Georgia v. Randolph

Legal Framework

The Fourth Amendment has been interpreted as generally prohibiting warrantless, unreasonable searches of a home, with certain exceptions. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971). One of those exceptions is where the occupant of the premises to be searched consents to the search. U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-594 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946). In Matlock, the Supreme Court considered the situation where one occupant was present and consented to a search while the other was absent and did not consent. 415 U.S. 164. The Court held that the search was reasonable when a co-occupant with "common authority" over the premises consented because the occupant who is absent has "assumed the risk" that his co-occupant will allow the police to search the premises. Id.

The justification for the Matlock decision is crucial to understanding the position of the State in the present case. One interpretation of Matlock is that it falls within the consent exception because there was a form of consent. However, Matlock may have created a new exception to the general prohibition on warrantless searches based on the concept of expectations of the parties. Other exceptions to the warrantless search rule created by the Court were similarly based on the conclusion that those exceptions are reasonable, as required by the Fourth Amendment. But, these exceptions have been very few. Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

The distinction between reliance on the consent exception and crafting Matlock as an exception in itself is subtle, but important because the parties will make arguments based both on the texts of various decisions and also on the reasonableness of the search itself. In other words, the State could argue that a decision in its favor is implied (required) by the decision in Matlock, and/or they could argue that even if not compelled by Matlock, a decision in its favor is compelled because the search was reasonable. Naturally, in response the respondent will argue both that Matlock does not apply to the present circumstances and also that the search was inherently unreasonable.

The Applicability of Matlock

The Matlock exception dictates that a search is reasonable when one "assumes the risk" that another person with "common authority" over the premises in question allows police to search it. The one set of facts that surely qualifies for the Matlock exception is that in the Matlock case itself: one co-occupant is absent and does not consent to a search, but a co-occupant allows the police to search the house. In the present case, both occupants were present but gave conflicting answers to the consent question.

The language from Matlock regarding the assumption of risk is not entirely clear or easily distinguished from the reasonability analysis. The risk of which the Court speaks seems to only exist based on the Court's finding the search to be reasonable. In order to avoid a circular argument, the "risk" in question would have to be something other than the possibility that the police search is rendered legal. For example, the court could have said that he assumed the risk by leaving home and knowing that his wife may give police consent to search the home. See, i.e., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (holding that where the defendant allowed his cousin to use his duffel bag, that he assumed the risk that the cousin would allow the bag to be searched).

However, Matlock may still be interpreted in one of two ways by the present Court. Either a search is reasonable when all non-consenting occupants are absent and at least one consenting occupant is present, or a search is reasonable whenever any of the occupants consents to the search. Of course, the State argues that the court in Matlock meant the latter, while the respondent argues that only the first interpretation is strictly necessary to arrive at the conclusion in the Matlock case and that the language should not be construed more broadly.

Reasonability of the Search

This section addresses the reasonability issue as distinct from the application of the Matlock ruling, though the parties may refer to reasonability analysis as "extending the consent exception." As stated above, to discuss the present issue as though it is the same as a case of consent is misleading, with a possible exception discussed in the next section.

Because of the general presumption that a warrantless search is illegal, Groh, 540 U.S. at 564, the Court will have to decide of the circumstances in this case are enough to overcome that presumption. The State argues that the same reasoning that led to the conclusion in Matlock should apply here, i.e. that the state has legitimate law enforcement interests in being able to conduct searches in cases like this. Brief for Petitioner State of Georgia at 20. The respondent argues that while the circumstances of Matlock may have justified a search, a critical difference in this case, the presence of the non-consenting occupant, makes the search unreasonable. Brief for Respondent Randolph at 14. The respondent argues that, since in the present case the non-consenting occupant was present and objected to the search, there is no lack of clarity as to whether the consent is valid as there might be where the non-consenting occupant is absent. Id at 26.

Additionally, the State argues that the search should be allowed because the expectation of decreased rights flows naturally from the lowered expectation of privacy that comes from sharing a home with someone else. Brief for Petitioner State of Georgia at 11. For instance, if the wife had wanted to, rather than allowing the police inside, she could have taken the evidence from the house and brought it to the police station. Thus, allowing the search in this case arguably did not harm the respondent.

The respondent will likely reply that if there were other means of achieving the same result, it is not necessary to burden the rights of the parties by allowing the search in this case (the law enforcement interest is less compelling). They will also argue that this alternative is superior in terms of protecting rights because if Mrs. Randolph brought the evidence in question to the court house, the police would have access to that evidence, but nothing more. Brief for Respondent Randolph at 27.

Question of Rights

One way the Court may reconcile Matlock would be to interpret the case as recognizing not only a right to be free from unreasonable warrantless searches, but also an unfettered right to grant police access to premises over which one has "common authority." Brief for Petitioner State of Georgia, at 13. This solution explains why the police in Matlock probably would not have been able to lawfully search the home if no one was there, but they were able to search if just one person consented. However, even if this is the case, the State is still in the unenviable position of arguing that the right to grant access to one's home is more significant than one's right to be free from warrantless searches. Although this reconciles Matlock, the Court may not find it persuasive.