standing

Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer

Issues

Can an individual who proclaims oneself as an Americans with Disabilities Act “tester” and has no intention to visit a place of public accommodation legally challenge that place of accommodation for failing to provide information on disability accessibility?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide on the Article III standing question where a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) “tester” challenges a hotel reservation website’s failure to disclose information about disability accessibility. Petitioner Acheson Hotels, LLC argues that Respondent Deborah Laufer lacks standing because she failed to assert any concrete, stigmatic, or emotional injury resulting from the missing accessibility information. In opposition, Laufer contends that Acheson’s discrimination against disabled people is the exact type of harm Congress intended to prevent by enacting the ADA. While Acheson further asserts that the case is moot because the website now complies with the ADA regulations, Laufer counters that she suffers continuing injury from third-party websites. The outcome of this case will affect the balance between protecting small businesses from excessive litigation and ensuring tester-plaintiffs’ role in effectively enforcing the ADA regulations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act “tester” has Article III standing to challenge a place of public accommodation’s failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she lacks any intention of visiting that place of public accommodation.

Respondent Deborah Laufer is disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Laufer v. Acheson Hotels, LLC. at 264. She relies on a wheelchair or cane to move around and has visual impairment.

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Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama; Alabama Democratic Conference v. Alabama (Consolidated)

Issues

  1. Does Alabama’s legislative redistricting plan violate the Equal Protection Clause because its drafters attempted to maintain black voting population percentages in order to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?
  2. Does the Alabama Democratic Conference have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Alabama’s redistricting plan?

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will likely clarify the extent that state redistricting plans may take race into consideration when trying to comply with the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution. The Alabama Legislative Black Caucus and the Alabama Democratic Conference allege that Alabama’s 2012 redistricting plan impermissibly focused on race in drawing new district lines. Alabama responds that the 2012 redistricting plan’s primary motivations were compliance with the Constitution’s requirement of “one person, one vote” and prevention of retrogression under the Voting Rights Act. The resolution of this case will likely address the role courts play in policing redistricting plans enacted by state legislatures.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

No. 13-895

Whether Alabama’s legislative redistricting plans unconstitutionally classify black voters by race by intentionally packing them in districts designed to maintain supermajority percentages produced when 2010 census data are applied to the 2001 majority-black districts.

No. 13-1138

This appeal in a legislative redistricting case presents issues of law in regard to how a State may rely on race in setting district boundaries. It is undisputed that the State had, among its chief goals, the idea that when possible it would redraw each majority--black district to have the same percentage of black population as the district would have had using 2010 census data as applied to the former district lines. This goal, particularly when combined with the new goal of significantly reducing population deviation among districts, led the State to stark racial intentionality in district-drawing, packing more super-majorities of black voters into already-majority-black districts, without regard to whether such efforts were actually necessary in each district to allow black voters to elect candidates of their choice. A divided three-judge District Court rejected the challenge to this map. This appeal presents issues summarized as follows:

a. Whether, as the dissenting judge concluded, this effort amounted to an unconstitutional racial quota and racial gerrymandering that is subject to strict scrutiny and that was not justified by the putative interest of complying with the non-retrogression aspect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?

b. Whether these plaintiffs have standing to bring such a constitutional claim?

After the 2010 census revealed malapportionment in most electoral districts in Alabama, the Republican-controlled Alabama legislature declared that compliance with the Constitution’s mandate of “one person, one vote” would be its highest priority in creating new district lines in 2012.

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Apple Inc. v. Pepper

Issues

Are App Store customers “direct purchasers” of Apple who have standing to bring a suit alleging antitrust violations?

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether customers of the iPhone’s App Store are considered direct purchasers of Apple. The question of direct purchaser status under the Illinois Brick doctrine is necessary to grant standing and proceed with an antitrust class action accusing Apple of monopolizing the market for iPhone apps. The Ninth Circuit held, and the class action representatives now argue, that customers of the App Store are direct purchasers because Apple functions as a distributor for app developers. Apple disagrees, arguing that it sells its distribution services to app developers, who are its direct purchasers; moreover, Apple asserts that it does not possess key price-setting power. The Court’s decision in this case will have implications for who may bring antitrust actions, potentially opening the door to duplicative damages and excessive private litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether consumers may sue for antitrust damages anyone who delivers goods to them, even where they seek damages based on prices set by third parties who would be the immediate victims of the alleged offense.

In 2007, Apple released the original iPhone. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 315–16 (9th Cir. 2017). One year later, Apple launched the “App Store,” through which iPhone users may purchase and download applications (“apps”).

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Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Issues

Is Arizona’s use of a commission to adopt congressional districts permissible under the Constitution and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c), and does the Arizona Legislature have standing to bring suit to challenge such a commission?

In 2000, Arizona passed Proposition 106, which formed the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (“AIRC”). The AIRC’s purpose is to manage congressional districts. Prior to the referendum, the Arizona State Legislature (“Legislature”) had the power to determine congressional districts through the traditional legislative process. In 2012, the Legislature filed suit in the U.S. District of Arizona to challenge the legitimacy of the AIRC. A three-judge district court dismissed the suit, holding that the AIRC could remain in charge of redrawing congressional districts. The Legislature appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether the Elections Clause and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) permit Arizona to use the AIRC to redraw congressional districts. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Do the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) permit Arizona’s use of a commission to adopt congressional districts?
  2. Does the Arizona Legislature have standing to bring this suit?

In Arizona prior to 2000, the Arizona State Legislature (“Legislature”) had the authority to alter and decide congressional districts through the ordinary legislative process. See AZ State Legislature v. AZ Independent Redistricting Committee, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1049 (D. Ariz.

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Bank of America v. Miami, 15-1111, Wells Fargo & Co. v. Miami, 15-1112 (consolidated)

Issues

Does a lawsuit against a bank satisfy the Fair Housing Act’s “zone of interest” and proximate cause requirements, where a municipality alleges harm to its fiscal interests from urban blight stemming from foreclosures caused by the bank’s discriminatory lending practices?

In this consolidated action, the Supreme Court will decide whether a city can sue a bank under the Fair Housing Act for discriminatory lending practices, and whether it can recover lost property tax revenues and funds spent addressing widespread foreclosures that the bank’s discriminatory practices allegedly caused. The City of Miami alleges, based on statistical analyses, that loans by Bank of America and Wells Fargo & Co. to minority borrowers were more than five times as likely to result in foreclosures than loans to white borrowers. The banks argue that the City of Miami falls outside the zone of interests required to obtain standing under the Fair Housing Act, and that any alleged causal relationship between the City’s financial losses and the discriminatory housing practices of the banks is too far a stretch to support a valid lawsuit. The City responds that it meets the broad standing requirements of the Fair Housing Act and should recover for its injuries because they are foreseeably and directly linked to the discriminatory lending practices of the banks. A victory by Miami could potentially overburden the courts with similar lawsuits and overextend judicial power; however, Miami’s defeat could leave the FHA under-enforced and cities underfunded to battle urban blight.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. By limiting suit to "aggrieved person[s]," did Congress require that an FHA plaintiff plead more than just Article III injury-in-fact?
  2. The FHA requires plaintiffs to plead proximate cause. Does proximate cause require more than just the possibility that a defendant could have foreseen that the remote plaintiff might ultimately lose money through some theoretical chain of contingencies?

MIAMI’S LAWSUIT AGAINST BANK OF AMERICA

Miami brought a Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) lawsuit against Bank of America, Countrywide Financial Corporation, Countrywide Home Loans, and Countrywide Bank (collectively, “Bank of America” or “the Bank”) on December 13, 2013, for discriminatory mortgage lending practices and unjust enrichment at the expense of Miami. See Miami v. Bank of America Corp., No.

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Bank of America v. Miami, Wells Fargo & Co. v. Miami

Issues

Does a lawsuit against a bank satisfy the Fair Housing Act’s “zone of interest” and proximate cause requirements, where a municipality alleges harm to its fiscal interests from urban blight stemming from foreclosures caused by the bank’s discriminatory lending practices?

In this consolidated action, the Supreme Court will decide whether a city can sue a bank under the Fair Housing Act for discriminatory lending practices, and whether it can recover lost property tax revenues and funds spent addressing widespread foreclosures that the bank’s discriminatory practices allegedly caused. The City of Miami alleges, based on statistical analyses, that loans by Bank of America and Wells Fargo & Co. to minority borrowers were more than five times as likely to result in foreclosures than loans to white borrowers. The banks argue that the City of Miami falls outside the zone of interests required to obtain standing under the Fair Housing Act, and that any alleged causal relationship between the City’s financial losses and the discriminatory housing practices of the banks is too far a stretch to support a valid lawsuit. The City responds that it meets the broad standing requirements of the Fair Housing Act and should recover for its injuries because they are foreseeably and directly linked to the discriminatory lending practices of the banks. A victory by Miami could potentially overburden the courts with similar lawsuits and overextend judicial power; however, Miami’s defeat could leave the FHA under-enforced and cities underfunded to battle urban blight.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. By limiting suit to "aggrieved person[s]," did Congress require that an FHA plaintiff plead more than just Article III injury-in-fact?
  2. The FHA requires plaintiffs to plead proximate cause. Does proximate cause require more than just the possibility that a defendant could have foreseen that the remote plaintiff might ultimately lose money through some theoretical chain of contingencies?

MIAMI’S LAWSUIT AGAINST BANK OF AMERICA

Miami brought a Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) lawsuit against Bank of America, Countrywide Financial Corporation, Countrywide Home Loans, and Countrywide Bank (collectively, “Bank of America” or “the Bank”) on December 13, 2013, for discriminatory mortgage lending practices and unjust enrichment at the expense of Miami. See Miami v.

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Beverly R. Gill, et al. v. William Whitford, et al.

Issues

Can individual voters challenge a state-wide redistricting plan as unconstitutional? Is a re-districting plan constitutional so long as it complies with traditional districting criteria? Was the issue of entrenchment properly litigated?

In what Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg called the most important case presently before the Supreme Court, the Court will venture into the thicket of redistricting. Wisconsin Republicans redrew Wisconsin’s State Assembly district maps in 2011, allowing them to win the majority of Assembly seats with only 48.6% of state votes and prompting Wisconsin Democrats to sue. A U.S. District Court held for the Wisconsin Democrats, finding the re-districting plan unconstitutional because it was gerrymandered with the intent of disenfranchising Democrats, had such an effect, and lacked a legitimate justification for its effects. Four issues will decide the outcome of this case: are the Democrats entitled to have their claim heard in court; is the test that the district court adopted judicially “discernable” and “manageable” enough for courts to apply; does compliance with traditional districting criteria render a redistricting plan non-discriminatory notwithstanding the district court’s test; and did the parties fully litigate the issue of entrenchment? Will the Court intervene in partisan gerrymandering and expand federal power or will it abstain from this politically charged question to protect federalism?

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the district court correctly held that Appellees have standing to challenge in its entirety the district plan for Wisconsin’s State Assembly as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander?
  2. Whether the district court correctly held that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable pursuant to the test the court adopted—requiring discriminatory intent, a large and durable discriminatory effect, and a lack of any legitimate justification?
  3. Whether the district court correctly held that compliance with traditional districting criteria is not a safe harbor that precludes any possibility of liability for partisan gerrymandering?
  4. Whether Appellants are entitled to a remand on the issue of entrenchment even though Appellees and the district court emphasized the durability of a party’s advantage throughout the litigation?

Wisconsin has long faced difficulty drawing its electoral districts—a process commonly known as redistricting. Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, at *5–6 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2016). In the 1980s, after a Republican governor repeatedly vetoed any redistricting plans proposed by the Democratic Assembly, a federal court had to determine the districts. Id. at 5.

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Biden v. Nebraska

Issues

Can six states challenge the Biden administration’s student debt relief plan by arguing that the plan exceeds the Secretary of Education’s authority or is arbitrary and capricious?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the legality of the Biden administration's student debt relief plan, which six states have challenged, claiming that the plan exceeds the Secretary of Education’s authority. The Biden administration argues that the six states do not have standing to bring the lawsuit because they do not suffer injuries caused by the student debt relief plan. Further, the Biden administration contends that even if the six states do have standing, the student debt relief plan falls within the statutory power of the Secretary of Education. The six states counter that they can establish standing because the student debt relief plan could cause financial loss to their state-authorized loan entity or reduce state tax revenue. The six states further contend that the student debt relief plan exceeds the statutory authority of the Secretary of Education because the plan is neither necessary nor proportionate to ameliorate the conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The outcome of this case will have far-reaching implications for student loan borrowers, state budgets, and the overall economy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether six states have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education's student-debt relief plan; and (2) whether the plan exceeds the secretary of education's statutory authority or is arbitrary and capricious.

Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (“Higher Education Act”) grants the Secretary of Education (“Secretary”) the authority to award federal financial aid to eligible students for their postsecondary education. 20 U.S.C.

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Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections

Issues

Do political candidates have Article III standing to challenge election laws?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether federal political candidates generally, and Michael Bost specifically, have Article III standing to challenge state election laws. In particular, the parties are asking the Court to identify the appropriate legal standard to establish Article III standing with respect to political candidates. Petitioners, Michael Bost, et al. (“Bost”), argue that political candidates meet the injury in fact requirement of standing because candidates are harmed by the possibility of losing an election, by their participation in an illegitimate election, and by the divergence of funds used to maintain an extended campaign. Respondents, the Illinois State Board of Elections, et al. (“Illinois”), counter that candidates cannot meet this requirement by simply asserting a risk of losing an election but instead must provide evidence that the risk of individual harm is substantial. A decision in favor of Bost would likely reduce standing requirements for political candidates, making it likely that more candidates will bring lawsuits challenging election laws. A decision for Illinois would make it more difficult for political candidates to bring suit, and if evidence of changed election outcomes is required, litigation surrounding election laws may be pushed until after elections take place, leading to uncertain and even overturned election results. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether petitioners, as federal candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.

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