Reynolds v. United States

The outcome of this case depends on a determination with respect to SORNA's applicability, prior to the Attorney General's issuance of the Interim Rule, to individuals with pre-SORNA sex offense convictions. Petitioner Reynolds will not have standing to challenge the Interim Rule’s legality if the Supreme Court determines that SORNA applied to pre-SORNA offenders before the Interim Rule was issued. Reynolds argues that SORNA’s registration requirements became applicable to pre-SORNA offenders only after the Attorney General issued the Interim Rule. See Brief for Petitioner, Billy Joe Reynolds at 20. Respondent United States, on the other hand, argues that SORNA’s registration requirements became applicable to pre-SORNA offenders the moment that SORNA was enacted. SeeBrief for Respondent, United States at 15.

Textual Arguments

SORNA requires all sex offenders to register—and keep the registration current—where they live, work or attend school. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a). SORNA also requires sex offenders to register before completing a prison sentence, or, if no sentence is given, to register within three business days of sentencing for the sex offense. See id.§ 16913(b). Section 16913(d) gives the Attorney General the authority to specify SORNA’s applicability to pre-enactment sex offenders, and to prescribe rules for the registration of sex offenders who cannot comply with other sections of the Act. See id.§ 16913(d).

The parties, however, disagree over the plain meaning of SORNA’s text. Reynolds asserts that Section 16913(d) bestowed the Attorney General with the power to determine both how and whether pre-SORNA offenders would be subject to the Act’s new registration requirements. See Brief for Petitionerat 23.Thus, in addition to enabling the Attorney General to control the manner and method of SORNA’s implementation, Reynolds argues that Section 16913(d) allows the Attorney General to substantively determine the scope of SORNA’s reach.See id. In support of this claim, Reynolds contends that the express terms of Section 16913(b) exempt pre-SORNA sex offenders from the Act absent action by the Attorney General. SeeReply Brief for Petitioner, Billy Joe Reynolds at 12. Reynolds also observes that pre-enactment offenders are unable to comply with Section 16913(b)’s registration requirements because their convictions predate SORNA’s enactment. Seeid. Reynolds maintains that he was unable to comply with SORNA because he was released from prison in 2005, and SORNA was not enacted until 2006. Seeid. Therefore, Reynolds concludes that SORNA did not apply to him until the Attorney General issued the Interim Rule. Seeid.

The United States, however, argues that SORNA’s registration requirements are immediately applicable to all sex offenders—pre- and post-enactment—because SORNA itself defines sex offenders using the past tense, covering any offender who was convicted of a sex offense. See42 U.S.C. § 16911(1); Brief for Respondent at 17. The United States contends that Congress defined sex offenders in the past tense precisely in order to include sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions. SeeBrief for Respondent at 17. Furthermore, the United States argues that SORNA’s registration requirements apply to pre-SORNA offenders because Section 16913(d) uses permissive language, bestowing on the Attorney General an optional authority. See id. at 23. Congress, the United States observes, did not provide that the Attorney General shall specify SORNA’s applicability to pre-SORNA offenders. Seeid. Rather, Congress provided that the Attorney General shall have the authority to specify SORNA’s applicability to pre-SORNA offenders. Seeid. The United States contends that Congress would have used stronger language compelling the Attorney General to affirmatively determine SORNA’s scope if Congress had intended to delegate such authority. Seeid.at 23–24. Hence, the United States concludes that Section 16913(d) enables the Attorney General merely to adjust or confirm SORNA’s registration requirements, not to substantively determine SORNA’s applicability to pre-enactment offenders. Seeid.at 25.

SORNA’s Statutory Context and Purpose

According to Reynolds, a broad grant of authority to the Attorney General is consistent with SORNA’s basic purpose: to establish a comprehensive national sex offender registration system that would protect the public against sex offenders. See Brief for Petitioner at 43; 42 U.S.C. § 16901. Reynolds contends that, in order to promote SORNA’s purpose of creating an effective registration system,Congress drafted most of SORNA’s provisions in a way that deferred authority over nearly every aspect of SORNA’s implementation to the Attorney General. See Brief for Petitioner at 43. Thus, Reynolds argues that scope-related deference to the Attorney General in Section 16913(d) is consistent with Congress' design of the overall Act. See id.

More specifically, Reynolds argues that the effectiveness of SORNA’s national registration system would have been compromised if SORNA had immediately applied to pre-SORNA offenders. See Brief for Petitioner at 40. Congress, in Reynolds’s view, was aware that SORNA’s implementation could cause significant logistical complications that could not be properly addressed through legislation. See id. at 41. Hence, Reynolds claims that Congress permitted the Attorney General to apply SORNA’s requirements to pre-SORNA offenders over time, recognizing that the Attorney General could use his superior expertise and resources to minimize logistical complications and to increase SORNA’s overall effectiveness. See id. Thus, contrary to the United States’ position, Reynolds asserts that Congress did not intend SORNA to be immediately applicable to pre-SORNA offenders. See id. at 40.

The United States, on the other hand, argues that SORNA’s national registration system would be ineffective if SORNA is not interpreted to be immediately applicable to pre-SORNA offenders; otherwise, hundreds of thousands of convicted sex offenders might never be required to register.See Brief for Respondent at 32. When SORNA was enacted, there were approximately 500,000 registered sex offenders living in the United States. See id.at 30. After SORNA’s enactment, jurisdictions were given three years to implement SORNA’s requirements, with the possibility of an additional two-year extension period. See id.at 29. If SORNA were not immediately applicable to pre-SORNA offenders, Section 16913(d) would also exempt from registration the offenders convicted during the three- to five-year implementation period, according to the United States. See id. at 29–30. As of 2009, SORNA imposed the only federal registration requirements applicable to thousands of individuals convicted during the three- to five-year implementation period. See id. at 30. The United States contends that, if SORNA’s requirements do not apply to such persons, hundreds of thousands of convicted sex offenders may remain unregistered, and the public would not be effectively protected against them. See id.at 32.

The United States also argues that, far from a sweeping mandate, Section 16913(d)’s grant of authority to the Attorney General was merely meant to provide the Attorney General with the flexibility to adjust and modify SORNA’s implementation in light of expected logistical difficulties. See Brief for Respondent at 26–27. The United States postulates, for example, that even after SORNA’s implementation, some states may refuse to properly spend their resources in tracking down unregistered sex offenders, while other states may resist implementation altogether. See id.at 26.Absent a delegation of certain authorities to the Attorney General, the United States argues, the effectiveness of the entire national registration system would be compromised. See id.

SORNA’s Legislative History

Reynolds argues that other legislation preceding SORNA’s enactment evidences Congress’s intent to exclude pre-SORNA offenders from SORNA’s new registration requirements. SeeReply Brief for Petitioner at 15. For instance, Reynolds notes that House Resolution 4472, the predecessor legislation on which SORNA was based, explicitly stated that the Resolution’s new registration requirements would apply to both pre- and post-enactment sex offenders. See id. However, Reynolds observes that Congress dropped the explicit reference to pre- and post-enactment application in the final version of SORNA. See id. Reynolds thus contends that Congress intentionally deleted the phrase in order to exclude pre-SORNA offenders from the definition of “sex offender” in the final Act. See id.

The United States, on the other hand, argues that predecessor legislation indicates Congress’s intent to immediately include pre-SORNA offenders in SORNA’s registration requirements. See Brief for Respondent at 38. The United States notes that the language of H.R. 4472 mandated the Attorney General to specify SORNA’s scope and to prescribe rules for the registration of convicted sex offenders. See id. However, in SORNA’s final version, Congress changed the language to a merely permissive delegation of authority to specify SORNA’s scope and to promulgate useful rules. See id. at 38–39. The United States argues that, by switching from mandatory language to permissive language, Congress deprived the Attorney General of the power to unilaterally determine SORNA’s applicability to pre-enactment offenders, thus enabling the Act to apply to pre-enactment offenders by its own terms. See id. at 25, 39.