FELONY

Borden v. United States

Issues

Does classifying a crime committed with a mental state of recklessness as a violent felony expand the reach of the Armed Criminal Career Act beyond its intended purpose?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 includes crimes in which an individual used force recklessly. Petitioner Charles Borden asserts that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit incorrectly held that committing a crime with a mens rea of recklessness constitutes a violent felony because the mental state of recklessness does not include the intention or knowledge that would satisfy the requirement of using force “against the person of another.” Respondent United States counters that a mens rea of recklessness satisfies the element because the focus is on the “use” of the physical force, which does not discern between mental states. The outcome of this case has important implications for criminal procedure, due process rights, and the necessary interpretation of the text of the ACCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompasses crimes with a mens rea of mere recklessness.

In the course of a traffic stop in April 2017, police found Petitioner Charles Borden in possession of a pistol. United States v. Borden at 266.

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Emma Cueto, 5 Supreme Court Access To Justice Cases To Watch, Law360 (Oct. 4, 2020).

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Dubin v. United States

Issues

If a criminal defendant uses someone else’s name while committing a criminal offense, can they also be charged with identity fraud?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a criminal defendant who uses someone else’s name while committing a criminal offense can also be charged with identity fraud. Petitioner David Dubin, an employee at a psychological evaluations services company, used the name of a patient on a form he filled out while committing healthcare fraud. Respondent, the United States, charged him with committing aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The circuits have split over how to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), specifically when defendants should be charged with identity fraud while committing an underlying offense. This circuit split has created tension over how broadly or narrowly the statute should be read in light of its language, the surrounding context, and congressional intent. The decision could impact the level of discretion that prosecutors enjoy when prosecuting claims under § 1028 and the extent of due process rights for criminal defendants in such cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a person commits aggravated identity theft any time they mention or otherwise recite someone else’s name while committing a predicate offense.

Petitioner David Dubin worked for Psychological A.R.T.S., P.C. (“PARTS”), a psychological services company that provided mental health testing services to people at emergency shelters in Texas. United States v. Dubin at 321. Williams House, an emergency youth shelter, engaged PARTS to perform testing services. Id. PARTS and Williams House agreed that PARTS would determine whether shelter residents were Medicaid-eligible.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Stephen P. Garvey for his insights into this case. 

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Mathis v. United States

Issues

How should sentencing courts determine whether a defendant has satisfied the predicate felonies necessary to mandate a higher minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

 

The Supreme Court will decide how a sentencing court using the “modified categorical approach” should determine if a defendant felon has satisfied the predicate felonies necessary to mandate a higher minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Mathis argues that the “modified categorical approach” can be based only on the text of the state criminal statute as well as state court analysis of its elements, without regard to the court record or the means necessary to accomplish an element. The United States contends that the standard is simply that criminal statutes phrased in the disjunctive are divisible and that courts may then use court documents under the “modified categorical approach” to determine if the defendant was convicted of the generic crime. This decision will impact the severity of prison terms for many prior felons and has great repercussions for noncitizen felons. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Must a predicate prior conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), qualify as such under the elements of the offense simpliciter, without extending the modified categorical approach to separate statutory definitional provisions that merely establish the means by which referenced elements may be satisfied rather than stating alternative elements or versions of the offense?

In March 2013, Richard Mathis (“Mathis”) was accused of forcibly molesting a teenage boy. See United States v. Richard Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir.

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murder

Murder is when a person unlawfully kills another person. Murder is not the same as homicide because not all homicide is unlawful. Instead, murder is a category of homicide. The precise legal definition of murder varies by jurisdiction. Most states distinguish between different degrees of murder (first, second, and third).

Packingham v. North Carolina

Issues

Does a North Carolina statute making it a felony for registered sex offenders to “access” social networking websites that allow minors to have accounts violate the First Amendment?

In 2002, Lester Gerard Packingham pled guilty to taking indecent liberties with a child and was registered as a sex offender in the state of North Carolina. After posting on Facebook in 2010, Packingham was arrested and convicted under a North Carolina statute that prohibits all registered sex offenders from accessing any social networking website. Packingham appealed, arguing that the law violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed Packingham’s conviction, finding that the law was an acceptable content-neutral speech restriction. Packingham argues that the law is substantially overbroad and is therefore unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to this case under either strict or intermediate scrutiny. North Carolina maintains that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s interest in protecting children from sexual abuse and therefore satisfies intermediate scrutiny. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the balance between state governments’ interest in public safety and convicted persons’ First Amendment rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The North Carolina Supreme Court sustained petitioner's conviction under a criminal law, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5, that makes it a felony for any person on the State's registry of former sex offenders to access a wide array of websites-including Facebook, YouTube, and nytimes.com-that enable communication, expression, and the exchange of information among their users, if the site is know[n] to allow minors to have accounts. The law—which applies to thousands of people who, like petitioner, have completed all criminal justice supervision—does not require the State to prove that the accused had contact with (or gathered information about) a minor, or intended to do so, or accessed a website for any illicit or improper purpose. The question presented is: Whether, under this Court's First Amendment precedents, such a law is permissible, both on its face and as applied to petitioner-who was convicted based on a Facebook post in which he celebrated dismissal of a traffic ticket, declaring God is Good!

On May 30, 2012, Lester Gerard Packingham, a registered sex offender, was found guilty of using a social network website in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5. See State v. Packingham, 368 N.C. 380 (2015). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.5 is a North Carolina statute that makes sex offenders’ use of social networking websites, like Facebook, illegal.

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