(a) Death of a Party.
Committee Notes on Rules—2024
Rule 8023.1 is derived from Fed. R. App. P. 43 and governs substitution of parties upon death or for any other reason in appeals to the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel from a judgment, order[,] or decree of a bankruptcy court.
Does a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 for a pre-deprivation hearing on an IRS proposed tax levy become moot if disputes about the underlying levy no longer exist?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a proceeding about an IRS proposed levy to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a dispute regarding the proposed levy. Commissioner of Internal Revenue contends that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction because there was no longer a live dispute and the petitioner lacked any cognizable interest in the case. Zuch argues that the Tax Court retained jurisdiction because the parties continued to have an interest in the case since the Tax Court could determine petitioner’s right to a refund. The outcome of this case affects the scope of Tax Court proceedings under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 and impacts taxpayers.
Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.
In 1993, Jennifer Zuch married Patrick Gennardo. Zuch v.
If a regulation doesn’t affect a party directly but only predictably, can that party still satisfy the redressability requirement for standing and bring a lawsuit?
This case asks the Court to determine whether fuel producers, like Diamond Alternative Energy, have standing to sue the EPA for its decision to allow California to impose stricter emissions standards than those in the federal Clean Air Act. Diamond argues that, while the decision affects only car manufacturers directly, and fuel producers only indirectly, the decision’s negative consequences for conventional fuel producers are so predictable that they should be able to sue to block the decision. Petitioners further argue that not allowing those who are indirectly regulated to sue would leave them dependent on third parties who may not share their interests and give the government an incentive to impose burdensome regulations. The Environmental Protection Agency, on the other hand, contends that allowing this type of standing would undermine the purpose of the Court’s standing requirements, which is to ensure that the Court resolves real, not hypothetical disputes and that a favorable court decision for a plaintiff remedies the harm they allege. This case touches on important questions about how regulations affect a variety of parties and who can bring suit when they believe the government has harmed them.
Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties.
The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) gives the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) the authority to promulgate federal emissions standards for new automobiles which preempt any conflicting state regulations because of
Does the structure of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force violate the Constitution's appointments clause by failing to put principal officers through Senate confirmation, and if so, can this defect be cured by severing the offending provisions?
This case concerns whether certain government task forces can issue binding recommendations without violating the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Department Preventative Services Task Force (“Task Force”), currently appointed by the HHS Secretary without the confirmation of the Senate, offers binding recommendations concerning mandatory coverage by employer insurance for certain preventative treatments under the Affordable Care Act. Braidwood Management contends that these recommendations by the Task Force are illegitimate because the members were not appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate as principal officers. HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. argues that the current appointment procedures suffice since the Task Force is composed of inferior officers who can be reviewed and fired at-will by the HHS Secretary. This case has wide-ranging implications, from potentially altering the structure of mandated healthcare under the ACA’s insurance to affecting the long-established method by which task forces, advisory bodies, and administrative panels must be appointed.
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that the structure of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force violates the Constitution's Appointments Clause and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the Health & Human Services Secretary’s supervision.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), requires private health insurance companies to cover certain types of preventive care services. Braidwood Mgmt. v.
The authors would like to thank Professor Michael Dorf for his insights into this case.
Does a public school burden a family’s religious exercise when it requires elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality, against the family’s religious convictions, without notice or opportunity to opt out?
This case asks whether a public school violates the Free Exercise Clause when it includes books containing LGBTQ characters in its curriculum and does not allow families to exempt their children’s exposure to such books on religious grounds. Petitioners argue that their children’s exposure to books that contain LGBTQ characters and themes burdens their religious exercise and that their claims should be examined under strict scrutiny, a rigorous standard of review. Respondents counter that free exercise claims must be supported by evidence of coercion, not mere exposure to ideas that go against one’s religion, and that their actions need only meet a rational basis standard of review. This case holds major implications for the future of LGBTQ education and the scope of religious and parental rights.
Whether public schools burden parents’ religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents’ religious convictions and without notice or opportunity to opt out.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Mahmoud v.
The authors would like to thank Professor Nelson Tebbe for his guidance and insights into this case.
When a court grants a motion to reopen the time to file a notice of appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) 4(a)(6) — and that motion itself could have functioned as a notice of appeal — must a litigant file an additional notice of appeal within 14 days?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a motion to reopen the window to file a notice of appeal can itself constitute a premature, yet permissible notice of appeal filed within the reopened window should that motion be granted. If yes, a litigant who, for good reason, fails to file a notice of appeal within the standard 30–day deadline will often only have to make one filing in order to successfully appeal nonetheless. If no, that litigant will have to first seek leave to appeal and then, if that leave is granted, file a notice of appeal within 14 days. Donte Parrish argues that the forgiving purpose of late-appeal provisions and common sense plainly dictate that because a motion to reopen that puts the opposing party on notice of appeal functions as a notice of appeal, such a motion should later be treated as a notice of appeal filed if that motion is granted. The United States — the opposing party in this case — agrees. But the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed, and Michael Huston, an attorney appointed by the Supreme Court to defend that ruling, argues that regardless of whether Parrish’s position is reasonable or not, caselaw and statute reject it. The outcome of this case will resolve a split between the Courts of Appeals and determine the proper to balance to be struck between protecting pro se litigants and ensuring that procedural law functions predictably.
Whether a litigant who files a notice of appeal after the ordinary appeal period under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b) expires must file a second, duplicative notice after the appeal period is reopened under subsection (c) of the statute and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.
Under 28 U.S.
The systematic and covert technical surveillance of a spouse’s highly personal area of life, resulting in psychological stress, justifies the issuance of a temporary injunction against the spouse pursuant to Section 382c and Section 382d Execution Order (Exekutionsordnung - EO).
In the event of significant violations of privacy, the persistently persecuted person can assert a claim for compensation against the stalker for the personal injury suffered as a result of the stalking. The assessment of the amount of compensation is a case-by-case decision and only unlawful if the Court of Appeal exceeded its discretionary authority.
Facts of the Case
According to the court's decision, the employer bears the burden of proof for the grounds for termination and dismissal asserted by the employer. If the employer bases termination on the possibility that the employee falsely accused her superior of sexual harassment, the employer must prove that the employee knowingly made false accusations, thus providing a valid reason for termination.
Facts of the Case
