Skip to main content

right to privacy

exigent circumstances

Overview

Exigent circumstances, as defined in United States v. McConney are "circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or other relevant prompt action) was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts." 

Taxonomy upgrade extras

First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v. Platkin

Issues

May a party challenge a state subpoena in federal court on First Amendment grounds without first being compelled to comply with the subpoena in state court?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide if a party subject to a state investigatory subpoena may seek relief in federal court without first being held in contempt in state court for refusing to comply with the subpoena. In his capacity as the Attorney General of New Jersey, Respondent Matthew Platkin issued a subpoena to Petitioner First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. (“First Choice”), requesting that it turn over donor information. The subpoena was issued in relation to Platkin’s investigation of alleged deceptive and fraudulent practices by First Choice in its solicitation of donations and administration of reproductive healthcare. First Choice argues that a federal forum should be available to hear its claims because the organization and donors are both suffering injuries-in-fact from the chilling of their First Amendment rights. Platkin argues that First Choice’s alleged injury is too speculative to constitute an injury-in-fact that would allow for Article III jurisdiction. This case has significant policy implications for the First Amendment rights and safety of organizations and their donors who are targets of state subpoenas and who seek federal relief from state investigations. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, when the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, a federal court in a first-filed action is deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court.

Federal and state governments have the power to issue subpoenas to procure information related to an alleged wrongdoing. Brief for Respondent, Matthew Platkin at 3. In New Jersey, if someone fails to comply with a subpoena sent by the Attorney General, the Attorney Ge

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Georgia v. Randolph

Issues

Can police legally search the home of an occupant who consents to the search despite the objections of another present occupant?

 

In this case the Supreme Court will resolve the issue of whether or not police can legally search the home of an occupant who consents to a search despite the explicit objections of another occupant. Police searched the house of Mr. Randolph with the consent of his estranged wife but against his unequivocal objections. Randolph would have the Court find that the search violated his reasonable expectation of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Georgia, however, reasons that a joint tenant's reasonable expectation of privacy is not infringed in this case because joint tenants assume a reduced expectation of privacy. Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in this case will interpret the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches of homes with multiple occupants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Can police search a home when a co-habitant consents and the other co-habitant is present and does not consent?

On July 6, 2001, police arrived at the Randolph residence after Mrs. Randolph reported a domestic dispute with her estranged husband, Defendant Scott Randolph. Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Georgia, 2003). The couple had separated two months earlier, and Mrs. Randolph left the home at that time with their son to Canada. Id.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Heien v. North Carolina

Issues

Can a police officer’s misinterpretation of the law provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop? 

On April 29, 2009, Sergeant Matt Darisse arrested Nicholas Heien in North Carolina after a traffic stop that Darisse initiated based on his misinterpretation of relevant state statutes. When Heien tried to exclude evidence that resulted from the traffic stop during his subsequent trial, the trial court denied his request. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that an officer cannot justify a traffic stop when a mistake of law serves as the primary justification for the stop. In December 2012, the North Carolina Supreme Court overturned the appellate court’s ruling. The Supreme Court of the United States will now consider whether a police officer’s mistake of law can serve as the requisite reasonable suspicion needed for a constitutional traffic stop. Heien argues that allowing police officers to base traffic stops on misinterpretations of the law would violate the Fourth Amendment rights of those stopped. North Carolina, however asserts that just as police officers can execute constitutional traffic stops by relying on reasonable mistakes of fact, a police officer can justify a stop if it is based on a reasonable but mistaken interpretation of a statute. The Court’s ruling implicates the Fourth Amendment practices of law enforcement, the right to privacy of individuals, and the right of individuals to be free from restraint. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a police officer’s mistake of law can provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop.

On April 29, 2009, Sergeant Matt Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff’s Department in North Carolina pulled over a vehicle in which Nicholas Heien was a passenger. See State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 352 (N.C. 2012). Darisse initiated the stop because one of the rear brake lights on the vehicle was not working properly.

Written by

Edited by

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Sherry Colb of Cornell Law School for her help and for directing them to her work on Heien v. North Carolina

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to right to privacy