federal preemption

Cantero v. Bank of America

Issues

Does requiring a national bank to pay interest on escrow accounts attached to its mortgages under New York’s minimum interest-on-escrow law unconstitutionally infringe on the bank’s exercise of its federal power under the National Bank Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider to what extent nationally-chartered banks should be shielded from state banking regulations on mortgage escrow accounts. Alex Cantero argues that the Second Circuit’s standard for preemption based on control is improper, and that the Court must evaluate the actual impact the interest-on-escrow law has on bank operations. Bank of America maintains that the state law is preempted because it both impermissibly exerts control over bank operations and also significantly hinders national banks’ exercise of their federally-granted powers. This case has significant implications not only for mortgage escrow accounts but also for states’ capacity to regulate other practices and products of federally-chartered banks.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the National Bank Act preempts the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks.

The core banking powers of federally chartered banks such as the power to lend come from the National Bank Act (“NBA”). Brief for Respondent, Bank of America at 1. Under the NBA, chartering, regulation, and supervision of national banks are overseen by the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”).

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Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.

 

From 1947 to 1974, George Corson worked as a machinist in several locomotive repair and maintenance facilities. He subsequently died of malignant mesothelioma, caused by exposure to asbestos during his employment. Corson’s widow and executrix brought state-law tort claims against Respondents Railroad Friction Products Corporation and Viad Corporation, entities responsible for the manufacture and distribution of asbestos-containing locomotive parts. The district court dismissed Corson’s case—asserting that the Locomotive Inspection Act (“LIA”) preempted the state-law claims—and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed this determination. Corson’s representatives argue that their state claims are not preempted because the LIA only regulates those locomotives that are in actual use. The Respondents, however, contend that the state-law claims are precluded because the LIA was intended to regulate the entire field of design and construction of locomotives. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine the preemptive scope of the LIA, and will establish the appropriate boundaries between states’ traditional regulatory power over railroad safety and Congress’s power to establish national uniformity in railroad-safety standards.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Did Congress intend the Federal Railroad Safety Acts to preempt state law-based tort lawsuits?

George Corson worked as a machinist, maintaining and repairing locomotives for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad, from 1947 to 1974. See Kurns v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., 620 F.3d 392, 393 (3rd Cir.

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Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta

Issues

Do states have criminal jurisdiction over crimes carried out by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the contours of state prosecutorial power in Indian country. This case flows from the Supreme Court’s decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which found that a significant portion of eastern Oklahoma was Indian country for criminal law purposes. Oklahoma asserts that, under principles of state sovereignty, it has the authority to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country within the state’s territorial boundaries. Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta counters that a state can prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed in Indian country only when Congress has authorized the state to do so; in all other situations, the federal government has the exclusive authority to prosecute under the General Crimes Act. This case has significant implications for tribal sovereignty and criminal jurisdictional boundaries between states and Indian tribes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state has authority to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in Indian country.

Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta (“Castro-Huerta”) is a non-Indian who was convicted of child neglect by a jury in Tulsa County District Court, a state court in Oklahoma. Castro-Huerta v.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Michael Sliger for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing (09-993); Actavis Elizabeth, LLC v. Mensing (09-1039); Actavis, Inc. v. Demahy (09-1501) (consolidated)

Supremacy Clause

The Supremacy Clause refers to the foundational principle that, in general, federal law takes precedence over any conflicting state law. Established under Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the Supremacy Clause enables the federal government to enforce treaties, create a central bank, and enact legislation without interference from the states.

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