Article 309-1 provides that violence against women means any public or private act or conduct, motivated by a woman’s gender, that causes physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to a woman, by physical force, verbal or psychological violence, intimidation or persecution.
Article 194 provides that any Civil State Official who authorizes the marriage of a widowed woman within 10 months from the death of the widow’s spouse, in violation of the Civil Code regulations for remarriage of widows, is subject to a fine of 20 to 100 Dominican pesos (RD$20.00 to RD$100.00).
The Civil Code of the Dominican Republic establishes that married women have all the same rights as unmarried women and vice versa. A woman has the right to work without the permission of her husband. A woman also has the right to mortgage or sell her property without the consent of her husband. A married woman has the right to manage and dispose of her earnings. A woman has the right to enter into debt without the permission of her husband.
The Work Code of the Dominican Republic recognizes that women have the same rights as men with regards to protections at work. The code also establishes that firing a woman for being pregnant is void. If a woman is terminated while pregnant, or within six months after delivery, the employer must submit such termination to the Department of Labor so that they may determine if she was terminated due to her pregnancy.
The Constitution sets forth the Dominican Republic’s fundamental principles, values, norms, and guarantees. Various constitutional precepts establish equality between men and women. Article 55 establishes the equal right to marry and form a family with both spouses having the same rights and obligations. Article 62 provides for equal rights in terms of work, including the type, quality, quantity and retribution for work performed.
Do disabled child plaintiffs who claim that a K-12 school discriminated against them based on their disability need to satisfy a higher burden of proof than other types of plaintiffs when bringing a claim of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine which standard to apply to claims of disability discrimination against students in K-12 schools under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Currently, multiple federal circuit courts apply the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard, which is a higher standard than the “deliberate indifference” standard. A.T. and G.T., on behalf of their minor daughter A.J.T., argue that the “deliberate indifference” standard is more consistent with the text of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and with the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279, and Osseo School Board counter that the precedential case that applied the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard is still good law, and the standard does not rely on IDEA but instead a proper reading of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The outcome of this case has implications for the protection of students with disabilities against discrimination while in K-12 public schools.
Whether the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.
A.J.T. suffers from Lennox-Gastaut Syndrome, a type of epilepsy that causes seizures and diminished intellectual capacities. A.J.T. v.
May a federal court certify a class action that includes members who lack Article III standing?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow courts to certify a class in a class action where some members lack Article III standing. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require commonality of questions and predominance of similar injuries to allow certification, and lower courts certified Davis and other blind plaintiffs as a class of all legally blind individuals unable to use Labcorp self-check-in kiosks due to their disability. Labcorp contends that was error because the class contains some members who never experienced any harm from Labcorp and therefore lack Article III standing. Davis counters that all class members within the certified class suffered an injury; but, even if they did not, Article III does not require an injury for all unnamed class members at the class-certification stage. The outcome of this case has implications for settlement frequency and cost and the accuracy of certified classes.
Whether a federal court may certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a mechanism for class action lawsuits allowing plaintiffs to file a lawsuit on behalf of a larger group, who can also benefit from any judgment.
Is the United States immune to a lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) when law enforcement agents raided the wrong home; and, what takes precedence in wrong-house raid cases: the government’s liability for intentional wrongdoing of law enforcement officers, or the “discretionary-function exception” in the FTCA that exempts government liability when any government employee carries out government functions that require discretion?
The Federal Tort Claims Act allows people to sue the United States government for wrongful acts by law enforcement officers in situations where a private person could be liable under the same circumstances. However, there are two key exceptions. The “discretionary-function exception” shields the government from lawsuits when federal employees are performing government functions. The “intentional-torts exception” also protects the government from lawsuits involving intentional torts committed by federal employees. Nevertheless, the “law enforcement proviso” within the intentional-torts exception allows people to sue for certain wrongful acts when committed by law enforcement officers specifically as opposed to other government employees. Curtrina Martin and other petitioners argue that the law enforcement proviso allows them to recover monetary damages when the FBI raided their house because their house was not the correct target. Martin also argues that the Supremacy Clause does not shield the government from Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuits. The United States, on the other hand, argues that the discretionary-function exception is a separate exception from the law enforcement provision and shields the government from Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuits. The court-appointed amici curiae also counters that the United States can raise the Supremacy Clause as a defense against liability since the government can raise any defense that a private individual could have in the case. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect the legal remedies that civilians have when mistakenly identified as suspects and harmed by law enforcement officers along with the ability of law enforcement to effectively perform their duties.
(1) Whether the Constitution’s supremacy clause bars claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law; and (2) whether the discretionary-function exception is categorically inapplicable to claims arising under the law enforcement proviso to the intentional torts exception.
Curtrina Martin, her minor child G.W., and Hilliard Cliatt lived in the suburbs of Atlanta, Georgia. Martin v. United States at *3. In 2017, the FBI executed a search warrant at their house believing it to belong to a known gang member.
(1) Whether a privately owned school that participates in a state’s charter school program is a government entity or engages in state action; and (2) whether a state can exclude a privately owned school from its charter school program solely because it is religious.
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if a state can exclude religious schools from participating in its charter school program. The state of Oklahoma operates a charter school program to which St. Isidore, a Catholic institution, applied. The Oklahoma Virtual Charter School Board (the “Board”) granted St. Isidore’s application. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered the state to revoke St. Isidore’s charter school contract because it is a religious school, and charter schools are public entities that must be nonsectarian under Oklahoma law. The Board contends that Oklahoma charter schools are not public entities engaged in state action, and thus the prohibition on sectarian charter schools violates its Free Exercise rights. Drummond contends that charter schools are public entities engaging in state action that a state can require to be nonsectarian without violating the Free Exercise Clause. This case touches upon important questions regarding the increasing prevalence of charter schools and their impact on equitable student achievement outcomes, as well as on protecting parental choice.
(1) Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students; and (2) whether a state violates the First Amendment's free exercise clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state’s charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or instead a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the First Amendment's establishment clause requires.
The Archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the Diocese of Tulsa applied to establish St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School (“St. Isidore”) as an online charter school. Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board at 4. St.
Does 10 U.S.C. § 1413a, a statute that authorizes combat-related special compensation for veterans, provide a settlement mechanism to be used instead of the default mechanism in the Barring Act?
This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify the procedures used when granting combat-related special compensation (“CRSC”)—specifically, whether the statute enacting CRSC also provides a settlement mechanism. Generally, military-related claims are governed by the Barring Act, which has a six-year statute of limitations. Soto argues that the Barring Act does not apply here because the CRSC-enacting statute provides its own mechanism for settling claims, thereby displacing the Barring Act. The United States instead asserts that the Barring Act is only displaced when a statute explicitly grants settlement authority, which is not granted in the CRSC statute, and that applying a different rule would be contrary to prior decisions. This case raises important questions regarding combat-wounded veterans’ access to compensation and the administrative and legal burden on the government.
Given the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s holding that a claim for compensation under 10 U.S.C. § 1413a is a claim “involving … retired pay” under 31 U.S.C. § 3702(a)(1)(A), does 10 U.S.C. § 1413a provide a settlement mechanism that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act?
Typically, retired veterans must waive a portion of their retirement pay in order to receive disability pay. Soto v. United States at 2. However, under 10 U.S.C.
