VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

Dubin v. United States

Issues

If a criminal defendant uses someone else’s name while committing a criminal offense, can they also be charged with identity fraud?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a criminal defendant who uses someone else’s name while committing a criminal offense can also be charged with identity fraud. Petitioner David Dubin, an employee at a psychological evaluations services company, used the name of a patient on a form he filled out while committing healthcare fraud. Respondent, the United States, charged him with committing aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The circuits have split over how to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), specifically when defendants should be charged with identity fraud while committing an underlying offense. This circuit split has created tension over how broadly or narrowly the statute should be read in light of its language, the surrounding context, and congressional intent. The decision could impact the level of discretion that prosecutors enjoy when prosecuting claims under § 1028 and the extent of due process rights for criminal defendants in such cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a person commits aggravated identity theft any time they mention or otherwise recite someone else’s name while committing a predicate offense.

Petitioner David Dubin worked for Psychological A.R.T.S., P.C. (“PARTS”), a psychological services company that provided mental health testing services to people at emergency shelters in Texas. United States v. Dubin at 321. Williams House, an emergency youth shelter, engaged PARTS to perform testing services. Id. PARTS and Williams House agreed that PARTS would determine whether shelter residents were Medicaid-eligible.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Stephen P. Garvey for his insights into this case. 

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United States v. Ali Danial Hemani

Issues

Does the Second Amendment prohibit a ban on the possession of firearms by all “unlawful users” of any drug?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a federal statute that prohibits any “unlawful user” of drugs from possessing firearms, even when not presently intoxicated, provides sufficient notice of the conduct it prohibits and comports with the Second Amendment. The United States argues that the statute comes from a long history of regulations which prohibit dangerous persons from possessing firearms. Ali Danial Hemani counters that the categorical ban goes much further than any historical law. This case presents public safety, gun rights, and government efficiency issues. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), the federal statute that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,” violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondent.

In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which, among other provisions, restricted certain categories of persons from possessing firearms. Pub. L. No.

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