the sufferer’s skin to deteriorate by either being burned off or by turning into an open wound. Bartlett subsequently suffered painful, permanent injuries, including near-blindness, esophageal burns, and lung damage. A New Hampshire federal jury awarded Bartlett $21.06 million for her injuries based on a New Hampshire products liability claim for defective design. Mutual Pharmaceutical Company, a sulindac manufacturer, now challenges that decision by arguing that federal law regulating generic drugs preempts New Hampshire's design-defect law. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the lower court design, finding no preemption, despite Supreme Court precedent finding preemption in similar contexts. Mutual Pharmaceutical argues that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempts the state design-defect law because the Act requires generic drug manufacturers to produce generic medications that are bioequivalent to the corresponding name brand version of the drug. Bartlett responds that the state law does not conflict with federal law because the state law imposes no duty for sellers to change their product from the name brand version. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the First Circuit erred when it created a circuit split and held-in clear conflict with this Court's decisions in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008); and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)-that federal law does not preempt state law design-defect claims targeting generic pharmaceutical products because the conceded conflict between such claims and the federal laws governing generic pharmaceutical design allegedly can be avoided if the makers of generic pharmaceuticals simply stop making their products. 

Issue

Does federal law governing claims against generic pharmaceutical products preempt state law design-defect claims against the makers of those products?

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