Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (Michigan, as amended)

The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act declares that the opportunity to obtain employment, housing, education, and the full use of public accommodations is a civil right. The Act prohibits discrimination in these areas based on religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, height, weight, familial status, or marital status. It further provides protections against retaliation for opposing discriminatory practices or participating in related proceedings.

Human Trafficking Notification Act of 2016 (Michigan)

The Human Trafficking Notification Act of 2016 requires specific public and private entities to display a conspicuous human trafficking notice in locations accessible to the public. Entities subject to the law include: the Department of Transportation, local units of government that operate rest stops, welcome centers, or public bus or rail services, all adult entertainment establishments, public airports, and owners of property that a court has determined constitutes a public nuisance due to acts of prostitution or human trafficking occurring on or connected to the premises.

Ellingburg v. United States

Issues

Is restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act a criminal punishment, which would implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, or a civil remedy?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is a criminal punishment, which would implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution upon retroactive application, or a civil remedy. Petitioner Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. was convicted of bank robbery and firearm use during a violent crime in August 1996 and sentenced under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, which capped restitution enforcement at twenty years after entry of judgment. However, Congress enacted the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act in April 1996 to extend the restitution enforcement period to twenty years after a defendant’s release from prison. Ellingburg argues that, in designing the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, Congress made a criminal punishment, so retroactively applying it to increase his penalty would violate the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. Court-appointed attorney John F. Bash, invited to support the judgment below, argues that Congress did not clearly design the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act as a criminal punishment, so it is a civil remedy that does not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The outcome of this case will have a major impact on the fairness of the restitution process for both criminal defendants and victims of crimes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act is penal for purposes of the Constitution’s ex post facto clause.

In December 1995, Petitioner Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. robbed a bank in Georgia at gunpoint. United States v.

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Sexual Assault Kit Evidence Submission Act of 2014 (Michigan)

The Sexual Assault Kit Evidence Submission Act of 2014 establishes procedures for the handling, submission, and retention of sexual assault evidence kits in Michigan. The law requires a health care facility to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency within 24 hours after obtaining written consent from the victim to release the kit for testing. If the victim does not provide written consent, the facility must inform the individual of its storage policy for unreported sexual assault kits.

Sexual Assault Victims’ Access to Justice Act of 2014 (Michigan)

The Sexual Assault Victims’ Access to Justice Act of 2014 establishes duties for law enforcement agencies in responding to reports of sexual assault and providing victims with access to information and resources in the state of Michigan. The law requires the investigating agency to give the victim written notice containing information about local community-based sexual assault services, the right to request a personal protection order, and the right to undergo a sexual assault evidence kit examination without cost and without being required to cooperate with law enforcement.

Bowe v. United States

Issues

Does 28 U.S.C. § 2255 incorporate the bar on second or successive applications in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), thereby preventing federal prisoners from filing repeat motions to vacate? When a court of appeals denies authorization for a successive § 2255 motion, does 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) bar Supreme Court review, making the courts of appeals the court of last resort for such prisoners?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide two questions about the interpretation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). First, does 28 U.S.C. § 2255 incorporate 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)’s restrictions on second or successive motions to federal prisoners? Second, are the courts of appeals the final forum for federal prisoners seeking authorization to file such motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e), or can the Supreme Court review these gatekeeping decisions? The Petitioner, Michael Bowe, argues that extending both the restrictions on second or successive motions and the bar on Supreme Court review to federal prisoners goes against congressional intent and creates an unnecessary roadblock to federal prisoner’s claims to be fairly adjudicated by the courts. Kasdin Mitchell, whom the Supreme Court appointed to defend the judgment below because the United States declined to do so, argues that allowing for second or successive motions will burden the courts with unnecessarily and largely erroneous filings. For its part, the United States argues that the bar on Supreme Court review in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e) should extend to federal prisoners because they have other avenues, beyond AEDPA, to appeal their convictions. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the fairness of habeas procedures and judicial economy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; and (2) whether § 2244 (b)(3)(E) deprives this court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under § 2255.

Habeas corpus proceedings allow prisoners to challenge the legality of their detention, but habeas procedures differ for state and federal prisoners. Specifically, 28 U.S.C.

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Louisiana v. Callais

Issues

Did the Louisiana State Legislature act unconstitutionally when it created SB8 to remedy a Section 2 violation?

 

This case asks whether the Louisiana State Legislature’s creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Appellant Press Robinson argues that not only does SB8 comply with both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but that it is a valid and necessary remedy to a particularly dangerous form of racial discrimination. Callais counters that SB8 is a presumptively invalid form of racially based governmental action and is neither narrowly tailored nor furthers a compelling governmental interest. This case raises significant issues about racial discrimination in redistricting, the responsibilities of elected officials to their constituents, and the relationship between the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the State’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

The Supreme Court first heard this case on March 24, 2025, but later ordered supplemental briefing and reargument. SCOTUSblog. On June 27, 2025, the Court directed the parties to focus on whether Louisiana’s second majority-minority distric

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Case v. Montana

Issues

Do police officers need to show probable cause to enter a home without a warrant to render emergency aid, or is reasonable suspicion that an emergency is occurring sufficient?

Court below

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if police officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they enter a home without a warrant but with a reasonable belief that an emergency is occurring, rather than probable cause. William Trevor Case argues that the framers’ intent and America’s commitment to privacy demand extending the probable cause standard from criminal searches to warrantless entries under the emergency aid exception. In response, the State of Montana argues that the plain text of the Fourth Amendment suggests that probable cause is not required to make a warrantless entry during a potential emergency. The case touches upon important questions regarding the balance between public safety and privacy interests.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable searches of their homes. U.S. Const. amend. IV.

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Connecticut General Statutes § 54-102b HIV Testing of Convicted Offenders

Connecticut General Statutes Section 54-102b requires that when a defendant is convicted of an offense involving a sexual act, the court must order the offender to undergo testing for HIV and AIDS upon the victim’s request. Testing is to be conducted promptly, and results are provided to both the offender and the victim. The statute is intended to ensure that victims receive timely and accurate health information following sexual offenses, enabling early medical evaluation, preventive treatment, and counseling when needed.

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