jury selection

Chappell v. Ayala

Issues

Does a state court’s determination that a trial court committed a harmless error amount to an “adjudication on the merits,” as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), thereby limiting a federal court’s ability to review the trial court’s conviction only when the standards stated in the aforementioned provision are met?

The Supreme Court will determine to what extent federal courts can evaluate state court determinations of federal error regarding a federal question. Kevin Chappell, Warden of the State of California, contends that federal courts must grant significant deference to state court determinations denying federal habeas relief for convicted defendants based on a finding that any error that occurred during a trial was a harmless error. Hector Ayala, a prisoner, counters that federal courts should have the opportunity to independently review federal habeas petitions for error and determine how much prejudice the defendant suffered when state courts determined an error was harmless. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the level of deference afforded to state courts in determinations of harmless error and will affect the jury selection process. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Was a state court's rejection of a claim of federal constitutional error on the ground that any error, if one occurred, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt an “adjudicat[ion] on the merits” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), so that a federal court may set aside the resulting final state conviction only if the defendant can satisfy the restrictive standards imposed by that provision?; and
  2. Did the court of appeals properly applied [sic] the standard articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson?

In 1985, Hector Ayala was charged with “three counts of murder, one count of attempted murder, one count of robbery and three counts of attempted robbery.” See Ayala v. Wong, 756 F.3d 656, 660. In 1989, jury selection began with the review of over 200 juror questionnaires followed by juror interviews by the court and parties.

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Flowers v. Mississippi

Issues

Did the Mississippi Supreme Court properly consider the prosecutor’s Batson violations in the petitioner’s previous trials when evaluating whether the same prosecutor committed Batson violations in the petitioner’s most recent trial.

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the Supreme Court of Mississippi correctly held that the state prosecutor in Curtis Flowers’ criminal jury trial did not violate Batson v. Kentucky when he struck black prospective jurors. Flowers argues that the state court failed to properly consider the prosecutor’s history of Batson violations in his specific case, and that these violations—along with other indications of racial discrimination—demonstrate the prosecutor’s purposeful racial discrimination against black prospective jurors. Conversely, Mississippi argues that the state court properly weighed the prosecutor’s history of violations and correctly determined that the prosecutor’s reasons for striking black jurors were legitimate. The outcome of this case will help further define the scope of the Batson doctrine and determine how heavily a court should weigh an attorney’s history of Batson violations when assessing a Batson claim.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in how it applied Batson v. Kentucky in this case.

Curtis Flowers (“Flowers”) has been tried six times in relation to four 1996 murders in Winona, Mississippi. Flowers v.

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Gonzalez v. United States

Issues

Can a defendant's lawyer, without personally consulting the defendant, orally agree to waive the defendant's right to have an Article III judge preside over jury selection?

 

A federal court convicted Gonzalez of drug charges in a trial in which a magistrate judge presided over jury selection. Though counsel for the defendant consented to the magistrate conducting voir dire (the questioning and evaluation of potential jurors) in lieu of an Article III judge, Gonzalez neither personally consented nor objected. Gonzalez argues that the right to personally choose whether an Article III judge will or will not preside over voir dire is an important constitutional right; the government argues that the rule in Peretz v. United States does not require personal consent, that the consent of counsel was adequate, and that conducting voir dire was within the scope of duties that may be delegated to magistrates. Gonzalez counters that the government misconstrues the language in Peretz.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Is a federal criminal defendant's counsel's oral consent to have a United States magistrate judge preside over jury selection binding on the defendant when the record does not reflect the defendant's own knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right to have an Article III judge preside over jury selection?
    A federal jury in Lorado, Texas convicted Homero Gonzalez on several criminal conspiracy and substantive counts related to possession of more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana. Brief for Respondent at 1,2. Gonzalez, a 45-year old Mexican citizen residing legally in the U.S., did not speak English at the time of trial and required a court interpreter to translate the proceedings into Spanish. Brief for Petitioner at 2. Gonzalez appeared before a magistrate judge for his detention hearing and arraignment and then appeared before a district judge for four pretrial conferences. Id. at 2.
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    Rice v. Collins

    Issues

    Does the deference to a trial judge’s findings, embodied in the habeas corpus statute, extend to situations where the fact finder did not directly observe an incident of allegedly inappropriate conduct by a potential juror but merely accepted the prosecutor’s account of events? Can the Federal court consider such actions by the state court trial judge as unreasonable even where the trial judge’s ultimate finding nevertheless falls within the acceptable range of what a rational court could have found given the evidence presented before it?

     

    The Ninth Circuit recently granted criminal defendant Steven Martell Collins’ habeas corpus petition on the grounds that the prosecution unconstitutionally used a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror on account of her race. Although the prosecutor convinced the trial judge that the dismissal was not racially motivated and was therefore acceptable, the Ninth Circuit found the trial judge’s decision to be unreasonable despite the fact that the decision was affirmed on numerous occasions throughout the state court system and at the Federal District Court. The Ninth Circuit held that, despite the statutory deference granted to the original fact-finder by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, such deference was inappropriate here. The Supreme Court will likely interpret § 2254 to determine whether the Ninth Circuit exceeded its authority when it held that the trial judge was unreasonable in accepting the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for dismissing the juror.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Does 28 U.S.C. § 2254 allow a federal habeas corpus court to reject the presumption of correctness for state fact finding, and condemn a state-court adjudication as an unreasonable determination of the facts, where a rational fact finder could have determined the facts as did the state court?

    The below facts are all derived from the amended opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Collins v. Rice, 365 F.3d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 2004). During the process of jury selection for Collins’s trial, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove two African American women from the jury. Id. at 674.

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    Snyder v. Louisiana

    Issues

    1. Did the Louisiana Supreme Court misapply Miller-El v. Dretke by failing to address several factors supporting a claim of intentional discrimination by the prosecution in a capital trial, including comparisons to the O.J. Simpson trial, the elimination of all African-Americans from the jury by peremptory challenge, differences in the questioning of black and white prospective jurors, and a manner of excluding minority prospective jurors that indicated a pattern of discrimination?

    2. Did the Louisiana Supreme Court erroneously apply the standard of review from Rice v. Collins, a federal habeas corpus case that employed a strict standard not applicable in the present case?

     

    An all-white Louisiana jury found Allen Snyder, an African-American man, guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. At trial, the prosecution used peremptory strikes to exclude all black prospective jurors from the jury. The prosecution compared the case to the O.J. Simpson case -- before trial, to reporters, and during sentencing, to the jury. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the Louisiana Supreme Court to reconsider its finding of no discriminatory jury selection in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). On remand, a narrow majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed its initial ruling. Snyder argues that the court misapplied Miller-El by failing to consider "all relevant circumstances" of the prosecution's discriminatory intent at trial and by according the trial court's findings an excessive degree of deference. The State of Louisiana contends that the court properly considered the case according to Miller-El's principles and rightfully excluded evidence not on the record from its analysis. The Supreme Court's decision will influence how future courts and litigants identify and prevent unlawful racial discrimination in jury selection.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Petitioner Allen Snyder, a black man, was convicted and sentenced to death by an all-white jury in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, for the fatal stabbing of his wife's male companion. Prior to trial, the prosecutor reported to the media that this was his "O.J. Simpson case." At trial, the prosecutor peremptorily struck all five African-Americans who had survived cause challenges and then, over objection, urged the resulting all-white jury to impose death because this case was like the O.J. Simpson case, where the defendant "got away with it." On initial review, a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court ignored probative evidence of discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor's O.J. Simpson remarks and argument, and denied Mr. Snyder's Batson claims by a 5-2 vote.

    This Court directed the court below to reconsider Mr. Snyder's Batson claims in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). See Snyder v. Louisiana, 545 U.S. 1137 (2005). On remand, a bare majority adhered to its prior holding, once again disregarding substantial evidence establishing discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor's references to the O.J. Simpson case, the totality of strikes against African-American jurors, and evidence showing a pattern of practice of race-based peremptory challenges by the prosecutor's office. In addition, the majority imposed a new and higher burden on Mr. Snyder, asserting that Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006), permitted reversal only if "a reasonable factfinder [would] necessarily conclude the prosecutor lied" about the reasons for his strikes. Three justices, including the author of the original opinion, dissented, finding the prosecutor's reference to the O.J. Simpson case in argument to an all-white jury, made "against a backdrop of the issues of race and prejudice," supported the conclusion that the State improperly exercised peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory fashion.

    The Louisiana Supreme Court's consideration of Mr. Snyder's Batson claims on remand from this Court raises the following important questions:

    1. Did the majority below ignore the plain import of Miller-El by failing to consider highly probative evidence of discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor's repeated comparisons of this case to the O.J. Simpson case, the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to purge all African-Americans from the jury, the prosecutor's disparate questioning of white and black prospective jurors, and documented evidence of a pattern of practice by the prosecutor's office to dilute minority presence in petit juries?

    2. Did the majority err when, in order to shore up its holding that Mr. Snyder had failed to prove discriminatory intent, it imported into a direct appeal case the standard of review this Court applied in Rice v. Collins, an AEDPA habeas case?

    3. Did the majority err in refusing to consider the prosecutor's first two suspicious strikes on the ground that defense counsel's failure to object could not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because Batson error does not render the trial unfair or the verdict suspect -- i.e., that failure to raise a Batson objection can never result in prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) - a holding directly conflicting with decisions from inter alia the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the Alabama and Mississippi Supreme Courts?

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    Warger v. Shauers

    Issues

    May a party moving for a new trial use testimony about juror deliberations to show juror dishonesty during voir dire? 

    Upon the return of an unanimous verdict in favor of the defendant in a vehicular accident resulting in personal injury, the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct as a basis for a new trial. That motion relied on a juror’s testimony about statements made during the jury’s deliberation by the foreperson that suggested she had withheld information during the jury selection process. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) (“FRE  606(b)”) allows the introduction of juror testimony only in very limited circumstances, and this case should determine whether the testimony offered here does or does not fall within one of those exceptions.  This case has greater implications for the sanctity of jury deliberations, as well as the balance between the right of civil litigants to a fair trial and the importance of finality in verdicts.  This decision should also clarify for lower federal courts the application of FRE 606(b). 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) permits a party moving for a new trial based on juror dishonesty during voir dire to introduce juror testimony about statements made during deliberations that tend to show the alleged dishonesty.

    On August 4, 2006, Respondent Randy Shauers (Respondent’s) pick-up truck collided with the Petitioner Gregory Warger (Petitioner’s) motorcycle. See Brief for Petitioner at 4. Petitioner Warger required surgical amputation of his leg following the collision.

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    Additional Resources

    Stephen A. Miller:, Preview of the Supreme Court’s October Term in 2014, The Legal Intelligencer, (September 4, 2014). 

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