drugs

Lopez v. Gonzales; Toledo-Flores v. United States

Issues

If a permanent resident of the United States is convicted in state court of a drug offense that state law classifies as a felony but that federal law classifies as a misdemeanor, should the offense qualify as an “aggravated felony” for the purposes of federal immigration and sentencing law, resulting in deportation and harsher sentencing under federal law?

 

Both Jose Antonio Lopez and Reymundo Toledo-Flores are permanent residents of the United States who were convicted of drug crimes that are felonies at the state level but misdemeanors under federal law. The government argues that both Lopez’s and Toledo-Flores’s crimes qualify as “aggravated felonies.” If that is the case, Lopez will be barred from seeking a waiver of the deportation order issued against him while Toledo-Flores will be subject to a stricter sentence under the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Lopez and Toledo-Flores argue that their drug crimes do not meet the definition of an aggravated felony because they are not felonies under federal law. Thus, the Court must decide whether drug offenses that are state felonies but federal misdemeanors satisfy the federal statutory definition of aggravated felony.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Lopez v. Gonzales

Whether an immigrant who is convicted in state court of a drug crime that is a felony under the state’s law but would only be a misdemeanor under federal law has committed an “aggravated felony” for purposes of the immigration laws.

Toledo-Flores v. United States

Has the Fifth Circuit erred in holding – in opposition to the Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits – that a state felony conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance is a “drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) and hence an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), even though the same crime is a misdemeanor under federal law?

Lopez v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2005)

Jose Antonio Lopez is a permanent resident of the United States. A South Dakota state court convicted Lopez of aiding and abetting the possession of a controlled substance, a felony crime in South Dakota. Lopez v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 934, 935 (8th Cir. 2005).

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Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing (09-993); Actavis Elizabeth, LLC v. Mensing (09-1039); Actavis, Inc. v. Demahy (09-1501) (consolidated)

Rodriguez v. United States

Issues

Does an officer’s continued detention of a driver, even after completion of the traffic stop, to conduct a canine sniff violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer lacks reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or some other legal justification to support the additional investigation?

The Supreme Court will determine whether an officer may extend a traffic stop, even after the stop has been completed, to conduct a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or some other legal justification. Dennys Rodriguez claims that any extension of a completed stop to conduct further investigation, no matter how brief, violates the Fourth Amendment unless the extension is independently justified by reasonable suspicion. The United States counters that officers may lawfully engage in further investigations during a traffic stop so long as the officer does not unreasonably prolong the stop. The Supreme Court’s decision might curb law enforcement’s investigative powers with respect to routine traffic stops by potentially creating bright-line restrictions on those powers. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

This Court has held that, during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, asking a driver to exit a vehicle, conducting a drug sniff with a trained canine, or asking a few off-topic questions are “de minimis” intrusions on personal liberty that do not require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment. This case poses the question of whether the same rule applies after the conclusion of the traffic stop, so that an officer may extend the already-completed stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.

On the night of March 27, 2012, police officer Morgan Struble saw a vehicle briefly drive onto the shoulder of a Nebraska highway in violation of Nebraska law. See United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905, 906 (8th Cir. 2014); Brief for Respondent, the United States at 2. Struble stopped the vehicle at 12:06 A.M.

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Ruan v. United States

Issues

Does a doctor who prescribed controlled substances outside of the usual standard of medical care violate federal drug distribution laws if the doctor believed in good faith that he was adhering to standard medical practice?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the requirements for criminal conviction under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1). Two physicians, Petitioners Xiulu Ruan and Shakeel Kahn, were convicted of violating the CSA by prescribing medication without legitimate medical purposes. Both physicians brought good-faith defenses, arguing that they did not intentionally or knowingly violate the CSA. The physicians claim that a subjective lack of knowledge or intent is sufficient to maintain innocence under the CSA. At trial, juries were instructed to find the physicians innocent only if the physicians reasonably believed they were in compliance with the law. Respondent United States claims this objective standard is the correct reading of the statute, and Ruan and Kahn claim the objective standard creates an impermissibly low standard for conviction. This case has important implications for the future of medical practice, medical research, and mens rea requirements in criminal law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice may be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) without regard to whether, in good faith, he “reasonably believed” or “subjectively intended” that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice

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Terry v. United States

Issues

Does the First Step Act’s definition of a “covered offense” include violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) because they constitute a violation of a federal criminal statute for which the Fair Sentencing Act has modified the statutory penalties?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the meaning of “covered offense” under Section 404(a) of the First Step Act to determine which crimes fall under its definition, and thus, may be subject to retroactive reduced sentencing. Petitioner Tarahrick Terry pled guilty to possessing with the intent to distribute an unspecified amount of cocaine base (or “crack cocaine”) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) in 2008. In 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act, which amended parts of 21 U.S.C. § 841 to adjust the difference in sentencing between crimes involving crack cocaine and those involving powder cocaine. In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which made the Fair Sentencing Act’s amendments retroactive. Terry, in support of vacatur, argues that violations of Section 841(b)(1)(C) are “covered offenses” under Section 404 of the First Step Act, based on the text of Section 404(a), as well as the statute’s design and history. Adam K. Mortara, as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below, argues that Terry’s offense is not a “covered offense” under Section 404(a) based on a proper construction of the statute and the meaning of the phrases “violation of a Federal criminal statute” and “statutory penalties.” The case has implications for future retroactive sentencing statutory amendments, as well as inmates currently in custody for low-level crack-cocaine offenses before Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether pre-August 3, 2010, crack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) have a “covered offense” under Section 404 of the First Step Act.

On March 11, 2008, a grand jury indicted Tarahrick Terry with three crimes: (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.

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Wyeth v. Levine

Issues

Whether a drug manufacturer that has complied with the Food and Drug Administration’s labeling requirements can still be liable under state product liability laws on grounds that the label was inadequate.

Court below

 

In 2000, Diana Levine was treated with Phenergan to relieve nausea caused by a migraine headache.  The drug was incorrectly administered into Levine’s vein, causing gangrene that ultimately led to the amputation of part of her arm. Levine sued Wyeth, Phenergan’s manufacturer, in Vermont Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Vermont on claims of negligence and products liability, arguing that Phenergan’s label was inadequate in warning consumers about its possible risks. Wyeth, on the other hand, argued that federal law preempted Levine’s state law claims, as state law directly conflicted with the requirements of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. With both lower courts ruling in favor of Levine, this case gives the Supreme Court an opportunity to further define the federal preemption doctrine by clarifying whether a drug manufacturer can be liable under state law after complying with the labeling requirements of the Food and Drug Administration. Stakeholders on both sides argue that the outcome of this case will have a direct impact on the kind of information included on drug labels and as such, has serious implications for patient safety and public health.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the prescription drug labeling judgments imposed on manufacturers by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") pursuant to FDA's comprehensive safety and efficacy authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., preempt state law product liability claims premised on the theory that different labeling judgments were necessary to make drugs reasonably safe for use.

In April of 2000, Diana Levine sought medical treatment for symptoms, such as pain and nausea, caused by a migraine headache. See Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt.

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Additional Resources

·   Drug and Device Law Blog:  Views on issues related to pharmaceutical and medical device product liability litigation.

·   Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices:  Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P. Briefing on Wyeth v. Levine.

·   Drug Injury Watch Blog:. Information about prescription drug side effects.

·   Mass Tort Litigation Blog

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