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Foster v. Chatman

Issues

Should the Georgia courts have recognized race discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, which held that race cannot be used as a basis for striking jurors, where the prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike each potential black juror, resulting in an all-white jury in the petitioner’s death penalty case?

 

This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to determine whether the Georgia courts erred in determining that the prosecution’s peremptory challenges were not based on race discrimination. See Brief for Petitioner, Timothy Tyrone Foster at 2–4; Brief for Respondent, Bruce Chatman, Warden, at 1–2. Petitioner Timothy Tyrone Foster contends that he was denied due process and the right to an impartial  jury,  because the prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike black jurors on the basis of race. See Brief for Petitioner at 2–3. Foster argues that the prosecution’s jury selection notes demonstrate intent to exclude black jurors from the jury and that the prosecution’s purported reasons for striking the black prospective jurors are insufficient in light of the corresponding notes. See id. at 27–28. Respondent Bruce Chatman counters that the prosecution established sufficient justification for striking each prospective black juror and that the notes were prepared in anticipation of a Batson challenge. See Brief for Respondent at 1–2. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will provide greater clarity as to what constitutes a violation  under  Batson v. Kentucky.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Did the Georgia courts err in failing to recognize race discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky in the extraordinary circumstances of this death penalty case?

In 1986, Timothy Tyrone Foster was arrested for the murder of 79-year-old Queen Madge White in Rome, Georgia. See Foster v.

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Gonzalez v. United States

Issues

Can a defendant's lawyer, without personally consulting the defendant, orally agree to waive the defendant's right to have an Article III judge preside over jury selection?

 

A federal court convicted Gonzalez of drug charges in a trial in which a magistrate judge presided over jury selection. Though counsel for the defendant consented to the magistrate conducting voir dire (the questioning and evaluation of potential jurors) in lieu of an Article III judge, Gonzalez neither personally consented nor objected. Gonzalez argues that the right to personally choose whether an Article III judge will or will not preside over voir dire is an important constitutional right; the government argues that the rule in Peretz v. United States does not require personal consent, that the consent of counsel was adequate, and that conducting voir dire was within the scope of duties that may be delegated to magistrates. Gonzalez counters that the government misconstrues the language in Peretz.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Is a federal criminal defendant's counsel's oral consent to have a United States magistrate judge preside over jury selection binding on the defendant when the record does not reflect the defendant's own knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right to have an Article III judge preside over jury selection?
    A federal jury in Lorado, Texas convicted Homero Gonzalez on several criminal conspiracy and substantive counts related to possession of more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana. Brief for Respondent at 1,2. Gonzalez, a 45-year old Mexican citizen residing legally in the U.S., did not speak English at the time of trial and required a court interpreter to translate the proceedings into Spanish. Brief for Petitioner at 2. Gonzalez appeared before a magistrate judge for his detention hearing and arraignment and then appeared before a district judge for four pretrial conferences. Id. at 2.
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    Rivera v. Illinois

    Issues

    Whether a court's decision in wrongfully denying a peremptory challenge requires an automatic reversal of the related conviction.

     

    This case concerns the effect of an erroneous denial of a criminal defendant's peremptory challenge to a prospective juror who was later seated. Defendant Rivera exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude Ms. Gomez, who worked administratively in a hospital known for treating gunshot victims. The trial judge denied the peremptory challenge, claiming a Batson violation. Ms. Gomez was seated on the jury, which then convicted Rivera of first degree murder in a gang related shooting. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the judge committed harmless-error in denying this peremptory challenge. Upon appeal before the Supreme Court, Rivera argues that the erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge necessitates automatic reversal "because it undermines the trial structure for preserving the constitutional right to due process and an impartial jury." The State of Illinois, on the other hand, argues that there has been no constitutional violation, and that state law should determine the effect of an erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge on the verdict.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Does the erroneous denial of a criminal defendant's peremptory challenge that resulted in the challenged juror being seated require automatic reversal of a conviction because it undermines the trial structure for preserving the constitutional right to due process and an impartial jury?

    In 1998, sixteen-year old Marcus Lee was fatally shot. See Brief for Respondent, Illinois at 1.

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    Warger v. Shauers

    Issues

    May a party moving for a new trial use testimony about juror deliberations to show juror dishonesty during voir dire? 

    Upon the return of an unanimous verdict in favor of the defendant in a vehicular accident resulting in personal injury, the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct as a basis for a new trial. That motion relied on a juror’s testimony about statements made during the jury’s deliberation by the foreperson that suggested she had withheld information during the jury selection process. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) (“FRE  606(b)”) allows the introduction of juror testimony only in very limited circumstances, and this case should determine whether the testimony offered here does or does not fall within one of those exceptions.  This case has greater implications for the sanctity of jury deliberations, as well as the balance between the right of civil litigants to a fair trial and the importance of finality in verdicts.  This decision should also clarify for lower federal courts the application of FRE 606(b). 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) permits a party moving for a new trial based on juror dishonesty during voir dire to introduce juror testimony about statements made during deliberations that tend to show the alleged dishonesty.

    On August 4, 2006, Respondent Randy Shauers (Respondent’s) pick-up truck collided with the Petitioner Gregory Warger (Petitioner’s) motorcycle. See Brief for Petitioner at 4. Petitioner Warger required surgical amputation of his leg following the collision.

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    Additional Resources

    Stephen A. Miller:, Preview of the Supreme Court’s October Term in 2014, The Legal Intelligencer, (September 4, 2014). 

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